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ABSTRACT 
The scope and magnitude of change that is occurring in business today is unprecedented in 
industrial history. The current paradigm shift from mass production to lean production-from the 
machine age view of the past to the systems view of the future-is one example of the profound forces 
that are reshaping corporations. The vast magnitude of this change has led to a deep interest in the 
concept of organizational learning. 
This dissertation explores key issues in organizational learning by providing a framework for 
integrating individual and organizational learning. Specifically, it identifies mental models as the transfer 
mechanism through which individual learning becomes operationalized and advances organizational 
learning. Mental models are described as a critical mechanism for 1) enhancing individual learning by 
making the individual's learning explicit for that person, and ?) doing so in such a way that the learning 
can be more easily transferred and diffused throughout the organization as shared mental models, 
By formulating a typology of methods for representing mental models, this dissertation shows the 
limits of current maps, and illustrates the effectiveness of causal loop diagrams and systems archetypes in 
the mapping of complex dynamic systems. System archetypes are described as dynamic scripts that can 
be used to map stories and schemas of significant dynamic complexity. 
The methodology presented in this dissertation offers a detailed process through which individual 
learning is translated into organizational learning. First, individual learning is mapped into explicit 
mental model representations. From those representations, a more integrated diagram is developed that 
captures data and the experiences of other members of the organization for the purpose of making the 
mental models explicit. Systems archetypes are then used to abstract (or decompose) the large, integrated 
diagram into more understandable and memorable scripts. According to the model of organizational 
learning proposed in this dissertation, out of those shared mental models will come new organizational 
actions which will produce new environmental response, from which the learning cyclic will continue. 
The experience of applying the methodology is represented in two case settings; Total Quality 
Management implementation false starts and product development. In the case studies of TQM false- 
start implementations, the methodology is applied to developing a shared understanding or the 
organizational issues preventing successful TQM efforts. The product development management case 
study describes the full cycle of working with product development managers as a team to translate 
individual learning into organizational learning and action. Specifically, it identifies two leverage points 
for managing product development efforts: the importance of managing the dynamic implications of the 
Tragedy-of-the-Commons archetype, and the systemic reasons why a heavyweight program manager 
with wide authority over the entire program may be requisite for a successful product development 
project. 
In so doing, this dissertation will attempt to make contributions to three areas: organizational 
learning theory, system dynamics and operations management, 
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Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
"One wonders sometimes i f  science will not grind to a stop in an assemblage of 
walled-in hermits, each mumbling to himself words in a private language that only he 
can understand. " 
-Kenneth E. Boulding 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the pace and scope of change that is occurring 
today is unprecedented in industrial history. Many of the changes of the last 
decade have been of global importance. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the Cold War, the ensuing struggle to set up independent 
democracies, and the creation of a European Common Market in 1992 are just 
some of the major headlines of this past decade. 
There have been many visible signs of major change in American business 
as well. The encroachment of the Japanese automakers into the U.S. domestic 
market, the near extinction of the U.S. motorcycle industry, and the decline and 
rebirth of our steel industry are just a few examples. More recent changes in 
corporate structure have resulted in an unprecedented number of CEO's ejected 
by their boards at such giants as IBM, General Motors, and American Express. 
These power-plays signal more than just disgruntled stockholders wanting to 
take a more active role; it is an admission that business-as-usual, conducted in 
the style of the old guard, is no longer acceptable. It is a symptom of a deeper 
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problem that lies at the heart of most organizations' problems-the structure of 
the organizations themselves. 
1.1 CURRENT BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
In Made  in America, (Dertouzos, Lester, & Solow, 1989) an MIT commission 
assessed the current health of American business and concluded that American 
companies were uncompetitive along a number of fronts. In particular, 
Americans were lagging far behind the Japanese in manufacturing processes. 
The land of the "cheap imitators" had become the land of the "superior 
imitators." Even though the US was still a leader in inventing new products, 
American businesses as a whole were unsuccessful at translating them into 
profitable businesses. 
1.1.1 Lean Production 
The profound revolution that has been taking place in manufacturing over the 
last several decades-from mass production to "lean" production-serves as a 
useful example to understand the magnitude of the shift that is occurring in 
business today. In 1991, Toyota, the world's third largest auto maker, had cash 
reserves large enough to buy both Ford and Chrysler at current stock prices with 
nearly $5 billion to spare. That's sobering news for American car manufacturers, 
who face a slumping market, eroding profits, and increased foreign competition. 
Japanese carmakers now command over 25% of all US car sales-almost double 
the amount a decade ago. But automakers are not alone: during the same time 
period, Japanese firms have decimated the motorcycle industry both in the US 
and Britain (with the notable exception of Harley Davidson), dominated 
consumer electronics, and made major inroads in many other industries. 
Many companies have responded to Japan's competitive onslaught by 
pursuing Total Quality Control (TQC), Just-in-Time (JIT), Quality Function 
0 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
Introduction 2 1 
Deployment (QFD), and Statistical Process Control (SPC) in an effort to imitate 
Japan's success. But after many years of hard work, improvement rates are 
plateauing even as companies increase their efforts. Many have hit their 
organization's limit, given their current management system and organizational 
infrastructure. 
The harsh reality now emerging is that many quality programs have 
distracted companies from a far more fundamental realization-that JIT, SPC and 
TQC are all pieces of a whole new way of doing business that is radically 
different from traditional Western methods. In The Machine that Changed the 
World, Womack, Jones, & Roos (1990) document with clarity and forcefulness the 
true nature of Japan's success, which they credit to a fundamental shift from 
mass production to what the authors call a "lean" production system. 
The book, the culmination of a five-year, five million dollar study of the 
future of the automobile, involved researchers from around the globe and auto 
producers in 17 different countries. Not all of the best lean producers studied 
were Japanese-Ford, for example, has made much progress toward becoming 
lean. Nor were all of the worst manufacturers mass producers. But what the 
best manufacturers had in common was a systemic undeistanding of how to 
integrate separate parts of the organization into a smoothly functioning whole. 
1.1.2 The Essence of Lean Production 
The lean production method, pioneered by Eiji Toyoda, requires less human 
effort, manufacturing space, investment in tools, and product development time 
than mass production. According to Womack, et al., (1990), "Lean production 
welds the activities of everyone from top management to line workers to 
suppliers into a tightly integrated whole that can respond almost instantly to 
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marketing demands from consumers. It can also double production and quality, 
while keeping costs down1 .I1 
\ 
By almost every measure, the lean producer outperforms the classic mass 
producer. According to Womack, Jones and Roos, the mass assembler takes 31 
hours to assemble a car with 130 defects per 100 cars and carries an average of 2 
weeks' inventories of parts. The lean assembler takes 16 hours, produces 45 
defects per 100 cars, and carries an average of 2 hours of inventories. 
The lean assembly plant has two key organizational features, according to 
the book: "It transfers the maximum number of tasks and responsibilities to 
those workers actually adding value to the car on the line, and it has in place a 
system for detecting defects that quickly traces every problem, once discovered, 
to its ultimate cause" (p. 99). In the typical lean producer factory, "indirect" 
workers such as machine repairers or inventory runners are non-existent. 
Almost every person on the floor is working directly on the car. Narrow aisles 
between work areas facilitate face-to-face communication between workers, an 
important part of the collaborative learning that is essential to lean production. 
Perhaps the most striking difference between the mass and lean producer 
occurs at the end of the assembly line: the massive areas full of cars needing 
further repairs before shipment is non-existent in the lean factory. Almost every 
car is driven directly from the line to boats or trucks for shipment. 
The lean producer's advantage is not limited to the factory floor. In product 
design, the lean producer takes approximately 485 people on average to design a 
new car versus 900 for a mass producer. Average development time is 46.2 
months for the Japanese, 60.4 months for Americans and 57.3 months for 
Europeans. As these numbers show, lean producers are able to offer a wider 
l~h i s  i  a direct quote from the back flap of the book jacket to The Machine that Changed the World 
@ 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
Introduction 23 
variety of products and replace them more frequently than mass production 
competitors. Or they can use their cost savings to invest in new technologies and 
increase product attractiveness. "The choice, and the advantage!'' note the 
authors, "will always lie with the lean producer" (Womack et al., p. 127). 
1.1.3 A Second Revolution 
The shift from mass production to lean production constitutes the second 
manufacturing revolution. Most craft producers did not realize in the early 1900s 
that their very survival was threatened by mass production. The competitive 
landscape in the automotive industry changed dramatically when the mass 
producers overwhelmed the craft producers with economies of scale. Their 
performance disproved the belief that unit costs stayed constant independent of 
volume (see Figure 1.1). As the lean producers emerged! the competitive 
emphasis shifted to quality improvement, where the old dogma of high quality! 
high cost had to be abandoned. The maturation of the lean producer is 
challenging yet another axiom-that increasing customization leads to increasing 
costs-as we enter the age of mass customization. 
As we near the turn of another century, mass producers face a similar 
challenge. "Manufacturing companies in all industries will be affected by the 
spread of lean production," claim Womack, et al. "They will be forced to [alter 
the way they operate] or face [extinction] by lean production competitors .... Its 
adoption! as it inevitably spreads beyond the auto industry, will change almost 
every industry ... and the fate of companies and nations as they respond to its 
impact" (Womack et al., p. 12). 
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Figure 1.1 
1.2.1 Paradigms 
The profound changes that are occurring in business today, summarized in the 
shift from mass production to lean production, can be categorized as a paradigm 
shift. To respond to that shift, what is needed may not be a change of action, but 
a change in perception. How we think, act, and value are all associated with our 
particular view of reality. In order to create a new "reality," we must discover 
how our current world view affects the way we perceive and respond to 
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problems. The leverage lies in going to a more fundamental level-to look 
beyond current problems and re-examine the paradigm that gave rise to them. 
As Perrow (1986, p. 137) writes, there seems to be 
a general trend in the social sciences and humanities that is likely to be 
significant over the next decade or two. This trend can be labeled 
"deconstructionism." For a couple of centuries we have been "constructing" a 
world that we view as organized on rational principles, where what happened 
was intended to happen, where interactions are discrete and quite atomistic, and 
where progress is continuous .... All this is now being questioned, and we are thus 
beginning to "deconstruct" this construction. 
1.2.2 Problem-Solution Model of Management 
The predominant model of management can be described as a "problem- 
solution" model (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Cowan, 1991; Thornton, 1992) 
individuals encounter problems (a mismatch between what is desired and what 
is obtained) and take corrective action to produce what they want (see Figure 
1.2). This is what Argyris & Schon refer to as single-loop learning. In this single- 
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Figure 1.2 
loop mode, people attack each instance of the problem individually, "fix" it, 
Match 
move on if the outcome matches expectations, or go back and modify their 
Strate iesÃ Problem . - 
strategies if there is a mismatch. For example, a marketing manager's response 
solution Expected Outcome 
to sluggish sales is to launch a new ad campaign to stir up sales. If, after a couple 
Mismatch 
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of weeks, sales increase as expected, she moves on to the next product in trouble. 
If sales fall short of expectations, she may try a variation of the old campaign or 
try a whole new one. 
From a systems thinking perspective, however, solutions often feed back to 
create other problems, or even a repeat of the same problem (Senge, 1990b; 
Sterman, 1989). By the time this happens, it can appear to be a brand new 
problem because people have either forgotten about the previous round of 
solutions, or the same person is no longer in that position (the average tenure in a 
position is 18 months or less in some companies). Studies have shown that 
managers systematically misperceive feedback and cannot transfer lessons 
learned from one setting to a similar setting (Bakken, 1993; Diehl, 1992; Sterman, 
1989). 
Bakken (1993), for example, conducted a series of experiments using two 
isomorphic cases with different "cover" stories. The experiment involved the use 
of a system dynamics computer simulation model that had been converted into 
an interactive decision making game (see also Peterson & Tok How, 1993). In 
one setting the simulator was presented as a real estate development game where 
the individual was to make decisions to maximize profits by investing in new 
developments or buying existing properties. Although players learned to 
improve their scores in repeated trials in that setting, they did not transfer the 
learnings to the next setting which was structurally identical but with a different 
cover story of it being the supertanker business. 
1.2.3 Pre-determined Solutions 
At its worst, the problem-solution paradigm leads people to see problems in 
terms of pre-determined solutions. This phenomenon is similar to the notion of 
competency traps where companies continue to use an inferior technology 
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because that was the first one they had used, and they had become skilled at 
using it (Levitt & March, 1988; Reinhart, 1985'. Statements such as, "The 
problem is we need a better information system," or "The problem is we need the 
latest flexible manufacturing system," are examples of solution statements at 
work. The danger of this habit is that once problems are framed in terms of 
solution statements, there is a tendency to exclude exploring other possibilities- 
including the possibility that the original statement of the problem may be 
wrong. That is, people never engage in double-loop learning. 
Even when someone's or some department's favorite solution is not used, 
the problem statement itself is often not challenged. A problem can be defined as 
a formal statement of a set of assumptions about the world. Those assumptions, 
however, are often not made explicit. By conversing and making decisions at the 
level of tacit assumptions, people can get very good at defending their point of 
view at the expense of learning. This can lead to what Chris Argyris calls 
"skilled incompetence." Rather than looking at the real data and real issues- 
which may prompt a re-articulation of the problem-people become very skilled 
a t  dancing around the issues. 
1.2.4 Problem Articulation (or Mess Formulation) 
Problems that are "solved" often do not remain solved for long because nothing 
has been done to fundamentally alter the deeper forces that gave rise to the 
problems in the first place (the unintended consequence loop at top of Figure 
1.3). Or, in Argyris and Schon's terms, the underlying values and assumptions 
which govern the stated goals have not been surfaced and changed, a process 
they refer to as double-loop learning. 
To re-examine the way we think about problems and solutions, we need to 
understand more fundamentally what a problem is. In reality, there are no 
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problems "out there" in the world-nature just is. Whether we see an event or 
situation as a problem depends on our view of the world. For example, if oil 
prices double, is that a problem? Our response would be a resounding "Yes!," 
since our economy is heavily dependent on petroleum products. If we lived in 
an OPEC nation, however, we would not see it as a problem at all. If we lived ir. 
an undeveloped country with no dependence on oil, we probably would not 
even be interested in the issue. 
Single-loop 
learning 
Double-loop 
learning 
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Problem Articulation Model 
Unintended 
consequence 
Figure 1.3 
Problems do not exist independently of the person who sees them. Out of 
the pool of life we "construct" problems in our minds (or in our organizations) 
by the way we view reality. Kofman (1992) suggests that deconstructing a 
problem and finding a way to re-articulate it can provide much more leverage 
than trying to just double our efforts to solve the problem as it is currently stated. 
One of the clear challenges is to explore more explicitly how we articulate 
problems. Why do we consider something a problem? The "why" is what leads 
us to surface the deeper set of assumptions that may give insight into 
reformulating an entirely different problem. 
Match 
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Kuhn (1962, p. 62) relates a vivid example of how paradigms can blind us 
from seeing what actually "is" because our perception becomes so heavily 
influenced by what we "expect" to see: 
In a psychological experiment that deserves to be far better known outside 
the trade, Bruner and Postman asked experimental subjects to identify on short 
and controlled exposure a series of playing cards. Many of the cards were 
normal, but some were made anomalous, e.g., a red six of spades and a black 
four of hearts ... 
Even on the shortest exposures many subjects identified most of the cards, 
and after a small increase all the subjects identified them all. For the normal 
cards these identifications were usually correct, but the anomalous cards were 
almost always identified, without apparent hesitation or puzzlement, as normal. 
The black four of hearts might, for example, be identified as the four of spades or 
hearts. Without any awareness of trouble, it was immediately fitted to one of the 
conceptual categories prepared by prior experience ... Even at forty times the 
average exposure required to recognize normal cards for what they were, more 
than 10 per cent of the anomalous cards were not correctly identified. 
"Knowing" that hearts are red and spades are black can preclude us from seeing 
what is really there. In what ways do our mental models blind us from seeing 
the world as it is, and from noticing signs of real distress in the system? 
1.2.5 Organizational Learning 
The vast magnitude of change occurring in organizations today has led to a deep 
interest in the concept of organizational learning. A study by Shell International 
Petroleum Company claimed the average age of a corporation to be less than the 
average lifetime of a human being, and stressed that the key to an organization's 
longevity is organizational learning (de Geus, 1988, p. 70). 
It has been claimed that organizational learning is the root from which all 
competitive advantage stems (Stata, 1989). The level of advantage depends on 
the speed and quality of learning, whether behavior change is accompanied by 
cognitive change, and whether continual education is emphasized over sporadic 
training. By emphasizing the importance of trying to understand a problem, not 
simply solve it, the framework and methodology in this dissertation attempts to 
help transform problem-solving organizations into learning organizations. A 
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learning organ.ization is one that consciously manages its learning process to be 
consis tent with its strategies and objectives through an inquiry-driven orientation 
of all its members. That is, learning organizations actively and explicitly encourage 
the learning process to ensure that areas of strategic importance are not neglected 
and emphasizes the importance of trying to understand a problem, not simply 
solve it. 
Building a learning organization means continually developing the capacity 
to create one's vision of the future (Senge, 1990b). Designing and implementing 
effective policies to create desired results requires an understanding of an 
organization and its environment as a unified system so that one can focus on a 
small set of high-leverage points to produce changes that self-reinforce and 
endure. To acquire such an understanding requires an ongoing management 
education process to develop a new style of thinking with the right blend of 
analysis and synthesis. 
Although the topic of organizational learning has gained a lot of attention in 
recent years, there is little agreement on what we mean by organizational 
learning and even less on what it means to create a learning organization. This 
lack of consensus is representative of the current state of knowledge about the 
whole concept of organizational learning. Without an explicit understanding of 
the mechanism through which individual learning is transferred to the 
organization, there is little opportunity to actively manage the learning process of 
an organization. 
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS DISSERTATION 
This dissertation makes contributions in three areas: 
1) At the theoretical level, it provides a framework and a methodology for 
integrating organizational learning and individual learning. The key 
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transfer mechanism in this framework is "mental modelsm-constructs 
and routines that shape how we think and act. 
2) The contribution for system dynamics is two-fold. It is an attempt to 
increase accessibility and broaden the system dynamics audience through 
further development of the front-end tools of systems archetypes (as 
opposed to the higher-end, computer modeling tools). Secondly, I link 
the concept of system archetypes and causal loop diagrams to the 
organizational literature relating to mental models, juxtaposed with 
scripts, stories, and schemas, clarifying the particular strengths that 
system dynamics mapping has relative to these other types when 
mapping dynamic complexity. 
3) This dissertation contributes to operations management by providing 
insights into TQM and product development management in Chapters 5 
and 6, respectively. Specifically, the studies of TQM implementation false 
starts begin to provide a base of understanding of the systemic reasons 
why TQM implementations fail. In product development, we found 
theoretical support for why heavyweight program managers are needed 
to manage large product development programs-because they are 
fundamentally "commons" management issues. 
1.4 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
Much has been written about the topic of organizational learning, but the 
discussions usually address either individual learning or organizational 
learning, without explicitly addressing how individual learning actually 
translates into organizational learning. The tendency is to jump from individual 
learning to organizational learning, with the implication that organizational 
learning retains all of the attributes of individual learning, but on a larger scale. 
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This dissertation provides a framework and methodology for linking 
individual learning to organizational learning. We develop a simple model of 
individual learning which is then integrated into a model of organizational 
learning in which two types of learning are differentiated-conceptual and 
operational. To do this, we address the role of individual learning and memory, 
differentiate between different levels of learning, take into account different 
organizational types, and specify the explicit mapping of mentaf  models as the 
transfer mechanism between individual and organizational learning. 
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to build a theory about the process through 
which individual learning advances organizational learning. - Chapter 2 lays out 
a framework for understanding the link between individual and organizational 
learning, first by building a model of individual learning based on the 
experiential model of Piaget, Dewey, and Lewin. This model, which is 
grounded in real experience, is a continuous cycle of observation, assessment,  
design, and implementation. For the purposes of organizational learning, however, 
the model is inadequate because it does not specifically address the process of 
making the learning explicit for the individual, and therefore not easily 
transferable to the organization. 
To address the need for a transfer mechanism from individual learning to 
organizational learning, we identify mental models as a critical mechanism for 1) 
enhancing individual learning by making the individual's learning explicit for 
that person, and 2) doing so in a way in which the learning can be more easily 
transferred and diffused throughout the organization as shared mental models. 
According to our proposed model of organizational learning, out of those shared 
mental models will come new organizational actions which will produce new 
environmental responses, from which the learning cycle continues. Thus, 
Chapter 2 lays out framework of individual learning, and proposes that 
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organizational learning is dependent on individual learning and built through 
the mechanism of mental models. 
In Chapter 3, we address more explicitly the challenge of operationalizing 
individual mental models in a way that will enable the individual and the 
organization to have access to them. Therefore, we begin by exploring various 
representational systems of mental models. We survey the literature in the 
physical domain and the conceptual domain. We make a distinction between 
detail complexity and dynamic  complexity and assert that most of the 
-,- arc good at rnapphg d&ail LL , '  
are designed to address either very static relationships or relatively simple 
systems but are not well-suited to represent complex dynamic systems. 
However, most of the significant problems in organizations lie in the realm of 
dynamic complexity. 
We then explain the features of dynamic complexity and propose a 
methodology that is well-suited to address dynamic complexity; namely, the 
field of system dynamics and its set of tools. In particular, system dynamics has a 
set of representational systems that is very powerful for making individual 
mental models explicit. 
However, when we begin to address the issue of building shared mental 
models, accessibility becomes a key issue. We cannot expect an individual to 
carry an explicit mathematical model in their heads. Systems archetypes, however, 
offer a simple representational schema that is particularly well-suited for 
communicating complex dynamic phenomena in a compact and succinct form. 
Systems archetypes can be seen as dynamic scripts that are well-suited for 
capturing dynamic complexity. Five systems archetypes are presented and 
described, along with illustrations of their suitability for mapping dynamically 
complex issues. 
@ 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
34 Organizational Learning: Framework & Methodology 
After having proposed the model and framework, Chapter 4 describes the 
proposed methodology for how we map individual mental models, and how 
individual mental models become shared mental models. This dissertation 
proposes a particular methodology that addresses dynamic complexity via 
system dynamics representational systems. Chapter 4 presents a detailed process 
through which individual learning is translated into an explicit mental model 
representation through gromded theory building. From that, a more integrated 
diagram is developed that captures data and experience of other members of the 
organization for the purpose of making the mental models explicit. Then we use 
the systems archetypes to abstract or decompose the large and relatively 
complicated picture back into more understandable and memorable (remember- 
able) chunks. 
The methodology contains at least three main phases: 1) to make individual 
learning explicit in the form of mental models; 2) to put it into a form in which it 
can be readily shared; and 3) to test how well it is shared. We present ways in 
which the level of sharedness can be tested, as well as the validity of the mental 
model representations themselves. 
The next two chapters present the experience of applying the methodology 
in two different case settings. In Chapter 5, we present the results of TQM (Total 
Quality Management) implementation false-starts in two different companies. 
We begin with a brief history of total quality management, discuss TQM 
implementation in America, the emerging problems with TQM implementations 
that have been encountered, and the need for a systemic approach to TQM. We 
then demonstrate the process of mapping from individual learning to individual 
mental models, integrating them into a diagram! and decomposing the large 
diagram into systems archetypes. This study, however, stops short of 
establishing the sharedness of the mental models or testing their validity because 
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that was not its intent. Instead, the purpose was to use the mapping methods to 
help make systemic sense of the companies' experiences. 
In Chapter 6, we take the methodology further by working actively in 
partnership with a real line management team around product development. In 
this setting we describe the full cycle of working together as a team to translate 
individual learning to individual mental models to an integrated map. The 
systems archetypes were used to share insights with others in the program which 
began the process of building a common understanding of some critical 
management issues. In addition, we discuss briefly another way in which the 
mental models were more widely shared through the development and 
implementation of managerial practice fields or learning labs. These learning labs 
integrate the mapping methodology and the research approach described in 
Chapter 4 with system dynamics computer tools, such as management flight 
simulators, to accelerate the process of building shared mental models. 
Finally, Chapter 7 contains a brief summary and reflections on the role of 
systems archetypes as a representational system for mapping individual mental 
models and for building shared mental models. Implications for further work on 
the framework and methodology are discussed as part of a larger research effort 
at the MIT Organizational Learning Center. 
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Chapter 2~ 
A Framework for Integrating Individual Learning 
and Organizational Learning 
"Organizat ional  learning m a y  be the  o n l y  sustainable  
competit ive advantage. " 
-Ray Stata 
2.1 INTRODUC~ION 
All organizations learnlf whether they consciously choose to or not-it is a 
fundamental requirement for their sustained existence. Some firms are 
deliberate in their efforts to advance organizational learning, developing 
capabilities that are consistent with their objectives, while others make no 
focused effort and, therefore, acquire habits that are counter-productive 
towards achieving stated goals. Nonetheless, all organizations do learn. 
Organizations are comprised of individuals and must ultimately learn 
via their individual members. Hence, theories of individual learning are 
crucial for understanding organizational learning. Although psychologists 
have studied the area of individual learning for decadesf they are still far 
from fully understanding the workings of the human mind. Our 
+ ~ n  adaptation. of this chapter is forthcoming in Sloan Management Reuiezul Fall 29931 
"Creating Learning Organizations: Understanding the Link between Individual and 
Organizational Learning." 
lstating that an organization "learns1' begs the question W h a t  is an organization that it may 
learn?" This issue will be addressed later in the chapter, but for the time beingl we can think of it 
as an organizational metaphor based on its familiar usage with individuals. 
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understanding of organizational learning! likewise, is still in an embryonic 
stage (Hubert 1991; Sims! Gioia, & Associates! 1986). In addition! theories of 
organizational learning often do not explicitly address the role of the 
individual (Duncan! 1974; Daft & Weick! 1984; Levitt & March! 1988). Within 
the context of organizations! one cannot talk about individual learning in a 
vacuum. Nor can we talk about organizational learning without being clear 
about the role of the individual! lest we become guilty of 
anthropon~orphizing organizations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to build a theory about the process through 
which individual learning advances organizational learning. To do this! we 
must address the role of individual learning and memory/ differentiate 
between different levels of learning, tak? into account different 
organizational types! and specify the transfer mechanism between individual 
and organizational learning. Each of these elements are developed in greater 
detail in later sections of this chapter. In a broader context! the purpose of this 
chapter is to contribute towards building a theory of what a learning 
organization is by developing a framewcrk that focuses on the crucial link 
between individual learning and organizational learning. Once we have a 
clear understanding of this transfer process! we can actively manage the 
learning process to be consistent with an organization's goals! vision! and 
values. 
2.1.1 Current Models of Organizational Learning 
Learning occurs at different levels! and each level involves very different 
processes and capabilities (see Figure 2.1). For example! Fiol & Lyles (1985) 
distinguish between lower-level learning (routine! which occurs through 
repetition in a well-understood context and at all levels in an organization) 
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and higher-level learning (non-routine! which occurs through heuristics and 
insights in an ambiguous context and mostly a t  upper levels of an 
organization). Others have made similar distinctions such as single-loop vs. 
double-loop learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978)! behavioral level and strategy 
level learning (Duncan! 1974, Dutton & Jackson! 1987)! habit-forming vs. 
discovery learning (fledberg! Nystroml & Starbuck! 1976)! and reactive vs. 
proactive learning (Miles & Randolph! 1980). Each of these theories implies a 
preference to one type of learning either for specific groups of people (higher- 
level us. lower-level) or for the entire organization (double-loop us. single- 
loop). The view that different types of learning can be pigeon-holed into 
specific parts of an organization or that one type of learning is wholly 
preferable over another is too simplistic. The organizational learning process 
is much too diffuse and dynamic to be categorized and located so precisely. 
These views of individual and organizational !earningl howeverf have 
several gaps which leave them incomplete for our discussion of 
organizational learning. Daft & Weickls (1984) model of organizations as 
interpretation systems does not explicitly deal with individual actors at  all. 
March and Olsen's (1975) model largely ignores the interaction between 
individual learning and learning at the organizational level. Roth (1992! p. 7) 
cites four shortcomings in March and Olsen's model: "inattention to stimuli 
interpretation and sharing of meaning among individuals; lack of 
consideration for structural elements impeding learning; focus on the 
organization as a learning environment of individuals; and emphasis on 
environmental response to organizational actions." In March & Olsen's 
model, individual learning is primarily driven by environmental responses, 
and organizational learning occurs when the whole cycle is completed. Their 
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Author Label Meaning 
Argyris & Schon Learning 
( 1978) Single-loop Lower-level cognition 
Double-loop Higher-level cognition 
Cangelosi & Dill Leaming 
( 1965) Interaction between Behavioral development 
individual & group adaptation Cognitive development 
C hakravarthy Ahpturion Cognitive development 
( 1982) 
Cyert & March 
( 1963) 
Ldarning 
Adaptation of goals, attention Behavioral development 
rules and search rules 
Daft & Weick b u r n i n g  
( 1984) Action after interpretation Behavioral development 
Durmn Learning 
( I 974) Behavioral level Behavioral development 
Strategy level Cognitive development 
Duncan & Weiss Learning 
( 1978) Action-outcome :elationships Cognitive development 
Hedberg Learning 
(1981) Habit-forming Behavioral development 
Discovery Cognitive development 
Jelinek 
( 1979) 
Learning 
OST-belief sharing Cognitive development 
March & Olsen Lzarning 
( 1975) Rational adaptation Cognitive development 
Interpretation 
Meyer Aalaprarion 
( 1982) Devialion-reducing Lower-level cognition 
Deviation-amplifying Higher-level cognition 
Miles Learning 
(1982) Diversification outcomes Behavioral development 
Planning forma\ization Cognitive development 
Miles & Randolph Learning 
( 1980) Reactive learning Behavioral development 
Proactive learning Cognitive development 
Miller & Friesen Adaptation 
( 1982) Actions Behavioral development 
Shrivastava & Mitroff Learning (Systems) 
( 1982) Evolutionary Behavioral development 
Designed Cognitive development 
An Overview of Organizational Leaming1Mode1s 
Source: Fiol & Lyles (1985) 
Figure 2.1 
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model implies that all organizational learning must be driven in some 
measure by what is happening in the environment, and does not explain 
what learning occurs within a firm, independent of the outside 
environment. 
Argyris and Schon (1978) focus their study of learning at the individual 
level. Their theory cf learning is defined in terms of an individual's ability 
to change strategies to correct deviations from desired results (single-loop 
learning), and ability to change the cognitive maps that drive strategy 
formulation (double-loop learning). They then extend their model of 
individual learning to organizations, speak of an organization as if it were 
simply a large individual. 
Others let organizational learning stand for the actions of a group of 
individuals, such as a top management group (Miles, Snow, Meyer, & 
Coleman, 1978). As with March & Olsen and Argyris & Schon, there is no 
explicit transfer process identified through which individual learning is being 
retained by the organization. Hence, if individuals should leave, the 
organization is likely to suffer a tremendous loss in its learning capacity. 
2.1.2 The Link between Individual and Organizational Learning 
I would argue that at the heart of organizational learning is the transfer 
process through which individual learning becomes embedded in an 
organization's memory and structure. This transfer process, which is 
essential to organizational learning, has received very little attention and is 
not well understood (Hedberg, 1981; Huber, 199 1) although a promising 
interaction between organization theory and psychology has begun (Cohen, 
1991). Schein (1993) explores links between psychology and individual 
learning in an organizational setting, adding emotional conditioning and 
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learned anxiety to his working definition of learning-a concept that affects 
both operational and conceptual learning. 
I n  this chapter, in order to better understand organizational learning, we 
will look at several theories of individual learning, present a working 
definition of learning, as well as models of experiential learning that 
differentiate between what I call operational and conceptual learning.2 Using 
a simple model of individual leaining, we will discuss two types of mental 
models, frameworks and routines, and address the individual-organizational 
learning dilemma by integrating these into a model for organizational 
learning. This combined framework highlights the crucial link between 
organizational and individual learning, i.e., the transfer mechanism of 
mapping mental models that allows an organization to absorb individual 
learning. 
Three potential incomplete learning cycles that have not been previously 
identified are introduced and explained. The OADI-SMM model of 
organizational learning in Figure 2.10 represents an integration of learning 
theories of individuals, current models of organizational learning, and the 
role of mental models on learning, both in individuals and in organizations. 
Although this model builds upon the current theories of organizational 
learning, specifically March and Olsen (1975) and Argyris and Schon (1978), it 
focuses more directly on the transfer process between individual learning and 
organizational learning via mental models. 
2P. M. Senge makes a similar distinction between instrumental learning, adjustments in 
behavior to cope with changing circumstances, versus generative learning, changes ir -dominant 
ways of thinking in "Organizational Learning: New Challenges for System Dynar D-memo 
4023, System Dynamics Group, MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA.(Senge, 1989) 
0 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
Framework 
2.2 INDIVIDUAL LEARNING 
The importance of individual learning for organizational learning is at once 
obvious and subtle-obvious because all organizations are composed of 
individuals; subtle because organizations can learn independent of any 
specific individual. The topic of learning at the individual level has been 
heavily researched by psychologists, linguists, educators, and others. There 
have been discoveries about cognitive limitations (Simon, 1957) as well as the 
seemingly infinite capacity of the human mind to learn new things (Restak, 
1988). Piaget's focus on cognitive-development processes of children and 
Lewin's work on action research and laboratory training have provided much 
insight into how we learn as individuals and in group settings (Kolb, 1984). 
Some of these theories are based on stimulus-response behaviorism; some 
focus on cognitive capabilities, and others on psychodynamic theory. 
Numerous other theories about the ways humans learn have been proposed, 
debated and tested, such as Pavlov's classical conditioning, Skinner's operant 
conditioning, Tolman's sign learning, Gestalt theory, and Freud's 
psychodynamics (Hilgard & Bower, 1966). 
Research in the area of human cognition has also revealed some 
interesting findings about our mental capabilities. Miller (1956) for example, 
identified the limits of short term memory to handling roughly seven 
"chunks" of information, a limit which he called the span of absolute 
judgment. Simon (1957) advanced the notior. of bounded rationality and the 
act of satisficing in the absence of perfect information. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) revealed the consistent biases and irrelevant cues that 
influence people's decision-making as well as the dramatic differences 
produced by the framing of decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1987) 
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Despite all the research done to date, we still know relatively little about 
the human mind and the learning process. It seems that the more knowledge 
we gain, the more we realize how little we really do know. Models on 
human thought are under constant revision. Before proceeding further, 
however, we need to have a common definition of the word "learning" upon 
which to build. 
2.2.1 A Working Definition of Learning 
Johnson-Laird (1983) remarked that a rationally designed language would try 
to avoid the use of ambiguous words, and if used, would use them 
infrequently. Yet the words we use most often are precisely the ones with 
many different meanings and are, hence, ambiguous. Jaques (1989) listed 24 
words, such as, manager, plan, work, results, etc., and stated that not one 
word is unequivocally defined in the whole field of organization 
development. Each word has "so many meanings that they have value only 
as vague slogans." 
The problem is that our language is not rationally designed, but evolves 
and emerges through daily use. Certain terms become over-used because new 
terms are not spontaneously created to represent a subtle difference in 
meaning that is required. Instead, we use and re-use the same words with 
many qualifiers to convey the specific meaning desired. In the process, the 
qualifiers (themselves inadequate) get dropped and the original word itself is 
left to convey the many different meanings. Such is the case with the word 
"learning," a term whose meaning varies widely by context. 
2.2.1.1 Levels of Learning: Operational and Conceptual 
The dictionary definition of learning simply states "the acquiring of 
knowledge or skill." Learning by this definition encompasses two meanings: 
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the acquisition of skill or know-how which implies the physical ability to 
produce some action and the acquisition of know-why which implies an 
ability to articulate a conceptual understanding of an experience. Argyris and 
Schon's (1978) theory of action stresses the importance of action as a measure 
of what is actually learned. In their framework, learning has taken place only 
when new knowledge has been translated into different behavior that is 
replicable. 
-- - - - -  
Characteristics Occurs through repetition Occurs through use of heuristics and 
insights 
Routine Non-routine 
Control over immediate task, rules Development of differentiated 
and structures structures, rules, etc. to deal with lack 
of control 
Well-understood context Ambiguous context 
Occurs at al! levels in organization Occurs mostly in upper levels 
Consequence Behavioral outcomes Insights, heuristics, and collective 
consciousness 
Examples *Institutionalized formal rules New missions and new definitions of 
direction 
Adjustments in management systems Agenda setting 
* Problem-solving skills Problem-defining skills 
Development of new myths, stories, 
and culture 
Levels of Learning 
Source: Fiol & Lyles (1985) 
Figure 2.2 
0 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
46 Organizational Learning: Framework & Methodology 
Fiol & Lyles (1985) divide learning into two levels (see Figure 2.2). Lower- 
level learning includes learning that may be a repetition of past behaviors, or 
adjustments in what an organization does. They link this with Argyris and 
Schon's (1978) single-loop learning. Higher-level learning involves the 
development of complex rules and associates regarding new actions, which 
they equate with double-loop learning. 
For Piaget, the key to learning lies in the mutual interaction of the process 
of accommodation (adapting our mental concepts based on experience in the 
world) and the process of assimilation (integrating our experience into 
existing mental concepts) (Piaget, 1970). Or, as Kolb (1984, p. 38) states: 
Learning is the process whereby knowledge is created through the 
transformation of experience. This definition emphasizes several critical 
aspects of the learning process as viewed from the experiential perspective. 
First is the emphasis on the process of adaptation and learning as opposed to 
content or outcomes. Second is that knowledge is a transformation process, being 
continuously created and recreated, not an independent entity to be acquired or 
transmitted. Third, learning transforms experience in both its objective and 
subjective forms. Finally, to understand learning, we must understand the 
nature of knowledge, and vice versa. 
In each of the above cases, the link between action and thought is defined 
as integral to the definition of learning. For our purposes, then, our 
definition of knowledge includes both the know-how and know-why of what 
is learned. We retain both parts of the definition because we are interested 
not only in the patterned responses that one picks up in mastering a skill 
(know-how), but the causal understanding (know-why) that accompanies it as 
well. Both are essential in order for learning to have any significant impact 
on the learner's ability to take effective action. 
For example, a carpenter who has mastered the skills of woodwork 
without understanding the concept of building coherent structures like tables 
and houses can not utilize those skills very effectively. Similarly, a carpenter 
who possesses immense know-why about architecture and design but has no 
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complementary skills to produce any designs cannot put that know-why to 
effective use. We can think of operational learning leading to new ways of 
doing things and conceptual learning leading to new ways of thinking about 
things. The carpenter example illustrates this distinction between conceptual 
(know-why) learning and operational (know-how) learning which we will 
discuss again in the context of organizational learning. 
Schein (1993) distinguishes three different types of learning, 1) knowledge 
acquisition and insight, 2) habit and skill learning, and 3) emotional 
conditioning and learned anxiety. The first two correspond with conceptual 
and operational learning, respectively. The third is an important distinction 
that affects both types of learning. Schein describes Pavlov's discovery in his 
research with dogs who were put in a green room, where they heard a bell 
ring and were given electric shocks. What the dog learned was to avoid green 
rooms and to cower or run whenever it heard a bell. Even after the shocks in 
the room were turned off, the dog would not go in, and so could not learn 
that anything had changed. 
What that finding teaches us about learning is that avoidance behavior is 
learned through punishment, it does not encourage trial and error learning, 
and that people who are punished across a wide range of behavior are likely 
to limit themselves to very narrow safe ranges or become paralyzed for fear of 
making mistakes. 
2.2.1.2 Experiential Learning Model 
The work of Piaget on the nature of intelligence and how it develops is part of 
a triad of work that is collectively referred to as experiential learning (Kolb, 
1984). Dewey's (1926) philosophical perspective of pragmatism in education 
and Lewin's (1951) work in translating phenomena to concepts and field 
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theory are the two other cornerstones in this school of thought. Experiential 
learning, as a body of learning theory, is the most consistent with addressing 
the two levels of learning in our definition above. As Kolb (1984, p. 20) 
writes: 
This perspective on learning is called "experiential" for two reasons. The 
first is to tie it clearly to its intellectual origins in the work of Dewey, Lewin, 
and Piaget. The second reason is to emphasize the central role that experience 
plays in the learning process. This differentiates experiential learning theory 
from rationalist and other cognitive theories of learning that tend to give 
primary emphasis to acquisition, manipulation, and recall of abstract symbols, 
and from behavioral learning theories that deny any role for consciousness and 
subjective experience in the learning process. 
In Kolb's view, learning should not be conceived in terms of outcomes (as 
behavioral theories tend to be) but rather as a continuous process grounded in 
experience. An outcome orientation would be analogous to what Freire 
(1974) referred to as the "banking" concept of education where teachers were 
the depositors and the students were the depositories of "things." Learning as 
a process, on the other hand, would be directed at stimulating inquiry and 
developing skills in the process of knowledge-getting (Bruner, 1966). In a 
way/ the outcome view stresses the "product" of learning that is available for 
storing away while the process view focuses on the "acquisition" of new 
knowledge. As we shall see, both aspects need to be explicitly included in our 
model of individual learning. 
Figure 2.3 contains a learning cycle that is representative of the 
experiential theory of learning. A person continually cycles through a process 
of moving from having concrete experiences, to making observations and 
reflections on that experience/ to forming abstract concepts and 
generalizations based on those reflections, to testing those ideas in a new 
situation which leads to another concrete experience. This basic cycle has 
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Observations 
Concrete 
concepts and generalizations 
Testing implications of 
concepts in new situations 
The Lewinian Experiential Learning Model 
Figure 2.3 
appeared in many forms in a variety of settings using different terms. In the 
Total Quality Management (TQM) literature, it shows up as the Deming cycle 
of Plan-Do-Check-Act or PDCA (Ishikawa, 1985) while Deming (1992) refers to 
it as the Shewhart cycle of Plan-Do-Study-Act. In Organizational 
Development (OD), Schein (1987~) calls his version the ORJI cycle 
(Observation, emotional Reaction, Judgment, and Intervention). In Action 
Science, Argyris & Schon (1978) refer to a Discovery-Invention-Production- 
Generalization cycle of learning. 
At the risk of added confusion, I have chosen to base my model of 
individual learning on Kofman's (1992) version of the learning cycle as 
shown in Figure 2.4 The Observe-Assess-Design-Implement (OADI) cycle 
preserves the salient features of all the other versions mentioned above, but I 
believe the choice of terms have clearer connections to activities conducted in 
an organizational context. In the OADI cycle, a person experiences a concrete 
event and actively observes what is happening. She assesses (consciously or 
subconsciously) her experience by reflecting on her observations and then 
designs or constructs an abstract concept that seems to be an appropriate 
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response to the assessment. She tests the design by implementing in the 
concrete world which leads to a new concrete experience, commencing 
another cycle. 
Assess 
observations) 
Observe 
(form abstract concepts) (concrete experience) 
- (test concepts) 
The 0-A-D-I Cycle of Individual Learning 
Figure 2.4 
2.2.2 The OADI-IMM Model of Individual Learning 
For the purposes stated in the beginning, the OADI cycle as drawn in Figure 
2.4 is incomplete because it does not explicitly address the role of memory, 
which plays a critical role in linking individual to organizational learning. 
Integrating the role of memory will also require making an explicit 
distinction between the two aspects of learning described above, namely, 
conceptual and operational, a.nd how the product of each type of learning is 
stored differently. 
Memory can be modeled as a separate stage since a similar distinction is 
made between human learning and memory in the field of psychological 
research (Postman, 1976), implying that they are separate but related domains 
of inquiry. The two are distinct because learning has more to do with 
acquisition while memory has more to do with retention of whatever was 
acquired. In reality, however, separating the two processes is difficult because 
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they are tightly interconnected-what we already have in our memory affects 
what we learn and what we learn affects our memory. The combination of 
these two processes is fundamental to individual learning because learning 
without memory would require relearning everything as if it were the first 
time, while memory without learning would be like a storage drum with no 
inflow whose usefulness decays over time.3 
The concept of memory is commonly understood to be analogous to a 
storage device where everything we perceive and experience is filed away. 
Powers (1973, p. 205) defines memory as "the storage and retrieval of 
information carried by neural signals" and draws an analogy to computer 
memory. Miller, et al. (1960) see memory as "plans for retrieval," without 
which storage would be meaningless. In an ACT (Adaptive Control of 
Thought) production system, memory is divided into three types: working, 
declarative, and production (Anderson, 1983). Declarative memory contains 
permanent records that have been stored for retrieval. Working memory is 
basically declarative memory that has been retrieved for active use. 
Production memory is engaged when an action is being executed. 
In each of the views of memory, the storage and retrieval process are 
most prominent and the active role that memory plays in the learning 
process itself is notably missing. Hence, we need to differentiate between 
'stored" memory such as baseball trivia and products of rote memorization 
and "active" structures that affect our thinking process and the actions we 
^estak (Restak, 1988) documents a pathological case of a patient whose ability to store 
anything new into his long-term memory was destroyed. He would see his wife and say how glad 
he was to see her for the first time that day even though he had just seen her moments before. 
When he turned his head and could no longer see her, no memory of that recent event was stored. 
Hence, when he turned his head back and faced her again, it was as if he were seeing her for the 
first time. 
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take. We will refer to these active structures as an individual's mental 
models. 
2.2.2.1 Individual Mental Models 
A model of individual learning (OADI-IMM) is proposed in Figure 2.5 in 
which "individual mental models" has been added to the OADI model to 
represent a particular type of memory. Forrester (1971) postulates that all of 
our decisions are made on the basis of mental models, and yet those models 
are fuzzy, incomplete, and imprecise. Norman (1983) contrasts mental 
models (what people really have in their heads that guides their actions) with 
conceptual models (tools meant to help us understand the actual reality). His 
findings suggest that there is often no direct and simple relationship between 
the two and that people's mental models are apt to be deficient in many ways. 
Senge (1990b, p. 174) describes mental models as "deeply held internal images 
A Simple Model of Individual Learning: OADI-IMM Cycle 
Figure 2.5 
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of how the world works" which have a powerful influence on what we do 
because they affect what we see. Troubles can arise when we take actions 
based on our mental models as if they were reality. In each case, the concept 
of mental models differs from the traditional notion of memory as static 
storage because they play an active role in what an individual sees and does. 
Mental models represent a person's view of the world, both explicit and 
implicit understandings. Mental models provide the context in which to 
view and interpret new material, and they determine how stored 
information is relevant to a given situation. They represent more than a 
collection of ideas, memories, and experiences-they are like the source code 
of a computer's operating system, the manager and arbiter of acquiring, 
retaining, using, and deleting new information. But they are also much more 
than that because they are also like the programmer of that source code with 
the know-how to design a different source code as well as the know-why to 
choose one over the other. 
The following excerpt is an example of mental models at work: 
Without an ability to make implicit inferences, written and spoken discourse 
would be beyond anyone's competence. In order to understand the following passage, 
it is necessary to make a variety of inferences: 
The pilot put the plane into a stall just before landing on the strip. He just 
got it out of it in time. Wasn't he lucky? 
Every word in the first sentence, apart perhaps from the articles and prepositions, 
is ambiguous, and the appropriate meanings can be recovered only by making 
implicit inferences from linguistic context and general knowledge. (Johnson-Laird, 
1983, p. 128) 
In this example, the reader is able to draw the appropriate meanings not 
because the sentences match an identical set already in memory but because 
he or she has a mental model about the concept of flying an airplane which 
contains scripts and props (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Winston, 1984) that 
provide the proper context for understanding the sentences. If the reader, for 
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some reason, invoked a different mental model, such as building a house, the 
words plane, stall, landing, and strip would mean very different things and 
the sentence would be incoherent. 
Mental models not only help us make sense of what we see, they can also 
let us see only what makes sense to the mental model. Consider this example 
of mental models at work: 
[Hlave you ever heard a statement such as, "Laura doesn't care about 
people," and wondered about its validity? Imagine that Laura is a superior or 
colleague who has some particular habits that others have noted. She rarely 
offers generous praise. She often stares off into space when people talk to her, 
and then asks, "What did you say?" She sometimes cuts people off when they 
speak. She never comes to office parties ... From these particular behaviors, 
Laura's colleagues have concluded that she "doesn't care much about people." 
It's been common knowledge-except, of course, for Laura, who feels that she 
cares very much about people ... Once Laura's colleagues accept as fact that she 
doesn't care about people, no one questions her behavior when she does things 
that are "noncaring," and no one notices when she does something that doesn't 
fit the [mental model]. The general view that she doesn't care leads people to 
treat her with greater indifference, which takes away any opportunity she 
might have had to exhibit more caring. (Senge, 1990b' pp. 192-193) 
People's untested assumptions about Laura played an active role in creating 
the set of interactions which made their mental model of her a self-fulfilling 
prophesy. Whenever we take actions on the basis of stereotypes, we risk 
committing the same error as Laura's colleagues. 
2.2.2.2 Frameworks and Routines 
As mentioned earlier, there are two levels of learning-operational and 
conceptual-so we need to distinguish between two types of mental models. 
Operational learning represents learning at the procedural level, where one 
learns the steps that one must follow to complete a particular task. This 
know-how is captured as routines such as filling out entry forms, operating a 
piece of machinery, handling a switchboard, re-tooling a machine, etc. which 
capture the information about how to perform those tasks. Not only are 
routines accumulated and changed through operational learning, but they 
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affect operational learning process as well. Hence the two arrows going in 
both directions in the diagram represent this mutual influence. 
Conceptual learning has do with the thinking behind why things are 
done in the first place, sometimes challenging the very nature or existence of 
prevailing conditions, procedures, or conceptions and leading to new 
frameworks in the mental model. The new frameworks, in turn, can open 
up opportunities for discontinuous steps of improvement by reframing a 
problem in radically different ways. 
To make the dynamics of the link between learning and mental models 
clearer, let's consider a simple example of driving a car home from work. 
Most of us, if we have lived in a place for a period of time and have worked 
in a place for a while, know the route home. We probably know several ways 
to get there, and have chosen one or two of them as the way we drive home 
most often. This is our routine, and we don't even have to think about it. 
The first time we made the trip, we attended to the details more carefully, 
perhaps consulted a map, looked closely at signs, and charted an unfamiliar 
path. 
According to the model, we tested our chart, and observed how well it 
worked the first few times. If all went well, we might have fallen into a 
routine from the very first trip. We might have had to make adjustments if 
the streets were one-way (unmarked on our maps), or if, during rush hour, 
traffic was very heavy on the route we first took. After trying a few 
variations, we settled on our favorite way to get home, all things being equal. 
We began to think of it as "the best way to go home." That's the know-how, 
when things require little thought, because we know how. We sometimes 
think of it a s  being on "automatic pilot." Acquiring a routine involves much 
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more thought and attention to detail, but once it has been acquired, we're all 
set, unless thing" change. 
The know-why, or conceptual part of the 1c irning has more to do with 
how we think as individuals, and includes our values and personal 
preferences. One person might think the best way home is the "quickest" way 
home, while another might define "best" as the most scenic, or the least 
stressful. Yet another might hate the speed and volume of highways, 
contrasted with one who avoids stopping frequently at traffic lights. In the 
assessment phase) we consider all of the factors that are important to us and 
how our concrete experience matches those criteria. We then design new 
plans cr renew our commitment to the original plan based on our experience. 
In either case, we form abstract concepts about the way home. We build a 
framework for "all things being equal,'' another for "in case of emergency/' 
and another for "when I need to stop for errands in town." 
Now, some of us may not spend too much time or consideration on these 
things, yet find we have a framework nonetheless. We discover these, often, 
when met with obstacles on the way home. Construction projects may block 
our normal route, and force us to take detours, either those planned by the 
highway department or one of our own design. All of a suddenl our routine 
has been challenged, blocked, and we experience distress, because our 
expectations have been thwarted. We feel we must go home this wayl 
because this is the best way. 
If we ask ourselves why we feel that strongly about it, we would discover 
the thinking behind our mental model about driving home this way, and 
could then reexamine the framework that we built. Clearly, there is always 
another way to go home. Our anxiety often stems from a belief that this is the 
only way. "Best,', unchallenged, and entrenched in our routine, has grown to 
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"only." And we probably don't even recall when it happened, or why. We 
often take mental models for granted until we are confronted, questioned, or 
until they no longer provide expected results. 
There are two processes: dynamics of solidification (cow paths) and 
dynamics of double loop learning (transformation). Frameworks are about 
perceptions that are created and designs that are discovered. Implement and 
observe are about routines. Although one can manage the flow of inputs, 
control the environment or manipulate the person in various ways, if that 
person's view of the world remains unchanged, it is unlikely that any such 
actions will affect the type of learning that takes place. For our purposes then, 
learning can be defined as increasing one's capacity to take effective action. 
Learning occurs when we know something new and we know how to 
translate it into action. We may or may not choose to implement the action, 
but we know how to. The same will hold true for organizational learning. 
In the next section, we will examine ways in which organizational 
learning presents more complex and dynamic challenges than merely 
increasing the proportions of information and s?xperience to match the 
numbers of people involved in the organization, and the reasons why this is 
so. We will also explore behavioral theories as well as theories of 
organizations as interpretation systems in order to develop an integrated 
model of organizational learning which provides for the necessary links and 
transfer mechanisms, and will illustrate the use of this model in an industrial 
setting. 
2.3 ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Organizational learning involves much more than a semantic shift from a 
singular to a plural reference of a generic learning process. The level of 
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complexity increases tremendously when we go from a single individual to a 
collection of diverse individuals. Although the meaning of the term 
"learning" remains essentially the same as in the individual case, the 
learning process is fundamentally different at the organizational level. A 
model of organizational learning has to resolve somehow the dilemma of 
imparting intelligence and learning capabilities to a non-human entity 
without anthropomorphizing it. In addition to capturing the learning 
process, a good model should also address questions such as what changes 
when an organization learns and what kinds of dysfunctions can inhibit their 
learning (March & Olsen, 1975). 
2.3.1 Levels of Complexity 
Moving from the individual human level to the organizational level adds at 
the least an order of magnitude increase in complexity in the unit of analysis. 
Issues such as motivation and reward, which are an integral part of human 
learning (Nuttin, 1976), become doubly complicated because the meaning of 
each depends, in part, on the type of organization as well as the individual. 
Boulding (1956) outlined a hierarchy of complexity where the various 
empirical fields of "individuals" are arranged into nine distinct levels. The 
first level represents static structure or frameworks-the geography and 
anatomy of the universe. The ninth level represents a class of transcendental 
systems-"the inescapable unknowables." In this hierarchy, the human level 
is at level seven and social organizations are at level eight. In describing this 
eighth level, Boulding (1956, p. 205) writes "the unit of such systems is not 
perhaps the person-the individual human as such-but the 'role'-that part 
of the person which is concerned with the organization or situation in 
question ... 11 
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Thus, in the context of organizational learning, we are interested in the 
individual's role as a learner and not in the unique characteristics of that 
particular person as a human being. It matters less whether the person is 
male or female, conservative or liberal, introvert or extrovert. It matters 
more if he or she is a manager or an operator; technical or clerical. 
2.3.2 The Individual-Organization Learning Dilemma 
What do we mean by organizational learning? Various definitions have 
focused on different aspects of learning. In the early stages of an 
organization's existence, organizational learning is often synonymous with 
individual learning since it usually involves a very small group of people 
and the organization has minimal structure. As an organization grows, 
however, a distinction between the two levels of learning emerges, and 
somewhere in that process, a system for capturing learnings from its 
individual members evolves. The way in which an organization learns 
through individuals is a topic of growing interest, but little consensus. One of 
the main dilemmas shared by all who tackle this issue was posed by Argyris 
and Schon (1978, pp. 9-10): 
There is something paradoxical here. Organizations are not merely collections 
of individuals, yet there are no organizations without such collections. Similarly, 
organizational learning is not merely individual learning, yet organizations learn 
only through the experience and actions of individuals. What, then, are we to 
make of organizational learning? What is an organization that it may learn? 
Clearly, an organization learns through its individual members and, 
therefore is affected either directly or indirectly by individual learning. 
Argyris and Schon (1978) present a theory of action perspective where 
organizational learning takes place through individual actors whose actions 
are based on a set of shared models. They argue that most organizations have 
shared assumptions which protect the status quo, preclude challenging 
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people's troublesome or difficult qualities and characteristics, and provide 
silent assent to those attributions; hence, very little learning is possible. For 
example, when confronted with a leader of the organization's tendency to 
steamroll over any opposition to his or her ideas, people tend to accept it with 
resignation, as "the way X is," rather than to point out the occasions when the 
steamrolling occurs. Furthermore, we assume that the person is aware and 
doing it on purpose, or we assume that the person doesn't want to talk about 
it. We don't make our own mental models explicit. We don't test our 
assumptions with that person. Whenever we interact with this person, we 
"know" he or she will steamroll, so we act in ways that make it easy to 
steamroll. 
There is little agreement on what constitutes "appropriate" learning; 
those actions or lessons that should be incorporated into an organization's 
memory. Standard operating procedures (SOP1s)4, for example, are viewed as 
an important part of an organization's memory and a repository of its past 
learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Perrow, 1986; Winter, 1985). Hedberg, 
Nystrom, and Starbuck (1976), however, argue against SOP'S because the use 
of old procedures that are inappropriate to radically different circumstances 
will preoccupy and delay the search for entirely new modes of behavior. 
Instead, they advocate minimal levels of consensus, contentment, affluence, 
faith, consistency, and rationality. Levitt and March (1988), on the other 
hand, caution against such fast, precise learning because it can lead to making 
mistakes faster and to specializing prematurely into inferior technologies. 
4~hroughout  this chapter, I refer to organizational routines and standard operating procedures 
(SOP'S) interchangeably. Both terms are meant to contain the general meaning of routines. (Cyert 
& March, 1963, Nelson & Winter, 1982) 
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In reality' both views are correct to a degree; the crux of the matter is 
knowing when organizational routines such as SOP'S are appropriate and 
when they are not. As Winter (1985, p. Ill) argues: 
Routinized competence clearly does not dictate inatten tion to considerations 
that fall outside of the scope of the routines; in fact, it should make possible higher 
levels of attention to such considerations. But the wider the range 01 situations 
subsumed by the routines and the better the routinized performance, the fewer 
reminders there are that something besides routinized competence might on 
occasion be useful or even essential to survival. 
This view is consistent with Perrow's (1986) praise for SOP'S where he clearly 
saw a useful role for such organizational routines. They are viewed to be 
very useful in most cases as long as the appropriateness of their use is 
reviewed regularly and with each new application. But how does an 
organization decide when once-appropriate routines are no longer the correct 
actions to take? Can an organization anticipate such obsolescence of its SOP'S 
or must it always learn by first making inappropriate decisions in the face of 
changing conditions? Are organizational SOP'S different from individual 
routines? These are the types of issues which a model of organizational 
learning must address. 
2.3.3 Organizations as Behavioral Systems 
Simon (1981, p. 65) proposed the following provocative hypothesis: 
A man, viewed as a behaving system, is quite simple. The apparent 
complexity of his behavior over time is largely a reflection of the complexity of 
the environment in which he finds himself. 
This statement was accompanied by a couple of caveats. First, Simon limited 
the definition of man to the "thinking man" and analyzed cognition rather 
than behavior in general. His second caveat was to view an individual's 
memory to be more a part of the environment than the individual. That is, 
the memory is generated by the actions taken to adapt to the environment. 
This behavioral perspective can be extended to organizations. For example, 
0 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
62 Organizational Learning: Framework & Methodology 
Cyert and March (1963) see the organization as an adaptively rational system 
which basically learns from experience. A firm changes its behavior in 
response to short-term feedback from the environment according to some 
fairly well-defined rules and adapts to longer-term feedback on the basis of 
more general rules. At some level in this hierarchy, they suggest, lie 
"learning rules." 
March and Olsen (1975) make a distinction between individual and 
organizational action in their four phase model of organizational learning 
(see Figure 2.6). In their model, individual actions are taken based on certain 
individual beliefs. These actions, in turn, lead to organizational action which 
produces some environmental response. The cycle is completed when the 
environmental response, in turn, affects individual beliefs. Tracing through 
this loop, we see that if the environmental response is static and unchanging, 
individual beliefs.. actions and therefore organizational actions will also 
March and Olsen's Model of Organizational Learning 
Modified from March & Olsen (1975) 
Learning 
Figure 2.6 
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remain unchanged. If there are changes in the environment, however, 
individual beliefs about the nature of the environment could change, thus 
precipitating a different set of individual and organizational actions. This 
will, in turn, set off a whole new cycle of learning. 
March and Olsenls model also addresses the issue of incomplete learning 
cycles where learning in the face of changing environment a1 conditions is 
impaired because one or more of the links is either weak or broken. They 
identify four cases where the learning cycle is incomplete and leads to 
dysfunctional learning. Role-constrained experiential learning can occur 
when individual learning has no effect on individual action because the 
circle is broken by the constraints of the individual's role. Audience  
experiential learning occurs when the individual affects organizational action 
in an ambiguous way. A third case is superstitious experiential learning 
where the link between organizational action and environmental response is 
severed. Thus, actions are taken, responses are observed, inferences are 
drawn, and learning takes place, but there is no real basis for the connections 
made between organizational action and environmental response. 
The last incomplete cycle is one of experiential learning under ambiguity. 
Here, the individual affects organizational action which affects the 
environment, but the causal connections among the events are not clear. 
"Learning takes place and behavior changes; but a model of the process 
requires some ideas about the imputation of meaning and structure to 
events" (March & Olsen, 1975, p. 160). In other words, operational learning 
occurs, but whether conceptual learning occurs is dubious. Organizational 
learning, in order to be effective, must advance in a balanced process of 
complementary learnings in both know-how and know-why. 
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2.3.4 Organizations as Interpretation Systems 
The behavioral view is consistent with the view of organizations as 
interpretation systems. Daft and Weick (1984) propose a model (see Figure 
2.7) composed of three stages that represents the overall learning process of an 
organization, namely, scanning (data collection), interpretation (data given 
meaning), and learning (action taken). Scanning involves monitoring and 
obtaining data about the environment. Interpretation can be seen as a process 
of translating events and developing concepts consistent with prior 
understanding of the environment. Learning is defined as knowledge about 
the inter-relationship between the organization's actions and the 
environment as well as the actions that are taken on the basis of such 
knowledge. 
This interpretation model is also consistent with Simon's hypothesis if 
we view the act of interpretation and learning to be analogous to the act of 
interacting with and adapting to the environment. The complexity of the 
actions taken (behaviors observed) is then largely determined by the 
complexity of the data collected from the environment. This implies that if 
the environment were utterly simple, the behavior of the organization 
would also be very simple, at least when viewed from outside the firm. 
Relationships among Organizational Scanning, Interpretation, and Learning 
Source: Daft & Weick (1984) 
LEARNING 4 INTERPRETATION 4 
(Action Taken) (Data Given Meaning) 
Figure 2.7 
SCANNING 
(Data Collection) 
Daft and Weick (1984, p. 286) formally defined interpretation as "the 
I 4 4 
process of translating events and developing shared understanding and 
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conceptual schemes among members of upper management." Although they 
likened interpretation to learning a new skill by an individual, I will again 
separate know-why from skill and say that interpretation occurs more at the 
conceptual than the operational level. Their typology of four different 
interpretation types-undirected viewing, conditioned viewing, discovering, 
and enacting- is shown in Figure 2.8. The horizontal axis is a measure of an 
Unanalyzable 
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Constrained interpretations. 
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Active detection 
Figure 2.8 
organization's willingness to look outside of their own boundaries. For 
example, a technology-focused company's efforts may be inwardly directed 
(intensive research in core technologies) while a marketing-focused 
company's efforts are outwardly focused (customer focus groups and market 
surveys). The two axes represent an organization's assumptions about the 
world and its own role in it, the combination of which capture an 
organization's world view or We1 tanschau u n g .  An organization's 
Weltanschauung, defined as "a comprehensive philosophy of the world or of 
human life," will determine how it interprets environmental responses, 
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whether it will act upon them, and what specific means it will employ if it 
chooses to act. 
Ideally, to increase learning, organizations ought to move away from the 
undirected viewing type and move more towards the enacting type. 
Although there are some merits in the other two types~conditioned viewing 
and discovery-neither encourages the type of open experimentation and 
innovative thinking that the enacting type embraces. Managers in an 
enacting organization will behave more like researchers than the traditional 
managers because the only way to find out about an unanalyzable 
environment is through active experimentation and testing i n  the 
environment. 
Non-adaptive organizations have short lives; most organizations appear 
to fall into this category. For example, fifty-year-old corporations represent 
only two percent of those created, and approximately 30% of those fifty-year- 
old corporations can be expected to disappear within ten years (Starbuck, 
1983). In order to maximize a firm's chance for survival, it must be nimble in 
its ability to think and act. How it views the environment and its own role 
within it will have a (potentially) large impact on its ability to learn and adapt 
to changing conditions. 
2.3.5 The Missing Link: from Individual to Organizational Learning 
Analogies of the human learning process have been drawn with respect to 
organizations (Beer, 1972) and various theories of organizations have 
counterparts at the individual level. For example, adaptation theory (Miles, 
et al., 1978; Miller & Friesen, 1980; Tushman & Anderson, 1986) can be viewed 
as analogs of individual stimulus-response theories (Hilgard & Bower, 1966), 
and strategic choice models (Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985) having similarities with 
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psychodynamic theories (Hilgard & Bower, 1966). If a distinction between 
organization and individual is not made explicit, however, a model of 
organizational learning will either obscure the actual learning process by 
ignoring the role of the individual (and anthropomorphize organizations) or 
become a simplistic extension of individual learning by glossing over 
organizational complexities. 
As explained earlier, the integrated model of organizational learning 
developed in this chapter builds upon the work of March & Olsen (1975) and 
Argyris & Schon (1978), among others, but it goes beyond both models by 
explicitly integrating the transfer process from individual learning to 
organizational learning via mental models. In the next section, I will attempt 
to build an integrated model that will address some of the existing 
shortcomings. 
2.4 AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Figure 2.9 shows an integrated model of organizational learning (OADI-SMM 
model) which encompasses all of the elements discussed in the previous 
sections into a cohesive framework for researching organizational learning. 
It builds on and extends the March and Olsen model (see Figure 2.6).5 The 
OADI-SMM integrates individual learning into the organizational learning 
process and addresses the issue of the transfer of learning through the 
exchange of mental models from individual to shared, and vice versa. 
Analogous to individual learning, organizational learning is defined as 
increasing an organization's capacity to take effective action. The distinction 
between conceptual and operational learning and between Weltanschauung 
  he four "disconnects" identified in March and Olsen's model have been transposed onto this 
model and are shown in Figure 2.10. 
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and organizational routines are also integrated throughout the different 
stages. A box has bee; drawn around the diagram to emphasize that the 
whole model is required to represent organizational learning. 
2.4.1 The Role of Individuals in Organizational Learning 
In the OADI-IMM model, learning is always rooted in concrete experience in 
the real world (implement and observe stages), so the individual is constantly 
taking actions and observing his experience. A distinct Individual Action 
stage that lies outside of the OADI-IMM cycle is modeled to represent those 
actions that have more direct consequence for the organization than the 
minute details of all actions taken by an individual. A person may, for 
example, learn about a new dance step and decide to enroll in a dance class. 
That person will presumably learn a great deal and take a lot of actions in 
their individual learning process. We would not, however, include those 
actions as being relevant Individual Actions for organizational learning nor 
for individual learning that would have relevance for the organization. 
In the OADI-SMM model, I have substituted individual beliefs in March 
and Olsen's model with the OADI-IMM model of individual learning. The 
individual learning cycle is the process through which those beliefs change 
and those changes are then codified in the individual mental models. The 
cycles of individual learning affect learning at the organizational level 
through its influence on the shared mental  models of the organization. In 
this model, the role of the individual in organizational learning is clear and 
explicit. Organizations can learn only through its members, but it is not 
dependent on any specific member (as denoted by the multiple boxes 
representing individual learning). Individuals, however, can learn without 
the organization. 
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Figure 2.9 incorporates Argyris and Schon's concept of single-loop and 
double-loop learning on both the individual and organizational level. 
Double-loop learning involves surfacing and challenging deep-rooted 
assumptions and norms of an organization that have previously been 
inaccessible, either because they were unknown or known but undiscussable. 
Individual double-loop learning (IDLL) is traced out in Figure 2.9 as the 
process through which individual learning affects individual mental models, 
which in turn affect future learning. Organizational double-loop learning 
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(ODLL) occurs when individual mental models become incorporated into the 
organization through shared mental models, which can then affect 
t 
organizational action. In both cases, double-loop learning provides 
opportunities for discontinuous steps of improvement where reframing a 
problem can bring about radically different potential solutions. 
2.4.1.1 Groups and Organizational Learning 
The model I have proposed includes the individual 
organization, but it does not explicitly deal with the 
learner embedded in an 
issue of groups. While 
such influences as the development and enforcement of group norms 
(Feldman, 1984), group polarization (Isenberg, 1986) and other factors have an 
effect on individuals (Hackman & Oldham, 1976), group effects are not 
explicitly included in this model. 
In terms of mental models, however, if we view a group as  a mini- 
organization, whose members contribute to the group's shared mental 
models, then the model can represent group learning as well as 
organizational learning. Bushe and Shani (1991) explore how a group 
functioning as a steering committee can provide a parallel learning structure 
within an organization. A group can then be viewed as a collective 
i 
individual with its own set of mental models who contributes to the 
organization's shared mental models and learning. This is consistent with 
the notion that groups themselves are influenced by organizational structure 
and type of management style such as control vs. commitment (Walton & 
Hackman, 1986) and, therefore, can be treated as if they were "extended 
individuals. " 
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2.4.2 The Transfer Mechanism: Shared Mental Models 
As we did at the individual level, we want to distinguish between 
organizational memory and shared mental models. Again, the concepts of 
static storage and active influence can illuminate the distinction. 
Organizational memory, broadly defined, includes everything that is 
contained in an organization that is somehow retrievable. Thus, storage files 
of old invoices are part of that memory. So are copies of letters, spreadsheet 
data stored in computers, and the latest strategic plan, as well as what is in the 
minds of all organizational members. The problem again, is that although it 
may be a comprehensive definition, it is not very useful in the context c?f 
organizational learning. 
The parts of an organization's memory that are relevant for 
organizational learning are those that play an active role in defining what an 
organization pays attention to, how it chooses to act, and what it chooses to 
remember from its experience. This is what we mean by mental models and 
shared mental models. They may be explicit or implicit, tacit or widely 
recognized, but they have the capacity to affect the way an individual or 
organization views the world and the actions that are taken. Organizational 
learning is dependent on individuals improving their mental models; 
making those mental models explicit enough to be shared mental models 
allows organizational learning to be independent of any specific individual. 
Why are we putting so much emphasis on mental models? Because the 
mental models in individuals' heads are where a vast majority of an 
organization's knowledge (both know-how and know-why) lies. 
To highlight the importance of mental models in organizations, let us 
carry out the following two thought experiments. Scenario 1: Imagine an 
organization in which all the physical records of that organization 
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disintegrated overnight. Suddenly, there are no more reports, no computer 
files, no employee record sheets, no operating manuals, no calendars-all 
that remain are the people, buildings, capital equipment, raw materials, and 
inventory. Scenario 2: Now imagine an organization where all the people 
simply quit showing up for work. The organization is left intact in every way, 
but all the people are gone. New people, who are similar in many ways with 
the former workers, but who have no familiarity with that industrial context, 
show up. Of the two cases described, which organization will be easier to 
rebuild to its former status so that it can continue to take actions and to learn? 
The obvious and safe answer would be to say "it depends," but that is not 
a satisfactory answer. Thinking through the full ramifications of each 
scenario, one could conclude that having all the people intact will be easier 
than having the systems and records intact. In terms of the model presented 
in Figure 2.10, scenario 1 is equivalent to eliminating the organizational 
memory (including the shared mental models), whereas scenario 2 can be 
likened to obliterating the individual mental models and their linkages to the 
shared mental models. Thus, when new individuals are put into the 
organizations, they come in with their own individual learning and mental 
models stages which have no connections to the remaining organizational 
memory (sans shared mental models). 
Even in the most bureaucratic of organizations, despite the 
preponderance of written SOP'S and established protocols, there is much 
more about the firm that is unsaid and unwritten; its essence is embodied 
more in the people than in the systems. Comparatively little is put down on 
paper or stored in computer memories (Forrester, 1993; Simon, 1991). These 
intangible and often invisible assets of an organization reside in individual 
mental models which collectively contribute to the shared mental models. 
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The shared mental models are what makes the rest of the organizational 
memory usable. Without these mental models, which include all the subtle 
interconnections that have been developed among the various members/ an 
organization will be incapacitated in both learning and action. 
This assertion is not as radical as it may sound. Actually there is some 
empirical support for the above assertion in the form of turnover data. As 
everyone knows, high turnover is costly in terms of time and money since 
new recruits have to "learn the ropes" while being paid and consuming an 
experienced person's time. In fact, the second scenario described above is 
precisely the case of high turnover taken to an extreme. Companies with a 
40-50% annual turnover rate have a hard time accumulating learning because 
their experience base is continually being eroded. 
An example of scenario 1 w-ould be the case of radical changes brought 
about by a new CEO (e.g./ Geneen at IT&T, Welsch at General Electric) or by a 
hostile takeover. In many such cases, the organization is completely gutted of 
its previous management style, procedures, and structures and replaced with 
a different one altogether. Although transitions are times of great upheaval, 
the organization as a whole usually remains intact. 
2.4.2.1 Weltanschauung a n d  Organizational Routines 
As stated earlier, mental models are not merely a repository of sensory data; 
they are active in that they build theories about sensory experience. Each 
mental model is a clustering or an aggregation of data which prescribes a 
viewpoint or a course of action. Conceptual learning creates changes in 
frameworks leading to new ways of looking at the world. Operational 
learning produces new or revised routines that are executed in lieu of the old 
ones. The revised mental models contain not only the new frameworks and 
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routines, but also knowledge about how the routines fit within the new 
framework. 
Individual mental frameworks become embedded into the organization's 
own Weltanschauung. The organization's view of the world slowly evolves 
to encompass the current thinking of the individuals within. In similar 
fashion, individual routines that are proven to be sound over time become 
standard operating procedures. Like an individual driving a car, the routines 
become the organization's auto pilot reflexes. The strength of the link 
between individual mental models and shared mental models is a function 
of the influence level of a particular individual or group of individuals. In 
the case of a CEO or upper management, influence can be high due to the 
power inherent in the positions. Similarly, a united group of hourly workers 
can have a high degree of influence due to their size. 
For example, Proctor & Gamble's Weltanschanung can be characterized as 
one where the company views itself as a strong community player, has a 
sense of community responsibility, and believes in the importance of its 
corporate image as well as that of its product brands. Its Weltanschanung is 
also a reflection of its culture, its deep-rooted assumptions and its artifacts, as 
well as overt behavior rules about what is the "right" thing to do. All of these 
things moderate its decision-making as it encounters unpredictable, non- 
routine events. Their Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS), on the other 
hand, may include things like a marketing plan to launch a new product, 
procedures for paying suppliers, employee performance reviews, and hiring 
criteria. These organizational routines allow the organization to respond to 
routine needs in very predictable ways. 
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2.4.3 Incomplete Learning Cycles 
In March and Olsen's (1975) model they identified four possible disconnects 
whereby organizational learning cycle would be incomplete. In our 
integrated model, I have identified three additional types of incomplete 
learning cycles which affect organizational learning: situational, fragmented, 
and opportunistic (see Figure 2.10). 
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2.4.3.1 Situational Learning 
An individual encounters a problem, improvises on the spot and solves the 
problem, and moves on to the next task. Situational learning occurs when 
the individual simply "forgets" or does not codify it for later use, that is, 
when the link between individual learning and individual mental models is 
severed. Regardless of whether the learning occurred at the conceptual or 
operational level, it does not change the person's mental models and 
therefore has no long term impact-the learning is situation specific. Since 
the individual's mental model was not changed, the organization does not 
have a way of absorbing the learning, either. 
Examples of situational learning fall under the broad category of "crisis 
management," where each problem encountered is solved but with no 
learning carried over to the next case. Quality improvement is a counter 
example which focuses on minimizing situational learning through a 
systematic data gathering, analysis, and standardization process. 
2.4.3.2 Fragmented Learning 
There are many instances where individuals learn, but the organization as a 
whole does not. That is, when the link between individual mental models 
and shared mental models is broken, fragmented learning occurs. 
Organizational learning is fragmented among isolated individuals (or 
groups), whereby loss of the individuals means loss of the learning as well. 
Individual mental models are changing, but those changes are not reflected in 
the organization's memory, and thus, there is no cohesive picture of what is 
occurring at the individual level. 
Universities are a classic example of fragmented learning. Professors 
within each department may be the world's leading experts on management, 
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finance, operations, and marketing, but the university as an institution 
cannot apply it to the running of its own affairs. Very decentralized 
organizations that do not have the requisite networking capabilities to keep 
the various parts connected are also susceptible to fragmented learning. 
2.4.3.3 Opportunistic Learning 
There are times when organizations purposely try to bypass their standard 
procedures because their established ways of doing business are seen as an 
impediment for a particular task. They want to sever the link between shared 
mental models and organizational action in order to seize an opportunity 
that cannot wait for the whole organization to change (or it may not be 
desirable to do so). Opportunistic learning occurs when organizational 
actions are taken based on an individual's (or small group of individuals') 
actions and not on the widely shared mental models (valuesl culture, mythsl 
or SOP'S) of the organization. 
The use of skunk works to develop the IBM personal computer is a good 
example, where they chose to bypass their normal bureaucratic structure and 
create an entirely separate, dedicated team to develop the PC, which it was 
able to do in record time. General Motors' creation of Saturn is another 
example on a grander scale as are joint ventures, when appropriately 
structured. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
The integrated model of organizational learning presented in the preceding 
section is not a simple one, but its complexity is justified for the following 
reasons. First, the link between individual and organizational learning 
needed to be made explicit, which requires including the learning process of 
the individual. Second, the distinction between conceptual and operational 
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learning is necessary to capture the differences between learning to do things 
differently versus learning to think about things in new and different ways. 
Either type of learning can occur without the other, but both types need to 
occur for effective organizational learning. Third, an organization's view of 
the world-Weltanschauung-plays an important role in its learning cycle. 
The W e l t m s c h a u u n y  affects how individuals within the organization 
interpret environmental responses, how each translates his or her own 
mental models into actions, as well as how the organization translates its 
shared mental models into action. 
In the above model of organizational learning, individual mental models 
play a pivotal role in the whole learning cycle, yet that is precisely one of the 
areas in which we know the least and where there is little to observe. One 
challenge is to find ways to make these mental models explicit; another is to 
manage the way these mental models are transferred into the organizational 
memory. Clearly, this involves creating new devices and tools for capturing a 
wide range of knowledge, some of which we are not even consciously aware. 
One of the reasons mental models are so elusive is that often, people are 
not even aware of them. If all one is exposed to is one's own mental model, 
then one simply thinks, "This is the way the world is. This is the truth." A 
major hurdle is always the clash between holders of different mental models 
who can only see that the other person is wrong and must be shown the error 
of his or her thinking. The attempt to articulate the way the organization 
currently operates is itself an exercise in surfacing mental models. More 
opportunities to explore and describe the inner workings of organizations in 
these ways are needed to complete the learning cycles and enhance 
organizational learning. 
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Chapter 3 
Representing Mental Models 
' The  world exists in forms that we establish and define." 
Ã‘Oswal Kulpe 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 laid out a framework for integrating individual learning with 
organizational learning in which mental models play a central role. In this 
chapter and the next, we will explore in greater depth what we mean by 
mental models. Within the framework of the organizational learning model 
presented in Chapter 2, this chapter focuses primarily on operationally 
representing what mental models are (see Figure 3.1). In Chapter 4, we will 
focus on the methodology of mapping individual mental models from 
individual learning and moving from individual mental models to shared 
mental models. 
We should note that when talking about mental  mode>^, we cannot say 
anything definitive about mental models, or even assert that people actually 
have "mental models." However, we recognize that mental models are a 
useful construct for us to use when referring to the knowledge that people 
contain in their heads. Therefore, we will be careful to maintain the 
distinction between the use of the term "mental modelsf'-the implicit 
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knowledge people have in their heads-and the \ise of the term "mental 
model representations"--the explicit representations of those mental models. 
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Figure 3.1 
Representing mental models requires having appropriate 
representational schemes that allow one to clarify one's understanding 
(implicit mental model) and make it explicit for others to also understand 
(see Figure 3.2). In other words, we want to operationalize an individual's 
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implicit mente! model into an explicit representation that will make it 
accessible and transferable to others. 
In many contexts, verbal representations are sufficient for capturing most 
of the salient features of a learning experience. There are contexts, however, 
where the English language is not particularly well-suited for describing a 
phenomenon of interest. I will suggest that verbal language and certain 
graphics-language representations (e.g., typical process flow charts) work well 
in addressing detail complexity, while a different representational scheme is 
needed for addressing dynamic complexity.1 Enhancing our ability to deal 
with dynamic complexity is important because most organizational problems 
cf significance are a result of dynamic complexity, not only detail complexity, 
We begin by examining the literature on mental models, first in the 
physical domain (physical representations, analogies, and autonomous 
objects), and then in the organizational realm (scripts, stories, schemas, 
influence diagrams, cause and effect diagrams, etc.). A set of criteria for 
assessing mental model representations is then drawn from the literature. 
The issue of usefulness of those representations in different domains is 
raised, specifically when dealing with detail complexity and dynamic 
complexity. We then develop a typology that distinguishes between different 
representational forms (e.g., verbal, graphics-language, and ma thema tical) 
and between domains of usefulness (e.g., detail complexity and dynamic 
complexity). System dynamics mapping representations (causal loop 
diagrams, systems archetypes, computer models) are positioned as having 
lsenge (1990b) makes an important distinction between dynamic complexity and detail 
complexity of systems. A system can have hundreds, perhaps thousands, of parts that have to be 
managed, but the dynamics of the whole system may be relatively simple. On the other hand, a 
system with only a dozen or so pieces can be extremely complex and difficult tn manage (Sterman, 
1989). The complexity lies in the nature of the inter-relationships among the parts whose cause- 
effect relationships are highly nonlinear and distant in space and time. 
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strengths in the domain of dynamic complexity. Finally, we present systems 
archetypes as a useful, mass-consumable set of mentai model representations 
for addressing dynamically complex issues and for building shaded mental 
models. Five of these archetypes are presented (Drifting-Goals, Fixes-that- 
Fail, Limits-to-Success, Shifting-the-Burden, Tragedy-of-the-Commons), with 
a summary table of them presented as dynamic scripts.2 
Operationalize Explict 
2a~---7% a +.A> Mental Model 
Representation 
Implicit Transfer Shared \ 
Explicit Mental Model Representations 
Figure 3.2 
3.1 LITERATURE ON MENTAL MODELS 
If what matters is not reality, but perceptions of reality, then fundamental to 
learning is a shared mental model and language. Kepner and Tregoe (1965) 
emphasize the importance of the thought process behind managerial 
* ~ a r ~  Burchill suggested the use of the term "dynamic scripts" to refer to systems archetypes. 
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decision-making and believe that making that process accessible is of key 
importance in advancing learning at the individual level as well as at the 
organizational level. Because mental models result from a mixture of what 
was learned explicitly and absorbed implicitly, it is difficult to be aware of 
them in order to be explicit and share them with others. 
In Chapter 2, a distinction was made between memory and mental 
models. Memory was likened to static storage devices which served as 
repositories of information and experiences that could be retrievable through 
varying degrees of effort (Powers, 1973; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960, 
Anderson, 1983).3 Argyris & Schon (1978, p. 160) describe organizational 
memory as 
a type of map, a map or the organization's past. Organizational memory, as 
we have seen, may be contained in individual heads, in files, in documents, or 
more recently, in computer memories. Organizational memory, therefore, may 
contain information that is scattered and inaccessible to the agents of 
organizational learning. 
On the other hand, I referred to mental model as "active" structures that 
affect the way a person thinks and the actions she takes. Mental models are 
both conceptual frameworks that contain the know-why about the way the 
world 
how. 
In 
menta 
operations, and the operational routines for translating that into know- 
an organizational context, the important issue is how to represent 
models in a way that 1) enhances the individual's learning and 2) can 
be shared with others in order to advance organizational learning. Various 
theories and methods have been formulated to represent mental models. In 
^arvin Minsky (1985), in Society of Mind, proposes an interesting model of memory where 
memories are attached to agents called Knowledge-lines or K-lines. "A K-line is a wirelike 
structure that attaches itself to whichever mental agents are active when you soLe a problem or 
have a good idea." You remember something by activating the appropriate K-line agent(s) that is 
attached to the relevant "mental states." 
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this chapter, we will review some of the literature on mental models research 
and categorize the various approaches into a typology that maps these 
approaches by type of representational system and their domain of usefulness 
(detail vs. dynamic complexity). We begin by looking at examples of mental 
models in two different domains of knowledge-physical and 
organizational-and then highlight some of the more important features to 
include in the operationalization of mental models. Later (in section 3.3.1), 
we will integrate the various features into a \ set of criteria for assessing the 
robustness of mental model representations. 
3.1.1 Physical Domain of Knowledge 
Gentner & Stevens (1983) characterize mental model research as a careful 
examination of the way people understand some domain of knowledge. The 
domain they choose to focus on is physical systems for the following reasons: 
Our first efforts to capture naturalistic human knowledge must necessarily 
center on the simplest possible domains. We need to choose domains for which 
there exists some normative knowledge that is relatively e<:?y to detail 
explicitly. Therefore, mental models research focuses on simple physical 
systems or devices .... The reason that mental models research has focused on 
seemingly technical domains is precisely because those domains have proved to 
be the most tractable to physical scientists are the one for which there exists 
the best explicit normative models. (Gentner & Stevens, 1983, p.2). 
The body of work contained in their book, Mental Models, is based on 
research done on people's mental models of physical systems such as springs, 
electricity/ heat exchangers, a buzzer system, learning to use calculators, and 
solving basic physics problems. 
3.1.1.2 Physical Representations 
The primary representational forms Gentner & Stevens used are schematic 
diagrams, verbal descriptions and the language of mathematics. For example, 
in solving physics problems, Larkin (1983) demonstrated how differences in 
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performance of experts and novices were related to the different problem 
representations they used. Novices used what she called naive problem 
representations composed of real world objects (blocks and springs) whose 
actions were governed by developments that occurred over time. Experts, on 
the other hand, were able to construct physical representations in addition to 
the naive representations, which contained abstract entities such as forces and 
momenta (see Figure 3.3). 
Naive Represent itions 
(Envisionments) Physical Represemiions 
Problem representations with qualitative inferencing rules 
and imagable entities 
"Familiar" entities Physical entities 
Simulation inferencing Constraint inferencing 
(follows time flow) 
Distant from physics principles Closely tied to physics principles 
Tree structure, single inference sources Graph structure, redundant inferences sources 
Diffused properties of entities Localized properties of entities 
Comparison of Naive and Physical Representations 
(source: Larkin, 1983) 
Figure 3.3 
Both naive and physical representations use rules of inference 
(qualitative, not directly tied to equations) to create new information, but they 
differ in the kinds of entities involved and the actual rules of inference used. 
Physical representations, for example, do not explicitly include time and are 
closely tied to physics principles. Thus, the physical representation depicts 
physical principles as constraint relations that can be examined independent 
of time flow. The naive representation relies on seeing the actual object, such 
as a toboggan going down a hill, as an entity whose behavior can be simulated 
as a sequence of events in time. Physical representations have localized 
attributes which are a defining part of the entity, independent of the context. 
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Naive representations, on the other hand, do  not separate the property of an 
entity (toboggans go down hills) from the environment (the snow is wet). In 
short, those who use naive representations have greater difficulty solving 
physics problems than those who use physical representations because of 
their inability to abstract the essential features of the problem from the details 
of the problem description. 
3.1.7.2 Analogies 
Gentner & Gentner (1983) studied mental models of electricity as analogies of 
flowing water or teeming crowds and their effectiveness in capturing certain 
principles of electricity. By comparing the usage of the two different 
analogies, they were able to show that the use of the analogy itself affected the 
thinking: that it was more than just another convenient way of talking about 
something they already knew through some other thinking process. The 
subiects who used the water model, for example, were more successful in 
differentiating between cases where the water analogy had greater explanatory 
power (batteries and voltages) while those that used the teeming crowd 
model were more successful in cases involving resistors and current flow. 
Analogies can convey overlap in relations among objects without 
necessarily sharing specific characteristics of the objects themselves. Thus, a 
water analogy can still convey the concept of a flow of electric current and 
voltage as a pressure differential without sharing the quality of wetness or the 
coupling of hydrogen and oxygen atoms. Analogies provide generic features 
that can be applicable in many settings that are very different in terms of the 
specific details. 
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3.1.1.3 Autonomous Objects 
Williams, Hollan, & Stevens (1983) studied how people invent, modify, and 
use various mental models in attempting to understand the mechanism of a 
heat exchanger. They propose several features fundamental to the concept of 
mental models. One feature is that they are composed of autonomo~is objects 
which have an "explicit representation of state, an explicit representation of 
its topological connection to other objects, and a set of internal parameters." 
These autonomous objects have definite boundaries and their behavior 
(defined as changes in parameter values) is "governed by internal rules 
reacting to internal parameter changes and to highly constrained external 
provocation." 
Heat Exchanger Model 
(source: Williams, et al., 1983) 
~ o t  Leg TI f1 -  
Cold Leg 1-3 f2 
Figure 3.4 
T2 
T4 
Mental models are comprised of a collection of connected autonomous 
objects that are rtinizable. By runnable, they mean that the parameter values 
of an autonomous object can change through qualitative inferences made 
based on its internal rules and specified topology. For example, a mental 
model of a heat exchanger would allow a person to "run" the implications of 
a sudden increase in the temperature of the hot leg liquid on the outgoing 
temperature of the cold leg liquid. Autonomous objects-based mental models 
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are seen to aid human reasoning by acting as inference engines for predicting 
the behavior of physical systems, for producing explanations, and serving as a 
mnemonic device to help remember things. 
3.1.2 Conceptual Domain of Knowledge 
Johnson-Laird (1983) distinguishes between physical models (representing the 
physical world) and conceptual models (representing more abstract matters). 
We will treat mental models in the organizational domain of knowledge as a 
subset of the social domain which is a sutxet of the more general domain of 
conceptual models. 
On a day-to-day basis, people communicate with others through linguistic 
constructions composed of words and sentences. People usually do  not think 
of such communication as being rooted in mental models that have been 
built up through prior inputs of other words. When a thought that was 
conveyed through words (a burning building) is retold to someone else, we 
are relating a real world object and not just a linguistic construction (article, 
adjective, noun). The distinction that the mental representation of sentences 
and texts model aspects of the world and not aspects of linguistic structure, is 
an important one for linguists. In Garnham's (1987, p. 16) words: 
Language is a tool that can be used to convey information about the world, 
but it does not follow that language itself is the system in which situations in 
the world are represented. Indeed, Enany people feel uncomfortable with the 
idea that a sentence represents a state of affairs .... If language does not 
represent the world, it is nevertheless true that information conveyed by 
sentences and texts can be incorporated into rnsntal representations. 
Furthermore, it is often the case that the knowledge people have of situations 
has been derived entirely from what they have been told. Linguistic inputs can 
be the sole external source for setting up a representation of a part of the world. 
For those of us who "know" the world through reading texts and listening to 
others talk of their experiences, our mental representations have been 
derived primarily through words as input as opposed to direct stimuli of our 
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other senses. That is, our mental models are created primarily on the basis of 
linguistic inputs. 
Linguistically based mental models 
...p lay a central and unifying role in representing objects, states of affairs, 
sequences of events, the way the world is, and the social and psychological 
actions of daily life. They enable individuals to make inferences and 
predictions, to understand phenomena, to decide what action to take and to 
control its execution, and above all to experience events by proxy; they allow 
language to be used to create representations comparable to those deriving from 
direct acquaintance with the world; and they relate words to the world by way 
of conception and perception. (Johnson-Laird, 1983, p. 397). 
In a general sense, linguistically based mental models affect almost all social 
interaction since most social activities require verbal communication, oral or 
written. The domain of linguistic mental models is broad and all- 
encompassing, which makes it relevant to the study of practically all human 
endeavors. While we recognize its ubiquitous relevance, we will take a more 
focused approach in integrating the contributions of linguistics to our concept 
of mental models. In particular, we will look at two related approaches to 
representing mental models, scripts and stories. 
3.1.2.1 Scripts 
Schank & Abelson (1977) proposed that part of people's knowledge is 
associated with each one. A script for dining in a restaurant, for example, 
may contain routines for making reservations, selecting a mode of 
transportation, ordering the meal (which may include sub-routines for 
ordering wine, appetizers and dessert), paying for the meal, etc. Scripts can 
help people in the planning and execution of conventional activities. They 
can also enable a person to understand when he or she observes someone else 
performing another instance of a conventional activity. 
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If we already have a script of washing clothes at a laundromat, for 
example, we are quick to understand what the other person is doing when 
they begin to separate clothes into different piles, go to the change machine 
and get a handful of quarters, bring over a rolling cart to load the piles of 
clothes, and search for a machine that is not in use. Without such a script 
(and no personal knowledge of the routines involved), the actions can appear 
as disjointed movements that are confusing and incoherent. 
When describing familiar activities, people generally agree on the nature 
of the characters involved, the actions taken, as well as the sequence of the 
actions (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979). They also agree on the segmenting of 
low-level actions into "scenes" which suggests a hierarchical order to their 
organization in memory. That is, "the script is not a linear chain of actions at 
one level but rather a hierarchically organized 'treef of events with several 
levels of subordinate actions" (Bower, et al., 1979, p. 186). In this tree, 
answers to why questions can be obtained by moving up the tree and answers 
to how questions are to be found by going down the tree. 
Analogous to the frameworks and routines in our OADI-IMM model, 
scripts provide a dual benefit by enabling understanding of situations (as 
schema-based sense-making structures) and by providing an appropriate 
guide to behavior for those situations (Gioia & Poole, 1984). That is, a script 
provides both the framework or context and the routines or sub-routines 
providing the know-how for following the script. At the top of the tree is the 
naming of the script itself which contains the know-why, and at each 
successive level down there is a routine that embodies the know-how. 
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3.1.2.2 Story Model 
In script theory, a person uses a script to understand situations that are 
similar to previously encountered ones. Scripts about conventional activities 
are commonly available through direct experience, observations, reading, 
conversations, television, etc. In contrast, the story model proposed by 
Pennington & Hastie (1991) in the context of juror decision-making is based 
on the hypothesis that jurors impose a narrative story organization on the 
evidence presented during the trial (see Figure 3.5). Their story model 
includes the following processes: 
...( 1) evidence evaluation through story construction, (2) representation of the 
decision alternatives by learning verdict category attributes, and (3) reaching a 
decision through the classification of the story into the best fitting verdict 
category. (Pennington & Hastie, 1991, p. 521). 
In addition to the above, the model claims that the jurors base their decisions 
on the story they have constructed using four certainty principles that 
determine the choice of story-coverage, coherence, uniqueness, and 
goodness-of-fit. 
In the construction of the story, three types of knowledge will be used 
according to the theory: 
..( 1) case-specific information acquired during the trial (e.g., statements made 
by witnesses about past events relevant to the decision), (2) knowledge about 
events similar in content to those that are the topic of dispute (e.g., knowledge 
about a similar crime in the juror's community), and (3) generic expectations 
about what makes a complete story (e.g., knowledge that human actions are 
usually motivated by goals). This constructive mental activity results in one or 
more interpretations of the evidence that have a narrative story form. One of 
these interpretation (stories) will be accepted by the juror as the best 
explanation of the evidence, The story that is accepted is the one that 
provides the greatest coverage of the evidence and is the most coherent, as 
determined by the particular juror. (Pennington & Hastie, 1991, pp. 521-22). 
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ABOUT STORY 
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STORY TO VERDICT 
CATEGOR I E S 
Sample Story Model for Juror Decision-making 
(source: Pennington & Hastie, 1991) 
CONCLUDE WITH 
VERDICT B IF FIT 
IS GOOD 
Figure 3.5 
Having the greatest coverage means that it accounts for the largest 
portion of the evidence presented. Coherence has three components: 
consistency (no internal contradictions), plausibility (corresponds with 
decision-maker's knowledge of the world), and. completeness (story has all the 
expected parts). These three components of coherence may be fulfilled to a 
greater or lesser extent, and the values of all three combine to give the overall 
sense of coherence. - 
3.1.2.3 Schemas 
Both the script and story models can be considered to be a subset of a larger 
theory-schema theory. A schema represents a cognitive structure that 
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contains organized knowledge about specific concepts or types of stimuli, both 
the attributes of the concepts as well as the relationships among the attributes. 
The following is a social schemata in action: 
A young woman, casually dressed, walked over to the campus bookstore's 
requisition desk. 'I'd like to order the books for a course,' she said, 
The older woman behind the desk said, 'The books aren't in yet for the fall 
semester.' 
'I know,' the first woman replied. 'I'd like to order ths books for the 
course.' 
'Oh, certainly. Well, what books does the professor want?' asked the 
other, helpfully. 
'I am the professor,' was the frustrated reply. 
Assumptions about other people enable us to function. Knowing or guessing 
tbit another person is a student, a secretary, or a professor allows us to observe 
and interpret, to remember and forget, to infer and judge, all in ways that fit our 
expectations about particular kinds of people. Accumulated general knowledge 
about categories of people does not do justice to the unique qualities of any given 
individual, but it makes possible a certain efficiency and adaptiveness in social 
cognition. (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, p. 139) 
The schema concept is seen as a "theory-driven" cognitive process 
because of the way in which they actively affect the way in which people view 
data as opposed to a "data-driven" process where the data shapes people's 
theories. Schemas are theories that help people select, process, and analyze 
raw data that they perceive. It is based on a fundamental assumption that 
people actively construct their reality by creating meanings and then adding 
to it observations from the world. The salesperson and the professor were 
running up against the salesperson's theory of what a professor looks like. If; 
did not occur to her that a casually dressed woman could be a professor. 
Those visual cues affected the interaction and eliminated certain possibilities 
that would not have been eliminated, presumably, if the woman looked 
more like the salesperson's picture of a professor. This powerful aspect of 
mental models cannot be underestimated. 
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3.1.2.4 Inflz~ence Diagrams 
The mental models representations covered thus far have been represented 
verbally through the language of words (scripts, stories, and schemas) or 
mathematically through the language of symbols (physical domain). There 
are, however, graphical methods for mapping mental models as well. The 
differences between graphics and verbal language-based representations are 
shown in Figure 3.6. 
Generally speaking, graphics allows one to grasp the whole first, then the 
parts; with language, it's the reverse. Graphics are also easier to understand 
without much instruction since comprehensibility is not rule-based. Using 
purely graphics-based representations, however, can be too limiting without 
the added flexibility of language. A hybrid system that uses both language and 
graphics can get the best of both worlds by combining the holistic visual 
impact of graphics with the concept-rich constructions of language. The first 
of these graphics-langziage methods to be covered is an influence diagram. 
Graphics Verbal Language 
Manner of First, the whole is First, elements are recognized. 
recognition: grasped. Next, elements Next, whole is constructed. 
are analyzed. 
Ease of Understood by almost If rules are not understood, 
understanding: anybody immediately then it  is incomprehensible 
(pictures). (e.g., foreign languages). 
Graphics vs. Language-based Representations 
(source: Mizuno, 1988) 
Figure 3.6 
Bostrom, et al. (1992) laid out a general methodology for characterizing 
people's mental models using a network representation of expert knowledge. 
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An i1zfl;~e11ce diagram is composed of node-link-node combinations which 
portray relationships where the value of a concept at the tail of an arrow 
influences the value of the concept a t  the arrowhead (see Figure 3.7). In the 
"Partial Influence Diagram of Radon Risk," for example, "radon 
concentration in gas supply" and "gas use pattern" influence "flux of radon 
from gas into house." When an influence diagram 
Radon f rom natural  
from gas into 
is completely specified, 
Radon f rom bui lding mater ia ls  
daughters into air of 
diffusion barriers 
a .Specific (low-level) concepts 0 Basic (high-level) concepts 
Partial Influence Diagram of Radon Risks 
(source: Bostrom, et al., 1992) 
Figure 3.7 
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conditional probabilities would be assigned to every link where "a influences 
b " if the probability distribution of b conditioned on a is different from the 
unconditioned distribution of bf' (Bostrom, et al., 1992, p. 87). 
The basic idea behind their methodology is to assess the completeness and 
accuracy of people's mental models about a given issue, such as radon risks, 
by mapping out their understanding into an influence diagram and 
comparing it to an expert influence diagram. They outlined the following 
steps: 
. .(a) create an expert influence diagram, (b) elicit lay people's relevant 
beliefs, (c) map those beliefs into the diagram, and (d) identify gaps and 
misconceptions. Once risk communications have been composed to address these 
lacunae, their impact should be evaluated empirically by repeating Steps b 
through d.  (Bostrom, et al., 1992, p. 89) 
In their analysis, they measured completeness as a percentage of concepts 
contained in the expert model that was also in a lay person's model. They 
also measured concurrence which they defined as a percentage of the lay 
person's concepts that also appeared in the expert model. Accuracy was then 
computed as a product of completeness and concurrence. On the basis of their 
study results, Bostrom, et al. concluded that "people's understanding of the 
radon problem seems not only incomplete but also incoherent, in the sensb of 
containing scattered and inconsistent items" (Bostrom, et at., 1992, p. 98). The 
influence diagram allowed them to explicitly map out people's understanding 
of the interconnections among many variables and identify gaps in 
understanding. 
3.1 -2.5 Total Quality Management ( T Q M )  Maps 
One reason for the relative widespread use and acceptance of Total Quality 
Management (TQM) tools and methodology is that the tools are designed for 
'mass consumption." The tools also fall into the graphics-language category, 
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which gives them the visual impact of graphics as well as the conceptual basis 
of language (see Figure 3.8). They are accessible because of three important 
features: (1) each tool is presented in bite-sized steps, (2) each step has clear 
guidelines for ease-of-use, and (3) all the tools have been systematically tested 
in the field. These seven tools are useful for looking at numerical data and 
constructing explicit maps of the informations4 
Of the seven QC tools, the cause-and-effect (CE) diagram is the only one in 
the network system category in Figure 3.8. The tools in the column-row 
system and the coordinate system are different ways of plotting various kinds 
of data. The CE diagram, on the other hand, requires a person to graphically 
-- 
Graphics-language Traditional seven Seven new quality 
system QC tools management tools 
Relational System KJ Method (or Affinity diagram) 
Network System Cause-and-effect Relations diagram method 
diagram Systematic diagram method 
Arrow diagram method 
PDPC (Process Decision 
Program Chart) method 
Column-row system Checksheet Matrix diagram method 
Coordinate system Pareto chart Matrix data-analysis 
Histogram method 
Scatter diagram 
Control chart 
Graphs 
Graphics-Language System Classification of TQM Tools 
(adapted from Mizuno, 1988) 
Figure 3.8 
*arious guidebooks are available that outline a step-by-step process for using the seven tools 
of quality control (QC) (Ishikawa, 1982); (Goal/QPC, 1985). 
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map one's understanding of the causal connections that contributes to the 
-7 
"effect" of interest, like deteriorating quality (see Figure 3.9). fcach arrow can 
have another tier of arrows pointing to it with factors that are causally linked 
to it. They/ in turn, can have arrows pointing to them. The final map looks 
like tree branches with little twigs sprouting from them. One of the main 
purposes of the CE diagram is to take quantitative data and sort out the causes 
of dispersion and organize causal relationships in a way that makes it clear 
what actions should be taken next. 
The seven "new" quality management tools (see Figure 3.8) takes a 
similar approach as the seven QC tools to looking at qualitative data in a 
rigorous way. Unlike the seven QC tools, the majority of these tools are in 
the network system and relational system category which makes them good 
candidates for representing mental models. The relations diagram helps 
clarify complex problems or situations by mapping them into intertwined 
causal relationships and facilitates the finding of appropriate solutions 
(Mizuno, 1988).5 The relations diagram method uses diagrams like the one 
in Figure 3.10 to solve problems that have a complex cause-and-effect 
relationship by: 
...( 1) isolating all factors related to the issue, (2) expressing these factors 
freely and concisely, (3) identifying logically the cause-and-effect 
relationships and depicting them using arrows in a relations diagram, (4) 
producing a complete picture, (5) extracting the key factors. (Mizuno, 1988, p. 
88) 
5~ brief description of the other methods in the same category follows. The systematic 
diagram is like a family tree or an organizational chart where one can trace the genealogy of 
problems or the means to accomplish given objectives. An arrow diagram is designed to help 
establish plans and monitor progress on a project. It can be used in conjunction with and in support of 
Gantt charts, PERT, and CPM for project management. The PDPC or Process Decision Program Chart 
is used for selecting the best processes to ensure obtaining desired results by reviewing various 
conceivable outcomes. For a fuller explanation, see Mizuno (1988). 
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Cause I 
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Effect 
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Cause-Effect Diagram 
(source: Ishikawa, 1982) 
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Figure 3.9 
I 
Equipment Measurement I 
_t I 
A Relations Diagram 
(source: Mizuno, 1988) 
Figure 3.10 
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The relations diagram is a logical technique that attempts to incorporate 
factors and items from a broad perspective into a logical cause-and-effect map 
of relationships. The relations diagram is considered to be the only QC tech- 
nique that is effective in tackling cases involving complex inter-relationships. 
Although the QC tools have not been explicitly linked to the concept of 
mental models in the TQM literature, several of them are, in effect, maps of 
mental models. The relations diagram and cause-and-effect diagram 
described above, for example, are very similar to the influence diagram 
discussed earlier. 
3.1.2.6 Action Maps 
Argyris & Schon (1978, p. 160) say: 
Maps, as we have pointed out, are organized pictures which show how the 
features of the system have been placed in some sort of pattern which 
illuminates the interdependence among the parts of the system. By 
interdependence, we mean the mechanisms by which the parts take from and 
give to each other the information needed to permit each part to accomplish its 
organic role and simultaneously help other parts to do the same, thereby 
creating and maintaining the system. 
Action mapping provides this container by the types of information it elicits, 
as well as the intention of making explicit what is, under most conditions 
inscrutable. Argyris believes there is much to learn from digging out the 
buried and hidden "undiscussables" lodged in individual heads and making 
that information available for consideration. It is the stuff that does not "go 
without saying," although individuals may believe that it can be taken for 
granted. 
Argyris maintains that just because people don't talk about their true 
motives or reasoning behind their actions does not mean that what is left 
unsaid is not driving their behavior. In Figure 3.11, we see an example of a 
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Contextual Cue Strategies Consequences 
When holding an withhold that I am holding little learning 
evaluation (that I an evaluation 
anticipate will be avoidance of conflict 
upsetting) withhold the withholding 
avoidance of 
and either disconfirmation of my 
evaluation 
reflect client's statement 
or present an intervention remain blind to my 
A strategy option based on responsibility and blame 
the assumption that the my client 
evaluation is true 
client becomes defensive 
communicate the and may act in ways that 
evaluation tacitly and confirm my evaluation 
[imply] that it is not 
discussable 
Action Map of a Counselor's Practice 
(source: Argyris, et al., 1985) 
Figure 3.11 
counselor's map of a tacit rule that describes "an inter-related set of 
propositions that told her how to act in the face of negative evaluations and a 
fear of evoking defensiveness" (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985, pp. 248-249). 
This map made explicit a tacit rule that made a counselor who was intent on 
being client focused, unknowingly act in a very counselor-centered way. 
Action maps generally include feedback loops which are meant to graphically 
capture an individual's (or organization's) pattern of behavior that locks itself 
in a cycle of repeated (and sometimes escalating) actions. 
3.1.2.7 System Dynamics 
System dynamics is a field of study that provides a methodology for mapping 
circular relationships and synthesizing disparate types of variables that have 
traditionally been considered too "fuzzy" to measure. Based on the concept of 
feedback loops, system dynamics provides a methodology for mapping the 
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ways in which prevailing policies may restrict learning and prevent us from 
gaining deeper insights into the nature of complex systems (see Appendix A 
for a list of ten different tools). 
Circular Causali ty .  James D.  Watson (1981) describes the process through 
which he and Francis Crick "cracked" the DNA code. While others were 
searching for complex structures to explain the diversity of life forms, they 
explored more simple, geometrical designs and eventually received a Nobel 
Prize for revealing the double helix structure that is the genetic basis for all 
life. Through their research, Watson and Crick proved that the infinite 
variations we see in nature can all be produced by one simple, elegant 
structure. 
Similarly, from a system dynamics perspective, two basic feedback loops- 
reinforcing and balancingb-can be seen as the equivalent building blocks of 
complex social and economic systems. These simple structures, represented 
as causal loop diagrams (CLD1s), combine in an infinite variety of ways to 
produce the complex system behaviors that managers are expected to control 
(for guidelines on constructing CLD's, see Appendix B). We can think of 
CLD1s as sentences which are constructed by linking together key variables 
with directed arcs and indicating the causal relationships between them. By 
stringing together several loops, we can create a coherent map of the structure 
underlying a particular problem or issue. A directed arc or link connects two 
 h he traditional system dynamics notation for signing the links are the plus sign to indicate 
additive change (and positive feedback loop to indicate a process that goes through additive 
cycles) and the minus sign to indicate a negatiq change (and negative feedback loops to indicate a 
process that ends up negating change at the end of a cycle). I have chosen to adopt the notation 
developed by Innovation Associates (Framingham, MA) that is free from the evaluative 
connotations of the words positive and negative. Instead of a plus we used an "s" to represent a 
change in the same direction. Instead of a minus, we used an "o" to denote a change in the opposite 
direction. Positive loops are referred to as reinforcing loops and negative loops are referred to as 
balancing loops. I recommend adopting such a notation for fieldwork because it communicates the 
message with less ambiguity. 
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variables together with the arrowhead pointing to the "effect" from the 
"cause" variable. A directional sign is indicated by an "s" meaning the two 
variables move in the same direction, or an "o" meaning the two variables 
move in opposite directions. 
Reinforcing Loops: Engines of Growth and Collapse. Reinforcing loops 
produce both growth and collapse. That is, they compound change in one 
direction with even more change. For example, in the employee-supervisor 
reinforcing loop (see Figure 3.12), positive reinforcement from the supervisor 
is capable of producing good employee performance, i.e., as Employee 
Performance increases, Supervisor's Supportive Behavior increases (same 
direction), leading to even higher "Employee Performance (same direction). 
This is often referred to as the "Pygmalion effect." Negative reinforcement, 
on the other hand, can produce the exact opposite effect. If "Employee 
Performance" had decreased for some reason, then the "Supervisors' 
Supportive Behavior" also decreases (same direction), which leads to further 
erosion of "Employee Performance" (same direction). 
Structure Behavior Over Time 
, Employee 
Supervisor's 
Behavior 
Supportive 
Reinforcing Loop 
(source: The Systems ThinkerTbf, Vol. 1, No. 1) 
Figure 3.12 
Positive 
~erfomanc! Reinforcement 
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Balancing Loops: Goal-Seeking Processes. Balancing loops try to bring 
things to a desired state and keep them there, much like a thermostat 
regulates the temperature in a house. An example in manufacturing 
involves maintaining buffer inventory levels between production stages (see 
Figure 3.13). In this situation, there is a desired inventory level which is 
maintained by adjusting the actual inventory whenever there is too much or 
too little. When the "Discrepancy" increases, "Inventory Adjustments" also 
increases to correct the discrepancy (same direction). This leads to a rise in the 
"Actual Inventory" (same direction), which reduces the "Discrepancy 
(opposite direction). Thus, when we come full circle, the actions tend to bring 
the system into "balance." 
From this feedback perspective, all complex dynamic behavior is 
produced by some combination of these two basic loops: reinforcing and 
balancing. The importance of this feedback loop concept is underscored by 
Weick (1991, p. 86). 
Most managers get into trouble because they forget to think in circles. I 
mean that literally. Managerial problems persist because managers continue to 
believe that there are such things as unilateral causation, independent, and 
dependent variables, origins and terminations. Examples are everywhere: 
leadership style affects productivity, parents socialize children, stimuli affect 
responses, ends affect means, desires affect actions. Those assertions are wrong 
because each of them demonstrably also operates in the opposite direction: 
productivity affects leadership style (Lowin and Craig 1968), children 
socialize parents (Osofsky 1971), responses affect stimuli (Gombrich 1960)) 
means affect ends (Hirschman and Lindblom 1962), actions affect desires (Bem 
1967). In every one of these examples causation is circular, not linear. And the 
same thing holds true for most organizational events. 
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Inventory m Discrepancy A widgets desired 
Actual 
inventory 
b 
Time 
Balancing Loop 
(source: The Systems ThinkerTh1, Vol. 1, No. 1) 
Figure 3.13 
The circular interconnected ways in which organizations operate is what 
makes them such complex systems. That is why, from a system dynamics 
perspective, if a system is decomposed into its components and each 
component is optimized, the system as a whole can be guaranteed not  to be 
optimal. A common characteristic of many complex systems, however, is 
that they are often designed with the intention of optimizing the parts rather 
than the whole. Causal loop diagrams are used to help map the 
interconnections among all relevant parts of a system, to capture a more 
integrated view of the system. 
System dynamics can help managers gain a more systemic view of their 
organization by focusing on making their mental rtiodels of critical issues 
explicit, exposing them to challenge, and altering them based on insights 
gained from this process. Although this can be said to varying degrees of all 
the different ways in which mental models may be represented, there are 
domains in which the system dynamics methods excel over the others. This 
point will be clarified in section 3.2.2 on Domain of Usefulness. 
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3.2 A TYPOLOGY OF MENTAL MODEL REPRESENTATIONS 
Making mental models explicit requires a language or tool with which to 
capture and communicate them. Different methods are useful in some 
domains and less so in others. In this section, we will pull together various 
ideas gathered from the literature reviewed above and create a typology to 
better understand the differing strengths and domains of applicability of the 
available methods. 
3.2.1 Criteria for Representing Mental Models Based on the Literature 
Based on the literature reviewed above, we can generalize a set of criteria for 
evaluating the usefulness of mental model representations. From the 
research on physical systems reviewed above, three general features of mental 
model work are particularly relevant to our model of organizational learning. 
First, a mental model representation should be sufficiently abstract to allow a 
person to think in terms of principles that are "disembodied" from the 
physical form (Larkin, 1983). Second, it should be sufficiently generic to hold 
true in various settings even though the specific characteristics of the 
representations may change (Gentner & Gentner, 1983). Third, it should be 
runnable-that is, represented in such a form as to allow mental simulation 
for inferring what the future state of a system will be (deKleer & Brown, 1983; 
Norman, 1983; Williams, et al., 1983). That is, not only do mental models 
provide us with ways to perceive the world around us in the present 
moment, they also project us into future considerations and expectations, 
Although the above discussion is presented in terms of concepts, not 
actions, the criteria apply to both mental model frameworks and to mental 
model routines. Being abstract means that the know-how is proceduralized 
into a "macro" routine (e.g., processing payroll checks) and not at a "micro" 
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level (e.g., getting the checks out of the drawer, putting pen to paper, etc.) 
Routines can be generic such that a basic routine is applicable to different 
circumstances (e.g., processing accounts payables or purchase orders). 
Routines, of course, must also be runnable in order for them to be useful. 
In the survey of the literature in the conceptual domain there are also 
several features worth noting. The concept of scripts reinforces the dual role 
of mental models in conceptual understanding and developing routines that 
guide behavior. In schema theory we see mental models as theory-driven 
cognitive processes where a particular schemata affects the way we view data 
versus a data-driven process where the data themselves affect the theory 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1984). In reality, both processes are always at work, although 
schema theory puts more emphasis on the former. The TQM literature 
highlighted the difference between verbal language and graphics-language 
representation systems and showed how graphics-language systems are better 
suited for explicating complex cause and effect relationships and 
communicating them to others. Both action maps and causal loop diagrams 
explicitly treat feedback relationships, with causal loop diagrams presenting a 
more rigorous method for treating multiple feedback loops. 
In addition to the many attributes summarized above, there were also 
some methodologies for validity testing of the mental model representations. 
The story model, for example, included a process for checking the overall 
coherence of the story which included consistency, plausibility, and 
completeness. In the use of influence diagrams, there was a method for 
testing the accuracy of the diagrams created by lay people by assessing 
completeness and concurrence. 
Mental model representation criteria summary: 
Provides a level of abstract representation 
Organizational Learning: Framework & Methodology 
Allows transferability through generic representation 
Enables mental simulation ("runnable") 
Are theory-driven 
Are testable 
Each of the representational systems reviewed embodies a particular 
perspective on the world and utilizes a specific form for capturing its view of 
the world. Clearly, no single representational scheme can be equally well- 
suited to model all domains of relevance. The combination of 
representational form and the worldview employed determine what 
domains each mental model representational system is capable of addressing. 
In the next section, we will draw a distinction between two different domains 
of usefulness and show why a system dynamics approach is well-suited for 
addressing domains where dynamic complexity is high. 
3.2.2 Domains of Usefulness: Dynamic vs. Detail Complexity 
Most of the mental model representation methods discussed above under the 
organizational domain of knowledge are suitable for mapping static 
relationships that deal with large amounts of detail. For example, the story 
model (presented in section 3.1.2.2) provided a way to make sense out of a 
very detail-rich case by providing a coherent storyline. The use of scripts, 
likewise, allows one to remember large amounts of information that are 
linked to scripts which act as triggers (e.g., when a person triggers a restaurant 
script, that in turn triggers sub-routines that are applicable in that situation). 
With the exception of systems maps, the representational methods are 
appropriate for dealing with situations that are rich in detail complexity, not 
dynamic complexity. And yet, arguably, the areas of significant importance in 
which organizations most need to learn are specifically those areas which 
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have complex short-term vs. long-term trade-offs, complex inter- 
relationships, and non-obvious causal interdependencies, i.e., while a 
network of proximate causal relationships might be identifiable by 
participants in the system, the critical inter-relationships for some other 
pattern of behavior are not obvious . 
In this next section, we will clarify what we mean by dynamic complexity. 
We will then propose why system dynamics provides a methodology and set 
of tools that are particularly well-suited for mapping dynamic complexity. 
Finally, we will present a typology that summarizes the various 
representational maps that have been presented in this chapter. The typology 
distinguishes between the different representational systems by language type 
and by the domain of usefulness. 
3.2.2.1 Characteristics of Dynamic Complexity 
Ackoff defines a mess as follows: 
I am going to call this thing a mess. Then we say that what reality 
consists of are messes, not problems. 
Now what is a problem? Let's take a mess for a moment, which is what 
you're confronted with in the morning when you come to work, and let's analyze 
it. Remember what analysis is-to take something apart. So if we take a mess 
and start to break it up into its components, what do we find that those parts 
are? The parts are problems. Therefore, a problem is an abstraction obtained 
by analyzing a mess. 
Then what is a mess? That's the significant thing-a mess is a system of 
problems. Now, the significance of this is that the traditional way of 
managing is to take a mess and break it up into problems and solve each problem 
separately, with the assumption that the mess is solved if we solve each part 
of it, 
But remember ... if you break a system into parts and make every part 
behave as effectively as possible, the whole will not behave as effectively as 
possible. Therefore, the solution to a mess does a consist of the sum of the 
solutions to the problems that make it up. And that is absolutely 
f~ndamen ta l .~ (~ckof f ,  p. 13) 
'This is taken from an essay by Russell Ackoff entitled "The Second Industrial Revolution." 
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In short, Ackoff's term "organizational messes" describes situations that are 
high in dynamic complexity. Figure 3.14 is an attempt to classify 
"organizational messes" into a grid based on Organizational Complexitv (the 
number of organizational units and level of complexity of their inter- 
connections) and Time Lags of Process (inherent time delays of the activities 
involved). "Fuzzy" variables often accompany Ackoffls "messes" because 
such systems are rarely clear-cut or well-defined by traditional measures. 
Organizational settings that are high in dynamic complexity have three 
characteristics: a high degree of organizational complexity, long time delays, 
and fuzzy variables. 
3.2.2.2 Organizational Complexity 
Schneiderman (1988) showed that the rate of improvement in a wide range of 
TQM projects is primarily a function of the organizational complexity of the 
project, not the specifics of the project itself. To appreciate how 
organizational complexity can present great difficulties in communicating, 
consider 
an organization with six levels below the senior executive and a span of 
control of three. This makes 1,093 people. More importantly, there are 586,778 
potential two-person interfaces that represent potential internal supplier- 
customer relationships. These 1,093 people depend on one other to get their job 
done, but their interdependencies are not explicit (Baker, 1989, p. 13). 
Managing even a few of those supplier-customer relationships can be a 
daunting task. Actions taken without an understanding of the 
interdependencies, however, can produce undesirable results. For example, 
managers at Xerox who bought into the concept of Just-in-Time (JIT) 
manufacturing "solved" their inventory problems by demanding their 
suppliers to hold the inventory until they were ready to accept them. By 
''injecting" a good idea into one part of the system without a full appreciation 
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of the whole, they severely strained the good supplier relations painstakingly 
developed over many years (Hutchins, 1986). 
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Figure 3.14 
3.2.2.3 Time Delays 
When time delays are relatively short, understanding the dynamics of the 
system is usually pretty straightforward. For example, reducing defects at a 
specific production step means getting real-time data and analyzing it. The 
process step usually takes minutes or hours, not days or months. Thus, it is 
feasible to collect data and be confident about causal conclusions drawn from 
the data. When the time delays of a project are extremely long, such as in 
product development, running real-time experiments becomes impractical 
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and current data is of limited usefulness. One can tweak individual steps 
within the process but cannot gain much insight about their implications on 
the process as a whole. 
3.2.2.4 Fuzzy variables 
The three laws of TQM are "look at the data, look at the data, and look at the 
data." Getting good, reliable data is not an easy thing to do, even on 
mechanical processes which have universally accepted units of measure such 
as units per minute, or pounds per unit. The task of collecting data becomes 
m ~ c h  more difficult as the measured item becomes less and less tangible. 
Fuzzy variables include such notions as time pressure, morale, productivity, 
creativity, and other information that may be available only at the intuitive 
level. 
3.2.3 Mapping Dynamic Complexity 
Mapping dynamic complexity requires a set of tools that is designed to map 
complex interrelationships and time delays in a system. System dynamics 
provides a set of tools and a methodology that are particularly well-suited to 
addressing the three characteristics of dynamically complex systems defined 
above. Fundamentally, system dynamics is about understanding the inter- 
connected feedback structures and dynamic behavior of complex systems. 
System dynamics embraces a particular view of reality that is powerful for 
understanding dynamic phenomena and encompasses many tools that are 
well-suited for tackling dynamic complexity. Prominent among them is the 
use of computer models, which enable the compression of time in order to 
simulate the long-term consequences of policies, and provide a format for 
quantifying the effects of fuzzy variables, such as morale, on performance 
figures, such as weekly sales. 
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Forrester (1961) presented a classification of models that provides an 
overview of the different categories of models that are of interest in 
differentiating between detail and dynamic complexity (see Figure 3.15). In 
the diagram, he identifies the kinds of models he feels are likely to 
realistically represent corporate and economic behavior-abstract, dynamic 
models that produce both transient and steady-state behaviors. I see those to 
Models 
/Y^x ear /ne, 
Unstab le Stable Unstab le Stable 
^ \  Steady- T rans i en t  
State 
Real i s t i c  
r ep resen ta t i on  o f  
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State 0 \ 
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( n o n e x i s t e n t )  
T rans i en t  
( n o n e x i s t e n t )  
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i n  t h e  management 
and economics 
I i t e r a t u r e  
Classification of Models 
(source: Forrester, 1961) 
Figure 3.15 
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be in the domain of dynamic complexity. The other class of models which he 
identifies as static, linear, and stable or dynamic, linear and stable are in the 
domain of detail complexity. System dynamics models are generally built to 
address dynamic complexity. 
System dynamics computer models are created through a rigorous 
thinking process which requires at least five different types of thinking 
skills-dynamic, generic, structural, operational, and scientific (Richmond 
(1990). Dynamic thinking is the ability to see and to deduce behavior patterns 
rather than focusing on and seeking to predict events. Generic thinking leads 
us away from thinking in terms of specifics and seeing commonalties across 
diverse settings. Struc tural  thinking, one of the most disciplined of the 
systems thinking tracks, requires that people think in terms of units-of- 
measure, or dimensions, and that they rigorously adhere to physical 
conservation laws, as in the distinction between a stock and a flow in a 
structural diagram. The fourth skill, operational thinking, means thinking in 
terms of how things really work-not how they theoretically work, and it 
grounds students in reality. Lastly, sc ient i f ic  thinking has to do with 
quantification (as opposed to precise measurement) and rigorous testing of 
hypotheses. 
Each of these thinking skills is required in system dynamics. Kim (1990) 
proposes a set of ten systems thinking tools that explicitly maps the system 
dynamics tools that are currently in use into several of the critical thinking 
skills identified by Richmond (see Appendix A). 
3.2.4 A Typology 
The typology contained in Figure 3.16 maps the various representational 
systems described above by representational system and domain of usefulness 
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(detail vs. dynamic complexity). This particular grid was selected in order to 
highlight the domain of organizational issues that we will be focusing on in 
Chapters 5 and 6 (which are high in dynamic complexity) and how the 
representational system (graphics-language feedback system) used differs from 
the others that have been presented. The purpose of this typology is to show 
relative strengths and not to categorically typecast each into a single box. 
Stories, for example, can convey a great deal of dynamic complexity, just as 
causal loop diagrams can represent a lot of detail complexity. The nature of 
each representational form, however, makes one stronger in capturing detail 
complexity and the other in dyn ~arnic complexity. 
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For the purposes of this dissertation, we will focus on the dynamic 
complexity domain and explore how system dynamics can contribute to the 
process of building shared mental models. 
System dynamics 
computer model 
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We have looked at great length what the attributes of mental models are and 
developed a typology of representational systems in Figure 3.16. Up to now, 
we have not addressed the issue of individual versus shared mental models. 
If a representational system works at the individual level, there is no reason 
for it not to work at the shared level. So, why do we even make the 
distinction between individual and shared mental models? Couldn't the 
explication of an individual mental model be considered an automatic 
contribution to a common organizational pool of available mental model 
representations? The answer is a qualified "no." 
On the face of it, the proposition seems valid. If an individual who is a 
member of an organization maps out his or her mental model and makes it 
available to other members, it certainly has the potential to be a shared 
mental model. But the real question is whether it is actually shared inside 
the minds of other members of the organization. This is an issue of diffusion 
and is dependent, in part, on the access ibi l i ty  of the mental model 
representation. Shared mental models, therefore, are those that have been 
internalized by many of the organizational members into a Weltanschauung 
that informs their view of the world and organizational routines that are 
consistent with that view. Simply having explicit organizational maps 
developed and available does not guarantee the existence of a shared mental 
model in the same way that having a company vision statement in print does 
not guarantee having a shared vision (Senge, 1990b). 
3.3.1 Accessibility 
Even though system dynamics has had a long tradition of recognizing the 
importance of mental models in organizational decision-making, the 
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development of system dynamics tools has focused primarily on preserving 
the rigor of the mathematical computer modeling discipline. The traditional 
textbooks have treated the computer model as the ultimate output of the 
system dynamics method. Both Richardson & Pugh (1981) and Richmond, et 
al. (1987) focus on developing models in a particular modeling language 
(DYNAMO and STELLA, respectively); Roberts (1983) presents a more general 
treatment of simulation models; Randers (1980) covers the principles 
underlying the system dynamics method. 
Of course, it isn't the sophistication of the modeling method or the 
elegance of the mathematical formulations that is important, but rather the 
relevance and significance of the issues modeled. As Forrester (1961, p. 116) 
writes: 
An elaborate and accurate model is of little value if it relates to questions 
and behavior that are of no consequence to the success of the organization. On 
the other hand, a simple and even inaccurate model may still be tremendously 
valuable if it yields only a little better understanding of the reasons for major 
success and failure. Our mental models are examples. The simple and rather . 
inaccurate dynamic models in the minds of skilled managers have been far more 
effective in carrying our industrial civilization to its present heights than 
have the formal mathematical models thus far used in management and 
economic science. The manager's working models in the form of verbal 
descriptions and thought processes are more attuned to important objectives of 
the future and more perceptive of the behavior mechanisms of actual 
organizations than have been the abstract models developed for the 
explanation of the past. 
Throughout the system dynamics literature, causal loop diagrams play a 
secondary role to computer simulation models in representing mental 
models (Forrester, 1971; Richardson & Pugh, 1981). Causal loop diagram 
mapping are presented as rich in problem conceptualization when building 
the model and in communication of model insights after the modeling 
project has been completed. It is recognized that the formulation of and 
testing of the computer model can generate insights about the system and 
alter people's mental models, but the computer models themselves do not 
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remain in people's minds. Causal loop diagrams are often used to 
encapsulate general principles and lessons arising from computer models. 
In The Fifth Discipline, Senge (1990b) proposes a different role for causal 
loop diagrams as a managerial tool for preliminary diagnosis and 
collaborative inquiry. He presents a set of "nature's templates" called systems 
archetypes that provide a feedback loop perspective on complex dynamics that 
are summary representations of many models built over the years. We can 
liken them to "dynamic scripts" in the way they embody particular 
interrelated dynamics such that when one recognizes a specific archetype, 
such as Shifting-the-Burden, it will trigger a line of inquiry guided by that 
dynamic script. A distinct advantage of these archetypes are that they don't 
require a steep learning curve. The archetypes provide a way for lay 
managers to map and enrich their mental models of complex systems by 
making explicit the feedback relationships and clarifying their understanding 
of them. We will cover systems archetypes in greater detail in the following 
. 
section. 
The archetypes meet the five basic criteria for mental model 
representations that we developed from the literature review. Each archetype 
has a storyline, which provides a level of abstract representation and aids a 
person in recognizing and remembering its general features. They are generic 
representations of dynamic phenomena that recur in diverse settings (Senge, 
1990a; Kim & Burchill, 1992), making it generically applicable and thus easy to 
identify occurrences. The causal loops embody a set of dynamic relationships 
that one can trace through and run mental simulations of the possible 
dynamic outcomes of a situation. Each archetype provides a theory-driven set 
of prescriptions that can guide actions and data gathering to test the causal 
relationships hypothesized in the archetype. In summary, the archetypes are 
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like dynamic scripts that provide a way of making sense of new learning as 
well as organizing what has already been learned (as mental models). 
3.3.2 Systems Archetype Descriptions 
In the following descriptions of five systems archetypes, we will describe the 
basic storyline of each archetype, present the structure of the feedback loops 
which comprise it, and offer several examples which illustrate how the 
archetype is used to create an abstract, visual representation of a particular 
issue. 
3.3.2.1 Limits-to-S uccess Archetype 
"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it 
was the age of foolishness ..." wrote Charles Dickens in A Tale of T w o  Cities. 
The Limits-to-Success archetype describes a similar paradox that many 
companies face. A rapidly growing company finds itself too busy to invest its 
profits in internal development, but when sales begin to slow, it no longer 
has the resources (money and people) to spend on needed improvements. 
The "best of times" for investing in resource development always seems like 
the "worst of times" for actually carrying out such plans, and vice versa. 
! Constraint ~ 
a 
time 
Limits-to-Success Template 
Figure 3.17 
@ 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
1 24 Organizational Learning: Framework & Methodology 
In a typical Limits-to-Success scenario (see Figure 3.17)' a system's 
performance continually improves as a direct result of certain efforts. As 
performance increases, the efforts are redoubled, leading to even further 
improvement (loop Rl). When the performance begins to plateau, the 
natural reaction is to increase the same efforts that led to past gains. But the 
harder one pushes, the harder the system seems to push back: it has reached 
some limit or resistance which is preventing further improvements in the 
system (loop Bl) .  The real leverage in a Limits-to-Success scenario doesn't lie 
in pushing on the "engines of growth," but in finding and eliminating the 
factor(s) limiting success. 
In a rapidly-growing company, for example, initial sales are spurred by a 
successful marketing program. As sales continue to grow, the company 
redoubles its marketing efforts and sales rise even further. But after a point, 
pushing harder on marketing has less and less impact on sales-the company 
has hit some limit, such as market saturation or production .capacity. To 
continue its upward path, the company may need to invest in new 
production capacity or explore new markets. 
3.3.2.2 Diets and Weight Loss 
The business and popular press provides many examples of situations in 
which rapid success is followed by a slowdown or decline in results. For 
example, a person on a diet usually finds that losing the first ten pounds is 
easier than losing the last five, and, in general, the first diet a person 
undertakes is usually more successful than any subsequent weight-loss 
program. 
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On a diet, ingesting fewer calories leads to weight loss, which encourages 
the person to continue to cut back on food intake (loop R2 in Figure 3.18). 
But, over time, the body adjusts to the lower intake of food by lowering the 
rate at which it burns the calories. Eventually the weight loss slows or even 
stops. The limiting process is the body's metabolic rate. To continue losing 
weight, the person needs to take actions that will increase metabolism. 
One method for increasing the metabolic rate is to perform exercise. 
However, exercise alone will not create the desired wei.gnt loss, because 
intense exercise burns simple sugars and not the stored fat that is the real 
target for weight loss. Intense exercise is counterproductive towards the 
dieter's goal because it increases appetite (leading to a higher food intake) 
while only temporarily raising the metabolic rate. A higher-leverage action is 
to engage in steady exercise such as long, brisk walks that will gradually 
increase the metabolic rate to a permanently higher level. 
3.3.2.3 Service Capacity Limit 
People Express airlines is one of the best-known casualties of the Limits-to- 
Success archetype (Sterman, 1988). Its tremendous growth was fueled by a 
rapid expansion of fleet and routes along with unheard-of low airfares. As 
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the fleet capacity grew, People Express was able to carry more passengers and 
boost revenues, allowing i t  to expand fleet capacity even more (loop R3 in 
Figure 3.19). The quality of service was initially very good, so the positive 
experience of many fliers increased word-of-mouth advertising and the 
number of passengers. 
The growth process a t  People Express was seen as physical capacity- 
expanding fleet size, employees and routes. The limiting factor, however, 
was service capacity-the ability to invest time and money in training 
employees-which became more difficult to sustain as the company grew 
(loop R4). 
Service 
Q_^- 7 7 capacity 
Revenues K 3  passengers B3 Service JV Quality / 
Limits to Passenger Growth 
Figure 3.19 
The number of passengers flown eventually outstripped the airline's 
capacity to provide good service. As a result, quality suffered and it began to 
lose passengers (loop B3). When competitors began matching low rates on 
selected routes, People Express' market competitiveness suffered further. 
Focusing only on the reinforcing side of the structure turned People Express' 
initial rapid growth into accelerating collapse, which contributed to the 
airline's demise. 
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Simply hiring more employees was not the solution to People Expressf 
service capacity problems. Similar to the dieter's reliance on intense exercise, 
it masked the real need for a steady, long-term commitment to hire and train 
the necessary people to bring service quality up to a high and sustainable 
level. 
3.3.2.4 Using the Archetype 
The Lirnits-to-Success archetype is most effective when it is used in advance 
of a systemic collapse to see how the czitnzilative effects of continued success 
might lead to future problems. Using the template to trace through the 
dynamic implications of a current or proposed strategy can highlight potential 
problems by revealing pressures that are building up in the organization as a 
result of the growth. 
The lesson of the Limits-to-Success archetype is that the systemic leverage 
lies in removing the limit (or weakening its effects), not on continuing to 
drive the reinforcing growth process. An awareness of the causal links 
between the growth processes and the limiting factors can provide insight 
into possible ways to manage the balance between the two. 
3.3.3 Shifting-the-Burden 
The story of Helen Keller, who, though stricken blind, deaf, and mute from a 
childhood illness, graduated from Radcliffe College and became an 
international lecturer and author, is much more than an inspirational 
human interest story. It illustrates a pervasive dynamic that is rooted in an 
archetypal structure, Shifting-the-Burden. 
Helen's parents, believing that their young child was helpless, assumed 
all caretaking responsibilities for her. Their actions, though well-intentioned, 
shifted the burden of responsibility for Helen's welfare to them. Every 
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problem or failure on Helen's part brought the parents rushing to her aid. As 
a result, Helen failed to learn even the simplest survival skills. Each incident 
further reinforced her parents' belief that she was indeed helpless. All three 
were caught in a system that was eroding Helen's ability (and desire) to cope 
with the world while shifting the responsibility for her well-being to her 
parents. Only through the intervention of her teacher, Ann Sullivan, was 
Helen able to break out of the dynamic and begin developing her own 
capabilities. 
3.3.3.1 The Structure 
The basic structure of this archetype is shown in Figure 3.20. The archetype 
usually begins with a problem symptom that prompts someone to intervene 
and "solve" it. The solution (or solutions) that are obvious and most able to 
Shifting The Burden Template [y;r)\de 
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Figure 3.20 
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be immediately implemented usually relieve the problem symptom quickly. 
However, these symptomatic solutions have two specific negative effects: 
they divert attention away from the real or fundamental source of the 
problem; and the symptomatic solution causes the viability of the 
fundamental solution to deteriorate over time, reinforcing the perceived 
need for more of the symptomatic solution. 
In the Helen Keller story, her parents' intervention is the symptomatic 
solution, Helen's failure to cope with real world is the problem symptom, the 
development of Helen's own abilities to care for herself is the fundamental 
solution, and the side-effect is that her parents assume increasing 
responsibility for her well-being. This particular type of Shifting-the-Burden 
structure, in which responsibility is shifted to a third party, is known as 
Shifting-the-Burden-to-the-Intervener. Over tim,e, the role of the intervener 
increases until it becomes an essential part of the system. In Helen's case, her 
parents' actions reinforced the underdevelopment of her abilities and 
therefore strengthened their role as "protectors." 
Another common side effect that occurs in Shifting-the-Burden 
situations is that the person may become "addicted" to the symptomatic 
solution. For example, a person who turns to alcohol or drugs to boost his 
self-esteem or help deal with stress may end up  developing an alcohol or 
drug addiction. 
3.3.3.2 Central vs. Local 
The Shifting-the-Burden archetype and its variants-Addiction and Shifting- 
the-Burden-to-the-Intervener-comprise perhaps the single most pervasive 
systems structure: Figure 3.21 illustrates a classic example of this dynamic. 
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A claims office in a local branch of a large insurance company is faced 
with a large, complex claim that requires more expertise than it  possesses. 
The central office responds by sending out its corps of experts who take care of 
the complex claim while the branch office goes about its other, more routine 
business. Although the occurrence of large claims may be infrequent- 
making it hard to justify keeping such experts in every branch-over time the 
interventions can result in deteriorating branch capability. 
Central Support vs. Branch Capability 
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CentralIOu tside 
In this example of a "Shifting the Burden" archetype, 
the symptomatic problem is a complex claim that the branch 
cannot handle alone. Experts from the central office help 
out. but over time the branch's ability to handle difficult 
claims atrophies, 
Central Support vs. Branch Capability 
Figure 3.21 
The reason is that after a while, an implicit operating norm develops that 
says if a person wants to handle complex, technically challenging claims she 
has to either join the central office or move to a different firm. Gradually, the 
most talented people take either of the two options. Unless these people can 
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be replaced by equally capable adjusters, the talent of the branch office 
gradually erodes, making it rely even more on central support. The cycle is 
reinforcing-as the central staff becomes better at intervening, the branch 
seeks their help more often. 
3.3.3.3 Using the Archetype 
In theory, any one of the four elements of the template-problem symptom, 
symptomatic solution, side effect, and fundamental solution-can help us 
identify a Shifting-the-Burden structure at work. Side effects, however, are 
usually very subtle and difficult to detect from inside the system. Solutions 
such as alcohol use, increased marketing, oil imports, or federal insurance are 
more readily identified, but there may not be complete agreement on whether 
they are "symptomatic" or "fundamental." Identifying problem symptoms 
such as high stress, falling revenues, energy s~lortage, or bank failures (see 
Figure 3.22) is probably the easiest way to begin filling out a Shifting-the- 
Burden template. 
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Keeping in mind that the "rightness" of a solution depends on one's 
perspective, it can be helpful to ask whether we are seeing the situation from 
the parents', Helen Keller's, or Ann Sullivan's point of view. Examining a 
problem or issue from these different viewpoints can help us understand 
why a Shifting-the-Burden archetype is operating and discover a solution that 
is fundamental, not symptomatic. 
At the heart of the Tragedy-of-the-Commons structure lies a set of reinforcing 
actions that make sense for each individual player to pursue (see Figure 3.23). 
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Tragedy-of-the-Commons Template 
Figure 3.23 
As each person continues his individual action, he' gains some benefit. For 
example, each family heading to the community pool will enjoy cooling off 
in the swimming area. If the activity involves a small number of people 
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relative to the amount of "commons" '(or pool space) available, each 
individual will continue to garner some benefit. However, i f  the amount of 
activity grows too large for the system to support, the commons becomes 
overloaded and everyone experiences diminishing benefits. 
Traffic jams are a classic example of how a "public" good gets overused 
and lessened in value for everyone. Each individual wishing to get quickly to 
work and back uses the freeway because it is the most direct route. In the 
beginning, each additional person on the highway does not slow down traffic 
because there is enough "slack" in the system to absorb the extra users. At 
some critical level, however, each additional driver brings about a decrease in 
the average speed. Eventually, there are so many drivers that traffic crawls at 
a snail's pace. Each person seeking to minimize driving time has in fact 
conspired to guarantee a long drive for everyone. 
This structure also occurs in corporate settings all too frequently. A 
company k i t h  a centralized salesforce, for example, will suffer from the 
Tragedy-of-the-Commons archetype as each autonomous division requests 
that more and more efforts be expendeed on its behalf. The division A people 
know that if they request "high priority" from the central sales support they 
will get a speedy response, so they label more and more of their requests as 
high priority. Division B, C, D, and E all have the same idea. The net result is 
that the central sales staff grows increasingly burdened by all the field requests 
and the net gains for each division are greatly diminished. The same story 
can be told about centralized engineering, training, maintenance, etc. In each 
case, either an implicit or explicit limit is keeping the resource constrained at 
a specific level, or the resource cannot be added fast enough to keep up with 
the demands. 
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3.3.4.1 Brazil's Inflation Game 
When the shared commons is a small, localized resource, the consequences of 
a Tragedy-of-the-Commons scenario are more easily contained. At a national 
level, however, the Tragedy-of-the-Commons archetype can wreak havoc on 
whole economies. Take inflation in Brazil, for example. Their inflation was 
367% in 1987, 933% in 1988, 1,764% in 1989, and 1,794% in 1990. With prices 
rising so rapidly, each seller expects inflation to continue. Therefore, seller B 
will raise his price to keep up with current inflation and hedge against future 
inflation (see Figure 3.24). With thousands of seller B's doing the same thing, 
inflation increases and reinforces expectations of continued inflation, leading 
to another round of price increases (Rl). 
f Â¥ 
Cost of Doing 
R2 Business 
B2 \ Capacity to 
\ ~ndexation \ Absorb Debt 
Inflation - Underlying 
of Economy s 
I 
s\ 
Inflation B l  / 
Prices 
Brazil's Inflation 
Figure 3.24 
Inflation also leads to indexation of wages, which increases the cost of 
doing business. In response to rising business costs, Seller A raises her price, 
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which fuels further inflation (R2). Since there are thousands of Seller A's 
doing the same thing, their collective action creates runaway inflation. The 
underlying health of the economy steadily weakens as the government and 
businesses perpetuate endless cycles of deficit spending to keep up with 
escalating costs. Over time, everyone grows increasingly preoccupied with 
using price increases to make profits rather than investing in ways to be more 
productive. Eventually the economy may collapse due to high debts and loss 
of global competitiveness, resulting in dramatic price adjustments ( B l  & B2). 
3.3.4.2 Common "Common's 11 
The most challenging part of identifying a Tragedy-of-the-Commons 
archetype at work is coming to some agreement on exactly what is the 
commons that is being overburdened. If no one sees how his or her 
individual action will eventually reduce everyone's benefits, the level of 
debate is likely to revolve around why individual A should stop doing what 
he is doing and why individual B is entitled to do what she is doing. Debates 
at that level are rarely productive because effective solutions for a Tragedy-of- 
the-Commons situation never lie at the individual level. 
In the sales force situation, for example, as long as each division defines 
the commons to include only its performance, there is little motivation for 
anyone to address the real issue-that the collective, not individual, action of 
each division vying for more sales support is at the heart of the problem. 
Only when there is general agreement that managing the commons requires 
coordinating everyone's actions can issues of resource allocation be settled 
equitably. 
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3.3.4.3 Mnmgirzg the Cornmor~s 
Identifying the commons is just the beginning. Other questions that help 
define the problem and identify effective actions include: What are the 
incentives for individuals to persist in their actions? Whol i f  anybodyl 
controls the incentives? What is tlie time frame in which individuals reap 
the benefits of their actions? What is the time frame in which the collective 
actions result in losses for everyone? Can the long term collective loss be 
made more reall more present? What are the limits of the resource? Can i t  
be replenished or replaced? 
The leverage in dealing with a Tragedy-of-the-Commons scenario 
involves reconciling short-term individual rewards with long-term 
cumulative consequences. Evaluating the current reward system may 
highlight ways in which incentives can be designed so that coordination 
among the various parties will be both in their individual interest as well as 
the collective interest of all involved. Since the time frame of the commons 
llcollapsell is much longer than the time frame for individual gainsl it is 
important that interventions are structured so that current actions will 
contribute to long-term solutions. 
3.3.5 Drifting-Goals 
The Drifting-Goals archetype is helpful for trying to understand why an 
organization is not able to achieve its desired goals. Drifting-Goals occurs 
when the gap between a goal and the actual performance is reduced by 
lowering the goal. Because this often happens over a long period of timel the 
gradual lowering of the goal is usually not apparent until the decreasing 
performance measure has drifted so low that it becomes a crisis. 
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3.3.5.1 The Strilcture 
The Drifting-Goals archetype works in the following manner (see Figlire 3.25). 
There is a certain goal-implicit or explicit-which is compared to the 
current state of affairs. If a gap persists, corrective actions are taken to 
improve the current state and bring it in line with the goal. This forms the 
basic balancing loop ( B l )  at the heart of any system that strives for 
equilibrium. A delay between corrective action and actual state represents the 
fact that results may take from minutes to years to materialize, depending on 
the specific situation. 
Pressure to ! Goal B2 Lower Goal 1 
-\ 7- 
GAFJ ! 
i i I Action ! 
Drifting-Goals Archetype 
Figure 3.25 
Of course, there is more than one way to close the gap. In the Drifting- 
Goals archetype, a second balancing loop is driven by pressure to 10werJhe 
goal. As the gap increases (or persists over a period of time), the pressure to 
lower the goal increases. If the pressure is high and persistent, the goal may 
be lowered, thereby decreasing the gap (loop B2). The critical difference 
between the two loops is that lowering the goal immediately closes the gap, 
whereas corrective actions usually take time. 
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3.3.5.2 Budget Deficits, Drifting Goals 
The federal budget deficit provides a good example of the Drifting-Goals 
archetype at work (see Figure-3.26). A gap between the previously stated 
acceptable deficit level and the actual deficit can be closed by either reducing 
government spending (B3) or increasing tax revenues (B4). Bipartisan 
compromises, however, have usually resulted in incremed government 
spending, mixed results in terms of taxes, and, consequently, higher deficits. 
The rising deficits have created an intolerable gap between the actual and 
stated maximum acceptable deficit, creating pressure to raise deficit targets, 
and eventually resulting in higher maximum acceptable deficits (B5). 
s Gramm-Rudman a - - - 
Target Deficit 
B6 I 
~ a x i k u m  Pressure to 
Acceptable Deficit Bs Raise Targets 
GAP 
Budget Deficit 
Figure 3.26 
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill (GRH) was believed by many to be a 
viable solution to the growing budget deficit problem. By making deficit 
reductions a law, it was intended to force bipartisan cooperation to eliminate 
deficit spending. If GRH target numbers are not met, mandatory cuts go into 
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effect, indiscriminately cutting billions of dollars from federal government 
programs and services. The GRH targets were meant to set a standard that lay 
outside of the current deficit-reinforcing system and would not, therefore, be 
susceptible to internal pressures. 
In a recent interview (Scheibla, 1989), Senator Rudman reacted to 
pressures to lower the goal by suggesting that GRH targets may be changed as 
"long as they are accompanied by a major deficit reduction." The net effect of 
Rudmm's revised proposal would be to re-introduce GRH targets into the 
Drifting-Goals archetype, which would negate its ability to anchor the deficit 
goal to an external source (B6). 
3.3.5.3 Using the Archetype 
Drifting or oscillating performance figures usually provide the signal that the 
Drifting-Goals dynamic is occurring and that real corrective actions necessary 
to meet the targets are not being taken. It may also mean current targets are 
being set more by past levels of performance than by some absolute standard 
(zero defects) or by something outside of the system (customer requirements). 
A critical aspect of evaluating a Drifting-Goals scenario in an organization 
is to determine ~ I - ~ a t  drives the setting of the goal(s). In quality improvement 
efforts, for example, the quality goal can be affected by competitors' qualityf by 
cust~mers' expectations of quality, or by internal pressures. The relative 
strength of each potential influence will determine whether the quality will 
drift upf down, or oscillate. Goals located outside the system, like the original 
G W  targetsf will be less susceptible to drifting goals pressures. 
3.3.6 Fixes-that-Fail 
"Today's problems come from yesterday's solutionsf' sums up the Fixes-thz 
Fail archetype. Its central theme is that most decisions carry short-term and 
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long-term consequences, and the two are often diametrically opposed. 
Oftentimes, a short-term sdution will have unintended consequences that 
result in additional problems (or a worsening of the original problem). 
3.3.5.1 The Structure 
In a typical Fixes-that-Fail situation (see Figure 3-27}, a problem symptom 
occurs that demands immediate resolution. A solution is quickly 
implemented that alleviates the symptom (loop Bl) .  The relief is usually 
temporary, however, and the symptom retarns, often worse than before. 
This happens because there are unintmded consequences of the solution that 
unfold over a long period of time (loop Rl ) ,  or as an accumulated 
consequence of repeatedly applying the solution, which exacerbate the 
original problem symptom. 
1 Fix 1 
Unintended ? 
Fixes-that-Fail Archetype 
Figure 3.27 
3.3.6.2 Expediting Customer Orders 
Expediting customer orders, a common practice in many manufacturing 
firms, illustrates the Fixes-that-Fail archetype. For example, if a large 
semiconductor manufacturer is experiencing some production problems and 
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is running behind schedule on some shipments, their customers literally will 
have to shut down their production lines until they receive the chips. 
Therefore, once Customer A discovers the delivery delay, it will call the 
company and demand that its product be delivered immediately. The 
semiconductor company responds by assigning an expediter to the complex 
task of tracking down A's order and pushing it through the line (see Figure 
3.28). The company produces over a hundred different kinds of integrated 
circuits, and Company A has many different types on order. Finding and 
expediting A's order involve departments throughout the factory, and result 
in disruptions 
order is rushed 
throughout the production line. Eventually, Company A's 
through, resulting ir a satisfied customer (loop B2). 
Dissatisfied 
Customers wl ~ x ~ e d i t e  
Late Orders B2 Orders ts\ Delivered Ord s 
\ 
Missed ~roduction Line 
R2 Disruptions Delivery D a l e s  
Expediting Customer Orders 
Figure 3.28 
But no sooner has A's order left the warehouse when company B calls 
demanding to receive its orders immediately, and the process begins all over 
again. At the same time, somebody else is expediting for company C. Each 
customer's problem is resolved, but the number of problems rapidly 
increases. As a result, the production line is continually being disrupted- 
leading to more missed delivery dates and more customer calls (loop R2). 
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3.3.6.3 Using the Archetype 
In most instances of Fixes-That-Fail, people are aware of the negative 
consequences o f  applying a quick fix. But the pain of not doing something 
right away is often more real and immediate than the delayed negative 
effects. If the long-term/short-term tradeoff was indeed one-for-one, where 
solving one problem today would create another one tomorrow, this strategy 
might be tolerable. But the reinforcing nature of unintended consequences 
ensures that tomorrow's problems will multiply faster than today's solutions. 
Breaking the Fixes-that-Fail cycle usually requires two actions: 
acknowledging up front that the fix is merely alleviating a symptom, and 
making a commitment to solve the real problem now. Launching a two- 
pronged attack of applying the fix and planning out the fundamental solution 
will break the problem-solution-problem cycle. The archetype can also be 
used to evaluate potential fundamental solutions, by mapping out any 
potential unintended side-effects. 
3.3.7 Summary Table of Systems Archetypes as Dynamic Scripts 
The archetypes can be viewed as dynamic scripts, each with a testable theory 
about dynamic behavior. The causal loop diagram "templates" provide a 
general framework for identifying "core categories" of data. The dynamic 
behavioral patterns provide a graphical representation of the dynamic 
hypothesis which each archetype is posing. Finally, there are also some 
prescriptive actions that are suggested by each systems archetype that supports 
a theory-driven inquiry into actions and their consequences. 
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Archetype 
Fixes that Fail 
Problem 
Symptom 
Unintended 
Dynamic Scripts and 
"Core Categories" 
The Drifting-Goals archetype 
states that a gap between a goal and 
current reality can be resolved in 
two ways: by taking corrective ac- 
tion to achieve the goal, or by low- 
ering the goal. It hypothesizes that, 
over time, the continual lowering of 
the goal will lead to gradually dete- 
riorating performance. 
Core Categories: Goal, Actual, 
Gap, Corrective Action, Pressure 
to Lower Goal. 
The Fixes-that-Fail archetype 
states that a solution that is used to 
quickly solve a problem symptom 
can have unintended consequences 
that exacerbate the problem. It hy- 
pothesizes that, over time, the prob- 
lem symptom will return to its pre- 
vious level or become worse. 
Core Categories: Problem 
Symptom, Fix, Unintended Come- 
quences. 
Dynamic Behavioral 
Patterns 
% 
Actual 
w 
Gap 
b 
Time 
Problem 
Systems Archetypes as Dynamic Scripts 
Figure 3.29a 
Prescriptive Actions 
Anchor the goal to an external 
frame of reference to keep it from 
sliding (e.g. benchmarking, voice 
of the customer). 
Determine whether the drift in 
performance is the result of con- 
flicts between the stated goal and 
implicit goals in the system (such 
as current performance measures). 
Establish a clear transition plan 
from current reality to the goal, in- 
cluding a realistic time frame for 
achieving the goal. 
Focus on identifying and re- 
moving the fundamental cause of 
the problem symptom. 
If a temporary, short-term so- 
lution is needed, develop a two-tier 
approach of simultaneously apply- 
ing the fix and planning out the 
fundamental solution. 
Use the archetype to map out 
potential side-effects of any pro- 
posed interventions. 
Archetype Dynamic Scripts and 
"Core Categories" 
Dynamic Behavioral 
Patterns Prescriptive Actions 
Limits to Success The Limits-to-Success archetype 
states that a reinforcing process of 
accelerating growlh (or expansion) 
encounters a balancing process as 
the limit of that system is ap- 
proached. It hypothesizes that, as 
the limit approaches, continuing 
efforts will produce diminishing 
returns. 
Core categories: Performance, 
Efforts, Li~t~ititig Action, Con- 
straint. 
Shifting the Burden 
1 Symptomatid 
The Shifting-the-Burden arche- 
type states that a problem symptom 
can be resolved in one of two ways: 
a symptomatic solution or a funda- 
mental solution. It hypothesizes 
that once a symptomatic solution is 
taken, it produces a side-effect that 
systematically undermines the abil- 
ity to apply a fundamental solution. 
Core categories: Problem 
Symptom, Symptomatic Solution, 
Fundamental Sol1itiot1, Side-Effect. 
Focus on removing the limit 
(or weakening its effects), rather 
than continuing to drive the 
reinforcing process of growth. 
Use the archetype to identify 
potential balancing processes 
before they begin to effect growth. 
Identify links between the 
growth processes and limiting 
factors to determine ways to 
manage the balance between the 
two. 
Problem Sympton \^ 
Symptonytic Solution 
x Fundamental Solution
Focus on the fundamental so- 
lution. If necessary, use the symp- 
tomatic solution only to gain time 
while working on the fundamental 
solution. 
Elicit multiple viewpoints to 
differentiate between fundamentall 
symptomatic solutions and to gain 
consensus around an action plan. 
Use the archetype to explore 
potential side-effects of any pro- 
posed solution. 
Systems Archetypes as Dynamic Scripts 
Figure 3.29b 
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Archetype 
Tragedy of the Commons 
Dynamic Scripts and 
"Core Categories" 
The Tragedy-of-the-Commons 
archetype identifies the causal con- 
nections between individual actions 
and the collective results (in a 
closed system). It hypothesizes 
that, if the individual use of a com- 
mon resource becomes too large for 
the system to support, the "com- 
mons" will become overloaded and 
everyone will experience diminish- 
ing benefits. 
Core categories: A 's Activity, 
Net Gains for A, B's Activity, Net 
Gains for B, Total Activity, Gain 
per Individual Activity, Resource 
Limit. 
Dynamic Behavioral 
Patterns 
Gain per 
Individual Activity 
B's Activity 
Systems Archetypes as Dynamic Scripts 
Figure 3 .29~  
Prescriptive Actions 
*Establish methods for making 
the cumulative effects of using the 
common resource more real and 
immediate to the individual users. 
Re-evaluate the nature of the 
commons, to determine if there are 
ways to replace or renew (or 
substitute for) the resource before it 
becomes depleted. 
Create a final arbiter who 
manages the use of the common 
resource from a whole-system 
level. 
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In this chapter we have highlighted the important role that mental models 
play in our model of organizational learning. We were careful to distinguish 
mental model representations from mental models, noting that we can never 
say anything definitive about what people actually have in their heads but it 
is useful for us to refer to them as mental models. The literature review of 
mental model representations provided some general attributes-abstract, 
generic, runnable, theory-driven, and testable-which provide a set of criteria 
with which to assess the usefulness of mental model representation systems. 
System dynamics methods of causal loop diagrams, systems archetypes, 
and computer models were proposed as being particularly powerful 
representational systems in domains where dynamic complexity is high. In 
particular, the use of systems archetypes as dynamic scripts was proposed for 
helping people learn and map their new understanding into their mental 
model and for communicating the new learning to others. 
In the next chapter, we will outline a methodology that can be used to 
help make individual mental models of dynamically complex systems 
explicit and to build shared understanding to advance organizational 
learning. 
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Chapter 4 
A Methodology for Linking Individual Mental 
Models to Shared Mental Models 
"The real voyage of discovery consists not in  seeking new 
landscapes but in having new eyes." 
-Marcel Proust 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3 we reviewed a number of representational systems that 
operationalized mental models into an explicit form. We focused on a 
specific type of representational system from the field of system dynamics, 
namely, causal loop diagrams and systems archetypes. In this chapter, we will 
focus on the process by which one maps individual learning into individual 
mental models and how individual mental models can become shared 
mental models. 
We begin in section 4.1 with an overview of the research, distinguishing 
between the scientific method and other ways of knowing and linking the 
OADI learning cycle with the scientific method. The Ladder of Inference and 
the grounded theory building approach is introduced, and their role in 
helping the research, and the researcher, stay grounded in the data is 
explained. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 present the methodology for mapping 
individual mental models and for diffusing them into shared mental models, 
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respectively. We conclude with a discussion on the strengths and weaknesses 
of this approach and possible next steps. 
.- -- 
Individual Learning 
to Individual Mental , 
Models I s 
I Map Individual 
I Learnings into Explicit Individual 
Mental Model 
Maps (e.g., CLD's) 
Individual MM to 
Shared Mental 
Models 
- Individual Learning 
- 
- >Â Environmental 
Design Observe '"-" Response 
- 
. Individual 
I works Action 
M u s 
into a common map 
and "decompose" 
into an accessible 
form for others -"? 
--* Â¥Â¥S Organizational Action 
Linking Individual Learning to Organizational Learning 
through Shared Mental Models 
Figure 4.1 
4.1 RESEARCH PROCESS AND APPROACH 
The methodology used for mapping mental models draws on many different 
traditions: system dynamics modeling (Forrester, 1961; Randers, 1980), 
process consultation (Schein, 1987c; 1988), the clinical perspective (Schein, 
1987a), action science (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985), grounded theory 
building (Strauss, 1987; Burchill, 1993) and TQM (Shiba & Graham, 1993). 
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In both the TQM and product development studies, the research teams 
were trained in the mapping methodology presented in this chapter, they 
collected interview data, and they participated in the analysis/synthesis 
process. In the TQM study, masters students were trained to gather interview 
data and to analyze the data as part of their thesis work (Brown & Tse, 1992; 
Peterson & Tok How, 1993; Balz & Garberding, 1993; Ehrler & Jansen, 1993). 
In the product development study, the line managers involved in the project 
were trained to conduct the interviews and participate in the 
analysis/synthesis of the data (Giancola, 1992; Roberts, 1992). In the TQM 
cases, the researchers were outsiders coming in to talk with the company 
insiders and eliciting their stories about their TQM implementation false-start 
experience. The analysis/synthesis was then performed by the researchers 
without the involvement of the interviewees. The product development 
case, on the other hand, involved company managers doing the data 
gathering themselves. Managers also played an active role in the analysis. 
As part of the training, both groups were exposed to the problem-solution 
and problem-articulation models of management described in Chapter I, the 
OADI cycle of learning described in Chapter 2, and the role of mental models 
in learning covered in Chapter 3. They were also trained in using the Ladder 
of Inference (Argyris, 1990), force-field analysis (Lewin, 1951), semantics 
(Thornton, 1992), causal loop diagrams (Kim & Burchill, 1992), and systems 
archetypes (Senge, 1990b). A brief description of each of the tools and 
methods is provided in the following sections, along with a general 
discussion of the scientific approach that was used. 
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4.1.1 Alternative Ways of Knowing 
Stone (1978) discusses four different ways of "knowing" through which 
individuals establish, defend, or change their beliefs about the world (and 
therefore their mental models): tenacity, authority, intuition, and science. 
Knowing through tenacity, Stone asserts, is based on the inertia of prior 
beliefs; that is, we believe something is true simply because we have always 
believed it to be true. Any evidence we encounter that is contrary to those 
established beliefs is discounted. Corporate sacred cows are usually 
perpetuated through this kind of knowing-pure dogma based on tradition 
and /or religion. 
Schein (1987b, p. 92) offers insights into England's moralism-pragmatism 
scale that make useful distinctions between levels of authority, including the 
scientific method. He puts forth the following typology of authority: 
1. Pure dogma, based on tradition and/or religion. 
2. Revealed dogma-that is, wisdom based on trust in the authority of wise 
men, formal leaders, prophets, or kings. 
3. Truth derived by a "rational-legal process, as when we establish the guilt 
or innocence of an individual by means of a legal process that acknowledges 
from the outset that there is no absolute truth, only socially determined 
truth. 
4. Truth as that which survives conflict and debate. 
5. Truth as that which works, the purely pragmatic criterion. 
6 .  Truth as established by the scientific method, which becomes, once again, a 
kind of dogma. 
Authority is another way of knowing. "Instead of simply holding on 
doggedly to one's beliefs, appeal is made to some highly respected source to 
substantiate the views held" (Cohen & Nagel, 1936, p. 193). Two forms of 
authorities can be consulted: a recognized expert in a given field (e.g., a 
medical doctor or a lawyer) and a higher authority who is believed to be 
infallible or whose opinion is seen as final (e.g., a philosopher or a religious 
leader), referred to as "revealed dogma" by Schein (1987b). Although the first 
kind of authority may be based on more reasonable assumptions that those 
0 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
Methodology 153 
experts were more trained to know about their specialized areas, both are 
inadequate when it conies to resolving differences of opinion among 
different experts. Reliance on experts also does not protect against the 
possibility of their being wrong. This is one of the main reasons why total 
quality management (TQM) is based on management by facts to replace 
management by opinion (which usually means somebody in a position of 
authority), by expertise or hierarchy. 
Knowing through i n  t u i t i on  relies on the "appeal to 'self-evident 
propositions'-propositions so 'obviously true1 that the understanding of 
their meaning will carry with it indubitable conviction of their truth" (Cohen 
& Nagel, 1936, p. 194). The problems with this approach is that self-evident 
truths can end up being wrong (high quality equals high cost) or two "truths" 
that contradict each other can not be resolved on the basis of intuition alone. 
Another problem with knowing through intuition is that the process and the 
reasons for knowing are not made explicit or known, making it difficult to 
transfer the knowledge or examine its basis when we encounter contradictory 
evidence. This is particularly problematic for organizations since they lose all 
the intuitive knowledge of their best managers when they leave. 
4.1.2 The Scientific Method 
According to Hempel (1965, p. 141), "Science aims at knowledge that is 
objective in the sense of being intersubjectively certifiable, independently of 
individual opinion or preference, on the basis of data obtainable by suitable 
experiments or observations." The scientific method is characterized by a 
continuous cycle of observing facts about the real world, building 
explanations about the relationships among the facts, making predictions 
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about the real world based on that understanding, and verifying those 
prediction by making more observations (see Figure 4.2). 
A hallmark of the scientific method is the testing of hypothesis in such a 
way that it allows new facts to discredit them. It is this possibility of 
continually testing and changing beliefs that are no longer supported by 
currently available facts that distinguishes the scientific method from the 
other methods of "knowing" described above. The scientific method is not 
immune, however, from becoming another form of "knowing through 
tenacity." All ways of knowing are susceptible to that possibility. As Schein 
(1987b) points out, truth, as established by the scientific method, becomes, 
once again, a kind of dogma. It is only through the continuous practice of 
open questioning and testing that separates the scientific method from the 
other ways of knowing. 
\ ( About Real 1 Relationships 1 
Model of the Scientific Method 
(source: Stone, 1978) 
Figure 4.2 
@ 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
Methodology 155 
The familiar P-D-C-A quality improvement cycle of TQM and our OADI 
model of individual and organizational learning are both rooted in the 
induction-deduction-verification cycle of the scientific method shown in 
Figure 4.3. In the OADI cycle, observations are made in the real world, rooted 
in concrete experience. In the assessment phase, explanations about the 
observations are created through an inductive process of moving from the 
specifics (a broken pump) to general concepts and explanations (infrequent 
maintenance leads to equipment failures). 
Observe 
(concrete experience) 
(form abstract concepts) 
The OADI Learning Cycle and the Scientific Method 
Figure 4.3 
This is the process through which we build (implicit and explicit) mental 
models of the world. Based on our mental models, we make predictions 
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about the world through a deductive process and design action plans to bring 
about the predicted behavior or outcome. We then implement those designs 
and verify whether they matched our predictions or not by making further 
observations. Our mental models are always "active" and affect each phase of 
the learning cycle.1 
How do mental models based on other ways of "knowing" differ from 
those based on the scientific method? This is a significant point-there is no 
difference. The mental models themselves are the same. The difference lies 
in the process by which those mental models are used, tested, and. changed. 
It's not the "what" you know that is different but the "way" of knowing. The 
scientific method is a more powerful way of knowing (and learning) because 
of its openness to falsifiability. 
But, even those following the scientific method can become trapped in a 
particular way of looking at the world through one's own paradigmatic lens 
(Kuhn, 1962; Schein, 198%). The following section on the Ladder of Inference 
and the reflexive loop addresses this point. 
4.1.3 Ladder of Inference and the Reflexive Loop 
How can we deconstruct our ingrained ways of looking at the world and begin 
to see how we are actively constructing our interpretation of reality? One tool 
that can help is the Ladder of Inference, developed by Chris Argyris (1990) 
which provides a framework for seeing how mental models are constructed 
(see Figure 4.4). It graphically depicts the process people use to draw 
conclusive opinions and judgments from data, showing that individual 
evaluations are, in reality, highly abstract and inferential. At the bottom of 
'MY motivation in reviewing such basics is to make clear the link between the model of 
individual and organizational learning, the research methodology used, and the scientific method. 
The learning cycle is rooted in the scientific method. 
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the Ladder of Inference is directly observable data: those things that can be 
objectively observed. From that data, we add culturally shared meaning- 
that is, we interpret and make sense of an event by the norms of our culture. 
The Ladder of Inference 
(adapted fruin Isaacs (1992)) 
Figure 4.4 
For example, suppose Bob, a colleague, walked into a 9:00 meeting at 9:15. 
The directly observable data is that Bob physically entered the room 15 
minutes after the scheduled start time. What do we say to ourselves when 
we notice this? When managers are asked this question, typical responses 
are: 
''He's late." 
"He doesn't care." 
"His previous meeting ran late." 
"He's not a team player." 
"He's disorganized." 
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If we locate the responses on the Ladder of Inference, we see that most of 
them are on the higher rungs of the ladder, reflecting the conclusions and 
inferences of different individuals based on the single piece of directly 
observable data. 
There is nothing inherently wrong about drawing inferences and 
conclusions from the events we observe. In fact, the ability to move quickly 
up the Ladder is what enables humans to make sense of the incredibly 
complex, infinitely-detailed world in which we live. It is impossible for us to 
see and absorb everything-we are constantly selecting out a narrow slice of 
life to focus on and understand. What we don't often realize, however, is 
that our set of beliefs and assumptions directly affect the selection process by 
which we receive new observable data. Argyris calls this process the reflexive 
loop because it happens subconsciously and involuntarily. 
For example, if we have concluded that Bob doesn't really care about 
meetings and is not a team player (our mental model of Bob), what do we 
begin to notice about him? We take note of all the times he shows up late, 
and we ignore or aren't aware of all the times he is on time. We notice that 
Bob does not say much at meetings, but don't register the fact that a few 
people always dominate the conversation and that there are others who say 
even less than Bob. We continually filter out any information that doesn't fit 
in with the mental model we have created about Bob. In fact, all the data we 
see confirm our beliefs and assumptions about Bob. We leap from data up to 
beliefs and assumptions/ and then operate as if the assumptions are the data. 
We literally believe we see "directly observable instances" of Bob being 
uncaring. The reflexive loop can also be called the paradigmcreating loop, 
because it is the process through which, over time, we develop a shared set of 
corporate assumptions and beliefs about reality. 
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Womack, et al., (1990, p. 77) give a striking example of how this paradigm- 
creating process literally affects our ability to see. The authors describe the 
lean production manufacturing system, which uses less material, requires 
smaller inventories, has a shorter design time, and produces fewer defects 
than the traditional mass production system. The authors tell the story of a 
General Motors plant manager's reaction after seeing a lean production plant 
in Japan: He "reported that secret repair areas and secret inventories had to 
exist behind the plant, because he hadn't seen enough of either for a 'real' 
plant." In actuality, there is no rework area in that plant-they drive the cars 
right off the assembly line and onto the ships. The GM manager's paradigm 
of a "real" plant kept him from seeing that there might be an alternative way 
to produce cars. 
The Ladder of Inference was presented and used as part of the interview 
training for both the TQM study (Chapter 5) and the product Development 
study (Chapter 6) for several reasons. First, it made those involved in the 
research more aware of how their own ways of thinking can affect what they 
see and hear. During the interview process, the Ladder of Inference provided 
them with a visual framework for seeing at what level of inference the 
interviewees were telling their stories and served as a reminder to get down 
to the level of observable data whenever examples were given at the higher 
rungs. In the data analysis and mapping steps, the Ladder of Inference was 
useful for checking for any "leaps of logic" that may have been used in 
creating links between variables. 
4.1.4 Grounded Theory Building 
The purpose of this methodology is to help elicit and map an individual's 
mental model. In other words, it is a process of exploration and discovery 
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which requires an inductive methodology that can build a theory from the 
ground up. Thus, we want to be careful to first listen to the data before we 
start making deductions and drawing our own conclusions. Dewey (1926) 
wrote of this need for "intellectual disrobing" of the habits we take on and 
wear when we assimilate the culture of our own time and place, to inspect 
them critically to see what they are made of and what wearing them does to 
us. In other words, he was asking people to surface and to test their 
assumptions. This effort, he believed, could only take place when one was 
grounded in tangible experience-a basic tenet of grounded theory building. 
Dewey asserted that the discipline required of a scientific work in physics 
or astronomy, the careful record of its calculations, and the deductions that 
were derived from past observations and experiments were more than just a 
record. These records of past observation also served as an indication, an 
assignment of further observations and experiments to be performed. They 
acknowledge that the work is ongoing, that it is rooted in real experience, and 
can be tested further. Dewey was responding to the philosophers in his day 
who were deriving theories and following trends from the same set of beliefs 
and prejudices, taking themselves farther and farther from reality. In effect, 
they were operating within a paradigm, blinded by it and unable to see or to 
value what was outside of it. 
In much the same way, our study of the complexities of management and 
organizational learning must be grounded in observable data; the more 
complex the interrelationships, the more important the data becomes. Dewey 
called on the rigors of the scientific method as a model for the kind of study- 
disciplined, open to refutation, and continuously observing and testing one's 
own and other's theories-that science has been engaged in to learn about the 
physical world. 
@ 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
Methodology 161 
In normal science, the subject matter is the physical world, which gets 
broken down into smaller and smaller fragments for closer scrutiny. 
Observations are recorded, hypotheses and predictions are made to explain 
the natural phenomena being studied, and more observation is conducted. 
But the subject matter of organizations is people in their work environments, 
and the fragmentation that is helpful in normal science is counter-effective in 
the study of social systems. Compared to the complexities of organizational 
learning, 
[tlhe areas investigated by normal science are, of course, minuscule ... By 
focusing attention upon a small range of relatively esoteric problems, the 
paradigm forces scientists to investigate some part of nature in a detail and 
depth that would otherwise be unimaginable." (Kuhn 1962, p. 24). 
We need to take a broader perspective because in the social sciences, more 
than in the physical and natural sciences, the importance of the 
interconnections is far greater than the importance of the pieces. We need to 
develop a different approach because 
a paradigm can insulate the community from those socially important 
problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be 
stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm 
supplies ... One of the reasons why normal science seems to progress so rapidly is 
that its practitioners concentrate on problems that only their own lack of 
ingenuity should keep them from solving. (Kuhn, 1962, p. 37) 
The rapid progress comes at a price because we do not ever get the whole 
picture but only pieces of it. As Strauss (1987, p. 6) suggests, 
One of our deepest convictions is that social phenomena are complex 
phenomena. Much social research seems to be based on quite the opposite 
assumption: either that, or researchers working in various research traditions 
describe or analyze the phenomena they study in relatively uncomplex terms, 
having given up on the possibility of ordering the "buzzing, blooming confusion" 
of experience except by ignoring "for a time" its complexity. 
Although Strauss (1987, p. 2) says that "qualitative researchers tend to lay 
considerable emphasis on situational and often structural contexts, in contrast 
to many quantitative researchers, whose work is multi-variate but often weak 
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on context1' neither research needs to remain in that state. Qualitative 
research can be more multi-variate just as quantitative research does not need 
to be devoid of structural context. As Strauss (1987, p. 10) sees it: 
[tlhe basic question facing us is how to capture the complexity of reality 
(phenomena) we study, and how to make convincing sense of it. Part of the 
capturing, of course, is through extensive data collection. But making sense of 
complex data means three things. First, it means that both the complex 
interpretations and the data collection are guided by successively evolving 
interpretations made during the course of the study. (The final products are 
analyses done at a relatively high level of abstraction: that is, theories.) The 
second point is that a theory, to avoid simplistic rendering of the phenomena 
under study, must be conceptually dense-there are many concepts, and many 
linkages among them. The third point: It is necessary to do detailed, intensive, 
microscopic examination of the data in order to bring out the amazing 
complexity of what lies in, behind, and beyond those data. 
Grounded theory building is characterized by a process that involves an 
exhaustive coding process that is rooted in the data. In sections 4.2 and 4.3, we 
will describe a methodology that is consistent with Strauss' three points and 
strong on context. 
4.2 METHODOLOGY FOR MAPPING INDIVIDUAL MENTAL MODELS 
Closing the situational learning disconnect identified in Chapter 2 requires 
developing the ability of individuals in the organization to transfer learning 
from a specific situation into more general maps that can guide them in 
future situations. Making mental models explicit and clear, however, 
depends on having the appropriate tools for the type of knowledge being 
mapped. Although the English language is useful for communicating on 
many different levels, it can >e wholly inadequate for descriptions of complex 
phenomena of a dynamic nature. Thus, English may be perfectly adequate for 
making one's mental model of a Shakespearean play explicit, and at the same 
time, be grossly ineffective in explicating a mental model of how the wage- 
price spiral affects capital investment decisions. 
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As described in Chapter 3, the understanding of dynamically complex 
systems requires an appropriate set of tools with which to make mental 
models of such systems explicit. In this section we outline a six-step 
methodology for mapping individual mental models into individual causal 
loop systems maps (see Figure 4.5), and in the following section (4.3), we 
explicate the process of developing shared mental models from those 
From Individual 
Design Observe 
5. Identify Potential - 1 Archetypes I 
6. Refine   it of 1 Archetype and Data 
From Individual Learning to Individual Mental Models 
Figure 4.5 
individual systems maps. The methodology is based on grounded theory 
methods (Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987) and system 
dynamics methods (Forrester, 1961; 1979; Panders, 1980; Richardson, 1981; 
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Richardson & Pugh, 1981; V e ~ i x ,  1990). It also draws on the recent work on 
inductive systems diagrams (Kendrick, 1992) and on systems archetypes as a 
diagnostic tool (Kim & Burchill, 1992). 
In describing the steps below, examples will be drawn from the different 
TQM studies whenever it is appropriate (Brown & Tse, 1992; Peterson & Tok 
How, 1993; Balz & Garberding, 1993; Ehrler & Jansen, 1993).2 
4.2.1 Step 1: Select System and Gather Data 
There are two primary tasks associated with this stage of the research: 
identifying the system or event to be investigated and collecting the 
appropriate data. The focus of the investigation is established by identifying 
significant problems and their symptoms. (The symptoms themselves are 
not expected to represent the high leverage intervention points but will serve 
as the starting point of the investigative trail.) A significant problem can be 
one which is important to the organization and has persisted despite efforts to 
eliminate it, or one which is present in a variety of organizational settings 
and is therefore difficult to define. In describing the problem, we start with 
the symptoms which are readily evident and attempt to characterized them, 
preferably in measurable terms. 
There are three main advantages to clarifying the target early in the 
investigative effort. First, since the system is bounded, identifying the most 
appropriate informants is more manageable. Second, the informants are able 
to reflect on their actual  experience rather than hypothetical or abstract 
events. Third, the amount of time required to conduct the analysis is 
minimized. 
2 ~ h e  author and Gary Burchill helped supervise these master's theses as part of an ongoing 
study of TQM implementation false-starts. 
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Semi-structured interviews are conducted by two field researchers with 
one person leading the interview while the other is responsible for taking 
detailed notes. The lead interviewer is responsible for the flow of the 
interview. The note taker's job is to capture the conversation as accurately as 
possible.3 After the interviewee finishes telling his or her story in 
chronological order, the field researcher leads the interviewee through a 
force-field analysis (described below). In the final step of the interview, the 
person is asked to identify the dominant forces at work and trace through the 
causal explanations behind those forces. 
The force-field diagram and analysis played a critical role in the interview 
process by providing a clear, structured (but not restrictive) framework for 
focusing the data-gathering. The following section explains the force-field 
concept and method in greater detail. 
4.2.1.1 Field Theory and Force-field Analysis 
In the words of Lewin (1951, p. 45) "field theory is probably best characterized 
as a method: namely, a method of analyzing causal relations and of building 
scientific constructs." The core view of field theory comes from the 
psychological perspective, owing to Kurt Lewin's training as a psychologist. 
Field theory began with the boundary zone of an individual life force and 
extended into the areas of planned change and organizational development. 
The field now spans the continuum between the individual level and social 
level of analysis and intervention. 
3~lthough tape recorders were used in some of the interviews, the note-takers were asked to 
take notes as if they had no tape as a back up. This was to counter balance the tendency to "relax" 
the active note-taking since it was going to be "on the tape." 
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Field theory places a great deal of emphasis upon the formal properties of 
scientific constructs and applies the rigors of the mathematical approach to 
individual psychology. For example, Lewin (1951, p. ix) believed that 
before a system can be fully useful, the concepts have to be defined in a 
way that (1) permits the treatment of both "qualitative" and "quantitative" 
aspects of phenomena in a single system, (2) adequately represents the 
conditional-genetic (or causal) attributes of phenomena, (3) facilitates the 
measurement (or operational definition) of these attributes, and (4) allows both 
generalization to universal laws and concrete treatment of the individual case. 
In field theory, the "method of construction" serves as a guide with 
which appropriate "elements of construction" are developed as well as ways 
of combining these elements into a system of concepts. For example, 
conceptual type or dimension is analogous to physical dimensions such that 
psychological position can be thought of in terms of spatial relations of 
regions where psychological concepts which have the conceptual dimension 
of position are things like group belongingness of an individual. Thus, all 
psychological variables that have the same dimension can be grouped and 
understood on the same plane. This would correspond to grouping things at 
a higher level on the Ladder of Abstraction (see section 4.2.2.2). 
The concept of systems as '"quasi-stationary equilibria" is somewhat 
similar to the system dynamics view of systems as being in dynamic 
disequilibrium seeking equilibrium. In field theory, quasi-stationary 
equilibria is maintained because the direction of the resultant forces around 
level L is toward L, their strength increasing with the distance from L. The 
resultant forces in the neighborhood of L is said to have the character of a 
"positive central force field" which is defined as a constellation of forces 
directed toward one region which keeps the system more or less where it is. 
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Any actions taken (or forces applied) on the system to change a certain level L 
will create internal resistance from the system that will tend to keep it at L.4 
From a field theory point of view) successful change includes three 
aspects: unfreezing the present level, moving to the new desired level) and 
refreezing group life on the new level. Since staying at any level is 
determined by a force field) permanency implies making sure that the new 
force field is made relatively secure against change. Force-field analysis is a 
technique that provides a framework for analyzing the forces that keep a 
given system in its current quasi-stationary state and determining which 
forces to attempt to alter in order to unfreeze the system. By developing a 
diagram which has all the driving forces and resisting forces displayed on it, 
one can get a quick idea why the system is frozen in its current position. 
Force Field Diagram. 
A force field diagram is constructed by drawing a line down the middle of 
a page and listing the situational forces on either side of the line with the 
enabling forces on the left side and the inhibiting forces on the right side. 
Arrows pointing into the center line are drawn to represent each force listed 
to represent the pressure that these forces are exerting on the balance. 
We added a couple of modifications to the method by integrating some of 
the ideas from the Ladder of Inference framework (see Figure 4.6). For each of 
the factors that the interviewees offered as being an enabler or inhibitor, they 
were asked to state the assumptions that led them to include a particular 
factor and to provide a directly observable example that illustrated the 
validity of that assumption. 
4~ similar principle identified in system dynamics is compensating feedback. 
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In terms of our research goal of getting grounded data through 
interviews, the modified force-field method provided a way to maintain 
focus and provide the data needed to build systems maps without making it 
so structured that the interviewees did not have the freedom to say things 
that we did not have the foresight to ask. 
Enablers I Inhibitors 
Inhibiting factor 1 
Enabling factor 1 L ~ssumptions 
Assumptions 
Observable data -- 1 L Observable data Inhibiting factor 2 
. 
. 4 Enabling factor 2 
~ n h i b i t i n ~  factor 3 
Enabling factor 3 . 
. 
Force Field Diagram 
Figure 4.6 
Enablers I Inhibitors 
Dominant factor 1 
Enabling factor 1 
Example Cause Ã‘> (observable+ Constraint 
data) 
Consequence 
Causes, Constraints, and Consequences 
Figure 4.7 
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An additional step was added to the force-field analysis based on the 
difficulty experienced in constructing causal connections among the variables 
with earlier interview data. Each interviewee was asked to identify what each 
felt to be the three most dominant forces and to provide the causes, 
consequences, and constraints for each force (see Figure 4.7). 
4.2.2.2 Case Settings 
In the TQM setting, we began our study by choosing to focus on well-defined 
TQM implementation "false starts" in order to bound the system we would be 
investigating. In the product development setting, we focused on a specific 
product development team responsible for developing one product. 
Our data collection relied mostly on informant interviews. In the TQM 
setting, we interviewed three different people in each organization, which 
allowed us to cross-check the individual stories for accuracy. We asked each 
interviewee to begin with a chronology of their experience (the story of the 
"false start" in the TQM setting and history of involvement in the product 
development setting). A time line was used at times to anchor specific 
reference points. 
4.2.2 Step 2: Coding Variables 
After gathering the initial round of data, the goal is to extract important 
variables from the "raw" interview data. 
4.2.2.1 Open Coding 
The main purpose of open coding is to produce concepts that fit the data. 
This is accomplished by scrutinizing every sentence to find as many concepb 
that relate to the issue under investigation as possible. This often involves a 
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line by line, word by word analysis. Strauss (1987, p. 30) offers the following 
rules of thumb: 
1. Look for in-vivo codes, terms used by the people who are being studied. 
2. Give a provisional name to each code, in-vivo or constructed. Do not be 
concerned initially about the aptness of the term-just be sure to name the code. 
3. Ask a whole battery of specific questions about words, phrases, 
sentences, actions in your line-by-line analysis. 
4. Move quickly to dimensions that seem relevant to given words, phrases, 
etc. 
5. These dimensions should quickly call up comparative cases, if not then 
concentrate on finding them. 
6. Pay attention to the items in the coding paradigm, as previously listed. 
The open coding process generates a lot of concepts very quickly. It is 
necessary to reduce the large number of concepts generated into a manageable 
number of variables. This step is one of the main difficulties faced by novices 
in creating systems maps-the selection of variable names. A useful 
guideline is to borrow from a TQM technique called the KJ (or affinity) 
diagram on the use of semantics for creating variables for inclusion in an 
archetype (Mizuno, 1988). 
4.2.2.2 Semantics as a way of "Cleaning" Verbal Data 
According to Shiba (1992), we need to distinguish among and understand the 
four characteristics of language processing that is relevant in generating 
variable names: 
1. The dual role of language 
2. The use of inference and judgment 
3. The ladder of abstraction 
4. Multi-valued vs. two-valued thinking5 
Shiba distinguishes between the language of reports and the language of 
affection. The first is for communicating information; the latter is for 
communicating emotions. When using language to transmit the same 
 h here are similarities between these characteristics and the typical guidelines given for 
constructing causal loop diagrams (Richardson & Pugh, 1981, pp. 28-29). 
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meaning of information to everyone, one needs to use the language of 
reports. In our everyday communication, we usually use a mixture of both, 
so it is not surprising that most people include both when formulating 
variable names. "Cleaning" verbal data into a commonly understood and 
usable form requires stripping away qualifying adjectives (e.g., smart 
managers) as well as judgment and inference (which is the equivalent of 
walking down the Ladder of Inference). 
The Ladder of Abstraction is another important semantic tool because i t  
makes the user very conscious of how far away the variables are from 
concrete facts and directly observables (see Figure 4.8). For example, Johnnie 
Potable 
L iquids 
I 1 
Alcohol ic Non-alcohol i c  
Beverages Beverages 
I I I I 
Hard Wine Beer 
I1 uor ? 
I 
I 
Scotch I I 
~ l e n d e d  s ing le  Ma l t  
Scotch Scotch 
Johnn i e  
Wa lke r  
Johnnie Johnnie 
Wa lke r  Wa lke r  
Red B lack  
Ladder of Abstraction 
Figure 4.8 
Walker Red is a specific brand of Scotch. If we are talking about alcoholic 
beverages, it would be very low on the Ladder of Abstraction. Systems maps 
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are generally constructed at a highly-aggregated level while most people's day- 
to-day experience is rooted at a much lower level. The Ladder of Abstraction 
coupled with the Ladder of Inference can serve as a useful guide for walking 
people down the ladder to a level at which the dynamics makes more sense to 
them.6 
The fourth guideline is a very familiar one. We want to use terms that 
can vary over time, not just switch back and forth like an on-off switch. 
4.2.2.3 Case Setting 
The following is an example of a coding session from one of the TQM study 
cases (Ehrler & Jansen, 1993, p. 22): 
Interview Transcript; 
Interviewer: What is an example of where "Improving your Process" was a 
reinforcing force for doing TQM? 
Interviewee: Communications. We made a lot of assumptions about the 
material we provided to financial and operations people, that it was good in 
their desired. What they said was completely opposite to what we were 
giving them. 
Coded Transcript; 
What is an example of where ["Improving your Process"]l was a 
reinforcing force for [doing TQM]2? 
[Communications]3. [We made a lot of assumptions about the material we 
provided to financial and operations peoplel4, [that it was goodl5, [in their 
desired forrnatl6. [What they said]? was completely opposite to [what we 
were giving theml8. 
The in-vivo codes (1-8) identified above are then placed on a list and 
referred to as coding continues, noting similar concepts encountered in later 
transcripts with the same coding number. Using the Ladder of Abstraction, 
similar concepts at different levels are grouped under one variable. For 
example, [communications] 3, [what they said]?, and [talking about the way 
a l t h o u g h  they may appear to be the same, there is a distinct difference between the Ladder 
of Inference and the Ladder of Abstraction. The Ladder of Abstraction distinguishes between the 
conceptual levels of aggregation of variables whereas the Ladder of Inference distinguishes 
between levels of meaning imposed on the data. 
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they send us information115 can all be lumped into the variable name 
"Communications." 
4.2.3 Step 3: Describe Variable Relationships 
For each significant variable identified, the next step is to identify other 
variables that are directly linked with it. This is where the force-field analysis 
in the interview is particularly helpful. The line of questioning that asks for 
causes, consequences, and constraints provides a rich description of the 
intervieweest knowledge about the linkages among the variables. Pairwise 
directed arcs are then constructed using the "s" and "o" notation described in 
section 3.1.2.7. The signed links are rechecked with the data to ensure their 
"groundedness" (see Figure 4.9). 
4.2.4 Step 4: Map Individual Story Causal Loops 
Once all the interview data has been coded, the researcher should have a very 
good "feel" for the data. Relevant variables have been coded and listed, 
relationships between variables have been identified, and the pairwise 
directed arcs have been verified with the available data. 
Step 4 is a crucial step in the overall process because here, for the first 
time, the system dynamics principle of feedback loop causality is integrated 
into the grounded theory building process. How does one begin to infer 
loops? How do we determine that the loops inferred from the data are 
justified? How do we check that the loops are formulated soundly? These 
are just a few of the questions that must be addressed in Step 4. 
Step 4 is divided into 5 sub-steps. In order to begin developing complete 
causal loops from the directed arc fragments (which can have several 
variables strung together), the identification of a common "story" that runs 
through a group of fragments is helpful. The story helps "guide" the causal 
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loop diagram construction process by providing a theme against which the 
inclusion of a fragment can be assessed. A separate causal loop diagram is 
constructed for each story identified. Each causal loop diagram should be 
compared to the collected data to ensure they accurately represent the 
available facts. Additionally, the diagrams should be investigated for "leaps 
of inference," i.e., can the diagram describe the patterns of events without 
explanation? Or, in terms of the Ladder of Inference, have we jumped too 
high on the ladder as we move from one variable to the next? The sub-steps 
involved in this process are listed below, followed by an extended example. 
Step 4a: Name and Describe the Story 
Step 4b: Construct Causal Loop with Fragments Relevant to Story 
Step 4c: Check the Diagram with the Story 
Step 4d: Fine-Tune the Loop Detail 
Step 4e: Recheck the Story Diagram for "leaps of inference." 
4.2.4.1 An Extended Example 
This extended example is based on one of the stories from Test, Inc., one of 
the TQM study sites covered in Chapter 5 (Brown & Tse, 1992). We will use 
the "Directive without Commitment" story to go through each of the five 
sub-steps outlined above. 
Step 4a: Name and Describe the Story 
The modeling process begins with reviewing the recorded interview 
session and notes. The primary issues and problems described in the 
interview are selected as potential "stories" for a causal loop diagram. Stories 
are selected which are recurring or systemic in nature and consequently have 
feedback characteristics, as opposed to one-time events which tend to be linear 
(no feedback). Each story is condensed until the essence or central points can 
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be told concisely. This "central story" is then used to focus the modeling 
efforts. 
The story of "Directive without Commitment" describes an attempt to 
implement a TQM effort without real commitment by those who were 
responsible for launching the activity. Senior management charged a group 
of managers to implement TQM at a division by forving a Quality 
Improvement Team (QIT). In principle, the Q1T team understood the long- 
term business implications of investing in TQM. The team, however, was 
composed of individuals who were very busy with daily demands on their 
time and were more concerned with outside (non-TQM) activities. The 
established group norms were that it was okay not to prepare for the 
meetings, that it was okay to be interrupted when doing TQM work, and that 
attendance at meetings was not all that important. The daily pressure's of 
getting the work done was much more visible than the need to invest energy 
in things beyond the current period performance indicators, i.e., shipments. 
s 
Sr. Management Ã‘Ã‘Ã TQM Importance 
Attention 
Attention to Process 2 Software Daily 
Improvement Activities Work Completion 
0 
Event-Driven 4 TQM Importance 
Activity 
s 
TQM Activity 4 Quality Improvement 
Event-Driven & Per id  Business 
Activity Performance 
0 0 Attention to Process 4 Non-Improvement TQM ~~.i~i~~ 
Improvement Activities Activities 
s 
TQM Importance 4 QIT Commitment to TQM 
Partial List of Directed Arc Fragments 
Figure 4.9 
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There was no feeling of ownership. If anything, there seemed to be a real 
rebellion against any serious attempts to make a commitment. Even if people 
had become interested in being more active, there were no training resources 
available for people to acquire TQM skills. 
In constructing the loop diagram, we draw from work completed by 
following steps 1-3 above. A partial list of directed arc fragments are shown in 
Figure 4.9 as an example of the type of abstracted data that is available at this 
stage of the process. 
Step 4b: Construct Causal Loop with Fragments Relevant to Story 
Relevant fragments of the story are identified and then linked to form a 
causal loop diagram. The central story is told as a focus for the causal loop 
construction, and the elements are linked together to reflect the flow of the 
central story. The fragments or elements are examined in both the cause and 
effect direction. The question, "Why did this happen?" is asked in order to 
uncover further upstream causality. The question "what did this affect?" is 
asked in order to determine further downstream causality. The elements are 
linked in a feedback or causal loop structure until the causal loop reflects the 
story being told. Delays between cause and effect connections are inserted 
where appropriate. 
We started with the variable Sr. Management Attention, which is linked 
to TQM Importance with an "s" since they tried to raise the importance of 
TQM by focusing on it and launching a QIT (see Figure 4.10a). 
s 
Management Ã‘Ã‘ TQM Imponance 
Attention 
Extended Example: Directive without Commitment 
Figure 4.10a 
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The belief was that as awareness of the importance of TQM increased, 
TQM activity would increase. This would eventually lead to improved long 
term business performance which should further heighten the 
TQM. The additional fragments create a reinforcing loop ( R l  in 
importance of 
Figure 4.10b). 
^T\ 
Sr. Management 
\ Attention Activity 
Long ' J  Term 
Business 
Performance 
Extended Example: Directive without Commitment 
Figure 4.10b 
Event-Driven 
Attention 
Long 'Term J 
Business 
Performance 
Extended Example: Directive without Commitment 
Figure 4 .10~ 
But in the story, senior management is also concerned with the day-to- 
day activities that have to get done. A link between senior management 
attention and event-driven activity is supported by the data. Another link in 
the story is between event-driven activity and TQM activity; as event-driven 
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activity increases, it takes time away from TQM activity, as was the case with 
the QIT members (Figure 4.10~). 
We now look at the data to find any evidence that links senior 
management attention with anything else that would place it  as part of a 
feedback loop. The link between Event-Driven Activity and Period Business 
Performance is identified in the data and added to the diagram. So is the link 
between Long-Term Business Performance and Period Business Performance. 
The belief that senior management attention is driven by a gap in period 
performance relative to business goals is also added to the diagram, which 
closes several feedback loops (B2 and B3 in Figure 4.10d). 
Even t-Driven 
Sr. Management 
Attention 
Activity 
Business 
s Long Term 
Business 
Period Performance 
Performance 
Extended Example: Directive without Commitment 
Figure 4.10d 
Step 4c: Check the Diagram with the Story 
The causal loop diagram is checked against the story to see that a walk 
through the diagram actually describes what the story is telling. Changes are 
made in the diagram where appropriate to better reflect the dynamics of the 
story. 
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In checking the diagram with the story, the link between senior 
management attention and event-driven activity was not explicitly supported 
by the data. And, although it seemed logical, including Period Performance 
in this story  about Directive without Commitment did not make sense with 
respect to the story line. The story included a bit about QIT Commitment to 
TQM as an important piece as well as the high daily workloads of the 
managers involved on the QIT team. The revised model is shown in Figure 
4.10e. 
sr. 
Attention / to TQM 
~ o n & ~ e r m  ' Attention to Process 
Business Improvement 
Software Engineering Activities 
Daily WorkCompletion ni / 
Extended Example: Directive without Commitment 
Figure 4.10e 
Step 4d: Fine-Tune the Loop Detail 
First, the logic flow is traced through the diagram to make sure that there 
are no interruptions or "leaps" in the logic flow, but that every cause-and- 
effect relationship represents the logical next step in the development of the 
story. Next, the level of detail or "abstraction level" is checked to make sure 
that all elements are telling the story at the same level of detail. For example, 
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an element such as "costs due to excessive engineering change orders" should 
not be in the same causal loop as "company business performance," but 
instead should be abstracted to "costs of poor quality." 
In terms of abstraction levels, Long-term Business Performance is at a 
high level relative to Software Engineering Daily Work Completion. In 
addition, the time frame of this story is too short for such a measure to really 
play a role. Quality Improvements is at a more appropriate abstraction level 
and time frame (see Figure 4.10f). 
TQM 
Sr. Management 
Attention / to TQM 
Quality ' 
O< 
Attention to Process 
Improvements Improvement 
\- Software Engineering Activities Daily Work Completion JO / 
Extended Example: Directive without Commitment 
Figure 4.10f 
Reviewing the storyline again revealed an inconsistency in the latest 
diagram. There are three reinforcing loops and no balancing loop. Tracing 
through the diagram suggests that TQM activities would continue to grow, 
once management focused their attention on it. The story indicated however 
that daily pressures distracted the QIT team from staying focused on the TQM 
work, suggesting that a balancing force is at work. 
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In Figure 4.10g, Senior Management Attention is pulled out of the loop 
because in this story once they delegated the task, they really were not part of 
the story anymore. A new link to Work Backlog is added to represent the 
pressures that accumulate whenever time is diverted from the daily work 
completion. This balancing loop captures the dynamics in the story of team 
members being interrupted and missing meetings when they were pressed by 
other daily activities. 
Attention / to TQM 
Quality 
Improvements R l  
TQM 
Software 
o Engineering 
+ Daily Work 
Completion 
Extended Example: Directive without Commitment 
Figure 4.10g 
Step 4e: Recheck the Story 
If any changes result from fine-tuning the loop detail, then the story is 
rechecked against the original notes or interview tapes to ensure that the 
story is still adequately represented by the causal loop diagram. 
A final check results in a slight modification. As the managers 
interviewed in the study had said, senior management did launch a TQM 
activity by having a QIT team form, so the causal arrow is mo\ <?d from 1'QM 
Importance to TQM Activity. The variable name is changed from Senior 
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Management Atten:' )n to Corporate Directive for Improvement Activities to 
better represent how the action was perceived at the division level. The final 
diagram is shown in Figure 4.10h. 
Corporate Directive for 
Improvement Activities 
Work 
TQM R l  TQM 
Activity B 2 Importance 
' Quality ) '< Software Engineering Daily Work 
Improvements Completion 
Extended Example: Directive without Commitment 
Figure 4.10h 
4.2.5 Step 5: Identify Potential Archetypes 
Up to this point, the process has been primarily an inductive one. Data is 
gathered and analyzed, out of which concepts emerge. At every step, the 
work is verified against the available data. In this step, we shift to a deductive 
approach by using systems archetypes as dynamic scripts. Using the storyline 
of an archetype as a guide, we try to identify potential archetypes (see "System 
Archetypes as Dynamic Scripts" in Figure 3.29) that are embedded in the data 
but not yet constructed into the causal loop diagram, or identify them in the 
causal loop diagrams developed in steps 1-4 above. 
With the knowledge gained from previous steps, a reference mode 
describing the behavior of symptoms over time should be drawn. The 
inventory of systems archetypes should be reviewed against the reference 
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modes to help identify potential fits. More than one candidate archetype can 
be selected. It is possible that none will appear to fit. 
Note: The purpose of this step is not to attempt to "force fit" the data into 
an archetype. Up to this point, we have allowed the data to do the "talking" 
and guide the loop construction process. We now want to see i f  any of the 
archetypes will provide us with a lens that will help us  "mine" more 
relationships from the data. 
4.2.6 Step 6: Refine Fit of Archetype and Data 
The use of systems archetypes at this stage is timely and appropriate. If i t  is 
used earlier in the process, i t  can stifle the "message" of the data by trying to 
impose a structure on the data before the data is fully understood. After the 
stories have been identified and all the obvious relationships have been 
mapped, however, the archetypes can play an important role in guiding 
theoretical sampling. According to Strauss (1987, pp. 38-39) theoretical 
sampling 
is a means whereby the analyst decides on analytic grounds what data to 
collect next and where to find them ... this process of data collection is controlled 
by the emerging theory. 
ilere, the archetypes can be used as the basis for theoretical sampling by 
guiding the data gathering process with a testable dynamic script. An initial 
assessment of fit is conducted between the CLD's drawn previously and the 
structure of the candidate archetype. Cycling between working up  from the 
data and down from the archetype is the most productive approach for 
finding a good fit. The updated diagrams must always be reviewed for 
consistency with the data. Again, it is possible that none of the archetypes 
will fit the data. 
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In Figure 4.11, we see a causal diagram of a Training Capacity story (from 
Test, Inc. in Chapter 5) where a capacity constraint in training has a negative 
impact on TQM Activity. According to the story, as TQM Activities increase, 
the level of TQM skills required will increase as people tackle more 
challenging projects. This increases the Demand for Training which reduces 
the Ability to Deliver Training if Training Capacity is not increased to meet 
the rising demand. As the TQM Training that is delivered decreases, the 
TQM Skill Gap increases, which will have a downward effect on TQM 
Activities. 
- TQM S k i l l s  
TQM 
0 
TQM B13 B14 
Activities Ability to 
Required 
Demand for 
Training 
Training 
'Training Capacity" Story 
(adapted from Brown & Tse, 1992) 
Figure 4.11 
The presence of a capacity constra.int which contributes to a balancing 
loop alerts us to the possibility of a Limits-to-Success archetype. The training 
capacity should only become an issue if the demand for training outstrips the 
supply. Demand would outstrip supply only if there was something driving 
it up outside of the balancing loops. The Limits-to-Success dynamic script 
suggests that there should be a reinforcing loop hooked up with this diagram 
somehow. 
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One such reinforcing loop that was identified involves a reinforcing cycle 
of quality improvements, TQM Importance and higher Motivation to do  
TQM (see Figure 4.12). 
Motivation 
to do TQM 
TQM 
Importance Ability to 
Activity B13 Deliver Rl,4,10 Training 
Actual 
Demand 
f o r  TQM Training 
s Training 
"Training Capacity" Limits to Success 
(adapted from Brown & Tse, 1992) 
Figure 4.12 
4.2.7 Summary of Steps 1-6 
From a system dynamicist's point of view, the output of this 6-^zp process 
looks very similar to what one would expect at the end of a typical 
"conceptualization" phase in model building. System dynamicists have 
employed various approaches to facilitate the front-end of the modeling 
process in different settings (Richardson & Pugh, 1981; Senge, 1990b; 
Richardson & Senge, 1989; Richardson, Andersen, Rohrbaugh, & Steinhurst, 
1992; Vennix, Gubbels, Post, & Poppen, 1990). The purpose of many 
conceptualization efforts is seen as the beginning steps towards the 
development of a system dynamics computer model. 
The purpose of the methodology outlined above, however, is to help 
elicit an individual's understanding of an issue and map it into a systemic 
representation. A major distinguishing feature of this methodology relative 
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representation. A major distinguishing feature of this methodology relative 
to many other methods used for conceptualization is the heavy focus on an 
inductive process at the very front end (steps 1-4). We are not as concerned 
with obtaining a valid representation of the world "as i t  really is" as we are in 
accurately capturing what the individual's belief of the world is. In other 
words, we are trying to inductively build an accurate representation of a 
person's mental model. This does not mean that the mapping process is 
simply a recording of someone's regurgitation of what was already known. 
The mapping process :.lay provide new insights to the individual and alter 
his or her mental model because of it as will be shown in the product 
development case in Chapter 6. 
4.3 METHODOLOGY FOR TRANSFER OF INDIVIDUAL MENTAL MODELS TO 
SHARED MENTAL MODELS 
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, making individual mental models 
explicit is necessary but not sufficient for advancing organizational learning. 
Since perceptions of reality can vary so widely among different people in the 
same setting, building shared mental models is crucial to organizational 
learning. Shared mental models are a product of individual mental models 
and vice versa-they are mutually influential. Thus, individual mental 
models play a pivotal role not only in individual learning but in 
organizational learning as well. 
Building shared mental models addresses another incomplete learning 
cycle presented in Chapter 2-fragmented learning. To get beyond the 
fragmented learning of individuals and be able to spread the learning 
throughout the organization, we need a way of sharing and institutionalizing 
key insights that are important to a firm's future. The purpose of this section 
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shared mental models by building on the six steps covered in the previous 
section. The steps are outlined in Figure 4.13 and a step-by-step description 
follows. 
/ Design Observe 
" -*Â¥Â¥ 
^\ 
-,o' Implement& 
-,&- o  ^
-- ------ -, 
From Individual 
Fragmented 
Learning 
From Individual Mental Models to Shared Mental Models 
Figure 4.13 
4.3.1 Step 7: Build Integrated Map 
From the individual mental model maps developed above, we begin to 
develop a shared mental model first through integrating the separate stories 
to create a common map that contains everyone's stories (see Figures 5.5 to 
5.10). In integration, the individual CLD's and archetypes developed in steps 
1-6 are combined to tell a complek arory. The first part of this step is to 
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develop a central story that clearly captures the dominant theme that runs 
through most of the maps (see Figure 5.11). Identifying a central theme is 
very tied to the main purpose-the raison d'etre -of the whole mapping 
effort. In Chapter 5 ,  for example, the central story was around the 
implementation plan for TQM so the main loop traced out a large reinforcing 
loop that represented the main purpose of that effort. 
Once the main loop has been laid out, the other "minor" themes that had 
been identified in the previous steps are incorporated into the central story 
line. Variables are then combined or re-labeled at a higher level of 
abstraction. Consistency of the final diagram is tested for logic flow, 
abstraction level, and fit with the available data (see Figure 5.12 for an 
example of an integrated diagram). 
4.3.2 Step 8: Make Sense of Map through Decomposition 
A typical integrated diagram developed in Step 7 may have between 10-30 
loops in it. Although it is a powerful representation of the current level of 
understanding of the system, at that level of complexity, most people find it 
extremely difficult to remember all the individual loops and their impact on 
the system as a whole. In this step, we try to make sense of the diagram by 
"decomposing" it into smaller, more manageable chunks.7 Again, the 
systems archetypes are applied here in a deductive process to spot structures 
in the integrated diagram that appear to fit the storyline of one or more of the 
archetypes. It is important to point out that the "groundedness" of the 
s  he traditional system dynamics alternative at this point is to proceed with the 
development of a computsr si-wl?tion model. We will discuss this point further in section 4.4. 
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abstracted archetypes rests on the grounded theory building work in the 
earlier steps.8 
The reasons for moving up a notch on the Ladder of Abstraction from the 
grounded diagram is for the purposes of sharing the insights gained from the 
individual mapping activities. I t  is unlikely that such a large and complex 
diagram can serve as a "shared" mental model if it can not be internalized in 
a coherent and accessible way. The archetypes, once internalized as generic 
dynamic scripts, can provide the mental model framework for sharing large 
"chunks" of the whole story. 
4.3.2.1 Model Decomposition 
The purpose of decomposition (or aggregation) is to reduce the complexity of 
a model without losing its defining characteristics (Eberlein, 1986; 1989; 
Richardson, 1986; Simon & Ando, 1961). Although the causal loop diagrams 
are not "computable" models, some oi  the methods used for simplifying 
mathematical models can be used as guides for simplifying CLD's. 
Simon & Ando (1961) address the issue of justifying the use of aggregate 
variables for economic analysis by providing a method for manipulating 
matrices into nearly decomposable forms. Under certain conditions, the 
solutions of the decomposed matrices can represent the original system. 
Although their purpose seems to be similar, their pure mathematical 
treatment of the problem makes it difficult to apply their methods to our 
conceptual models, i.e., the causal loop diagrams. 
Eberlein (1989) outlines a theory of simplification that can be used for 
increasing the understanding of a system dynamics computer model. The 
8~bstract ing up  from the "grounded" diagram raises a number of validity issues which will be 
discussed in section 4.4. 
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basic idea is to retain a selected subset of the feedback loops that are important 
in generating the selected behavior of interest. In his approach, "model 
simplification is based on behavior, with simplified models generating only 
selected behavior of the full model" (Eberlein, 1989, p. 55). The selection of 
modes is outlined in Eberlein (1986), but the method requires the 
manipulation of matrices of equations and is not applicable to our problem at 
hand. There are, however, some general guidelines that come out of the 
process that can be applied to the decomposition of CLD's as well: 
1. Identify and list the behavior modes of interest. 
2. Seek a structure that generates a behavior mode of interest. 
3. Simplify feedback structure by eliminating loops that do not have a 
significant effect on the behavior mode of interest. 
4. Confirm that the behavior of the simplified model is consistent with 
the behavior mode of interest in the large model 
Although we can't do the kind of behavior testing described in the fourth 
guideline, we can translate the first three guidelines into a set of steps that can 
be use to simplify or decompose the integrated diagram created in step 7 into 
smaller chunks that are more comprehensible. We will address the behavior 
confirmation issue in section 4.4.2 where we discuss the role of computer 
models. 
4.3.2.2 Causal Loop Diagram Map Decomposition 
The sub-steps of the process of decomposing the causal loop diagram are listed 
below, followed by an example that revisits the "Training Capacity" story in 
section 4.2.6: 
Step 8a: Identify a behavior mode of interest. 
Step 8b: Find relevant loops in the integrated diagram 
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Step 8c: Simplify loops by collapsing multiple links into a single link 
Step 8d: Check that loop polarity remains the same 
Step 8a: Identify a behavior mode of interest. 
We begin the decomposition process by identifying a behavior mode of 
interest based on direct observation or on reasoning based on prior theory 
(e g., systems archetypes). In the training capacity story, there were two 
behaviors that stood out: the time behavior of TQM Activities and the 
Ability to Deliver Training. As TQM Activities increased, the Ability to 
Deliver Training decreased. The behavior modes of interest are shown in 
Figure 4.14. 
- TQM Activities \ \ Ability to 
Deliver Training 
- 
time 
Behavior Modes of Interest 
Figure 4.14 
The archetype dynamic scripts can also serve as a guide for identifying 
behavior modes of interest. In particular, they can be used as a point of 
reference to see if the patterns of behavior suggested by an archetype, like 
Limits-to-Success, can help improve one's understanding of a behavior mode 
in the case. A generic behavior generally found in the Limits-to-Success 
archetype is the initial growth of a variable, followed by a leveling off or 
collapse of that variable due to a constraining factor. The behavior mode 
described in Figure 4.14 seems to follow this general pattern, as TQM activities 
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grow for a while, and then level off as the ability to deliver training decreases. 
In this case, that behavior pattern was already identified from the case history. 
But if it hadn't been already identified, the researcher could investigate 
whether such behavior was present, basing her reasoning on the Limits-to- 
Success archetype. 
A second use of systems archetypes is to identify "latent" patterns of 
behavior. In this case, the systems archetypes may be used to posit patterns of 
potentially important behavior that have not yet  been observed. For 
example, the Tragedy-of-the-Commons (ToC) archetype predicts an 
undesirable global outcome in the future while desirable local outcomes are 
being achieved in the present. When an organization recognizes that it is 
caught in a ToC archetypal situation, actions can be taken in advance to 
prevent the predicted dynamics from occurring (for an example, see the ToC 
case in Chapter 6). 
Step 8b: Find relevant loops in the integrated diagram 
Motivation 
to do TQM 
TQM 
Importance 
Deliver 
Actual 
Demand 
s 
"Training Capacity" Limits to Success-Revisited 
(adapted from Brown & Tse, 1992) 
Figure 4.15 
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The relevant loops for the training capacity story were identified in Figure 
4.12 and are redrawn here as Figure 4.15. As explained above, the diagram has 
been abstracted from the integrated diagram presented in Figure 5.12. 
Step 8c: Simplify loops by collapsing multiple links into a single link 
Although the CLD in Figure 4.15 only has three feedback loops, it contains 
11 variables which add to its complexity. This simplification step can help 
reduce the number of variables, which in turn, reduces th number of links. 
This process can also reduce the number of loops, although this is not always 
the case. The archetypes may be useful for identifying the central dynamic 
that is of interest and to suggest a CLD structure that the simplified diagram 
can represent (although using an archetype is not necessary). 
In reducing the number of variables and links in a diagram, the 
replacement variable needs to preserve the essential m e a n i n g  of the 
individual variables, and the new link needs to preserve the polarity of the 
directed arc between the old set of variables and the variable to which it is 
causally linked. Figure 4.16 shows the three different combinations which 
(a) an increase in A 
causes an increase in C 
(b) an increase in D 
causes a decrease in F 
(c) an increase in G 
causes an increase in  1 
Preserving Directed Arc Polarity 
Figure 4.16 
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will be encountered and what the collapsed link should look like. Notice that 
we start with a variable (e.g., A) and go "downstream" in the direction of the 
causal arrow and include all arcs and variables (e.g., A -5 B -5) up to but 
not including the "effect" variable (e.g., C) to which the collapsed variable will 
be linked. The link between the new variable (e.g., AB) and the "effect" 
variable (e.g., C) should be labeled with an "s" or an "o" to preserve the 
original causal effect on the final effect variable (e.g., AB -5 C). 
The three examples in Figure 4.16 show the three different combinations 
une will encounter in collapsing links. We've already covered case (a) where 
the links being collapse are all "s's." In case (b), one of the links is an "st' and 
one is an "o" which means that as D increases, E decreases, and F decreases. 
The collapsed version preserves the "net" polarity by signing the new arc 
with an "0" so that an increase in DE causes a decrease in F. In the case of (c), 
where an increase in G causes a decrease in H which causes an increase in I, 
we see that the net effect of an increase in G is an increase in I. The collapsed 
variable, GH, is linked with I and is signed with an "s" so that an increase in 
GH causes an increase in I. 
Required 
TQM Skills 
Training Training 
Demand for 0 Ability tc 
TQM Skills Ã‘Ã‘ Deliver 
Training Training 
Collapsing Links Example 
Figure 4.17 
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A simple example of collapsing links is shown in Figure 4.17. We take a 
piece of a loop contained in Figure 4.15, and collapse two links into one. The 
two variables, Required TQM Skills and Demand for TQM Training are 
combined into a single variable, Demand for TQM Skills Training, because 
the TQM skill requirement is not as essential to the story as the demand that 
it generates for the training. The nec effect to Ability to Deliver Training is 
preserved by signing the arc with an "o." The entire simplified diagram is 
shown in Figure 4.18. 
TQM A t  o^ 
Importance Motivation ,x TQM Skills 
, ^\odoTQM 
' TQM 
-Importance- 
Actual ' 
- - 
. Quality 
, \ Quality 
TQM' , 
raining ' ~ % ,  
Ability to 
Deliver 
Training 
Ability to t  
, 
Actual - -  - - *- Demand 
Quality \ '\ for TQM 
Training 
Demand for -- - -  - 
TQM Skills Training 
Training Capacity 
Importance 
1 TOM 
Actual 
Quality Demand for 
TQM Skills 
Training 
Deliver 
Training 
Training 
Capacity 
Simplified "Training Capacity" Story 
Figure 4.18 
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In principle, the mechanics of this procedure can be generalized to 
collapse any number of variables and links into one variable and an arc 
whose polarity would be determined by the number of "o's" that had been 
collapsed. An odd number of "o's" would indicate signing the arc with an "o" 
while an even (or zero) number of "o's" would indicate signing the arc with 
an "s." In practice, however, the number of variables that can be collapsed 
together will be constrained by the first requirement of preserving the 
essential meaning of all the individual variables that are being combined. 
Step 8d: Check that loop polarity remains the same 
The final step is to double-check that the loop polarity has not been 
changed by the simplification process, i.e., balancing loops should still be 
balancing loops and reinforcing loops should still be reinforci~g loops. 
4.3.3 Step 9: Share Decomposition with Others 
The diagrams are continually verified against the available data in the 
modeling process-checking for consistency between the storyline and the 
constructed CLD's. The diagrams should also be verified with all the people 
who were interviewed for "face validityu-that is, can they look at the 
diagram and agree that it reflects the dynamics of what they believe 
happened. If the individuals who had been interviewed as part of the data 
gathering process understand the decomposed diagrams and agree with the 
accuracy of the links and loops, it builds confidence that the diagram has 
preserved the essential structure that explains the behavior mode of interest. 
4.3.4 Step 10: Confirm and Test the Decomposition 
Once the relevant archetypes have been identified and agreed upon by the 
initial group of interviewees, they should be circulated to other relevant 
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players in the organization who had not been involved in the study. The 
validation at this stage consists of two parts. One, is whether there is a 
general agreement that the decomposition accurately describes what. has 
happened. Second, is whether there is a general agreement on the prescribed 
actions suggested by the archetype. The results to both questions can be tallied 
and shared. How widely the mental models are sharedcan be measured by 
assessing to what extent there is general agreement about both theframezuork 
that the archetype provides for capturing the experience and the routines that 
the archetypes prescribe for addressing similar situations in the future. 
There is one important caveat, however. This analysis does no t  imply 
that the prescribed actions should necessarily be taken. The CLD's and 
systems archetypes abstracted from the integrated diagram represent elements 
of a larger theory (i.e. that embodied by the integrated diagram). Individual 
prescriptive actions based upon individual sets of loops taken out of the 
whole diagram may conflict with one another, or interact in ways that do not 
lead to the overall d.esired behavior. In decomposing a complex computer 
model, individual insights can be checked against the larger model's 
behavior. This is not possible in decomposing a complex CLD. Therefore, we 
strongly recommend that (1) researchers and managers be extremely cautious 
in taking actions without considering such interaction effects and (2) 
computer simulation models be used to further test the policy implications of 
taking such actions. 
4.3.5 Summary of Steps 7-10 
The main purpose of steps 7-10 is to provide a way for a group of individuals 
to see their individual experiences mapped into a common map and see the 
richness of the inter-relationships among all the variables. The integrated 
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diagram gives them a "systemic view" by graphically showing how the 
individual stories and maps fit together as part of a larger system. On the 
other hand, the large size of the integrated diagram makes it very difficult for 
people to walk away from the diagram and remember all of it in a coherent 
way. That is, people may appreciate the richness of the connections, but the 
mental model representation they walk away with is akin to a bowl of 
spaghetti. 
The decomposition process is meant to help simplify the diagram into 
manageable "chunks" while preserving all of the important structures that 
explain the behavior of interest. The process of sharing and testing the 
decompositions with others in the organization can help build a shared 
mental model of the structure and the behavior mode it is meant to 
represent. 
It is important to note that the methodology proposed above is meant to 
accurately represent what people believe to be true based on their current 
understanding of the situation. It is a structured process for mapping people's 
mental models into an explicit and sharable form. Although new insights 
may be discovered by the participants through the mapping process, the 
methodology does not (nor is it meant to) verify that the mapping is an 
accurate representation of reality. This kind of testing process is beyond the 
capability of simple pen and paper tools like CLD's and systems archetypes; it 
requires the use of a computer model. This topic will be covered in the 
following section. 
4.4 DISCUSSION 
In any modeling effort, whether it be computer models or conceptual maps, , 
the issue of validity needs to be addressed. In this section we will take a 
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critical look at tile methodology outlined above and assess its level of validity. 
We will also look at its strengths and weaknesses relative to its stated purpose 
and compare them with the pros and cons of the traditional system dynamics 
approach of building computer models. We conclude with a brief discussion 
on possible future work to develop the methodology further. 
4.4.1 Validity 
In scientific research, there are three types of validity one needs to address: 
construct, internal, and external (Kidder & Judd, 1986). While these validity 
criteria were established for evaluating experimental research and are not 
fully achievable in "real world" research settings, they serve as a useful 
benchmark against which one can measure strengths and weaknesses of one's 
research. It is with this intent that we will apply the validity criteria to the 
mental model mapping methodology described above. A fourth kind of 
validity is also relevant for the kind of work described in this thesis-face 
validity. We begin by establishing a brief definition of each type of validity 
criterion. 
Construct validity is the degree to which the variables that have been 
defined accurately reflect or measure the construct of interest. That is, it tries 
to address the question: 
To what extent are the constructs of theoretical interest successfully 
operationalized in the research? (Kidder & Judd, 1986, p. 28) 
Having high construct validity means that all the constructs that the research 
intended to study have been successfully represented by the specific variables 
the researcher has selected. For example, if one were interested in studying 
the effect of poverty on educational achievement, one needs to operationalize 
the concept of poverty into a measurable variable, such as "income level." 
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Internal validity is concerned with the extent to which one can draw 
conclusions about the causal effects of one variable on another. Internal 
validity means addressing the question: 
To what extent does the research design permit us to reach causal 
conclusions about the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable? (Kidder & Judd, 1986, p. 28) 
Internal validity comes closest to the everyday use of the term validity, i.e., 
"does theory match reality?" If we have high internal validity, i t  means that 
we are more able to argue that the relationships we have identified are causal 
(not correlational) ones. We can have high construct validity in both the 
independent and the hypothesized dependent variable, but have low internal 
validity in the causal link between the two. For example, "income level" may 
be a very good indicator of poverty and "years in school" may be a good 
measure of educational attainment, but if internal validity is low, we can not 
say much about the causal connection between the two. Threats to internal 
validity come in the form of rival hypotheses which the experimental design 
has not addressed. 
External validity is concerned with the generalizability of the research 
results to other similar settings of interest. Addressing external validity 
means answering the question: 
To what extent can we generalize from the research sample and setting to 
the populations and settings specified in the research hypothesis? (Kidder & 
Judd, 1986, p. 28) 
Suppose, for example, that we had high construct validity in our 
measures of poverty and educational achievement and that we could claim a 
reasonable causal connection between the two (high internal validity). How 
strong of a claim we can make that the results of the research are applicable 
beyond the study itself is dependent on the strength of the study's external 
validity. 
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Face validity is evaluated by a group of experts or judges who assess 
whether a measuring technique measures what it claims to measure (Kidder 
& Judd, 1986). Although every instrument we use must pass a face validity 
test, i t  is inherently a subjective process. One way to quantify a measure of 
face validity would be to compute the amount of agreement on a measure by 
a panel of judges 
We return to a picture we first presented in Chapter 3 to help clarify the 
discussion on the validity issue as well as on the purpose of the methodology 
outlined above. The revised picture is shown in Figure 4.19 with four distinct 
gaps identified in the organizational learning cycle. 
(construct 
validity) 
(face 
validity) 
Assessing the Gaps in Organizational Learning 
Figure 4.19 
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The first s a p  is the one between an individual's implicit mental model 
and the real world (Gap 1) which is a measure of how well-grounded the 
individual's mental model is. That gap can never be addressed directly by an 
outsider because mental models are implicit until they are explicated through 
some formal representation. It is a matter of philosophical debate whether 
the individual herself can ever address that gap directly. In either case, this 
dissertation is not about addressing Gap 1 (thank God!). 
The second eau is between what the individual has implicitly in her head 
and the explicit representation of it (Gap 2). The purpose of steps 1-6 in our 
methodology is to operationalize an implicit individual mental model into 
an explicit representation of that mental model while minimizing the size of 
Gap 2. The grounded theory building process is designed to ensure high 
construct  validity. That is/ the variable development process is intended to 
create a high level of confidence that the concepts represented by the 
constructed variables accurately captures the gathered data. The lower the 
size of Gap 2 is, the higher the construct validity, that is, our representation 
accurately "measures" the implicit mental model. 
The third gau is between the explicit representation of the individual 
mental model and the "sharedness" of the implicit mental model of others in 
the organization (Gap 3). The variables identified in the decomposed diagram 
has less cons truc t  validity than the ones at the end of steps 1-6 because by 
collapsing two or more variables into one, we are reducing the likelihood of 
the new variable accurately representing the original, more grounded 
variables. At this point, however, we are more interested in face validity 
because the purpose of these steps is to build a shared understanding of the 
dynamic behavior and structures of interest. Thus, circulating the 
decomposed maps and getting a high degree of agreement among the people 
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surveyed increases face validity. To the extent that others in the organization 
who have shared experience in the context we are studying believe there is a 
good match between their implicit mental model and the explicit 
representation, we have high face validity. The main purpose of steps 7-10 is 
to help reduce the size of Gap 3. 
The fourth gap is between the explicit representation of the mental model 
and the "real world" of experience in which the organizational members 
share (Gap 4). The more evidence we can provide that the causal 
relationships captured in the mental model representation is in fact what 
exists in the real world, we will be building internal validity. The size of Gap 
4 depends on the size of Gap 1 and Gap 2. The methodology outlined in this 
chapter, however, is not intended to explicitly address either Gap 1 or Gap 4. 
One way to increase internal validity would be to expand the data 
gathering to include more people and more sources of data. The causal 
connections that are constructed from the data could then be tested against 
other available data. The development of a system dynamics simulation 
model can also strengthen internal validity by testing for internal 
inconsistencies in the mapped relationships-a possibility we will discuss in 
the following section. 
Since the focus of the methodology in steps 1-6 is on mapping individual 
understanding of a specific situation in which she was involved, the issue of 
external validity is not really relevant. However, in a broader context of 
organizational learning-that is, when shared mental models developed by a 
given group are eventually used to guide action by other groups-the concept 
of external validity will become relevant. Studies of external validity, while 
outside the scope of this dissertation, will be important future research as this 
methodology gets put into broader practice. 
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4.4.2 Role of System Dynamics Computer Models 
The methodology described above is strong on construct validity and face 
validity, but weak on internal validity. The use of systems maps is not 
intended as a replacement for a computer model, but as a necessary and 
important step to help managers clarify their level of understanding of 
dynamically complex issues and provide a way to communicate it to others. 
Although there will be some cases where insight generated by the clarity of 
the causal maps can be translated directly into action (the product 
development team in Chapter 6 ,  for example), there are many more instances 
where the diagrams alone will be inadequate. This is where the role of 
computer models become important. The model can be all the more 
powerful when the organizational members themselves conclude that the 
use of a computer model is necessary once they have gained clarity around 
their issue. 
In Figure 4.20, we have placed a fork in the process after step 7. The 
traditional system dynamics approach is to proceed from the conceptual map 
of step 7 to building a computer model. Policy analyses are conducted 
through multiple simulation runs and the results are shared with others 
through various means, such as CLDrs, management flight simulators, 
simulation runs, and learning labs. Policies are implemented and their 
impact are assessed. 
Which way should one go when one reaches the fork? There is no 
absolute right choice for all settings. The choice depends on the purpose and 
circumstance of each individual case. As the above discussion showed, steps 
8-10 can provide a high level of face validity for sharing a map that is of 
importance to the organization. The decomposition steps help to make the 
maps more accessible to more people, thereby increasing the size of the shared 
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base. The maps, however, are weak on internal validity and can lead to 
actions that are not based on a sound representation of the actual causal 
connections. 
The computer models can clarify and add richness to the explicit 
, representation of the causal connections of a complex system. By simulating 
and testing, one can help improve an individual's understanding of one's 
own mental model representations as well as the long term consequences of 
actions taken based on that understanding. However, the level of skill and 
the investment of time required to construct a good computer model is much 
more significant than what is required to create causal maps. Even though 
the additional payoff may be proportionately greater, it can be difficult for 
those who have not experienced the value of simulation models to see value 
in it. This is especially true of people who believe that they don't have a Gap 
1-they have a lock on reality. It is a classic catch-22. Once people see the 
value, they may be glad to invest in it. But unless, they invest in it, they will 
never see the value. 
The systems mapping work, because of the minimal investment it 
requires upfront, can provide a glimpse into the value of going further into 
more rigorous work with computers. The main point is that the choice does 
not have to be an either/or. As Figure 4.20 shows, the methodology proposed 
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From Individual 
Mental Models to 
Shared Mental Models 1 7. Build Integrated 
Map 
Systems Archetypes ""I Computer Models 
8. Make sense of Map 
t hru Decomposition 
9. Share Decomposition 
10. confirm and Test 
the Decomposition 
8c. Build computer Model 4 and Run Policy Tests 
9 ; .  Share 1nsights with 
Others 
CLD's piigh Simulation kabs 
and Assess 1 
Systems Archetypes and Computer Models 
Figure 4.20 
in this chapter is more like a detour than a substitution. People may end up 
going from sharing the decomposed diagrams, and based on that 
understanding go right to getting engaged in the process of building a 
computer model (with a professional modeler's help). One could also cycle 
through the computer modeling process and then go to Step 8 and follow the 
decomposition route in step 8 above for clarifying and sharing the learning 
from that experience. 
4.4.3 A Final Note on Validity 
Does this mean that the use of the computer model suddenly brings more 
validity to the party? The answer is no. The same validity issues apply 
equally to the whole computer modeling process. The question of validity 
must always be addressed relative to a stated purpose. 
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I 1 Model-Building Operator's View I Model-Building Observer's 
I 
I View 
Definition of I "well-rounded or justifiable: "validity of an inference: 
Validity 1 applicable to the matter at hand: 1 correctly derived from its premises; 
(Webster ' s  Third 1 pertinent, sound. Able to affect or 1 specifically: true in terms of the 
N e w  International \ accomplish what is designed or logical principles of the logistic 
Dict ionary)  intended: effective, efficacious." I system to which the inference 
I belones." 
Definition of Theory of relationships I Computational Result Model 
View of Model I A tool for decision-making 
Proof of Validity 
Collector's item; organizes and 1 rearranges data 
Degree of confidence in 1 A defined concept; certain 
assumptions; no absolute proof I statistical tests are met. 
I 
- 
Use of Model 1 Seeks shared confidence 
I I 
i Seeks competitive debate 
I ! 
Operator vs. Observer View of Models and Validity 
- (adapted from Forrester, (1973)) 
Figure 4.21 
Forrester (1973) provides an interesting comparison between two views on 
models and their validity: an operator view and a model-building observer's 
view (see Figure 4.21). Operators are people who make decisions to control 
action (e.g., manager). Observers, on the other hand, explain and criticize, but 
they do  not act (e.g., staff advisor). 
Their views of models and of validity, as expressed by Forrester, are very 
different. The operator's view is pragmatic and "use-oriented." The 
observer's view is philosophical and "theory-oriented." The methodology in 
this chapter was developed with a particular eye on the operator's view and 
the belief that operators need to better articulate the implicit theories guiding 
their actions. Although, Forrester was referring to computer models in his 
paper, the points apply equally well to any kind of model-including pen- 
and-paper models. 
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Chapter 5 
Mapping Mental Models: 
TQM Implementation False-Startst 
"The world is ruined by best efforts." 
-Dr. W. Edwards Deming 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2, the role of mental models in organizational learning was made 
explicit and highlighted as a critical link. In Chapter 3, we looked more 
deeply into the nature of mental models and reviewed various methods 
used for mapping them. Chapter 4 presented a research process and 
methodology for making mental models explicit and for moving from 
individual to shared mental models. In this chapter, I present two case 
studies where the methodology is used to make systemic sense of TQM 
implementation efforts that proved unsuccessful. In terms of the 
organizational learning model developed in Chapter 2, the focus of these two 
cases is on the link between individual learning and individual mental 
models and the link between individual and shared mental models (see 
Figure 5.1). 
+ The work described in this chapter was supported by the MIT Organizational Learning 
Center. The case studies covered in this chapter are based on joint work with Gary Burchill and 
fieldwork presented in the MIT Sloan School of Management master's thesis (Brown & Tse, 1992) 
which the author and Burchill helped supervise. 
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Individual Learning 
r ,/ -7 Assess. 
OADI-SMM Organizational Learning Cycle 
Mapping Experience into Explicit Mental Models 
Figure 5.1 
This chapter begins with a brief history of total quality management and 
its implementation in the U.S., paying particular attention to the emerging 
problems organizations are experiencing in this country with TQM 
implementation and the need for a systemic approach. 
TQM implementation false starts are studied in two companies. Focusing 
on each company, one at a time, we present the "stories" told by three 
interviews through causal loop systems maps. The stories are then integrated 
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into a single diagram which graphically shows the inter-relationships among 
all the stories. The integrated diagram is then "decomposed" into several 
systems archetypes, each of which provides a clearer way of seeing the 
systemic structure responsible for the company's experience. The 
presentation of the first company case, Test, Inc., includes systems maps of the 
individual stories, an integrated map, and the systems archetypes. The 
second company presentation, Wafers, Inc., includes the integrated diagram 
only and the systems archetypes. In the final section, I present a summary of 
the findings on TQM implementation patterns, and offer some possible next 
steps. 
5.1 TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
Total Quality Management1 (TQM) embodies a management approach that is 
committed to satisfying customers by designing, producing, and delivering 
high quality products. TQM attempts to involve all employees to 
continuously improve the company. TQM is both an all-encompassing 
philosophy about managing a business and a set of specific statistical tools 
applied to specific problems. It is this blend of the micro and the macro which 
makes it such a potent discipline. Either element by itself would not be 
revolutionary. Without the philosophy, TQM is reduced to a bag of tools 
which is applied to problems only as they arise; in effect, simply helping to 
fight fires. Without the statistical tools, however, TQM is nothing more than 
a guiding light to a goal that offers no help for navigating the terrain. TQM1s 
l ~ h e r e  are many different terms in common use at different companies, such as QIP (Quality 
Improvement Process), TQ (Total Quality), El (Employee Involvement), CWQC (Company Wide 
Quality Control), Total Quality Control (TQC), etc. Although there are differences among some of 
these, they are usually variants of the same theme, namely, to improve the quality of product and 
services to customers through a company wide focus on quality, and will be collectively referred to 
as TQM or Total Quality Management. 
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success in helping companies improve the quality of their operations lies in 
linking the goals of top management with a set of tools that workers can use 
to achieve those goals. 
Quality improvement efforts are carried out with the purpose of 
improving the product or service provided as determined by the customer, 
both internal and external. The application of the traditional TQM tools (see 
Chapter 3) to manufacturing has proven highly successful. Reduction in the 
number of defects, shortening of manufacturing and product development 
cycle times, and increasing throughput in the manufacturing process have all 
been accomplished steadily through the TQM process. 
TQM is not just about improving production steps and reducing cycle 
times, however. It is a thought revolution in management (Ishikawa, 1985; 
Ozawa, 1988). In other words, TQM is about changing the mental models of 
management in order to enhance an organization's fundamental capability to 
determine its own future. This change requires more than a one-time shift in 
thinking; it means continually re-evaluating the way managers think, 
Sustaining this thought revolution requires not only engaging in the 
continual improvement activities already accepted by many firms, but also 
changing the conventional wisdom and mental models shared within an 
organization-it requires organizational learning. 
Many American companies have begun applying the TQM approach in 
their organizations with mixed results. In this chapter we will look at the 
results of a study on TQM implementation false-starts and see how systems 
archetypes can help provide a better understanding of those false-starts. But 
first, we will begin with a brief history of TQM from its origins in Japan to its 
eventual adoption in America. 
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5.1.1 A Brief History of Modem TQM2 
After the devastation of World War 11, Japan had to rebuild its industrial base 
almost from scratch. With the help of U.S occupation forces, they began to 
apply the modern techniques of quality control in rebuilding their industries. 
A group of engineers and scholars formed the Union of Japanese Scientists 
and Engineers (JUSE) to engage in research and to disseminate knowledge 
about quality control. The concept of quality control was introduced to Japan 
in 1950 when JUSE invited Dr. W. Edwards Deming, a recognized expert in 
the field of statistical sampling, to give a seminar on statistical quality control 
for managers and engineers. 
Although the tools proved to be valuable for production problems, 
managing the process of getting workers to use them effectively was 
problematic. Dr. Joseph M. Juranls visit in 1954 shifted Japan's quality control 
emphasis from the factory floor to an overall concern for the entire 
management. The initial concept of Total Quality Management emerged 
from that shift in thinking. 
Quality Control (QC) began with an emphasis on inspecting-out defects 
and evolved into the concept of Quality Assurance (QA) controlling 
manufacturing processes in order to keep defects from being produced in the 
first place. This idea was later extended to include the product development 
process-to design-in quality from the very beginning. Once the product 
development process was involved, it was clear that the entire company 
needed to be included in quality control activities. QC was no longer the 
province of inspectors performing an isolated function, but a company-wide 
activity which involved all divisions and all employees. 
^or an in-depth history of quality management in America, see Bushe & Shani (1991). 
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QC Circles grew out of the important role workers played in the actual 
manufacture of products. The cornerstone of the QC Circle lay in the 
combination of education in statistical methods with on-the-job application 
of the tools that were learned. It was based on a strong belief in voluntarism 
which contributed to a slow start in the initial number of activities, but later 
mushroomed rapidly. 
The results of Japanese TQM activities require little elaboration. Japanese 
companies have practically decimated many U.S. industries, such as 
integrated steel, dynamic memory semiconductors, motorcycles, televisions, 
35mm cameras, and nearly the entire consumer electronics industry. They 
have penetrated virtually every market they have entered with superior 
quality products both in workmanship as well as design. Since the early 70's, 
Japanese car makers have increased their share of the U.S. automobile market 
almost every year by producing fuel efficient and higher quality cars. Japanese 
semiconductor manufacturers currently supply 85% of the worldwide 
memory chip market. The U.S. steel industry's share of the world market 
shrank dramatically between 1975 and 1985, and by 1986, imports had risen to 
37% of domestic consumption. By 1989, the U. S. went from being the world 
leader in steelmaking capacity 25 years ago to being in third place behind the 
former Soviet Union and Japan (Dertouzos, Lester, & Solow, 1989). 
5.1.2 TQM Implementation in America 
Although it has taken some strong convincing, many U.S. manufacturing 
firms have begun to implement the TQM way of conducting business and 
have made significant strides towards improving quality. AT&T cut the 
development time for their model 4200 cordless telephone from two years to 
one year while improving quality and lowering costs (Dumaine, 1989). All 
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three U.S. auto makers have undertaken TQM activities, which have helped 
reduce defects, cut cycle times and improve customer satisfaction. 
Computer and semiconductor manufacturers have also instituted TQM 
in their organizations. Analog Devices, a leading manufacturer of linear 
integrated circuits, has included Quality Improvement objectives in their 
strategic planning and bonus incentives (Stata, 1989). At Hewlett-Packard's 
Lake Stevens, Washington, facilities, they have cut failure rates for their 30 
products by 84% and manufacturing time by 80% over the past three years 
(Dumaine, 1989). In recognition of their achievements in quality 
improvement, Motorola received the first annual Malcolm Baldridge 
National Quality Award, America's equivalent of Japan's prestigious Deming 
Prize. Florida Power and Light became the first non-Japanese company ever 
to win the coveted Deming Prize in Japan. 
5.1.3 Emerging Problems with TQM Implementations 
If the decade of the 80's can be characterized as the great boom years of quality 
awareness in America, the 90's are beginning to look like a hangover after the 
big party. After several years and millions of dollars of investment, a large 
number of companies are sobering up to the fact that their quality efforts have 
not produced much in terms of tangible results. A study by Arthur D. Little 
(Kendrick, 1992), which surveyed over 500 American companies, revealed 
that only a third of them felt that their TQM efforts produced any competitive 
impact. According to Graham Sharman, an expert on quality with McKinsey 
in Amsterdam, two-thirds of quality programs that have been in place in 
Western firms for more than two years "simply grind to a halt because of 
their failure to produce the hoped-for results."3 
3 " ~ h e  Cracks in Quality," The Economist, April 18, 1992 (1992) 
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If TQM has been responsible for giving Japanese firms their competitive 
edge, why is it not producing results for the majority of Western firms? 
That's a question many managers are confronted with today, as TQM efforts at 
their companies falter. According to Boston Consulting Group Vice President 
Thomas M. Hout, "The majority of quality efforts fizzle out early, or give 
some improvements but never fulfill their initial promise."4 The TQM 
movement, viewed as the savior of Western industry when it was introduced 
in the 1980s, appears to be losing momentum in the U.S., as many companies 
have become disillusioned by their lack of significant progress. 
The problem is not that TQM methods don't work, but that most Western 
companies do not fully implement the total package and sustain the effort. 
Companies implement pieces, not recognizing that TQM as a system requires 
all of the pieces. Many do not go much beyond implementing the statistical- 
based tools on the production floor (Brassard, 1989). Although such tools can 
help pinpoint problems in a machine or a particular process and bring them 
under control, they do not address the larger organizational issues that need 
to be overcome. In fact, Deming estimates that statistics-based tools address 
approximately 20% of the problem; the other 80% has to do with 
management and systems which govern an organization's policies and often 
determine its behavior. 
5.1.4 The Need for a Systemic Approach to TQM 
The Japanese began their TQM activities in the early 1950's and have taken 
nearly four decades to attain their current level of worldwide prominence. 
Viewed as-a marathon race, the Japanese overtook the U.S. sometime in the 
'80s by running at a faster pace for the previous two decades-improving 
^Where Did They Go Wrong?" Business Week. October 25, 1991 (1991). 
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their manufacturing capabilities at a faster rate than the U.S. Stata (1989, p. 69) 
presents a provocative argument that, unlike "the Boston Consulting Group's 
experience curve theory which says that learning is a function of cumulative 
volume, independent of time ... learning, properly managed, occurs as a 
function of time, independent of cumulative volume." Fine's (1986) work 
on a quality-based learning model provides theoretical support to Stata' s 
statement. Fine showed how quality investments can drive learning curve 
rates faster and produce cost reductions more rapidly than normal experience 
curves. 
If learning were solely volume-based, then the Japanese could never have 
caught up to the U.S. in industries such as autos. The fact that they did catch 
up provides tangible evidence that the volume-based learning hypothesis is 
not generally applicable. The implications are that the U.S. could leapfrog 
Japan just as Japan previously leapfrogged the U.S. The question remains as 
to how. 
One possibility is to see TQM in the broader context of organizational 
learning and find a way to accelerate the learning process as a whole. 
Viewing TQM as a method for improving a product or process can largely 
ignore a potentially greater benefit-the learning effect that the activity itself 
has on those involved in improvement activities. Failure to see TQM in the 
context of learning and ignoring the benefits of learning effects may lead to 
underinvestment in TQM with negative consequences on both cost and 
quality competitiveness (Fine, 1988). 
Many of the TQM methods and tools (such as, the seven QC tools and the 
seven management tools covered in Chapter 3, with the exception of the KJ 
method) are particularly well-suited to advance learning at the operational 
level. As discussed in Chapter 2, however, learning is required at both the 
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conceptual and operational levels. Compared to TQM's emphasis on 
operational learning, system dynamics' underpinnings are more conceptual 
in nature. System dynamics (SD) approaches problems from the basis of the 
whole/ rather than first breaking up the whole into its individual pieces and 
trying to understand each part. Where TQM focuses on analysis of the 
separate parts that make up the whole, SD strives for synthesis of the 
constituent parts. 
From a SD perspective, if a system is decomposed into its components 
and each component is optimized, the system as a whole will almost certainly 
not be optimal (Ackoff, 1981). A common characteristic of many complex 
systems is that they are often designed with the intention of optimizing the 
parts rather than the whole. In a typical company, the manufacturing 
function is expected to operate as efficiently as it can. The same goal holds for 
marketing, accounting, engineering, etc. When a leading manufacturer of 
linear integrated circuits initially attempted to deploy TQM to improve on- 
time delivery performance, each function jockeyed to improve its own 
performance measure, which resulted in no net improvement to the 
customer. 
As shown in Chapter 3, system dynamics provides a methodology for 
thinking about the ways in which prevailing mental models may restrict 
learning, for gaining deeper insights into the nature of complex systems/ for 
finding high leverage points in the system, and for testing one's assumptions 
about the efficacy of various policy choices. Systems archetypes, usedrtomap 
the dynamics of TQM implementation efforts, can help identify the 
organizational structures that become, barriers to success. The following 
sections describe an exploration using systems archetypes as a diagnostic tool 
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in making sense of two companies' experience with TQM implementations 
that stalled out. 
5.2 DESIGN OF TQM IMPLEMENTATION FALSE-STARTS STUDY 
Systems archetypes5 offer an innovative diagnostic tool for understanding 
complex organizational issues. As presented in Chapter 3, the archetypes 
provide a simple framework for casting vexing problems in a systemic 
context. Each archetype represents a dynamic structure that comes with a 
coherent story line which people can readily understand. The archetypes 
provide a way to identify a starting point and ending point, as well as help to 
decide what to include in the diagram. Archetypes help novices see the 
circular feedback structures that are producing the problematic behaviors they 
are trying to solve. 
In this study, we used the systems archetypes as a diagnostic tool to better 
understand TQM implementation dynamics in two companies. More 
specifically, we wanted to see if the archetypes could reveal a coherent theory 
of how organizations can fall into "structural" patterns of failure that may be 
common across organizations. 
5.2.1 A Systemic View of TQM Implementation 
TQM implementation requires the development of an infrastructure to 
redesign relationships in the company and to mobilize mass participation. 
The infrastructure must be able to institutionalize TQM as a new way of 
doing business. Figure 5.2 shows a TQM implementation plan that identifies 
the necessary infrastructure for ensuring success. In this model, there are 
some "push" activities, such as training & education and promotion, some 
-see Chapter 3 for a summary and description of systems archetypes. 
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"pull" activities, such as diagnosis & monitoring and incentives & awards, 
and sustaining activities, such as diffusion of success stories, that serve to 
reinforce the TQM activities. This system is established through appropriate 
goals and organizational structures. 
Education 
> T I  Activities ^> 
5. Diffusion of 7. Incentives & Fl Elb-1 
Output 7 
TQM Implementation Model 
(source: (Shiba, 1993)) 
Figure 5.2 
From a systemic perspective, each of the areas identified in the TQM 
implementation plan represents reinforcing processes that are designed to 
drive the successful growth in TQM activities (see Figure 5.3). As "TQM 
Activities" increase, "Promotion" activities increase, leading to more "TQM 
Activities" (Rl) .  Similarly, "TQM Activities" leads to more "Training and 
Education" which leads to more "Promotion" and increased "Goal 
Attainment" which lead to more "TOM Activities" (I72 & R3), and so on. The 
implicit assumption is that if we work hard in pushing and pulling all the 
right things, we will achieve success. If we focus on the growth drivers, we 
should expect the pattern of behavior of TQM Activities to resemble 
exponential growth as shown in Figure 5.3. 
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5. Diffusion 
/ 
Time 
Reinforcing TQM Implementation Loops 
Figure 5.3 
The reality, at least in U.S. firms, is usually characterized by a behavior 
pattern that looks more like the one shown in Figure 5.4. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, that pattern of behavior suggests that a Limits-to-Success archetype 
may be at work. A Limits-to-Success archetype is characterized by a 
reinforcing loop and a balancing loop linked together by some performance 
criteria. When performance growth begins to slow (e.g., TQM Activities), the 
leverage in most Limits-to-Success cases lies in developing a better 
understanding of the balancing loop(s). The more obvious action that people 
take is to "do more of the same" that had worked before, namely, to keep 
pushing on the factors shown in the reinforcing loop(s). In the long run/ this 
leads to diminishing returns from the reinforcing loops and to continue the 
shift in "loop dominance" to the balancing loops. 
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In the seven-point TQM implementation infrastructure above, we 
identified all of the factors to be a part of reinforcing feedback loops. What is 
missing in this TQM implementation model is an explicit coverage of all the 
balancing feedback loops that will resist the effects of the growth loops. The 
Limits-to-Success archetype is an appropriate starting point to begin looking at 
TQM implementation false-starts more systemically since the classic Limits- 
to-Success behavior pattern is consistent with real-life experiences of TQM 
false-starts. 
Time 
M u l t i p l e  Possible O u t c o m e s  
Figure 5.4 
We conducted a separate study in each of the two c ~ m p a n i e s . ~  A 
summary of the findings are presented in sections 5.3 and 5.4. The results 
from both cases are summarized and discussed in the final section. 
5.3 CASE I: TESTING EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER-TEST, I N C . ~  
In this section, we begin with some background information on the company, 
Test, Inc., and a brief chronology of TQM efforts there. This is followed by a 
force-field diagram developed over three separate interviews which captures 
^or a more detailed coverage of the studies, see Brown & Tse (1992). 
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some of the major factors identified to be enabling and inhibiting forces in the 
TQM implementation effort. Causal loop diagrams are developed around 
several "stories" drawn from the interviews which are then integrated into a 
single map that contains the interconnections among all the stories. We then 
identify systems archetypes embedded in the larger diagram, which help us 
understand the dynamics in terms of systemic "chunks" rather than as a 
complicated web of spaghetti. 
5.3.1 Test, Inc.: Background 
Test, Inc. manufactures electronic systems and software for the electronics and 
telecommunications industry. Most of their customers are component 
manufacturers who use Test, Inc.'s systems to design and test their products/ 
as well as electronic equipment manufacturers who inspect incoming 
components and design and test whole circuit boards and other assemblies 
using Test, Inc.'s systems. The company sells through direct worldwide sales 
organizations. Their products are so complex, they require extensive support 
by both the customer and the company. 
Two of the key divisions of the company, the Test Equipment Group 
(TEG) and the Central Manufacturing Group (CMG) were involved in our 
TQM study. One TEG division, Test Equipment East (TEE), performs final 
assembly and testing of test equipment that its engineers design, while 
subsystems and components are manufactured at the separate Central 
Manufacturing Group. 
The story of the TQM false start began with interviews with three 
managers directly involved in its implementation, chosen to gain different 
perspectives that people in different organizational levels could give on the 
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same story. Interview subjects at Test, Inc. were the Director of Quality7 at 
CMG, the Division Manager of TEE, and an Engineering Manager at TEE. 
CMG's successful quality program had been set up with the help of the 
Quality Director, who was helping the TEE division set up a similar quality 
program at the time of the false start. He belongs to the CMG, reports to the 
Senior Vice President of that group, and acted as the "quality facilitator" in 
the false start. The Division Manager, the general manager of the entire TEE 
division, directs about 250 people and reports to the Senior Vice President of 
the Test Equipment Group. The Engineering Manager reports to the Division 
Manager. Both he and the Division Manager are considered "quality 
implementors" in the story. 
5.3.2 Test, Inc.: Chronology 
Test, Inc. did not have a corporate TQM program at the time of the false start. 
Quality programs at Test, Inc. at that time occurred on a division basis. The 
false start story at Test, Inc. involves the effort by one of the divisions, TEE, to 
initiate a TQM program. 
By the time of the false start at TEE, CMG itself had already started its own 
quality improvement effort and was well into the TQM process. Interviews 
with Test, Inc. managers, pinpoint 1983 when the quality program at CMG 
was initiated through the division's own desire to become a world class 
manufacturer. Patterned after the methodologies of the Crosby school 
(Cowan, 1991) the division's full-time quality coordinator, the Director of 
Quality, educated, planned, and helped implement improvement processes. 
M e r e  specific references are necessary, each person is referred to by functional responsibility 
to preserve anonymity, 
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Corporate headquarters initiated the quality improvement effort at TEE in 
a 1989 directive. While the division was suffering a significant loss in market 
share, major customers were complaining about the poor quality of its 
products. The company CEO concluded that improving quality would be the 
key to their recovery. This decision was subsequently passed on to the group 
vice president of the Test Equipment Group, who in turn directed the 
Divisional Manager of TEE to begin a quality improvement program. 
With the help of the Director of Quality of CMG, a Quality Improvement 
Team (QIT) was set up at TEE to improve the quality of Engineering Change 
Orders (ECO) as a start. The team consisted of managers from the different 
functional groups of TEE and was chaired by the Division Manager himself. 
The members of the QIT were sent to the Crosby quality college in Florida for 
training, and an effort was made to devise plans for setting up the quality 
program at TEE. 
However, being a QIT member did not necessarily mean strong 
commitment to the process. For instance, not everyone on the QIT made it to 
the quality college. Members allowed phone calls and meetings to take 
priority and interrupt the weekly QIT meetings, sometimes missing meetings 
altogether. Accomplishment of action items was sporadic. When the team 
finally initiated an awareness seminar for the employees of TEE to learn 
about the quality program, it was prepared not by the QIT members, but by 
their subordinates. It was delivered not as an informational session as 
recommended by Crosby, but as a motivational session. In addition, the 
requisite follow-on employee training never took place, partly due to poor 
planning, and partly to the corporate-wide TQM program taking shape at the 
same time. This quality program finally ended and was folded into the 
corporate effort. 
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5.3.3 Test, Inc.: Systems Maps 
Based on our interview data and the force field diagrams, we identified six 
stories and developed causal loop diagrams that captured the dynamics of 
each story. The individual stories were then integrated into a single diagram 
from which several systems archetypes are identified and summarized. 
The following stories-Directive without Commitment, Customers 
Demand Quality, Cost of Poor Quality, Urgent vs. Important Work, Roll-out 
without Follow-up, and Training Capacity-were mapped based on the data 
gathered through interviewing three different people who were involved in 
the same false-start effort. The systems map of each story along with a brief 
description is presented below. 
5.3.3.1 Directive zuithoiit Commitment. 
Corporate Directive for 
Improvement Activities 
QIT Commitment Work 
TQM R 1 TQM B2 
Importance 
Software 
Engineering 
Daily Work 
Improvements Completion 
Directive without Commitment 
Figure 5.5 
The causal loop diagram in Figure 5.5 shows the classic quality reinforcing 
loop that links TQM activities to quality improvements to commitment and 
finally to more TQM activities (Rl). The directive from corporate to do TQM 
provides the initial thrust that is meant to start the reinforcing process. 
0 1993 Daniel H, Kim 
Application: TQM Implementation 229 
Involvement in TQM activities, however, took time away from the 
engineers' daily work, resulting in an increase in their "Work Backlog." 
Reducing the backlog almost always took precedence over conducting TQM 
activities, thus it provided a balancing force that always took precedence over 
any TQM activities (B2). Given the continual pressure of Work Backlog, very 
little was invested in TQM Activity and, given the delay between action and 
results in Quality Improvements, the reinforcing loop did not have much of 
a chance to gain momentum. This lack of commitment to TQM activities, 
shown in the diagram, clearly exhibited itself in the team's choice of 
priorities. 
5.3.3.2 Customers Demand Quality 
Customer Demand 
for Quality 
\ Quality 
Goal 
\ Quality 
Actual 
Quality ^ 
B3 T ~ M  
Activity 
Quality 
Improvements A TQM s,
'<Importance 
Customers Demand Quality 
Figure 5.6 
In this story, the demand for better quality by an important customer, one 
well-known for its quality products and one who purchased a lot of test 
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equipment every year, initiated the corporate directive for quality efforts at 
TEE in the first place. The division's products were not meeting the 
customer's expectations of high quality standards from its suppliers. As a 
result, TQM was implemented at TEE in an effort to close the gap in customer 
expectations and appease the customer. 
As shown in Figure 5.6, "Customer Demand for Quality" raises Test, Inc's 
own "Quality Goal" which widens the "Quality Gap" between what they have 
and what is now desired. The gap can be narrowed by engaging in "TQM 
Activity" that will lead to "Quality Improvements" which lead to true quality 
improvements over time (B3). When that happens, TQM gains credibility 
and importance, which can lead to further increase in TQM activities (R4). As 
processes improve and if customers' demand for quality is stable, the quality 
gap decreases, making TQM activities seem less urgent and leading to the 
decline of improvement activities. 
5.3.3.3 Cost of Poor Quality. 
In the beginning, the true cost of poor quality was not known nor was it really 
seen to be an important topic. When the "Business Quality Goals" were 
translated into explicit measures of Acceptable Cost of Poor Quality metrics (at 
Test, Inc., measured as the cost of additional Engineering Change Orders, 
ECO's), the "Cost of Poor Quality Gap" was able to be quantified. Once the cost 
of poor quality (COPQ) was exposed, this heightened people's awareness of the 
cost of poor quality, as shown in Figure 5.7. As the importance of TQM was 
recognized, this led to "Improvement Activities" which, over time, reduced 
"Cost of Poor Quality" and brought the COPQ back to an acceptable level (B5). 
This is a balancing loop that acts to close the gap between acceptable and actual 
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Cost Quality) of Poor / Pcor$li!y \ 
Cost of Poor 
4 
Awareness of Metrics 
(Cost of Poor Quality) 
Quality TQM 
Improvements Importance 
Activities 
Cost of Poor Quality 
Figure 5.7 
COPQ. Obtaining the actual cost figures usually involves a delay because of 
situations like the one described above and because the cost effects of the 
quality improvements cannot be assessed immediately. 
5.3.3.4 Urgent us. Important Work. 
At Test, Inc., some software engineers were given improvement activities 
such as collecting data to measure the cost of quality ("important" work), 
while also being pressured to perform their daily software engineering tasks 
in order to meet the software release schedule ("urgent" work). But, missed 
release dates could be detrimental to the relationship with a customer which 
presented a conflict for the engineers when faced with the decision of 
choosing which tasks to give more priority to during a time crunch. 
The story map in Fig. 5.8 describes a case of Success-to-the-Successful 
archetype where a common resource (time available) must be allocated 
between two different tasks (Software work and Improvement work). There 
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Release Schedule Ã‘Ã‘Ã Schedule 
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Improvement Work 
Improvement Pressure to d 
Results 
R7 TQM 
Importance 
Urgent vs. Important Work 
Figure 5.8 
are clear and immediate benefits of working on the software release work 
that shows up in release schedule performance and improved customer 
relationship. This makes the decision to invest in software release work over 
improvement work easier and easier (R6), especially when total workload is 
high. The total workload on the engineers is raised by both the pressure to 
release the software on time and the pressure to perform TQM activities. 
Performing software work does relieve the pressure to release, which 
increases the ability to perform both types of tasks (B8). On the other hand, 
TQM activities can lead to improved business results over time, boosting the 
importance of TQM and the internal pressure to do more. This process could 
cause people to choose to do more improvement-related work (R7). But the 
pressure to do more TQM is seen as an added workload by the engineers and 
the perception that they can't do all the tasks grows leading them to choose 
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software release work over improvement work (B9). A key point is that 
results of the improvement work occur only after a time lag, and short-term 
pressure such as a shortening of the planned software release date tend to 
siphon off the available resource because it delivers quicker results. 
5.3.3.5 Roll-out without Follow-up. 
Observation of 
CMG's TQM 
RIO B 1 
Frustration, 
"Program of the 
Month" 
\ TOM / 
/ 
TQM Activity \ 
TQM s / 1 Expectation Gap 
Activities 
TQI - -. - - -  +A 
c TQM 1 M Skills 
"Roll-Out" 
Gap 7 
Roll-out without Follow-up 
Figure 5.9 
This story describes what happened when the employees at TEE were 
motivated to get involved in TQM without any planned efforts to train them 
in the requisite skills to carry out improvement activities. The TEE people 
knew of the successful implementation in the CMG division (located in the 
same building) so expectations were high that a similar program would be 
initiated there as well, once a QIT was formed. But the QIT members 
delegated the planning for the training program to a group that did not fully 
understand the purpose of their task. 
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The general manager who had been given responsibility for 
implementing the TQM activities at his division by the vice president was 
caught in the middle. He didn't know whether he should wholeheartedly go 
into it or wait it out. Without adequate follow-up after the initial sessions, 
motivation turned into frustration as employees grew disillusioned with the 
lack of change and labeled the TQM effort as another "program-of-the- 
month." Motivation to engage in TQM activities dropped, and eventually 
the level of activity also dropped. 
The dynamics of the TQM roll out are captured in Figure 5.9. The roll out 
effort got many people highly motivated to start engaging in TQM activities 
immediately (see Bll). This set up a high level of expectations about what 
they would be able to engage in shortly after the informational session and 
quickly led to frustration when nothing happened. Motivation to do TQM 
dropped. The longer term plan, of course, was to motivate people to engage 
in "TQM Activities" which would lead to improvements and further 
motivate people to do TQM (RIO). But with high motivation and no TQM 
Activities, people's expectations went unfilled. The wide gap between 
expected level of activity and actual activity led people to become frustrated 
and view the current effort as another program-of-the-month. This led to 
demotivation which reduced the likelihood of actually engaging in TQM 
activities even if the skills gap is later addressed (R12). 
5.3.3.6 Training Capacity. 
At Test, Inc. there was insufficient training of the workers after the initial 
TQM roll-out seminar. Essentially, the training capacity or program was not 
in place when it was needed most as described in the above section on 
"Rollout without Follow-up." As shown in Figure 5.10, the level of "TQM 
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Current 
TQM 
B14 
Activities 
Ability to 
Deliver Training 
Required 
Training 
Training Capacity 
Activities" drives the need for higher levels of "Required TQM Skills" 
because the work will require increasing sophistication of tools and methods. 
The skill gap increases and TQM activities decrease since people do not have 
the proper level of training to go beyond what they are currently doing (B13). 
One way to remedy this gap is to obtain more training. So, "Required 
TQM Skills" also drives the "Demand for TQM Training." But, as training 
demand increases, the "Ability to Deliver Training" will fall if "Training 
Capacity" is not expanded to accommodate the additional demand 
(presuming that it was already operating at full capacity, which it was in this 
case). "TQM Training" declines since the training resources are not in place 
to meet the demand, and thus, skills are not upgraded and the "TQM Skills 
Gap" increases (B14). Both balancing loops act to counter any increases in 
TQM activities unless adequate training capacity is provided. 
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5.3.4 Test, Inc.: Integrated Map 
In relation to our methodology outlined in Chapter 4, we are in step 7, Build 
Integrated Map. After mapping each of the individual stories (in section 
5.3.3), we want to integrate all the diagrams into a large single map to see how 
the stories are inter-connected with each other. In general, the identification 
of such a main loop should be guided by the overall purpose of the activity 
being studied. Once the loop has been identified and drawn, it provides a 
framework for integrating the story maps. 
Activity / TQM \ Quality 
Improvements 
Main Reinforcing Implementation Loop 
Figure 5.11 
In this study, the main objective was to implement TQM as a way of 
doing business as outlined by the implementation plan presented in section 
5.2.1. So, we begin by trying to identify the main reinforcing loop that 
represents the implementation effort, such as the one shown in Figure 5.11. 
The launching of "TQM Activity" is expected to produce "Quality 
Improvements" which will result in higher levels of quality. As people see 
the results, the importance of TQM is recognized and motivates more people 
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to engage in "TQM Activities." This is the basic story line that was in loops 
R l ,  R4, and RIO. 
Once the main loop is laid out, the various stories can be "attached" to it. 
A complete map is shown in Figure 5.12. 
5.3.5 Test, Inc.: Systems Archetypes 
The integrated map (Figure 5.12) contains the essential features from all the 
stories identified in this case study and has been double checked with the 
interview stories and the interviewees. The integrated map, while extremely 
useful for displaying all the interconnections, however, can be difficult 
enough for those intimately involved in the study to comprehend, let alone 
communicate to those who are totally unfamiliar with the case. We found it 
useful to simplify our integrated maps by applying the concept of abstraction 
and abstracting upwards to find larger "chunks" of stories embedded in the 
integrated map that can be captured in terms of systems archetypes. 
In the above discussions on the individual stories, there were cases where 
the presence of an archetype was pretty clear (for example, Success-to-the- 
Successful in Urgent vs. Important work). There may be additional 
archetypes that won't surface until all the stories have been integrated into a 
single map because the archetypal structures may be contained in the inter- 
linkages with other story loops. It is also possible that no new archetypes will 
. . emerge. 
The large reinforcing loop that is the focus of the implementation effort is 
.. , 
. coupled with many balancing loops which can either slow things down (as in 
. . 
the case of training) or completely derail it (as in the program-of-the-month 
frustration). Using the descriptions of systems archetypes as dynamic scripts 
in Chapter 3 (see Figure 3.29), we can decompose the integrated diagram into 
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Corporate Directive for 
Improvement Activities 
Motivation 
Release Schedule 
Observation of Release Software 
Pressure to do- 
Test, Inc. Integrated Map 
Figure 5.12 
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systems archetypes. A summary of these archetypes that were identified are 
shown in the chart below. A predominant theme from all the stories is the 
Limits-to-Success archetype-5 of 7 archetypes are Limits-to-Success. The 
other two are Success-to-the-Successful and Drifting-Goals. 
Archetype 
Name (and 
Story Source) 
1. 
Limits-to- 
Success 
(Urgent vs. 
Important 
Work) 
2. 
Limits-to- 
Success 
(Cost of Poor 
Quality) 
Archetype 
Structure 
Ability to / Perform AH 
Decision to Spend Tasks b 
Time on SW Work 
vs. B9 
Improv. Work ~ o i a l  ^ Workload Improvement Pressure to do 
Results R7 TQM 
Importance 
Business Goals 
- (acceptable ^ 
TQM 
COPQ) 
Awareness 
o t  Metrics 
Rl,4,10 Activity (COPQ) ^\ COPQ 
Actual 
Cost of Poor 
General 
Lessons 
This LtS story in Urgent 
vs. Important work is 
very similar to the one 
in Directive without 
Commitment. The 
successful cycle of TQM 
work adds to the total 
workload until choices 
have to be made 
between TQM and 
other activities. All else 
being equal, in 
situations like this, when 
something has to be 
dropped, it is likely to be 
the TQM work. 
The Cost of Poor Quality 
LtS structure comes into 
play when TQM 
Activities are sensitive 
to people's focus on 
COPQ metrics. As in 
the case of Test, Inc., 
when the COPQ were 
widely known and 
targeted for 
improvement, TQM 
activity increased. 
When current 
objectives are being 
met or awareness falls 
off for other reasons, 
TQM activity is 
susceptible. 
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Success 
(Roll-out Frustration. 
without "Program of the 
Month'' 
s 
s Rl,4,10 todoTOM B1l TQM 
t 
i 
4. 
Limits-to- 
Success 
(Training 
Capacity) 
\ I \ -  Activity 
TQM 
Skills Gap 
TOM 
TQM f ~ r a r n i n g y  
Importance 
I 
TOM Ability to - 
Activity Deliver Rl,4,10 j igs 
i for TQM Training Training s Capacity 
i 
The Roll-out without 
Follow-up LtS structure 
can easily happen in 
many companies 
because it is so easy to 
get the "hype" ahead of 
the substance. 
Launching promotional 
campaigns and 
speeches can be done 
relatively quickly and 
get everyone pumped 
up. The time required 
to actually get things in 
motion and the 
investments that are 
required to build 
supporting structures 
are usually a lot longer. 
The Training Capacity 
LtS structure is a classic 
case of a system 
running up against a 
resource limit. The 
catch-22 for most 
organizations is that 
they don't want to have 
training capacity until 
there is a demand for it. 
But, unless there is 
training capacity 
available, it is likely that 
demand will not grow. A 
tough choice for 
organizations is 
deciding to put in 
training capacity ahead 
of current demand, and 
base i t  instead on future 
demand that would be 
generated by a 
successful reinforcing 
loop. 
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success-to- 
the 
Successful 
(Urgent vs. 
Important 
Work) 
6. 
Drifting- 
Goals 
[Customers 
Demand 
Quality) 
Schedule 
/Â¥ Gap o\ 
Customer Software Work 
Relationship 
k Decision to Spend 
Time on SW Work 
vs. 
Improv. Work 
Improvement Pressure to do 
Results R7 TQM 
Importance 
n 
Schedule Decision to Spend 
Pressure to Time on SW Work 
Release Software vs. Improy, Work 
I 0  Quality 
Goal 
1 
Customer 
Demand for 
Quality 
n 
TQM 
Activity 
\ 
Actual ~ u a l i t y  
This case of Success-to- 
the-Successful 
can occur whenever you 
are introducing 
something new into an 
established 
environment. Unless 
special measures are 
put in place as added 
reinforcement for the 
new work, the choice 
preferred by the 
existing system will 
generally be the one 
that the players are 
already accustomed to 
and are currently being 
rewarded for. This 
tendency is referred to 
as competency traps in 
the organizational 
literature (Levitt & 
March, 1988) 
- 
This Drifting-Goals 
structure that is drawn 
from the Customers 
Demand Quality story 
reflects a general 
vulnerability of goals to 
erode due to internal 
pressures. In this case, 
increased TQM activity 
takes time away from 
software release work, 
which creates schedule 
pressure that will have a 
negative effect on the 
quality goal. This is why 
having a goal that is set 
by an absolute standard 
(e.g., zero defects) or by 
competitors (e.g., 
benchmarking) or by 
the customers (e.g., 
voice of the customer) is 
important for TQM 
efforts to stav on track. 
In this section, we describe the background of a second company. Wafers, Inc., 
give a brief chronology of their TQ efforts. An integrated systems diagram of 
their story is presented from which we will draw out the systems archetypes 
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that captures the stories told by the interviewees of their company's 
experience. 
5.4.1 Wafers, Inc.: Background 
Wafers, Inc., a division of a multinational manufacturer of semiconductors 
and related components.. is a major producer of high performance linear and 
mixed-signal integrated circuits (ICs) used in precision data acquisition 
systems with approximately 1000 employees and worldwide annual corporate 
sales in excess of $500 million. Wafers, Inc. also manufactures digital ICs, 
signal processing components, board-level subsystems and systems. Original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) who incorporate the company's products 
into a wide variety of instruments and systems comprise a large portion of 
the company's sales. Among its many markets are military/aerospace, 
computers, consumer electronics, industrial automation, telecommuni- 
cations, and automotive/ transportation. 
All seven manufacturing operations worldwide are under the 
responsibility of one Vice President of Manufacturing. Several factors drive 
this centralized manufacturing structure. In the past, technological 
innovation drove the company's success-introducing new proprietary 
products offering unique features. As long as the final product performed as 
promised, production quality was not seen as a big concern. When company's 
customers came under intense competition, they began to demand lower 
prices, higher quality and better service than they had in the past. In addition, 
Wafers, now entering new consumer markets where high volume 
manufacturing at low cost is becoming as important as technical innovation, 
must adjust to the fast-paced nature of their customers' markets, minimizing 
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delivery delays and meeting promised delivery dates, if they are to retain 
market leadership. 
As done at Test Inc., our TQM false start study at Wafers, Inc. began with 
interviewing three people directly involved in that TQM implementation, 
again chosen to gain different perspectives on the same story from people in 
different organizational positions: the Vice President of Quality, the 
Operations Manager of the Semiconductor Division, and the General. 
Manager, also of that division. 
The Quality V.P. at Wafers, Inc., reporting directly to the company CEO, is 
responsible for facilitating quality implementation efforts within the 
company across all the divisions. The Quality V.P. was the "quality 
facilitator" in the TQM false start story. The Operations Manager in the 
Semiconductor Division, one of the "quality implementors" in the false start 
study, reports directly to the Vice President of Manufacturing at Wafers, Inc., 
but also answers indirectly to the General Manager of the division. The 
General Manager, formerly a product-line manager at one of Wafers, Inc.'s 
manufacturing facilities, now manages the company's largest division, the 
Semiconductor Division. 
5.4.2 Wafers, Inc: Chronology 
The company's quality improvement efforts began in 1984, when the 
emphasis throughout the company was on design and marketing. 
Manufacturing was seen as "a necessary evil in order to get customers to part 
with their money."8 Between 1982 and 1988, the company missed their five- 
year goals by a. wide margin. The company CEO, rather than blaming the 
disappointing results on the malaise of the U.S. electronics industry at the 
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time, thought they were due to a pervasive internal problem, and instituted a 
push for quality in both product and services aimed at satisfying the 
customer. This company's quality initiatives began with the "Crosby" 
approach in the early 80s, and shifted into the J'Juran" approach in the mid 
1980s. It is now embracing the broader philosophy of Total Quality 
Management. 
The company instituted the office of Quality Manager (which has now 
become the Quality V.P.) and hired a veteran of quality programs to fill the 
position, someone who brought along with him a knowledge of and 
experience with quality improvement methodologies, including industry 
benchmarking. He helped the managers of Wafers, Inc. to organize their 
improvement efforts and set realistic goals as improvement targets. 
Wafers, Inc. made efforts to improve the company's on-time delivery 
performance of products to customers at Wafer's Semiconductor Division 
(WSD). Management at WSD saw the basic problem as the unreliability of 
the factory's committed delivery dates. The factory often missed up to two or 
three committed delivery dates in a single order (Kim, 1986). 
Managers at Wafers, Inc. were aware of the problem with on-time 
delivery performance before the Quality VP came into the organization. 
However, without a process methodology in place, efforts to improve 
performance only led to varying degrees of finger-pointing among the 
managers.9 
Moreover, the incentive scheme apparently made matters worse. 
Managers' performance evaluations were directly related to the amount of 
9This information was taken from interviews with the Operations Manager, as cited in Brown 
& Tse, 1992, p. 2 3. 
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shipments delivered during the quarter, resulting in a big boost in shipping 
effort near the end of each quarter to push products out the door. 
TQM soon gained high visibility, thanks to the efff!rts of the Quality V.P. 
The company's upper management responded well to the process 
improvement methodologies he had suggested. Results of the quality 
improvement efforts were the first item on the agenda at quarterly senior 
management meetings. The Quality V.P. developed a quarterly scorecard, 
making visible comparative ranking between divisions and pressuring the 
non-performing divisions to institute TQM into their operations. Initial 
resistance, especially among divisions at a greater distance from corporate 
headquarters, waned over time, and before long, TQM was adopted among all 
the divisions. Indicators that quality was improving included on-time 
delivery performance which increased from 60% in 1986 to 97% in 1990. 
Then in 1990, the business of Wafers, Inc. underwent several significant 
changes. Internally, the acquisition of another company in a distant location 
caused some confusion, and required organizational changes. Externally, the 
electronics industry was in a downturn reflected in their fall from favor on 
Wall Street. The stock price of Wafers, Inc. dropped precipitouslyl and 
management was concerned about takeover threats. As a resultl 
management attention was focused away from quality and other long-term 
programs and more on the short-term financial survival of the company. 
Quality improvement was now last on the agenda of quarterly management 
meetings and then fell off the agenda completely, a clear sign that it was no 
longer a priority item in the company. Improvement activities slowed as 
short-term shipping activities became more important. On-time delivery 
performance deteriorated from its peak of 97% in 1990 to the low 90's as of 
mid-1991. 
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We conducted a case study of their shipping performance activities based 
on their assessment that it constituted a quality improvement "false start." In 
other words, improvements were made and then subsequently lost. In this 
analysis, the Division's General Manager, Quality Manager and Operations 
Manager were interviewed for approximately 2 hours each. 
5.4.3 Wafers, Inc.: Integrated Map 
The integrated diagram presents a rich map of the pattern of events which 
still preserves each mini-story without losing the details.10 
losee Company A in Brown & Tse (1992) for a description of the individual stories. 
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5.4.4 Wafers, Inc.: Systems Archetypes 
Archetype 
Name (and 
Story Source) 
7. 
Limits-to- 
tuccess 
Dimming the 
spotlight) 
3. 
Limits-to- 
Success 
Train the 
Froops) 
Archetype 
Structure 
Personnel 
Availability 
Sr Mgmt. 
Attention to - 
/ s Process Personnel Gap 
Business 
Financial R l  TQM Activity 
Performance / 
On-Time 
Demand for 
Improvement 
Delivery Personnel 
Performance 
Personnel 
Sr Mgmt. Available for 
Attention to lmprovement^"s, p r ' r n i ~  6 Work Training TQM 
Business 
Financial R l  Â ¥ / v i  TQM B3 
Performance 
I 
Ability to 
On-Time Demand Deliver 
Delivery for TQM >Training 
Performance Training 
Training 
Capacity 
General 
Lessons 
Xis Limits-to-Success 
LtS) structure is likely 
o be encountered in 
my company setting 
vhere TQM activity is 
iependent on 
improvement personnel 
o support that activity. 
rhis is very similar to 
h e  "Training Capacity" 
story from Test. In both 
:ases, the inability to 
meet early demand for 
raining that was 
generated by the TQM 
4ctivity served to 
dampen TQM activity. 
State that the "logic" of 
:he loop would suggest 
that the decrease in 
I'QM Activity would 
irode delivery 
performance, create 
financial problems 
which would take senior 
management attention 
away from TQM and 
lead to a downward 
spiral. However, this 
should be interpreted as 
"the loop has the 
potential to do that if 
the R l  loop was not 
hooked up to any other 
loops. In reality, things 
are never that cleanly 
divided and so we must 
always remember the 
larger systemic context 
from which we 
'decomposed' the 
archetype." 
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9. 
1 Limits-to- i 1 SU- 
; (Productivity 
Dilemma) 
Sr Mgmt. 
Attention to 
mprovernent /"Â Process 
Business 
Financial R l  
Performance Fear of 
Vs On-Time Job Loss 
Delivery 
Performance 
I B5 
Employee 
Utilization 
Rate 
1 Limits-to- 
Success 
(Resistance to 
Change) Sr Mgmt. 
Attention to 
Business 
Financial R l  
Performance TQM 
On-Time Adoption 
Delivery 
Performance 
\ B15 Resistance to 
Change Current 
ykactices 
Delivery 
Goal Gap 
The Productivity 
Dilemma presents a 
real problem for any 
organization that is 
improving its 
productivity without a 
commensurate growth 
in its customer demand. 
I f  productivity grows 
faster than demand, 
then labor utilization 
decreases and the 
traditional view of a 
financially sound 
business decision would 
be let the unneeded 
workers go. Thus, 
according to loop B5, 
fear of job loss will tend 
to keep TQM activity at 
a level that is not jog- 
threatening. 
Any change effort is 
likely to encounter 
resistance from some 
members of the 
targeted organization 
which is a natural and 
expected reaction 
((Schein, 1987c) The 
resistance dynamic 
captured in this set of 
loops is a tricky one to 
overcome because the 
resistance is in the form 
of a mindset or mental 
model that is 
predisposed to not 
value TQM. \%en 
TQM activity succeeds 
in improving on-time 
delivery performance, 
for example, the goal 
gap decreases, which 
increases resistance to 
change because the 
improved delivery 
performance is 
perceived as a signal 
that the old ways are 
working just fine. Thus, 
TQM adoption 
decreases and TQM 
Activity is also 
decreased. 
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11. 
success-to- 
the- 
Successful 
(Ship or 
Measure) 
12. 
Drifting- 
Goals 
(Resistance to 
Change) 
Sr Mgmt. 
Attention to o Expediting 
mprcivement p- Process A -- Activities 
Business 
Financial R l  TQM R13 
^ivity 
0 
Performance 
On-Time 
' i - 
On-Time 
Improvement 
Delivery Rates 
Performance 
Activity s 
/ TQM 
i s  
On-Time 
Adoption 
0 
Delivery B6 
Performance Resistance to Change 
of Current Practices \ On-Time 
Delivery Goal 
1 
Lowball ~g 
On-Time 
4 
Individual 
Performance Defensiveness 
Goal-Setting d 
This story of Ship or 
Measure is similar to 
the Urgent vs. 
Important Work story 
in Test., Inc. In Wafer's 
case, it is Senior 
management's 
attention that gets 
pulled in one direction 
over another. If there is 
constant attention given 
t o  TQM, delivery 
performance will 
improve with better 
financial results. This 
reinforces Sr. 
management's 
attention to TQM (Rl). 
If, on the other hand, 
attention id given to 
Expediting, due to a dip 
in financial 
performance, 
expediting goes up 
which has a negative 
effect on On-Time 
Improvement Rates 
which undermines 
delivery performance in 
the long run and leads 
to more financial 
pressure to focus on 
short-term expediting 
(R13). 
The Resistance to 
Change story is also part 
of a Drifting-Goals 
archetype. The 
dynamics in this case 
revolve around people's 
insecurity about 
achieving delivery goals 
which leads to 
defensiveness and "low 
balling" goal setting. By 
setting goals that are 
achievable with current 
practices, the resistance 
to change increases. 
This stifles TQM activity 
and lowers delivery 
performance. The 
resulting gap creates 
more defensiveness, 
reinforcing the 
tendency to low-ball 
goal setting. 
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5.5 DISCUSSION 
Based on these two case studies of TQM implementation false starts, we can 
draw some tentative conclusions about the common pitfalls that all 
companies may be susceptible to. We started this chapter by pointing out that 
TQM implementation plans tend to focus on launching and managing the 
reinforces forces, such as training and promotion, without an explicit focus 
on identifying the balancing forces that are important for a successful 
implementation. On the basis of the two case studies, a tentative 
recommendation can be mad that the Limits-to-Success archetype may be a 
good point from which to start an investigation of TQM false-starts. Our 
preliminary results indicate that this archetype comes up repeatedly in the 
company stories. 
5.5.1 Common Failure Modes 
The most common archetype identified was Limits-to-Success with eight 
occurrences. There were two Success-to-the-Successful and two Drifting- 
Goals archetypes identified. A surprising result was that none of the other 
archetypes appeared in the stories. In other organizational settings, Tragedy- 
of-the-Commons (ToC) or a Shifting-the-Burden (StB) archetype frequently 
surface as one of the organizational stories (see Chapter 6, for example). In 
retrospect, however, it makes sense that these are not likely to show up in 
cases where the implementation never really takes off because they either 
explain the entrenchment of behaviors over a long period of time (StB) or the 
dynamics of multiple demands on a fixed resource (ToC). 
The archetypes and stories identified in this study highlight three major 
issues that may be relevant to other company settings: (1) Constancy of 
Purpose, (2) Training Capacity, and (3) Old vs. New. The lessons and 
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implications of these issues will be discussed as well as how they fit with 
some of the existing quality literature. A fourth issue, Productivity Dilemma, 
was not common to both companies, but it still has potential implications for 
all companies engaging in TQM and other productivity enhancing work. 
Test, 
Inc. 
Company 
Cost of Poor Quality 
(LtS) 
Constancy of Purpose 
Roll Out without 
Follow Up (LtS) 
Training 
Wafers, 
Inc. 
Training Capacity 
U S )  
Dimming the 
Spotlight (LtS) 
Ship or Measure (StS) 
Train the Troops (LtS) 
Old vs. New 
Urgent vs. Important 
Work (LtS) 
Customers Demand 
Quality (DG) 
Resistance to Change 
(StS) 
Ship or Measure (StS) 
Resistance to Change 
(DG) 
Three Major Systemic Issues in TQM Implementation 
Figure 5.14 
5.5.1.1 Constancy of Purpose 
One of Deming's fourteen points is creating constancy of purpose for 
improvement. He states: 
There are two problems: (i) problems of today; (ii) problems of tomorrow, 
for the company that hopes to stay in business ... 
Problems of the future command first and foremost constancy of purpose and 
dedication to improve the competitive position to keep the company alive and 
to provide jobs for their employees, (Ernst & Young, 1991, p. 24-25) 
Deming admonishes people that fixating on solving the problems of today is 
not enough. You can get better at solving current problems as you slowly go 
out of business. A constancy of purpose is required, however, to keep focused 
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on the problems of tomorrow because of the constant demands of today's 
problems. 
Juran (1982) also stresses the importance of the role senior management 
plays in a successful implementation. His prescription includes having a 
formal infrastructure in place from the very top of the organization to the 
individuals on the factory floor. TQM implementation should be a well- 
planned out process with full commitment (not just involvement) by top 
management.11 The experiences of these two companies as represented by the 
archetypes shows why this is such an important point. 
The Cost of Poor Quality (LtS) and Roll-out without Follow-up (LtS) 
stories from Test and Dimming the Spotlight (LtS) and Ship or Measure (StS) 
stories from Wafers all indicate a lack of constancy of purpose. In the Cost of 
Poor Quality story, the TQM activity would be affected by the ebb and flow of 
focus on the Cost of Poor Quality" (COPQ) measures. If there was enough of a 
gap that it couldn't be ignored, efforts to make improvements would increase. 
When COPQ and the COPQ gap fell, so would the focus on TQM activities. 
In the Roll-out without Follow-up, there was an inconsistency between 
people's expectations and the actual level of activity that followed some 
initial meetings. The expectations were based on people's observations of 
what was happening at another division at the same location, but the efforts 
begun with them were not the same. This lack of consistency of action was 
seen as a lack of senior management commitment and led to a reinforcement 
of a prevalent belief that this was yet another program-of-the-month. 
l l ~ t  a seminar for top management at Wafers, Inc. Juran explained the distinction between 
involvement and commitment. He said that when you have ham and eggs for breakfast, the 
chicken was involved in producing it, but the pig was committed. 
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Dimming the Spotlight points out the dynamic where inadequate 
attention is paid to making sure there are enough 'improvement' personnel 
available to sustain a TQM effort. If senior management pays attention to 
TQM in the beginning of the effort and then gradually dims their spotlight on 
it, the result is likely to be another Limits-to-Success situation. 
The Ship or Measure story points to the important issue of performance 
measures which govern an organization's actions. If the business financial 
performance indicators that senior management pays attention to are based 
solely on the results of short term activities, like quarterly shipments, then 
the incentive for workers to invest in TQM activities is low. People know 
how to "win" by the old measures. 
All four stories emphasize the need for a clearly articulated constancy of 
purpose. The window of opportunity for establishing credibility may be 
relatively short in organizations who have had many programs come and go. 
5.5.1.2 Training Capacity 
One of the difficulties that is probably common to a lot of organizations is 
having just enough training capacity to handle current demand without 
having more than is required. The two stories are virtually identical. 
The Training Capacity story focuses more on the skills gap while the 
Train the Troops story focuses more on the personnel gap. Either for lack of 
skilled people to help the workers or the lack of skills of the workers, the 
TQM activities will suffer. The Training Capacity (LtS) and Train the Troops 
(LtS) stories suggest that the downside of having inadequate capacity may be 
greater than the costs of having too much capacity, especially in the early 
stages of implementation. Given the level of skepticism with which most 
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new programs are received, the success or failure of the first phase of an 
implementation can have far greater effect than any la,ter efforts. 
5.5.1.3 Old vs. New 
Introducing a new way of doing things into an organization raises the issue of 
how to balance the new with the old. Five of the stories were related to this 
issue: Urgent vs. Important Work (StS), Customers Demand Quality (DG), 
Resistance to Change (StS), Ship or Measure (StS), and Resistance to Change 
(W. 
The urgentlvs. Important Work and Ship or Measure stories point to the 
same issue of when faced with a choice under a lot of work pressure, the day- 
to-day work needs almost always wins out. The visibility of the results, both 
in terms of the formal measures as well as the immediate experience of 
getting tasks accomplished (engineering work or expediting shipments), for 
the short term work makes this a classic case of the Success-to-the-Successful 
archetype. From a management perspective, the archetype highlights the 
need to explicitly address the issue of work overload when implementing 
something new that will require time and effort for people to learn. It is the 
principle of short term pain vs. long term gain. Unless senior management 
changes the system to accommodate that tradeoff, the short term pain is likely 
to govern the workers' actions. 
Resistance to Change is also a Success-to-the-Successful archetype but is 
slightly different in nature. This one is based more on a mindset or 
worldview that is not open to new ideas. Providing enough time and 
training will not be enough to overcome this hurdle of ingrained cynicism, 
which is why Ishikawa (1985) says it requires a thought revolution in 
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management. Senior management commitment and constancy of purpose is 
critical for overcoming this kind of resistance. 
A TQM implementation can face an Old vs. New issue through a 
Drifting-Goals structure, as in the stories of Customers Demand Quality and 
Resistance to Change. Without having an absolute measure that is not 
measured relative to how things are currently being done, the goals are 
susceptible to drifting depending on daily work pressures and entrenched 
mindsets. 
5.5.1.4 Productivity Dilemma 
Although this story was represented in only one of the stories, it raises an 
important general issue-as you increase productivity, what do you do when 
you need fewer people to do less work? This question is very relevant to 
companies who are working to accelerate organizational learning as well as 
those engaged in TQM. It also relates directly to Deming' s point about 
driving out fear in the workplace. 
It is popular to refer to people as a company's most important asset and to 
view productivity improvements as increasing one's asset base. This, 
however, is more rhetoric than substance because people only show up on 
the expense side of company income statements. Hence, when productivity 
improvements are gained, financial analysis suggests reducing the 
"unneeded" people to make performance look even stronger. 
But what if we really treated employees as assets-not just in words but 
on our financial statements? For starters, we would add another category on 
the asset side of the balance sheet and devise a way to assess the value of the 
intellectual capital of the organization. Unlike physical assets, people assets 
could appreciate over time. We would still account for people's salaries, 
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benefits, and other employee-related costs as expenses, but we would also 
have a corresponding valuation for the people-capacity of the organization. 
The people-asset column would provide corporate visibility that the people- 
capacity was being enhanced. 
Putting employees on the balance sheet as assets could also change the 
way we think about cost-cutting. Training would be viewed as an investment 
and would not be automatically cut when times get tough. Vacation days 
would be considered vital investments that help our most important assets 
become even more productive. Employees would not be seen as expenses to 
be cut out, but assets which we could invest in and expect to get a return in 
terms of higher productivity, new products, better quality, and a myriad of 
other possibilities that we have not yet begun to identify. 
5.5.2 Next Steps 
In this study, we used the methodology developed in Chapter 4 to understand 
better what the organizational pitfalls are when implementing TQM. The 
stories and systems maps were grounded in the data provided by the 
interviewees. In terms of organizational learning, the study helped the 
managers take the first step by making their individual experiences explicit in 
a form that captured the dynamic richness of their organization's experiences 
with TQM implementation. 
Both the integrated map and the systems archetypes can provide a means 
to begin sharing the current understanding of their TQM experience with 
others in the organization. Although this study did not include taking the 
next step of trying to make the systems maps widely shared, that step could be 
done as a follow up to this study. We could develop a measurement of how 
widely the structures identified in the model are shared in the organization 
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before and after being introduced to the diagram. This would be an 
assessment at the level of conceptual learning and frameworks. Another 
measurement that would need to be designed is assessing the different actions 
that people took on the basis of the new insights-that is, measuring 
operational learning and assessing its link to conceptual learning. 
A useful result would be the development of a whole typology of 
implementation patterns of failures and successes represented in the 
framework of archetypes and causal maps. To build such a typology we need 
to replicate this study with about a dozen more field sites. The results of this 
initial two-company study suggests that there may be some common patterns 
that companies can fall into (such as the Limits-to-Success structures 
summarized in the charts above). Having such a typology could help 
companies understand how their implementation plans went awry so that 
they can design ways not to fall into the same traps. Perhaps more 
importantly, new companies venturing into a TQM implementation can 
learn from the experience of others and avoid falling into the same 
organizational traps. 
5.5.3 Final Note 
In a recent article, Drucker (1990) writes about the "postmodern factory" 
whose essence will be defined by the synthesis of four principles and 
practices-Statistical Quality Control (SQC), new manufacturing accounting, 
'flotilla" or module organization of manufacturing processes, and a systems 
approach. According to Drucker, the integration of these four concepts will 
build a new theory of manufacturing where every manufacturing manager 
"will have to learn and practice a discipline that integrates engineering, 
management of people, and business economics into the manufacturing 
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process" (p. 102) Implicit in Drucker's theory is the underlying goal for 
creating an environment conducive to continual learning. 
Being TQM-driven means creating such an envir'onment by advancing 
continuous improvement at every level of the organization. From the 
factory worker to the CEO, the goal is to become better learners. But, to be 
lasting and significant, organizational learning must advance on both the 
operational and conceptual level. Learning at one level without the other is 
like trying to run a marathon with one foot nailed to the starting line; you 
can be off to a quick start, but you won't get very far. 
Total Quality Management and system dynamics have complementary 
strengths that can greatly enhance an organization's ability to improve its 
performance through a more balanced learning process. The integration of 
the two approaches can provide the synergistic boost th.at will help U.S. firms 
reassert their competitiveness and build the foundations for a new type of 
organization-a learning organization, where front line people work in self- 
managed groups, managers develop their research skills and take on the role 
of theory-builders, and leaders become more like philosophers who inspire 
the human spirit. At the core of these learning organizations will be learning 
systems and processes that are firmly rooted in the two disciplines of TQM 
and system dynamics. Systems archetypes can play an important role in 
helping companies see their organizations more systemically. 
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Chapter 6 
Mental Models and Organizational Learning: 
Product Development Management? 
"We have the technology, the people, the skills, all the pieces- 
why can't we put it all together?" 
-product development manager 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 5, the TQM implementation study focused on helping managers 
map their experiences into a systemic framework, make their understanding 
of that experience explicit onto the systemic maps, and then put it into a form 
that could be explicitly shared with other people. Given the nature of that 
study, it provided an example of the ability to take individual learning, make 
it explicit into the mental models, and put it into a form which clarified the 
experience and made it more easily sharable, much in the same way that K-J 
diagrams in total quality methodology allow one to construct a representation 
of one's process and experience in a form that's easily shared. 
The purpose of this chapter's study on product development 
management is to go through the entire organizational learning cycle as 
  he work described in this chapter was supported by the MIT Organizational Learning 
Center. Parts of the case work and product development literature review are drawn from two MIT 
Sloan School of Management masters' theses which the author helped supervise (Giancola, 1992; 
Roberts, 1992) 
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described in Chapter 2 (Figure 6.1), especially as implemented in the 
methodology developed in Chapter 4. This study details the outcome of a 
new product development team's going through the process described in 
Chapter 4. The frameworks and the tools enabled team members to look at 
their product development process differently, and to do that by making 
explicit their individual mental models. 
OADI-SMM Organizational Learning Cycle 
Double-Loop Organizational Learning 
Figure 6.1 
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In section 6.4, for example, there will be a detailed extended example of 
how the core product development team went through a process of building a 
shared mental model as a g -oup, and we'll see the map that resulted from 
that process. Making individual mental models explicit in a group session 
began to illuminate a shared mental model. This helped them to clarify 
potential points of high leverage action, which they could and did take. 
Implementing these actions resulted in organizational changes which led to 
apparent improvement in particular performance indices. 
In section 6.5, there will be an example which takes the experience of the 
core team into a "learning lab" environment. Once again, building the 
systems archetypes helped other component teams to build a shared 
understanding of issues similar to the ones addressed by the core team. In 
particular, understanding the Tragedy-of-the-Commons helped to resolve an 
issue that team members had been wrestling with for many weeks and which 
they expected to struggle with for many more weeks without resolution. 
Two important insights were generated from the field work that were 
translated into organizational action. One insight, which was discovered 
during a systems mapping session, was the recognition of the ways in which 
the organization's own system for keeping the program on time was directly 
causing it to miss its timing schedule. The second insight was a direct result 
of working with the Tragedy-of-the-Commons archetype and recognizing the 
important role it plays in managing the product development process. The 
Tragedy-of-the-Commons archetype provided a systemic understanding of 
why a heavyweight program manager with wide authority over the entire 
product program makes sense in circumstances where individual component 
groups can destroy a "common" upon which all depend. 
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We begin the chapter with an overview of product development in 
general, and a review of the research literature on product development, 
followed by a brief chronology of the project work at the company site. This is 
followed by the extended case examples in section 6.4 and 6.5. At the end of 
the chapter, we examine some conclusions about managing product 
development (section 6.6) and implications gained from the research findings 
for further efforts to improve organizational learning (section 6.7). 
6.1 BACKGROUND ON PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT 
Product development refers to the process by which an orgmization designs 
and markets a new product or redesigns and improves an old one. Three 
functional groups, broadly defined, are involved in this process: design 
engineering, manufacturing, and marketing. The scope and extent of the 
process vary widely across and within industries, depending on the 
complexity of the product involved. 
6.1.1 Importance of Product Development 
A key concern for companies in a wide range of industries is redesigning the 
product development process to increase the rate of new product 
introductions, improve the quality of products marketed, and reduce cost 
throughout a product's lifecycle. As Clark & Fujimoto (1990, p.1) have 
written, "Developing high-quality products faster, more efficiently, and more 
effectively tops the competitive agenda for senior managers around the 
world." Product development has also been highlighted by several studies of 
national competitiveness (Dertouzos, et al., 1989; Hayes, et. al., 1988). Survey 
research by Gupta & Wilemon (1990) has shown that 87% df the managers 
they surveyed felt increased pressure to develop new products faster. 
Companies who are able to get new products to market sooner and orders 
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from customers faster may well hold the principal tool for achieving 
competitive preeminence in coming years (Dumaine, 1989). Thus, product 
development performance constitutes a key strategic variable for 
management. 
A number of forces are driving the need to improve the product 
development process. First, product lifecycles are shrinking across a broad 
spectrum of industries (Roseneau, 1990), which means that new designs 
become stale faster as product functionality is rapidly surpassed by each round 
of competitive introductions. Second, as competition becomes more global, 
there is the dual challenge of serving worldwide markets and fighting 
worldwide competitors. Ohmae (1990) states that, in the "interlinked 
economy" of the world's industrialized and newly industrializing countries, 
products must be introduced almost simultaneously across the globe. 
Companies no longer have the luxury of extending product lives by pushing 
old products into new geographic markets, because customers everywhere are 
demanding similar quality and functionality. 
Third, the rate of technological change has accelerated, and the increasing 
speed of dissemination of technological advances has compounded this effect. 
As a result, more companies can access new technologies faster, and 
innovations can be rapidly emulated. This means that advantages based on 
(currently) superior technology can be short-lived (Gomory, 1989). Finally, 
markets are becoming more fragmented as marketers identify finer 
segmentations of customers based on behavior and needs. Such niche 
markets place greater demands on firms to develop a higher variety of 
differentiated products in order to hit these smaller targets. 
The implications of these trends are extremely Important because the 
opportunity costs of being late to market can be very high. One analysis. 
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showed that products coming to market within budget but six months late 
earned 33% less profit over five years versus 4% for those that came out on 
time but were 50% over budget (Gupta & Wilemon, 1990). Globalization 
means that firms must be ready to roll out new products on a wide scale and 
also monitor a larger, more disparate group of competitors and markets. 
Peters (1991) sees several imperatives for success in such an environment. 
"Sluggish" functional units must be broken into self-contained teams focused 
"on the fragile, fleeting task at hand." Information must flow freely both 
within the firm and in the company's "extended family" of suppliers, 
distributors, and customers. Experimentation and rapid decision making 
must be encouraged while working to reduce blaming and risk aversion. 
This is the kind of rewiring that an organization must do in order to cope 
with the new, chaotic environment. 
The above changes place great pressures on product development 
organizations to restructure themselves to become more nimble. For those 
that meet the challenge even greater rewards are available. Stalk & Hout 
(1990) cite a number of advantages of shorter development cycles, including 
higher margins due to premium pricing lower development costs due to 
reduced rework, and improved quality due to better design integrity. 
Stalk, Evans, & Shulman (1992) suggest that companies that can 
transform product development into a competitive weapon by iterating 
rapidly and consistently through the design cycle will have a competitive 
advantage. In light of the environmental shifts discussed above, how a firm 
competes may be more strategically significant than where it competes. Thus, 
a strong argument can be made for the link between superior performance in 
product development and superior corporate performance. 
0 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
Application: Product Development 267 
6.1.2 Product Development and Organizational Learning 
As discussed in earlier chapters, in the rapidly shifting economic 
environment faced by firms today, organizational learning is crucial both to 
cope with day-to-day fluctuations and to adapt to significant environmental 
changes. Senge (1990a) defined a "learning organization" not as one 
increasing its capacity "merely to survive," but as one "that is continually 
expanding its ability to create its own future." This ability requires what he 
refers to as "generative learningu-learning that "enhances our capacity to 
create." 
A number of authors have described product development as a learning 
process or discussed it in the language of learning. For example, Adler, Riggs, 
& Wheelwright (1989) cite support for learning as a top management priority 
for enhancing product development capabilities. Maidique & Zierger (1985) 
developed a model of the "new product learning cycle" that involves three 
types of learning, each with a different locus. "Learning by using" takes place 
in the customer base as buyers gain experience with a product. "Learning by 
doing" occurs as the firm manufactures greater volumes of the product and is 
based on the theory of the "experience curve" (Henderson, 1972). "Learning 
by failure" takes place as managers launch successive generations and 
variations of products into the market and gain a better understanding of the 
development process and market responses by identifying failure patterns 
and weak links in the organization. 
Meyers & Wilemon (1989), in contrast, direct their attention toward 
"intra-team learning" and the mechanisms by which it can be reinforced, 
documented, and transferred. Imai, Nonaka, & Takeuchi (1985) argue that 
learning is central to Japanese firmsf product development success where the 
interplay between "learning" and "unlearning." Learning occurs within and 
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between "self-organizing product teams" in a highly adaptive and interactive 
manner. Unlearning, on the other hand, prevents the development process 
from becoming overly rigid, and provides a mechanism for continuous 
improvement. 
Based on these varied perspectives on the product development process, 
it is clear that learning can be an important "by-product" of the product 
development effort, enhancing understanding of both the firm's markets and 
its internal processes. Exploring the intersection between product 
development and learning should provide an extremely powerful leverage 
point for focused effort to improve organizational performance. 
6.1.3 Review of Studies on Product Development1 
This section provides a brief, cross-sectional review of the many perspectives 
and different research methods used in product development process 
research. These studies range from best practices and how-to's that offer 
advice on how world class firms have organized and managed their product 
development efforts to empirical studies that are based on well-defined 
research methodologies and involve the study of a large sample of firms or 
managers. 
6.1.3.1 Best Practices 
A number of recent books aimed at managerial audiences offer guidance on 
how to organize and manage product development efforts (Roseneau, 1990; 
Rosenthal, 1992; Smith & Reinertsen, 1991). Roussel, Saad, & Erickson (1991) 
and Stalk & Hout (1990), while not focusing exclusively on the product 
development process, devote significant time to new product issues. Almost 
l 1  acknowledge the help of Roger Roberts, a research assistant, who pulled together much of 
the literature review in this section. For a fuller review, see Roberts (1992) 
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all of these authors appear to draw heavily on concepts discussed earlier by 
Imai, Nonaka, and Takeuchi (1985; Takeuchi & Nonaka, 1986). 
House & Price (1991) offer a set of metrics for tracking product 
development projects in order to reduce the development cycle. These 
measures, used at Hewlett-Packard, include "break-even time" (BET), time 
until the project generates a positive cash flow, and "time-to-market," the 
time from the start of commercial development until the product is released 
in the market. 
While other authors advocate one best way to achieve development 
success, Krubasik (1988) cautions managers to cus tomize  their product 
development approach based on factors related to their specific product and 
competitive environment. He points to two key variables, the opportunity 
cost of not reaching the market within a certain time window and the 
development risk of the project, as determining factors in how resources are 
allocated and projects are structured and managed. This is in contrast to most 
of the authors cited above. 
Though many of these studies offer helpful models and insights, they 
have inherent limitations. Best practices examples and anecdotes about how 
the Japanese do it, for example, typically focus heavily on the "what" of 
product development and give little attention to detailed analysis of how new 
methods can be introduced into the complex realities of functioning 
organizations. Similarly, benchmarking can be a valuable for targeting an 
achievable level of performance but is not, in and of itself, a viable method 
for implementing such performance. According to Sense (1990a, p. l l ) ,  
"[benchmarking] can do more harm than good, leading to piecemeal copying 
and playing catch-up. I do not believe great organizations have ever been 
built by trying to emulate another, any more than individual greatness is 
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achieved by trying to copy another great person." There is a need for a deeper 
understanding of the realities of product development in real organizational 
contexts which is the goal of many of the empirical studies covered in the 
next section. 
6.1.3.2 Total Quality Management 
Feigenbaum (1991, p.6), one of the founding fathers of the TQM movement, 
writes that "the most demanding task of managers and engineers will be to 
change a company's philosophy from 'make it cheaper and quicker' to 'make 
it better.' New product development is one of the critical areas requiring 
excellence in work process emphasis." He advocates applying quality 
principles within the development process. 
Rosenthal (1992) also emphasizes the relationship between new product 
development process improvement and TQM. Focusing on processes that 
build customer satisfaction, a key tenet of TQM, accustoms the organization to 
viewing the firm as a network of processes (one of which is product 
development) instead of as a confederation of functional fiefdoms. Rosenthal 
also encourages application of the tools and techniques of TQM to the analysis 
of the development system. 
6.1.3.3 Marketing 
From a marketing perspective, product development can be seen as a process 
of scanning for unmet market needs, translating them into a design, and 
producing new products. Traditionally, marketing placed a heavy emphasis 
on product concept development and testing. This can be seen in texts by 
Urban & Hauser (19801, Crawford (1983), and Pessemier (1986) which devote 
little attention to the questions of managing the information flows across the 
firm or of resolving conflicts between functional perspectives. 
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Fine, Hauser, Clausing, & Sachs (1989) advocate the use of quality 
function deployment or QFD (also known as the "House of Quality") for 
improving the marketing-design interface in product development. QFD 
addresses some of the organizational issues mentioned above by facilitating 
interfunctional planning and communications by starting from the premise 
that interfunctional teams can improve the development process (Hauser & 
Clausing, 1988). The mapping methodology facilitates communication 
between marketing, design, and manufacturing because it serves as a 
mechanism for transmitting the "voice of the customer," recorded in terms of 
desired product attributes, and translating these attributes into the 
quantifiable language of engineering characteristics. Empirical studies on the 
effectiveness of QFD appear to show improved inter-functional 
communication (Griffin & Hauser, 1990). 
6.1.3.4 Organizational Behavior 
Product development can also be viewed as an organizational process that 
involves the resolution of conflict between representatives of various 
functional cultures or constituencies. The focus here is on how effective 
teamwork can be fostered in a process that cuts across the various turfs that 
delineate the political power structure of an organization. 
One of the earliest attempts to examine product development from an 
organizational behavior perspective is based on the research of Lorsch & 
Lawrence (1965). Their study of the processes of specialization and 
coordination required to generate and market innovations showed that while 
specialists are needed to increase the efficiency of development tasks, 
coordinating mechanisms (of which there can be many forms) are crucial to 
integrate the views and work of specialists. Dougherty's (1987) study of the 
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interaction of functional units as they attempt to comprehend the market for 
a new product emphasized the different ways in which functional units think 
about the market-each seeking disparate information and interpreting the 
information differently. She coined the term "thought world" to describe the 
distinctive views of different organizational constituencies, who 
institutionalized their own routines and reinforced the distinctions that 
would keep them separate and prohibit creative learning. 
In a similar vein, McDonough & Leifer's (1986) analysis of multiple 
cultures within firms engaged in product development projects revealed that, 
although a degree of creative tension is valuable among those responsible for 
innovation, strong project leadership is needed to reconcile the cultural 
clashes that result. Rubenstein, et. al., (1976, p.20), in their study to 
understand the factors influencing innovation success at the project level, 
concluded that one of the two areas on which organizational re-design efforts 
should focus is in improving "communication in terms of frequency, 
openness, timing, quality, context, and content between many pairs of 
company functions involved in the [product development] process." This 
emphasis on communication is similar to the need to develop shared 
understanding between Dougherty's multiple thought worlds. 
A common prescription for improving the product development process 
is the use of cross-functional teams. Ancona & Caldwell's (1992) assessment 
of the impact of diversity in both tenure and function on cross functional 
team performance produced mixed results. They found that diversity helps 
in setting goals and priorities and maintaining external communications, but 
diversity impairs the internal processes of teams in a manner that outweighs 
the external benefits. They suggest that changes in team training and 
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evaluation as well as in organizational norms are required to realize the 
potential benefits of teamwork. 
6.2.3.5 Operations Management 
Studies that focus on the mapping of flows and the examination of processing 
stages are classified under the heading of operations management. Rosenthal 
(1992, p. 7) sees the development process as a "series of decisions that 
combine to transform an initial [conceptual] product into a physical reality." 
Larson & Gobeli (1988) found that a project-biased matrix product 
development structure yielded the best results for the firms in their sample. 
Allen's (1977; 1980) pioneering studies of communication patterns in R&D 
groups showed that the level of communication drops dramatically if team 
members do not work in close proximity, providing strong support for the 
concept of co-located teams. 
Others have studied the use of Design-for-manufacturing (DFM) 
guidelines on product development and production system performance for 
high-volume products in time-critical markets. By reducing part complexity 
and shortening tooling procurement times, deviating from DFM guidelines 
can actually improve performance (Ulrich, Sartorious, Pearson, & Jadiela, 
1993). Eppinger et al. (1990) describe a process for reducing the overall 
complexity of a project by reorganizing the relatively few tasks that are critical 
to the project. They use a design structure matrix method for strategically 
decoupling major design tasks that require more manageable design team 
sizes (Gebala & Eppinger, 1991). 
Perhaps the most extensive and detailed research on product 
development in the automotive industry is contained in Clark & Fujimoto 
(1991). The authors studied projects in 20 firms over a six year period, basing 
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their work on a view of product development as a "process by which an 
organization transforms data on market opportunities and technical 
possibilities into information assets for commercial production" (Clark & 
Fujimoto, 1991, p. 20) . 
Despite all the research done in the areas mentioned above, product 
development managers have a lot more questions than they do answers. As 
one product development manager put it: 
"We have the technology, the people, the skills, all the pieces-why 
can't we put it all together?" 
If one agrees with the premise that they indeed have all the pieces, then the 
problem lies in how those pieces are managed. Clark and Fujimoto (1991) 
underscore this point repeatedly: 
1. Introducing cross-functional communication tools in such an 
[adversarial] atmosphere (which we found in many other companies as well) 
might easily reinforce the traditional separation of functions. For example, 
requiring product engineers to release preliminary information to process 
engineers will make design fluctuations more apparent to process engineers. If 
process engineers react by blaming product engineers for the changes, the 
product engineers will become increasingly defensive. From their perspective, 
early communication to process engineers only opens them to earlier attack and 
gives process people opportunities to unilaterally impose design constraints in 
the name of manufacturability. This may reinforce a lldon't-tell-them-early~f 
attitude on the product side. On the process side, the notion that early design 
information, because it is likely to change, does not deserve serious 
consideration may reinforce a wait-and-see attitude, (Clark & Fujimoto, p. 
125) 
2. We have observed that technical expertise in a variety of disciplines 
is essential to developing an outstanding product rapidly and efficiently, but 
that even more important [emphasis added] is the way expertise is applied 
and integrated. Firms face a variety of choices about structure, procedures, 
assignments, and communication. Effectiveness appears to be a function of 
consistency and balance in managing the critical linkages within and across the 
stages of development. (Clark &; Fujimoto, p. 127) 
3. Engineers, tending to be perfectionists, are often reluctant to release 
work that is incomplete. The upstream group will be even less willing to 
release information early if [he environment is hostile, with design changes 
triggering accusations of sloth or incompetence. If the attitude of product 
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engineers is "I won't give you anything now because I know I'll have to change it 
later and I know that I'll take the blame for it," management may have to 
effect a fundamental change of attitude throughout the engineering 
organization, both upstream and downstream, a very difficult task. (Clark & 
Fujirnoto, p. 213) 
4. Introducing overlapping without requisite changes in communication, 
organization, and management is more likely to reduce product quality, incur 
unintended schedule delays, and lower morale in the engineering organization 
than to improve performance. (Clark & Fujirnoto, p. 238) 
The above statements suggest that one of the greatest barriers to better 
product development performance lie in the organizational structure and 
systems in which the process must be managed. Even when an organization 
has all the component technologies and expertise necessary, performance can 
be greatly diminished by the way it is managed in concert. It is not enough to 
have the product development manager understand how all the pieces are to 
be managed; the whole engineering organization needs to understand and 
agree to work together effectively. That is, they all need to be thinking 
globally and acting locally (Sterman & Senge, 1991) . 
To achieve the "fundamental change of attitude throughout the 
engineering organization," that Clark and Fujimoto write about will require 
building a shared understanding (or shared mental models) of what the 
product development process is about in a way that allows people to connect 
their individual activities to the whole. 
6.2.1 Focusing on Product Engineering and Process Engineering 
Product development is an incredibly complex process which requires the 
managing of multiple constraints and demands spanning a relatively long 
time horizon with multiple phases. Figure 6.2 shows Clark and Fujimoto's 
(1991) summary results of "average project schedule by stages." Compared to 
the U.S., Japanese automakers have a substantial advantage in their ability to 
get products more quickly to market. The Japanese appear to undertake more 
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of their stages in parallel than their US counterparts. In particular, the 
product engineering and process engineering stages are conducted almost 
completely in parallel resulting in a 10 month advantage over the US in 
those two stages alone, and the pattern is similar in the other stages as well. 
months before start of sales 
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(source: Clark & Fujimoto, 1991) 
Figure 6.2 
As Figure 6.2 shows, the Concept Generation and Product Planning stages 
have virtually no overlap with the Product Engineering and Process 
Engineering stages. The Advanced Engineering stage does have some 
overlap, but we may be able to assume that the requisite advanced 
engineering is available to us when the product engineering effort gets 
underway. The product engineering and process engineering stages are likely 
to exist in many organizational settings outside of the car industry. Success in 
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these stages is also more likely to depend less on technical expertise and more 
on managerial competence than the earlier phases. 
6.2.2 Focusing on Overlap/Coordination 
~ctivitiesl~ntensive 
Transmission of 
Information 
Early and Mutual 
Simultaneity of Releases of Preliminary 
Upstream-Downstream ation Minimizes 
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1 Confusion and Delays 7 Downstream ~rocess 
Levels of Knowledge (low to high) 
Information Flow 
Overlapping with and without Intensive Communication 
(source: Clark & Fujimoto, 1991) 
Figure 6.3 
Clark and Fujimoto also cited the importance of simultaneity of 
upstream-downstream activity in conjunction with continuous sharing of 
information. One can conduct upstream-downstream activities at  the same 
time but achieve very different results depending on how one went about 
sharing information throughout the process (see Figure 6.3). As quoted 
earlier, encouraging overlapping without changing the way communication 
is handled can potentially be less productive and more costly than doing 
things more serially. 
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What allows one organization to be able to implement and manage 
according to the top model while others struggle on in the bottom model? 
What keeps organizations who understand the value of the more productive 
model from following suit? These are the kinds of questions that are raised 
by the reported results. One approach to addressing such questions is to begin 
looking at how the current system has a natural tendency to reinforce it's 
current status. 
In this project, the maps and methods described in Chapters 3 and 4 were 
used to help line managers understand the reasons why problems recur 
when, in principle, team members already "know what to do." Evidence 
shows that many firms are in this situation. Gupta & Wilemon's (1990) 
survey data indicate that while 88% of managers face increasing pressure to 
accelerate development cycle, 87% report that, despite increased attention to 
product development, the problems of the past persist in their firms. As 
Meyers & Wilemon (1989) point out, this persistence of error is an indicator 
that learning is not taking place. 
As a manager in the study said, "There is a lot of stuff out there that will 
tell you what to do, but not much to tell you how to do it." Improving the 
rate of learning is a key to shrinking product development cycles and to 
improving the quality of the development process. Our focus in this study is 
thus placed on helping managers to "learn to learn," and thus to identify, 
understand, and remove the obstacles to learning and change 
6.2.3 Product Development and the OADI-SMM Learning Cycle 
The OADI-SMM cycle in Figure 2.9 can serve as a framework for advancing 
organizational learning in a complex organizational setting like product 
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development. Managers at Cars2 agreed that they traditionally have operated 
in the Assess-Implement mode and have not invested much effort in the 
Observe and Design aspects of the learning loop. At Cars, there was little 
learning that was transferred from one product program to the next. In terms 
of the organizational learning model, there was no formal process for 
capturing individual learning into explicit individual and shared mental 
models that would lead to new organizational actions. In effect, they did not 
have a product development process that was continually accumulating 
learning from each product development experience; they had a long series of 
isolated individual product development efforts. 
In our work with Cars, we focused on building the managers' skills to 
tease apart assessment from observation. By building capabilities for 
reflection and inquiry, it is possible to encourage managers to balance inquiry 
(their new role) with advocacy (their traditional role).3 Making managers 
more conscious of their "bias toward action" helped them to be more aware of 
when they were jumping from assessment to implementation, and decrease 
their tendency to short-circuit the loop. 
By recognizing the influence of mental models on what i t  is that people 
observe, and by bringing to light the ways in which "leaps of inference" and 
hinden assumptions can shape their assessments, it is possible to use the 
OADI cycle to reason from directly observable data, to assess the nature of 
systemic structures, and to identify and design high leverage improvement 
actions, leadir i  to further observations of the effects of implementing such 
actions. The end result is the creation of an organizational capability to make 
-This is a pseudonym used for the company under study. 
 o or a discussion of "Balancing inquiry and advocacy," see Senge (1990bj, pp. 198-202. 
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positive changes in systemic structures and thus advance organizational 
learning in product development. 
6.3.1 Company Background 
Cars, Inc. is one of the largest manufacturing companies in world. With 
customers' more sophisticated demands for quality and styling, Cars re- 
examined its product development process in an effort to better meet the 
market's new challenges. 
Various parts of Cars experimented with different approaches, including 
world-class timing, to improve the product development process. One 
product development team, the APDP (A Product Development Program) 
team, chose to participate in a MIT Organizational Learning Center (OLC) 
pilot project in order to understand their product development better and use 
it as a means to build an ongoing learning process within their product 
development organization (see Appendix C for a brief description of the OLC 
research objectives). 
6.3.2 Project Chronology 
In late 1989 and early 1990, Cars' program for its top 2000 worldwide 
executives addressed crucial issues on the Chairman's desk. When the 
program ended, it became clear that another round of development programs 
would be needed. The series left executives intrigued but unclear as to how 
the new ideas might be applied. The Executive Development office was 
challenged to find a way to operationalize systems thinking throughout Cars. 
ope or a more detailed description of the process of conducting the research partnership with 
Cars, Inc. as well as the details of the meetings held, see Giancola (1992). 
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In 1991 a diverse group of Cars managers attended a series of five two-day 
core competency courses on systems thinking and related learning disciplines 
at the OLC. Seeds were planted, and some took root. Engineers in product 
development wanted a "deeper dive" into the learning, envisioning a 
difference in the way they made decisions in their new product development 
cycle if  they could become familiar with new learning tools such as feedback 
loops and causal diagrams. 
Interviews conducted separately with the Program Manager and Planning 
Manager in charge of APDP revealed differences in how they saw the source 
of problems, and then ideas about how to best effect solutions. The Planning 
Manager, on the one hand, wanted the OLC project to focus on 
improvements in the Evaluation Prototype (EP) in the belief that if the EP 
works, the new product is likely to work. Although Cars has a very specific 
process, they have never followed it in developing a product. 
The Program Manager, however, believed that concentrating on EP 
would be too short-term a solution, and would create backlash problems in 
the future. He felt what was needed was to take a deeper look at Cars' entire 
manufacturing paradigm, currently based on resource control and restraint 
and the engineer design validation process, which he sees as over-involving 
senior management, treating suppliers with indifference or hostility, and 
greatly reducing the authority of operating personnel to meet their quality, 
cost, and time objectives. 
The APDP core team had its first 1-1/2 day planning session in January 
1992, with the Program Manager, Planning Manager, Engineering Manager, 
Manufacturing Manager, Finance Manager, Purchasing Manager and Internal 
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Consultant from Cars and the @LC research teams. These sessions, held 
roughly every four to six weeks, were intended to help the team "learn about 
learning." Over the course of several sessions, the team members were 
exposed to the problem articulation approach and mapping methodology 
described in Chapter 4. 
The team members worked with ladder of inference, left-hand/right- 
hand column tool, action maps, systems archetypes, and affinity (or KJ) 
diagrams. The team members were trained to conduct interviews of others in 
the APDP program in order to gather additional directly observable data from 
those outside of the core team. The team constructed numerous systems 
archetypes based on their own experiences and the data gathered from the 
interviews. 
6.4 MAPPING SHARED MENTAL MODELS~ 
In Chapter 4 we laid out a 10-step methodology for mapping individual 
mental models and for transferring them to others. In this section we will go 
through an extended example of a systems mapping session as an illustration 
of how the core team was able to make their individual mental models 
explicit and integrate them into a collectively constructed map around a 
specific issue. Although the Cars core team followed the general steps 
outlined in Chapter 4, we also made some variations. First, since this team 
was composed of the line managers who were actually responsible for the car 
program, the independent researcher coding process was not used. Instead, 
we created the variable names in real time with the managers. Second, 
- - 
5 ~ h e  OLC team consisted of Daniel Kirn and Paula Giancola, except for the first meeting 
which also included Bill Isaacs. Don Seville joined the OLC in August, 1992. Paula Giancola left 
the team in May 1992. 
mapping session contained in this session are drawn from a transcript of a meeting held in 
August 1992. 
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interviews of others on the car program were conducted by the core team 
members and analyzed as a group. Third, the integrated diagrams were also 
created in real time by cycling through steps 1-4 in rapid succession. The map 
that resulted from this process produced new insights for the group and led to 
identification of high leverage actions that produced much better results for 
the APDP program.7 
The core team members have been identified as managers A, B, etc. to 
help preserve anonymity. The author is identified as MR (MIT Researcher). 
Portions of the conversation that are underlined indicate variables that are 
relevant to the diagram being constructed. Portions that appear in bold are 
insights or process observations made by the managers. The presence of 
I /  
* * * "  means that portions of the conversation have been deleted. My 
commentary is in italics. 
6.4.1 Focusing on an Issue: Parts Behind Schedule 
The session began with a discussion about what issue to focus our efforts on, 
given where the APDP program was in its schedule. The stated goal was to 
try to map what was intuitively known in various pieces by different people 
and make explicit the interconnections between the different pieces and how 
different actions that we take can create differing short-term and long-term 
consequences. The starting point was with a Fixes-that-Fail systems 
archetype. 
[Mgr. A]: ... I agree with [Mgr. B] on that late carts beine one t i ;  -.t we can still influence. I 
took the one that adds in addition, a different version, they're basically the same, 
but then I took another version of i t  that's different, that adds in the supplier 
impact, which is exactly what we're doing today, putting thy heat on the suppliers 
for 7-day weeks, 24-hour days ... 
^ ~ h r o u ~ h o u t  the APDP pilot project, the core team met on a monthly basis, more or less. During 
these sessions, a number of causal maps and systems archetypes were constructed. The following is a 
detailed account of one of the sessions. 
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Parts Behind Schedule 
Figure 6.4 
6.4.1.1 Supplier Timing 
It is interesting to note that the suppliers are the first thing the managers 
think of when we focused on the problem of late parts. Later, they revise the 
sequence and say that the first thing they try to do is get more engineering 
resources. Both are considered to be typical "knee-jerk" responses to parts 
being late. 
0 0 0  
[Mgr. A]: 
[Mgr. B]: 
[Mgr. A]: 
WRI: 
* * a  
[Mgr. B]: 
Well, [the] supplier will tell you what compromises he's making. 
He's saying you're pushing it off on me, and then manufacturing is going to say 
you're pushing it off on me, which neans I have less capability to evaluate the 
process. We're shifting the burden from us who make decisions to the engineers who 
release the parts late, to the suppliers who have to ... 
But the supplier tells you, we sat at a meeting where we were told [B] said they 
could ship the first shot without this data, and we said we don't want you do that. 
So, they tell you what those timing shortcuts are. They're observables. 
So, for instance, if we said, parts behind schedule and there's this pressure-what 
do we do with that pressure? If we mapped one of them ... 
We c o q m s s  the & and the next thing that's likely to happen is we're Eonna 
somehow, we re-adjust the sequence. 
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Figure 6.5 
6.4.2.2 Build Timing 
In this segment, we begin to see that there is some confusion about what 
"compress build timing" really means. Section 6.4.2 contains an example of 
another point of confusion around compressing development timing. In 
both cases, having the causal loop diagram and explicitly drawing the links 
appeared to keep the group focused on clarifying each variable being added to 
the map. 
[Mgr. A]: 
[Mgr. F]: 
[Mgr. A]: 
Â 0 0 
[Mgr. F]: 
[Mgr. A]: 
[Mgr. F]: 
[Mgr. A]: 
[Mgr, F]: 
[MR] : 
[Mgr. A]: 
Or we deldy the build and reduce the time to function part. 
Does compress mean overtime? 
It either means overtime or it means to take the units that you were going to build if 
these parts are late for and put it later in the production schedule. If  the moon roof 
is late you try to build cars without moonroofs first. We just did that. We delayed 
the first moon roof by five weeks and pulled other cars up in the lineup so we could 
handle the late part. 
Short cut, don't d o  testing, 
That's where you can compress the actual functioning. 
I would say compress means do it faster, this is ... 
ress b& or f u n c h  if you can't compress the build anymore you reduce the 
amount of time you have to function. Effectively to delay the prototype, 
To me, compress build means do the same thing faster. 
Well, compress build timing says you shrink the time, but the question is, and your 
intention is to get back on schedule, but if you point out with the supplier, one of the 
things is that if you have to take anything out, they'll gonna take short cuts. 
They'll tell you what ... 
Well, why don't we make it c m s s ~ d  build or d e v w .  
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Compress 
Build Timing 
Compress Build Timing 
Figure 6.6 
6.4.1.3 Development Process 
[Mgr. Dl: Or make it a separate thing. 
[ M m  They're very different effects. 
[Mgr. Dl: Compress develo~ment timing is another way to get back on schedule. 
Compress 
Development 
Parts Behind 
B l  Get Back on 
Compress 
Build Timing 
Compress Development Timing 
Figure 6.7 
6.4.2.4 Delay Program 
[MRk What other actions do you take to respond to the pressures to get back on schedule? 
[Mgr. A]: Well, the obvious last one is you delay the Job 1. 
[Mgr. F]: Would working over time be one? 
[Mgr. A]: That's compress. Compress means all-out overtime. 
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[Mgr. B]: 
[Mgr. A]: 
[Mgr. B]: 
[Mgr. A]: 
[Mgr. B]: 
What else we're going to do is &pin to throw more e m  to do the job 
faster, compress the engineers. If you find you're behind schedule because of parts, 
because engineering's not getting done fast enough, you're gonna throw more 
enpmeers in there to complete it. 
But that isn't helping. 
That's what we're doing on [program Y]. We allocated resources on a dramatic 
Lasis, and that could happen to us if we find out we're in trouble. Delavine the 
is the easy solution. But the consequences ... 
But it belongs on the loop. 
You're right. It belongs there. 
Parts Behind 
B l  Get Back on Schedule. Schedule 
Supplier Timing 
Compress 
Build Timing 
Delay Program 
Figure 6.8 
6.4.1.5 Engineering Resources 
[MR]: Any other ? 
[Mgr. B]: Increase enpineering resources to get the parts out faster. Or get the engineering 
done faster. 
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fMgr. C]: 
[Mgr. Dl: 
[Mgr. A]: 
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Add Eng 
Delay Program s 
s Pressure to 
B l  Get Back on 
Compress 
Compress 
Build Timing 
Add Engineering Resources 
Figure 6.9 
That's probably the first thing you say, when parts are getting done late, they're 
going to be late, so can we catch up by adding engineering resources? 
And if that doesn't get to you, then you do the next thing, which is compress. 
Another thing you could do is reduce content. 
Actually, the first tw we d o  is c o w  the %??her time, That's the way we 
react. 
6.4.1.6 Cancel Late Parts 
0 0 
[Mgr. F]: [Mgr. Dl said, reduce content is anoiher option, 
[Mgr. A]: In this specific map, it's not reduce content, it's canre1 the late parts. That's 
basically what we do by reducing the content. The only reason you're reducing the 
content is cause you can't get it there in time, so what you're doing is canceling the 
late parts. 
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[Mgr. C]: 
[Mgr. C]: 
[Mgr. A]: 
6.4.1.7 
Â 
[Mgr. C]: 
[Mgr. A]: 
Add Eng )el-~rog~:4~~ 
s Pressure to Pans Behind 
B l  Get Back on Schedule Schedule 
- cancel Parts 
Cancel Late Parts 
Figure 6.10 
That works with some parts. You can say, I'm 17 weeks late with the wood, I'm not 
anymore, but I was, for the console, instead of kicking prints and beating up the 
surface layout people, which is what we did, I canceled the wood, and say I'm 
going to go ... 
But if it was door trim that was late, you wouldn't cancel the change in your door 
trim, because you really can't. You still have to do the work. 
It only works with some parts. They don't have to be optional, but it doesn't work 
with everything. You've got to have an engine. You've got to have wheels. 
Information Delay 
There's one thing that doesn't come out there, and that's when you first admit that 
the parts are behind schedule. The thing is, you get to the point where you have to 
compress the product timing an everything because I don't know if there's actions 
you could do beforehand, but the fact that the parts are behind schedule, does not 
necessarily come out on a timelv basis. 
[Mgr. C]'s dead right. If vou out a delav riptit there between varts behind schedule 
and the first time vou do something about it, that delay is actually going to be 
called here. 
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Reporting of 
Pans Behind Lateness 2 Pressure 10 Get Back on 
Information Delay 
Figure 6.11 
[Mgr. C]: Or  even right before the part's behind schedule there's a delay, there's something 
tha t  ... 
[Mgr. F]: There's a delay but it's also a loop, something that's going on, that you might want 
to explain that ultimately creates the pressure. 
[Mgr. A]: There is an unwillingness to admit that you blew it which then further reduces the 
amount of time you have to take action on it. She's right. That is a critical 
leverage point. 
[Mgr. C]: Because there may be some things that you can do, I don't think we've ever found 
what those things are, because by the time we finally get to this point, those are 
the only things we tend to do. 
[Mgr. Dl: Reco ition of parts behind schedule is what vou don't have. 
[Mgr. A]: So there's a delay before vou compress. 
Â 4 0 
[Mgr. A]: ... Two [meetings] ago, the fashe team came in and said, the fashes are one week 
late. One week later, last week, fashes are six and a half weeks on the front and 
eight weeks late on the rear, and I said, wait a minute, in one week, with no 
changes, nothing happened in that week to the fashes, 1 lost five and a half weeks 
on the front, and 7 weeks on the rear. I don't believe it.! 
[Mgr. C]: [A person] did the same thing on his door trim panel. He went from one week to 
fifteen weeks. 
[Mgr. A]: That's the delay. Thev knew thev were reallv late. and didn't want to say 
anything about it. 
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[Mgr. A]: 
[Mgr. C]: 
[Mgr. A]: 
[Mgr. F]: 
[Mgr. A]: 
One of the reasons they delay, is lhe h o ~ e  w o d v  w i n  
vfre even later, an d reschedule the build. 
. .  it's kind of like why go into all this stuff if maybe the first thing that we have to 
do is figure out why there's this delay in the reporting of lateness? And if there's 
some way that you can attack that. That is our leverage point. 
There are other leverage points. 
But if you want one that you could have an impact on, 
This points out even when you know you think you know wh, : that system is, I 
could practically draw that in my sleep, still sitting here today we came up with a 
new insight. 
6.4.1.8 Summary 
The insight that Manager A is referring to is about the identification of the 
delay in getting lateness information frdm the engineers. The significance of 
this is not the fact that the delay was identified because that had already been 
known from the very beginning of the project. That data had come out in the 
preliminary interviews as well as in the interviews with those outside of the 
core team. The significant insight is that they now saw it as a lcvcrnge point. 
That little piece of information which had been an undistinguished part of 
their ocean of information suddenly glistened and caught their eye because of 
the implications made explicit in the causal loop diagram. 
This realization led them to see more clearly the reinforcing dynamic of 
how people play the waiting game when they are late with their part. As one 
engineer we interviewed said: 
If  you make a mistake, people will jump all over the mistake, highlight 
it. People I work with are motivated to make it look like they don't make 
mistakes. Important to look like you know what you're doing, whether you d o  
or not, 
As the data from earlier interviews support, there is a tremendous reluctance 
to be the first bearer of bad news, therefore everyone waits for some one else 
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to be the first to be "discovered." This delay has enormous consequences for 
the program because everyone else has to continue working under the 
assumption that everything is on schedule, rather than making the necessary 
adjustments as soon as they are required. 
6.4.2 Clarifying a Point through Mapping. 
There were times when people were confused about what was meant by one 
thing or another. The following segment shows how the mapping process 
helped to surface and clarify what is meant by "compressing development," 
One reason it does this is by having a common picture of the conversation 
that is continually accumulating throughout the process so that 
inconsistencies and unclear points do not simply "disappear" once you have 
discussed them. Another reason is that the map also makes explicit the 
assumed linkages in an unambiguous way, making it easier to spot 
inconsistencies or lack of clarity. 
[Mgr. A]: 
[Mgr. Bl: 
[Mgr, A): 
[Mgr. B]: 
[Mgr, A]: 
[Mgr. B]: 
[Mgr. A]: 
[Mgr. B]: 
That's compressed development, because effectively you build a [APDP] not / / t c  
[APDP] you wanted developed. 
Compressed development I thought meant that instead of having three months to 
evaluate your prototypes you're going to have two months. 
Well, for the part that's late, compressing development could mean I'm pw~p, to 
delay it's availability on the APDP, could mean I'm going to use something that's 
not representative. 
That's not the way I see it. We have to clarify that. Compressed development 
means you're going to have less time to evaluate the parts, i t  doesn't say anything 
about the quality of the parts you're evaluating. 
What about 1 could have reduced time, or I could have no time. 
Yeah, you make that assumption, 1 didn't. You see what I am -i ing? 
Yeah. 
I guess what we're saying is instead of getting the part that's supposed to be fully 
representative of Job 1 levels at[EP, we'll say, build that with a surrogate process 
that's not fully production representative, and the part isn't of the materials that 
you would have at Job 1, so therefore, okay it's a compromise part. See? We're 
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fighting the battle now. And we're going to fight that battle at EP, and we're going 
to fight that battle at functioning when the engineer says let me give you some sort 
of a part so you can build the car, but ... 
a * *  
[Mgr. B]: Yeah, but we're in two months gonna be faced with an issue. Do you build on time, or 
do you accept compromise parts in certain areas? We will accept compromise c arts 
in certain areas, which means, I don't care what we say, it's not the same aualitv as 
we wanted it. How do we capture that? 
Because what the engineers are thinking at  the back of their minds is "sh- 
-, I'm not going to get my part there, I just know I'm not going to get that part 
there! I've got to find a substitute part." 
aft .  
[Mgr. Dl: \nd the manufacturer, the supplier, is not developing his process, is not becoming 
capable, is not reducing variability, because he's not even into the process yet. W 
using a substitute. 
[Mgr. B]: He's piven vou a substitute oart in order for us to build. 
[Mgr. A]: So what we're comoressing is both product development and manufacturing 
develooment. 
a  a  a  
[Mgr. A]: If we're going to go about it that way, I would change compress development, and I 
would call it instead delay prototype build. 
[Mgr. Dl: They think their job is to take care of scheduling problems. They try to do it 
themselves before they get overwhelmed and then all of a sudden, they're 
overwhelmed, they're late, and then they report. 
[Mgr. B]: Then we get to a stage where building the prototy~e is more important than the 
duality of the Drototvue, meaning, "I've got to build a damn car. I've got to tell 
management we've built the car. I've got to tell management it's on the road, okay? 
They'll never know what I put into the car. I can fix this." 
[Mgr. A]: That isn't the logic flow. Yeah, that's true, but it's not the logic flow. The logic 
flow is "I got thousands [of] tests I can be running if I built the prototype, this is just 
one of them, so I'll leave all the tests associated with this out. It's non- 
representative." 
[Mgr. B]: He says, I'll be testing my component separately anyway, so I'll just give them 
something to put in the car. What happens is on the prototypes (a) we don't know 
what the level of the parts are; (b) we don't know what the design of the parts are, 
and (c) we don't know whether the parts are any good. Okay, you try to ride a crcr 
against a part, and the engineer suddenly says, you can't do that because it's not a 
representative part. 
[Mgr. A]: That's use of substitute Darts, 
[Mgr. F]: Is delaying the prototype the same as delaying the program? 
[Mgr. A]: You can delay prototype building, compress the amount of time you have to 
develop. 
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[Mgr. F]: So you're saying the only place you're talking about the quality if you will of 
development is in the substitute part. That loop takes care of all the concerns. 
[Mgr. A]: No, if I delav the ~ro to type  parts, then I risk the auality of the procram, because I 
no longer have as much time to develop the vehicle. The reason I put the cars on an 
EP is so I can find problems with the whole car. These parts interact in a total 
vehicle, so by using a substitute part, I reduce the amount of time I have for 
developing that part, but by delaying the prototype, I've got a representative 
prototype, but I've reduced the amount of time I have for development of all parts. 
So usually, we go the other way, we use a substitute part, but we build. Unless 
everything is late, or something real basic is late, like missing an engine. 
Â ¥ e  
[Mgr. B]: That's compressed build timing. That's where we revise [the] build schedule. This 
is an example of our being real clear on what we mean. 
The value of having the causal map as it was being built became 
particularly evident through the above discussion around what was meant by 
"compress development." Without the diagram, there is no common, 
coherent structure to refer to as the discussion takes place. With the diagram, 
in front of them, they saw the balancing and reinforcing loops and how the 
various pieces were logical when viewed in within the context of the system. 
They realized that the loop structures made sense for the players and that's 
why the dynamics continue to occur 
In continuing to map, they saw how much of their efforts were expended 
responding to the late parts problem and how the late part problem worsened 
as a result of those actions. For example, when the suppliers' timing is 
compressed, the suppliers decrease the time they spend helping Cars, Inc. 
engineers, which slows their progress and leads to more parts falling behind 
schedule (see R9 in Figure 6.13). 
6.4.3 The Completed Systems Map 
The mapping session followed a general set of steps. First, we started with a 
problem symptom of interest (parts behind schedule), which then led us to 
identify all the actions that are taken (e.g., compress supplier timing, revise 
build schedule) to solve the parts behind schedule problem. But, there are 
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some side effects of taking any one of these actions which can make other 
parts late and increase the pressures to take more actions (e.g., "Supplier Time 
to Help Engineering"). Next, we identified the loops that create the problem 
symptom by looking upstream of the symptom by asking "what are the 
sources of the reasons why the symptom is coming up in the first place?" We 
then looked for the interconnections between the side effects and the problem 
creating loops. Next, we tried to identify leverage points that will have high 
impact for relatively low effort (e.g., reporting of lateness) which is covered in 
the following sec'ion. 
Excerpts from the session that are linked to the additional pieces of the 
causal map are included below. The full diagram is shown in Figure 6.13. 
* a 0  
[Mgr. 61: 
[Mgr. A]: 
e e e  
[Mgr. A]: 
e e o  
[Mgr. A]: 
e e *  
[Mgr. F]: 
Another thing is en-heerinp error. That has been the cause of some of our biggest 
concerns on the [APDP] is just plain errors. 
And I would argue that chan(nng the part you're probably introducing more errors. 
If you increase changes, you increase errors, 
That in addition to content changes is another one called late decision timing. We 
change the ground that it's on. There ought to be something ... 
Functional rewards, in other words, they don't care about timing, they're not going 
to worry about timing, they're aware of function. Timing is [a] program manager's 
problem. Shouldn't we add to the parts time schedule another thing is "Wait to 
till we're sure that this is what they really want?" 
Now this helps, when you stand back and learn, even what we just gone through ... 
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6.4.4 Leverage Points 
Finding leverage points is not an obvious thing when dealing with complex 
social systems, such as a product development organization. The counter- 
intuitive nature of such systems has a way of directing one's attention to the 
place of least leverage, furthest removed from the fundamental source 
(Forrester, 1971). The causal loop diagram kept the types of interventions 
explicit and helped the team to picture the kinds of consequences they 
expected, as well as other unintended consequences. 
[Mgr. A]: That's the leverage point even now, if we took action to reward or punish the 
engineer, not just for function, but for timing and for quality of EP parts, you'd get a 
different reaction, even now to know what's coming in the EP that we don't know 
about. 
0 0 0  
[Mgr. A]: It seems to me we want to work as much on the left side of [the diagram] as we can. 
Look for the leverage points and box them and either talk about an action plan or 
get together again and talk about an action plan. What actions it would take to 
have an impact on the leverage point? 
0 0 0 
[Mgr. B]: This is really interesting because I'll tell you right now where we spend the bulk of 
our effort. To the right of parts [behind] schedule. We do all of that stuff, some 
combination, every program does that, some worse than others, but every program is 
that, and we focus there, we throw so much energy into that .... 
Having all the actions that they typically take mapped out as responses to 
the delayed information about the lateness made it clear that those actions 
were all reactive responses to a deeper problem. 
0 0 0  
[Mgr. Dl: There are reasons that some of these things happen, and one of the ones that's 
hurting us is that little circled delay there. And part of that is we don't walk our 
talk. We don't want to know the truth. We like people who come to us with good 
news. 
[Mgr. B]: If we can project somehow, way in advance, that a part's going to be late because of 
information we have about it, then we can do something about it. For example, you 
know, if we could project this part's going to change, because we know another part's 
g0ir.g to change, or because there's not resources working on this part, or a multitude 
of reasons, if we could project the lateness of the parts. Right now, we don't know 
the parts are late until they're late. 
O O *  
[Mgr. B]: ... I think we have a lot of leverage, potential leverage in that thin? called delay. 
We're going to go back, and we're going to work on that. I want to book that for the 
moment. 
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It became apparent through the discussion that there was probably more 
than one leverage point. The diagram helped the managers to distinguish 
between leverage points that are currently available, given where they are in 
the program today, and ones whose relevant time was already past. 
[Mgr, A]: 
[Mgr. B]: 
[Mgr. A]: 
Â ¥ e  
[Mgr. A]: 
If we thought about the left hand side from the engineer that has the late part and 
we took his actions and split them into things outside of his control that affect him 
and therefore could make things late, and things within his control that affect 
whether things are late or not, think about it that way for a minute, I would 
conclude that late decisions is a high leverage point but it's too much to handle 
right now. It's another whole set of maps. But I'd sav functional rewards only is a 
hiph leverage point that will affect how the engineer thinks. Timing could become 
very important to him, which would make him do different things even from the 
outside stuff that happens to him. 
In retrospect, there's a couple of really high leverage points there. But, we're 
beyond some of them, there is nothing we can do, that's basically done. But in the 
future, what are the high leverage points? And I agree with you, [Mgr. A]. That is 
a high leverage, because we still have to go through the verification program, we 
still have to go through the final design, the tweaking, and there's going to be 
incredible temptation to make a lot of change. So I would circle that 
"functionality," the whole issue of when do you stop engineering? 
If we were at a different point in a different program, I would box content changes as 
a high leverage point because it's discretionary and it really screws up the system, 
but we put in a change management control, we've said no more discretionary 
changes, so for our program, I don't think it's a high leverage point any more. I 
guess what you box depends on where you are. 
I wouldn? box anything over on the revise build schedule and compress supplier 
timing, delay prototype build. Those are the last resorts that we have. We know 
what to do when we get to there, and they're not leverage points. 
The completed map helped the managers see where they were in the 
context of the larger system which they were managing. As one manager 
observed: 
[Mgr. B]: ... I'm now beginning to think how time-dependent we are in what we're doing, and 
as a result, this has been very beneficial to me. I'm really beginning to appreciate 
it, I'm beginning to understand what an incredibly complex thing we've got here ... 
6.4.5 Outcomes 
As a result of the mapping session described above and the identification of 
the delay in reporting lateness as a high leverage point, the Team Manager 
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and the Planning Manager focused their efforts on minimizing that delay. 
They began emphasizing the importance of informing as early as possible 
whenever a delay was known. They consciously worked on their behaviors 
to receive the "bad" news with encouragement rather tha-I the more 
common and expected behavior of "shooting the messenger." They began to 
hear about problems many weeks earlier than they would have typically, and 
thus, were able to minimize the use of the many "fixes" that were a normal 
part of the accepted way of managing a product program. 
A critical test of the positive benefits of working on that leverage point (as 
well as other actions that were directly and indirectly related to the project) 
was the readiness of the product at the prototype phase. The APDP team 
achieved a part availability of 87%. As a basis of comparison, other programs 
usually come in at around 50% with no program ever exceeding 60%. The 
APDP team broke the company record by a large margin. Although, there is 
no way to directly attribute the result to the actions described above, the Team 
Manager and Planning Manager feel that they were an important factor. 
Of course, the mapping session above was not the only thing that the core 
team worked on. By meeting together as a cross functional team, the project 
work helped improve the communication lines that Clark & Fujimoto (1991) 
identified as critical. The ability of the team to get information about the 
lateness of parts earlier is an important part of that communication. Another 
important piece of the communication channel is the frequency, bandwidth/ 
and quality of the communication among the engineers in the various 
subsystem teams. As Figure 6.3 indicated, the ongoing intensive 
communication between upstream and downstream activities is an 
important factor in compressing the product development cycle time. 
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The systems mapping process that produced the insight and the chain of 
events described above was based on a Fixes-that-Fail archetype. In the next 
section, we illustrate how another systems archetypes translated into systemic 
insights that led to actions involving many players on the product 
development team. 
6.5 FROM SHARED MENTAL MODELS TO ORGANIZATIONAL CTION 
The account described above illustrates how the process of making mental 
models explicit can help build shared understanding, identify high leverage 
actions, and catalyze individuals to act. Those actions, when taken by the top 
management of a product development program, can and did alter the 
behavior of many people which, in turn, reinforced the value of those actions 
in the minds of management. In addition, the changes in management 
action and policy about handling news about problems has had a cascade 
effect on others. There is a growing indication (based on field interviews and 
anecdotes) that the effects are diffusing throughout the larger APDP team. 
Another contributor to the diffusion process is the use of learning 
laboratories which introduced a larger group (50 people to date) to the same 
process and tools that the core team had experienced. Through a two-day 
immersion, participants were introduced to new principles that helped 
change their individual frameworks and provided new tools that allowed 
them to produce new routines or responses to old problems. 
In relation to our methodology of Chapter 4, the work described in this 
section is focused more on the use of archetypes described in the latter steps 
(8-10). The systems archetypes are presented as useful ways to view the 
organizational issues with examples from Cars developed by the core team 
members shared with other APDP members. The transferability of the 
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archetypal lessons appeared to be relatively high as the following account will 
illustrate. 
The following story illustrates how systems archetypes can play an 
important role in building shared understanding among a group of people 
about an issue and lead to new actions. In effect, the principles underlying 
the archetypes can help to change the Weltanschauung of the organizational 
members and suggests new operating procedures that may become standard 
over time. To illustrate, we will take a closer look at the Tragedy-of-the- 
Commons archetype and how it was used in one of the subsystems teams of 
the APDP program at Cars/ Inc. 
6.5.1 Tragedy of the "Power Supply" Commons Story 
As you recall from Chapter 3, in a Tragedy-of-the-Commons structure, each 
individual pursues actions which are individually beneficial, but which/ over 
time, result in a worse situation for everyone involved because the collective 
action is depleting a "common" resource which is limited. At  Cars, Inc., 
individual component teams in the APDP program were all drawing power 
from the limited power supply. It made sense for each component team to 
draw as much power as they required to maximize the functionality of their 
part. The collective result was an impasse in the design process, since no 
team could concede what they saw as in the interest of their own component. 
Individual attempts to resolve the issue were unproductive according to the 
power supply manager whose responsibility it was to work with the 0the.r 
teams to resolve the issue? 
^ ~ ~ a i n ,  to help preserve anonymity, the managers will be referred to as SSM A, SSM B, etc. 
SSM stands for Sub System Manager. Wherever there were specific references made that would 
reveal the nature of the company's identity, I have substituted more general terms in [brackets]. 
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[SMM A] ... There just wasn't enough power to [supply all the components],..So, we did all the 
normal Cars, Inc. things and we established a little [action team] and we brought 
all the members in and we sat around and we talked about problems and the weeks 
went bv and we had these margins and we were, say, [x] amps from where we 
needed to be. And then after six or eight weeks we were [x-5O/0] amps from where we 
needed to be. And we were just sitting there floundering, looking at each other, 
saying, "Well, you know . . .", going through the same issues: "No, can't do anything 
with that, can't do anything with that." 
Given the culture of Cars, the admission of their impasse was not an 
acceptable option. This relates to the discussion in the previous section about 
how bad news was usually received. When this manager attempted to go to 
management about this issue earlier, the response was a typical Cars response: 
[SSM A] And I actually got some feedback from some management. I went to our manager and 
said, "We're struggling. I need some help." 
"Well, are you telling me your team has failed?" 
And I'm like, "well, no, our team hasn't failed. We just need more time." 
"Well, take your time." 
What typically happens in situations like this is that the teams will 
continue to struggle among themselves until at some point, the program 
timing is jeopardized and a decision has to be made. This usually means that 
the program manager has to step in and dictate what each team can have. 
This makes the teams unhappy because they were not able to make the 
decision themselves and because some of them did not get what they wanted. 
The manager is not happy because he had to intervene when he had expected 
the team to make the decision. The conclusion is that this was just an 
instance of a poorly-aligned team or a heavy-handed manager. There is no 
general framework for them to learn from, so it is seen as situation-specific. 
Given the mindset that either you solve it yourself or you are a failure, it 
is not surprising that the team is reluctant to go to the Team Manager (TM) 
without having the issue resolved: 
[SSM A] There just wasn't enough power to go around. And the solution to the Tragedy-of- 
the-Commons (as I see it now], if you can't resolve it within your peer level-which 
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we couldn't-you've got to go to the king, and say, "King, they're misusing the 
resource. You've gotta implement some policy." 
[But] we tried doing that before [without the Tragedy-of-the-Commons archetype], 
in the team saying, "Hey man, we've gotta go up to [the Team Manager] with this. 
We're just not getting anywhere." 
"Oh, well, we can't-let's keep working at it." 
Cause everybody felt on the team that if we do that, this team failed. Nobody 
wants to fail. Everybody wants to succeed. 
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Figure 6.13 
From a systems perspective, the team was caught in a Tragedy-of-the- 
Commons structure (see Figure 6.13) which meant that the problem cannot be 
solved at  the individual level. Only a collective governing body or an  
individual with the authority to impose constraints on all the teams could 
resolve the situation. Once the team mapped out their situation and saw it as 
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a Tragedy-of-the-Commons archetype, the course of action and the reasons for 
why the action was necessary was clear.. 
[SSM A] When ... we came back from [the learning lab] and there were a couple of us ... who 
had been through the training ... we went to the [power supply] team and said, 
"Hey, we've been eight weeks on this and we're not getting anywhere. We're 
convinced we're not going to get anywhere at our level because we're in a Tragedv- 
of-the-Commons. And that's where we got the funny looks ... And the only solution 
to the Tragedy-of-the-Commons is to go to the King, so we gotta go to [the Team 
Manager]. 
Their first inclination was that [the Team Manager] would, you know, rip our head 
off. And I said, "You know, I'm pretty confident we'll go into [the Team Manager's 
oifice] and we're gonna say, 
, 
"[Team Manager], we're caught in a Tragedy-of-the-Commons and we need your 
help. And here's our solution. Here's our shopping list. You pick the ones you want. 
You know, you're the [APDP] manager." 
And everybody on the team thought, "Yea, right." ... But we did. We went in saying 
"we have a Tragedy-of-the-Commons. Can you help us out?" 
The program manager was given all the component designs and was 
asked to make the decision on how much power to allocate to each of the 
components. Those who had to give up some functionality did not like it, 
but they understood why, given the systemic structure. A critical feature of 
this story is that the Team Manager also understood the principle of the 
Tragedy-of-the-Commons archetype. It provided a common language and 
framework that helped both parties rise above the common view that 
individuals (or teams) are responsible for either succeeding or failing and see 
that there are larger systemic structural forces that govern certain situations. 
The message of the Tragedy-of-the-Commons is not that individuals should 
not focus solely on their own actions, but rather to view those actions in a 
systemic context that reveals how the rewards and incentives conspire to 
make solutions at the individual level ineffective. 
The following account from the Team Manager shows his understanding 
of this Tragedy-of-the-Commons case from his perspective: 
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[The power supply team was] fooling around and fooling around, trying to solve this 
problem. They didn't want to bring it to me. Months were going by. We were 
getting to real cut-off points where it was going to be too late to influence design. 
They couldn't solve the problem and they regarded that as a failure and so they 
didn't want to tell me they couldn't solve the problem. Okay, I didn't know there 
was a problem to solve because they wouldn't tell mewhich is the normal Cars, 
Inc. environment. 
And, finally they mapped it. They used the [systems mapping] technique. They 
mapped it. They said, "This is a case of 'Tragedy-of-the-Commons. There is 
absolutely nothing v. e can do that's gonna get us out of this dilemma. And they 
came to me and I made the decisions and I said, "Okay, here's what we're gonna do. 
You're gonna do this. You're gonna do that. And you're gonna do this. 
And they took those as orders, which they accepted because while they knew, 
while it was against their chimney's objective, it was what it took to solve the 
Tragedy-of-the-Commons. And they viewed it as an insoluble problem within 
their constraints. So, they were happy to accept somebody saying, "Here's what 
you're going to do. 
Whereas, if they didn't map it, they couldn't reach that conclusion. And they 
would have fooled around for another couple of months and it would have been too 
late. We would [then] have had to do something really drastic at the time of the 
prototype. . . because the prototypes wouldn't run. 
The Team Manager went on to explain how the company's system was set 
up to make this a case of Tragedy-of-the-Commons: 
[TM] Well, they laid out all their individual problems and their incentives: What 
their organization wanted, what its goals were and how it was going to be 
measured, and what the effect of what it would have to do to solve this problem 
would be on that chimney and its goals and how it measured the performance of its 
people on the team. And what they were doing was absolutely consistent and right 
with how they were going to be judged in their chimney. 
And, when they laid out the whole map, it was clear that they were all going to be 
right and the end result was going to be the [APDP] would fail. So, it was 
absolutely clear that we were trying to get out of the system more than existed and, 
as long as we all kept doing what was right for how we were going to be measured, 
we were going to fail. 
And yet, no one wanted to be the one that would be criticized by his management for 
doing something foolish with his component in order to make somebody else 
successful. And once they laid it out and it was clear to all of them that this was 
happening, they said, "Okay, we're not going to resolve this but in the end, the 
[team] manager could just order it on the basis of the whole. I, as engine engineer can 
never agree that's what I want to do. But, I can accept that's what I have to do to 
make the APDP work if the [team] manager tells me that's what I have to do. 
Otherwise, I going to say, "Why don't you do it" to somebody else. "Why don't you 
fail. I don't want to fail." And, so you keep going around in circles, saying, "You do 
it, I'm not going to do it." And, nobody agrees, And so, they took it to me. We made 
the decisions and it works. 
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The decision was seen to work from the power supply team's perspective 
as well: 
[SSM A] The team left, not feeling [like] they had failed. They just felt they had done as 
much as they could within their role, and they needed more leverage. The 
leverage came from management. 
Subsequent teams looked at other common resource issues and realized 
that they, too, fell in to the Tragedy-of-the-Commons structure. For example, 
mapping their relationships with component suppliers also revealed a 
Tragedy-of-the-Commons situation (see Figure 6.14). The "commons" in this 
case was the performance of a particular supplier. As a division builds up a 
history of a good working relationship with Supplier XI that division is more 
likely to contract with Supplier X in the future. If another division decides on 
the same supplier, Supplier X's ability to satisfy both divisions' requirements 
can erode. Successive demands by more and more divisions can over-burden 
the supplier until no division is being served well. 
Supplier X, given its dependence on and historical relationship with Cars, 
feels that they are not in a position to say "no" to any of the requests in fear of 
losing future work. The unfortunate outcome is that Supplier X becomes 
over-burdened and fails to deliver on some of its commitments. Cars' 
purchasing department concludes that Supplier X is not reliable and drops 
them from their list of suppliers. 
What is emerging from the realization of the ubiquitousness of the 
Tragedy-of-the-Commons archetype in the product development setting is a 
systemic understanding of why a heavyweight program manager with wide 
authority over the entire product program makes sense. The ToC archetype 
provides a theoretical explanation for the successes of companies using 
heavyweight project managers ( d a r k  & Fujimoto, 1991) the implications of 
which we will explore further in section 6.6.1. 
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In the preceding sections, we presented the process of applying the 
methodology developed in Chapter 4 to the product development setting. 
Two insights were gained from the work at Cars, Inc., which contain broad 
implications for managing the product development process: (1) Tragedy-of- 
the-Commons as a significant dynamic that must be explicitly managed in the 
product development setting; and the communication bottlenecks which 
have a compounding effect on delays and future levels of communication. In 
the following sections, we will explore these research findings and their 
implications in more detail. 
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6.6.1 A "Commons Management" View of Product Development 
Clark and Fujimoto (1991) list several characteristics that a heavyweight 
product manager must have to be effective. Among them include the 
following: 
Coordination responsibility in wide areas, including production and 
sales as well as engineering, 
Coordination responsibility for the entire project period from concept to 
market, 
Responsibility for concept creation and championing as well as cross- 
functional coordination, 
Frequent and direct communication with designers and engineers at the 
working level as well as through liaisons, 
Possess multi-lingual and multi-disciplined abilities in order to 
communicate effectively with marketers, designers, engineers, testers, plant 
managers, controllers, and so forth, 
Role and talents in managing conflict surpass those of neutral referees or 
passive conflict managers; they may initiate conflicts to prevent product 
designs or plans from deviating from the original product concept, 
Circulate among project people and strongly advocate the product 
concept rather than do paperwork and conduct formal meetings. (Clark & 
Fujimoto, pp. 256-257) 
The above list identifies what characteristics are required to be a successful 
heavyweight product manager; the experience with the APDP program is 
beginning to show the why and the how of being successful. 
Each of the characteristics mentioned above sounds attractive. Who 
wouldn't argue for having a product manager possess multi-lingual and 
multi-disciplined abilities or conflict management skills? Recognizing a 
desirable set of characteristics is relatively easy; obtaining the skills and 
managing by them is much more difficult. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact 
that learning new tools and skills alone is inadequate by themselves. 
As the Cars case showed, there are organizational norms and beliefs that 
influence the way people behave. When you put the organization under 
stress, either by trying to change it or when it encounters a crisis, you are 
likely to run into the organization's culture (Schein, 1987). Such occasions 
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can also be opportunities for the organization to learn and affect its culture, as 
Schein (1987) observed: 
When an organization faces a crisis, the manner in which the leaders and 
others deal with it creates new norms, values, and working procedures and 
reveals important underlying assumptions. Crises also are significant in culture 
creation and transmission partly because the heightened emotional 
involvement during such periods increases the intensity of learning. If people 
share intense emotional experiences and collectively learn how to deal with 
very emotionally involving situations, they are more likely to remember what 
they have learned. (Schein, p. 230) 
The APDP core team, through the changed behaviors of that program's 
leaders and the changes in others who have been involved in the pilot 
project, have begun to challenge and change some basic operating norms. As 
the team manager of APDP reflected: 
...[ Elvery time you reach a stalemate in your working level group and you have to 
elevate to the next level of management to get a resolution, that stuff takes time, 
wastes a lot of people's energy. You have to prepare papers for it, and everyone has 
to come in and posture, and you bring all your management together. Every time you 
have to do that, you waste time. Sometimes it takes weeks to get resolutions. 
It also causes hard feelings. Somebody wins, and somebody loses in those battles. 
So that's what you don't want to do. You want to get the team to consense. And for 
me, one of the paradigm shifts I had to make [emphasis added] was for a long time, 
when you look at a situation, you see things going down the downhill side of the 
problem resolution, you say, 
'Somebody's screwing up here. There's got to be somebody I can go out and find and 
crucify for this.' 
That's just typical of how we think about situations, and when you take a step back 
and say, 'If I change, if I start to think, I've learned from experience, when you 
really get into these issues, you'll find that it's not any one individual that isn't 
trying as hard as he absolutely could, and didn't think he wasn't doing the right 
thing.' I haven't met one person at [Cars] who isn't trying to do a good job, isn't 
trying to do the best he can from his perspective. 
The secret is, when you go in with that mindset, instead of looking for someone to 
hang, you might learn something [emphasis added]. You might find out that this 
person has another issue that he's been struggling with, and maybe can't talk about 
because of a management issue, or in the case of a supplier who's terrified about 
saying anything negative about the company for fear that maybe he won't get the 
next program. You got to get past that stuff or you'll never learn anything from each 
other. You still walk around trying to find somebody to point the finger at, 'Oh, 
your part's late, so it must be your fault.' It just isn't productive. And it doesn't 
help. 
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Accomplishing such a shift in paradigm requires learning at the 
operational and conceptual levels. In terms of our framework for 
organizational learning developed in Chapter 2, we need to provide new 
frameworks and develop a new organizational W e l t a n s c h a u u n g  to 
complement the tools in order to produce new routines and procedures to 
advance organizational learning. 
6.6.1.1 Tragedy-of-the-Commons Revisited 
A shift in thinking that may help product development organizations in 
general is to view their whole process as a Tragedy-of-the-Commons issue. 
This is an alternative to the "zero-sum" game, "survival of the fittest," and 
the "us vs. them" assumptions on which most are based. 
The dynamic script for the Tragedy-of-the-Commons archetype was laid 
out by Garrett Hardin (1977). Hardin's work was a reaction to Adam Smith's 
popular idea of the "invisible hand," which states that the individual who 
intends only his own gain is believed to be led by an invisible hand to 
promote the public interest. Although Smith never asserted this to be true, 
enough of his ideas support this thinking that many still assume that 
decisions based on individual self-interest will be in the best interest of society 
as a whole. An implicit assumption that is rarely made explicit, however, is 
that the invisible theory is contingent upon the existence of unlimited 
resources. 
Hardin's description of managing the commons is based on a little- 
known pamphlet written by mathematical amateur William Forster Lloyd in 
1883.9 Hardin describes the Tragedy-of-the-Commons using the analogy of a 
^ited in Hardin (1977) as W.F. Lloyd. Two Lectures on the Checks to Population 
University Press, Oxford, England, 1833). 
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common pasture that is used by herdsman to graze their cattle. In order to 
maximize the growth of their herd, it is expected that each herdsman will try 
to graze as many cattle as possible. As long as nature, wars and disease keep 
numbers of humans and their animals below the carrying capacity of the 
land, this system works well. However, each additional animal increases the 
load upon the land, until each added cattle will decrease the benefit to all 
herdsmen. It is still in the best interest of the individual herdsman to keep 
adding animals to his herd, but each time he does, the commons suffers, the 
effects of which are shared by all herdsmen: 
Each is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without 
limit in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all ...( Hardin, 
1977, p.20.) 
Where does the leverage lie in this situation? Although we can legislate 
prohibition, as Hardin says, we cannot legislate temperance. It is difficult to 
persuade the individual herdsmen to forego the incremental gain each 
additional cattle adds to his herd, especially when the collective negative 
result of that action appears slowly over time. 
6.6.2.2 Economic Externalities 
The situation is the same when a firm has limited resources and each 
department vies for more use of a common resource in order to produce the 
best product. As the product development team members acknowledged, 
appealing to the "good of the whole car program" backfires, because no 
component group leader is willing to sub-optimize his component (and face 
the backlash from his functional area or team) in order to optimize the 
whole. One possible solution is what Hardin calls "mutually agreed upon 
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coercion," that is, mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of 
people affected. 
Economists refer to this whole dynamic as the theory of externalities. 
Meade (1973, p. 15) defines externalities in the following way: 
An external economy (diseconomy) is an event which confers an  
appreciable benefit (inflicts an appreciable damage) on some person or persons 
who were not fully consenting parties in reaching the decision or decisions 
which led directly or indirectly to the event in question. 
Meade refers to externality in those matters involving "ill-defined 
ownership!" where there is some scarce resource such that the more 'you' use 
it, the less there is for 'me,' a clear linkage to the notion of the commons. In 
these instances, Meade asserts, we cannot rely upon voluntary groups to 
internalize all important externalities! but governmental compulsory 
intervention will often be necessary (Meade, 1973, p. 57). This is precisely the 
role of the heavyweight product manager. 
Similarly, Baden (1977) asserts the need for governmental intervention in 
cases of common pool resources, where one or a set of users can have adverse 
effects upon the interests of other users. In the situation where there is no 
agency with the power to coordinate or to ration use, act ion which is 
i nd iv idua l l y  rational c a n  be disastrous.  Baden also mentions the "free-rider 
problemf" which states that in cases where investment by each member of a 
program would benefit all, the incentive for an individual, is not to 
contribute and still reap the benefits of his fellows who seemingly do invest. 
If every individual thought this way, however, there would be no 
contribution by any member.10 
 aden en suggests that the world, as a whole, is taken on "an ever-greater resemblance to a 
common pool" (Baden, 1977, p. 141) . 
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6.6.2.3 Strategic vs. Operational Autonomy 
In organizational settings, managing the commons requires suspending 
willing consent, relinquishing autonomy in certain areas in order that the 
collective good is served. Bailyn (1984) explores the meaning of autonomy 
among workers in an R&D lab, making an important distinction between 
strategic and operational autonomy. She defines the former as "the freedom 
to set one's own agenda," vs. the latter, "the freedom, once a problem has 
been set, to attack it by means determined by oneself, within given 
organizational resource constraints" (Bailyn, p. 7). In her research she found 
that most scientists valued operational over strategic autonomy; 
unfortunately, so did their managers. 
In matters affecting the commons, it may be more effective for managers 
to take charge of strategic decisions regarding scarce resources. Engineers, 
once they become aware that the Tragedy-of-the-Commons structure is 
operating may recognize the necessity for management to take charge of the 
strategic decisions, such as allocating power requirements or weight limits. 
At Cars, Inc., the team members voluntarily relinquished strategic autonomy, 
while maintaining operationally autonomy to engineer the best parts and 
use-systems possible within the pre-set constraints and objectives. 
6.6.2.4 Managing the Product Development "Commons" 
The Tragedy-of-the-Commons findings of this study and the above discussion 
provide theoretical support for Clark & Fujimoto's (1991) findings on the 
importance of having a heavyweight project manager. Their studies showed 
that a product managers who have broad authority in setting agenda, and 
who clearly convey that information so that the engineers know what is 
expected of them have significantly greater success than those who have less 
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authority and influence. How does viewing the product development 
process as a commons management issue change the way it is managed? The 
following is a tentative list of implications: 
At  the sub-system or component team level 
At the start of each product program, all the potential Tragedy-of- 
the-Commons (ToC) issues should be identified, 
All the individual players who are part of a ToC should know 
what commons they are a part of and with whom they are sharing 
it with, 
Each commons member should know who the governing 
authority is for his or her commons, 
9 Those who share a commons should have systems in place to 
maximize coordination and sharing of information, 
At a program manager level 
Identify all the common "pools" of company resources that the 
program depends on for success, 
Identify all the critical suppliers who are susceptible to being over- 
burdened by demands from all programs, 
Meet regularly with other program managers to update and 
communicate for the purposes of managing the commons, 
At the product development organization level 
Design an information system that provides real-time feedback to 
all sub-systems and component teams how their commons is 
being affected by everyone's collective actions, 
Design a dual recognition system that gives teams credit for 
producing the best individual part and also credits them for "give- 
ups" which sacrifice part functionality for product integrity. 
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A lot of items listed above may sound like basic resource allocation issues, 
and at a basic level, they are. The difference lies in the underlying 
assumptions which governs all the prescribed actions. As noted above, a 
I/ 
zero-sum game" mentality or "individuals are at fault for anything that goes 
wrong" belief will produce a very different system and outcome when 
operationalizing the above points. Viewing it as "managing the Tragedy-of- 
the-Commons," leads one to focus on how the system as a whole is 
interacting to produce undesirable results and direct efforts to work on the 
system rather than on the individuals. 
6.6.2 Structural Impediments to Intensive Communication 
Another major finding in the research involved the leverage point 
discovered from examining the mapping of parts behind schedule. Team 
members on the ADPD program knowingly delayed providing information 
about late parts to management because of the measurement system which 
punished them for being the bearers of bad news. The system encouraged 
each team to delay reporting its own problems in the hopes that some other 
team's problem would be announced first. Once somebody's part is late, it 
often meant that everyone else's schedule gets revised because of the impact 
of one part is usually felt by multiple parts. 
The case of the reporting of late parts (described in section 6.4.1) illustrates 
the importance of timely communication in the product development 
process. As Clark and Fujimoto's diagram showed (Figure 6.3), lack of early 
communication in a product development process creates confusion and 
delays in the downstream process. Two reasons for lack of communication 
that were uncovered during the work with Cars, Inc. were the incentive 
system and the functional gridlock that can occur when individual team 
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actions inadvertently create problems for other teams. This phenomenon 
was mapped into a Shifting-the-Burden archetype by the core team (see Figure 
6.16). 
6.6.2.1 Shifting-the-Biirden and Functional Gridlock 
As explained in Chapter 3, in a Shifting-the-Burden structure, a problem is 
"solved" by applying a symptomatic solution that diverts attention away from 
more fundamental solutions. When the symptomatic solution creates 
another problem, prompting further symptomatic solutions, the double 
Shifting-the-Burden pattern that results can spawn a whole maze of 
interlocking problems. In the process, the organization's ability to 
fundamentally resolve the problem atrophies. 
In the APDP program, a Noise, Vibration, and Harshness (NVH) team 
encounters a noise problem (see Figure 6.15). Ideally, they should coordinate 
with all potentially affected parties (Bl)  but, given the time pressures they are 
under, they devise a fix independently by adding reinforcements to the car 
(B2). This solves their problem which improves their ability to meet timing 
(R3), and they move on to their next problem. 
NVH's fix for the noise problem, however, increases the car's weight and 
presents a problem for the chassis tear.' Chassis, facing the same timing 
pressures in turn, "fix" their problem by increasing the tire pressure (B4), 
instead of first communicating with the affected parties (B5). This action 
helps the chassis team meet their timing objectives (R6), but now has created 
a harshness problem that NVH will later discover and have to fix. Another 
round of NVH quick fixes lead to another round of chassis quick fixes in a 
vicious reinforcing spiral (R7). 
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As the fixes may lead each team to focus more and more on meeting their 
own timing targets, they invest even less in cross-team communication (R3 
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and R6). The interaction effects (e.g., reinforcements leading to an added 
weight problem for chassis) lead to an increasing unwillingness to 
communicate with the other team, and further reinforces an "us versus 
them" mentality (see Figure 6.16). Over time, that mentality becomes more 
entrenched through more cycles of the reinforcing loops R8 and R9. 
6.6.2.2 Teams: Definition vs. incentive structure. 
Given the impediments to communication described above and in section 
6.4.1, what are the leverage points for fostering improved team 
communication? Senge (1990b) asserts that an essential element of learning 
within teams is alignment around a common goal. Yet the recent experience 
with team management programs has illustrated that grouping people in a 
company together to produce a certain product or goal is not enough. Many 
traditional organizational norms and routines, such as incentive systems, run 
counter to the creation of an optimal team. 
In many companies, performance reviews are conducted on an 
individual basis, as are the rewards and punishments of individual players. 
In many product development organizations, like the one at Cars, Inc., team 
members are evaluated by the functional "home" organization who have 
little stake in the specific car program. In addition, Ostrom (1977) states, 
"Consequences which cannot be measured directly in dollar terms have often 
been ignored. While we may not be able to attach money value directly to 
some consequences, all events can be evaluated in terms of the alternatives 
foregone." 
The Tragedy-of-the-Commons and the Shifting-the-Burden archetype 
offers some general insights into managing teams for optimal performance. 
The basic insight is that as long as there is a difference between what is good 
0 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
Application: Product Development 319 
for the team and what is good for individual team members, attempts to 
create team unity are at risk of being undermined by the fundamental 
dynamics at work. 
6.6.2.3. Implications 
A system that discourages timely reporting of problems not only hampers an 
organization's ability to respond effectively to the problem by ruling out 
certain options, it also shortens the window of opportunity for responding in 
a timely and effective manner. The leverage in breaking through the 
communication gridlock is to change the system from one that tracks 
problems for "controlling" (which in reality gets translated into "punishing") 
purposes to one that is used for planning and coordinating. As the APDP 
program management discovered, encouraging the early reporting of 
problems and working extra hard not to be punitive (both intentionally and 
unintentionally) can produce dramatic results (recall that the APDP team 
achieved a part availability of 87% vs, a company average of 50% for their EP 
prototype build). This requires a shift in program management's thinking to 
become less fixated in today's problems and to focus on the long-term 
systemic result that is desired. 
Making such a shift requires a relationship of trust between program 
management and the teams, as well as between each of the teams. Building 
that trust is not easy, especially when different people from different parts of 
the organizations have very different mental models about the "right way" of 
doing things or "what's good for the program." The framework and 
methodology for building shared mental models presented in this 
dissertation is proposed as an important first step that a product development 
team can take to build the common ground from which everyone involved 
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in a program can work together towards achieving their shared vision of the 
final product. 
6.7 BUILDING SHARED MEANING 
Archetypes such as Shifting-the-Burden and Tragedy-of-the-Commons can 
help to elicit and capture the intuitive understanding of experienced 
managers about complex dynamic issues. They are particularly powerful for 
advancing conceptual learning because they help explicate a better 
understanding of know-why and offer guidelines for operationalizing those 
insights into know-how. 
The above Tragedy-of-the-Commons example shows how mapping the 
dynamic structure of the teams' inter-relationships allowed them to make 
explicit a common view of their issue in a framework that improved their 
conceptual understanding of the situation. The systems archetype also helped 
in prescribing a course of action to resolve the issue once there was a shared 
understanding of that structure. The archetype provides a way of mapping 
the individual instance to a general framework to guide future learning. 
6.7.1 The Role of Computer Simulators and Learning Labs 
As pointed out in Chapter 4, however, there are limitations to what can be 
accomplished with archetypes and causal loop diagrams alone. A computer 
model can capture all the causal relationships from the pen-and-paper 
diagrams and simulate the consequences of intended actions over a long 
period of time. A person does not give up mental models easily unless they 
are proven to be no longer useful. Even then, it is difficult to let go of what is 
familiar. One of the benefits of a simulation model is in helping an 
individual become more open to other possibilities and to be exposed to 
others' assumptions and mental models by 'running' multiple scenarios and 
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testing one's assumptions repeatedly. But, translating an individual's (or a 
small group's) mental model representations into a good computer model 
can take an enormous amount of time and effort. It  is not a process that is 
economically feasible to replicate with everyone in the organization, and yet 
having the insights generated by such a process may be very important to 
have widely shared. How can one address this dilemma? 
One way is through the design and implementation of microzuorlds or 
learning laboratories (Kim, 1989; 1990; Senge, 1990b). Senge & Lannon (1990) 
describe them as the equivalent of managerial practice fields where teams of 
managers can practice and learn together. Learning laboratories are designed, 
in part, around the learnings captured through the systems archetypes. The 
spirit of the learning lab is one of active experimentation and inquiry where 
everyone participates in surfacing and testing each other's mental model. 
Through this process, a shared understanding of the key assumptions and 
inter-relationships of the organization emerges. 
6.7.1.1 Overview of Computer Model 
The use of an interactive computer management "flight" simulator (based on 
a system dynamics computer model) offers participants an opportunity to test 
their assumptions and to viscerally experience the consequences of their 
actions. Management flight simulators represent mental models that have 
been translated into a more formalized and explicit computer model. 
The product development management flight simulator (PD-MFS) 
focuses on managing the up-stream (product engineering) and down-stream 
(process engineering) activities in a typical product development program. 
The computer model and simulator that has been developed thus far 
addresses the following issues: 
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parallel/serial development/ 
degree of coordination between product engineering and process 
engineering, 
the manner in which one staffs up the effort from beginning to 
end, 
the influence of budget pressure, schedule pressure, or both on 
decisionma king, 
the extent to which one allows the target scheduled date to slip, 
ensuring quality throughout the process 
The major issues addressed by the PD-MFS used in the learning lab are 
shown in Figure 6.18 (for a more complete description of the PD-MFS 
computer model, flight simulator, and user's guide, see Appendix D and E ) 
Coordination Coordination 
vailable Tasks Completions 
IncentiveiReward 
Process Engineering 
Tasks Completions 
Planning/Review 
New Product Development Model Overview 
Figure 6.17 
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6.7.1.2 Learning Labs 
At Cars, Inc., we conducted several two-day learning labs which provided an 
opportunity for APDP team members to learn new conceptual tools and apply 
them to their work situation. The learning lab design combined the research 
process and mapping methodology described in Chapter 4 with a computer 
simulator on product development management. The learning lab consisted 
of an introduction that discussed the relevance of Senge's (1990b) five 
disciplines of the learning organization, moving from problem-solving 
paradigm to problem articulation, and the opportunity inherent in a learning 
lab to practice learning together. 
The participants worked in pairs on the computer simulator and tried to 
manage a product development project to meet cost, timing, and quality 
objectives. By working in pairs and encouraging them to make explicit the 
reasoning behind their decisions, the mental models that drove their 
decision-making were surfaced. They discovered, for example, how their 
assumptions about the right pace of staffing and coordination between 
product and process engineering led to missing all three targets. The learning 
lab is currently being used as a mechanism for sharing the Shifting-the- 
Burden and Tragedy-of-the-Commons stories by allowing others in the car 
program to work through similar issues and discover their own insights. 
Through wide use and successive iterations of the learning lab, the 
practice sessions are expected to impact the organization's shared mental 
models via its Weltanschauung and organizational routines. People leave 
the learning lab with tools that they can use in their work settings which 
advances operational learning. Tools like systems archetypes also embody a 
set of principles which helps advance conceptual learning as individuals use 
them. 
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I believe that the process of surfacing individual mentcil models and making 
them explicit can help accelerate individual learning. As mental models are 
made explicit and actively shared, the base of shared meaning in an 
organization expands as does its capacity for effective coordinated action 
which advances organizational learning. The way in which Johnson & 
Johnson handled the Tylenol poisoning incident is a vivid example of what a 
powerful force a deeply shared value (or Weltanschauung) on the value of a 
human life can have on an organization's ability to mobilize a coordinated 
response in a short space of time. 
On a less grand scale, systems archetypes provide a glimpse of the 
possibility of developing a similar capability for enhancing coordinated 
action. As more people understand the meaning behind the Tragedy-of-the- 
Commons archetype, the use of the term itself will conjure up the whole 
storyline behind it as well as its implications for action. Vygotsky (1989), 
offers an analogy that highlights the potential. 
Very good examples of the condensation of external speech and its 
reduction to predicates are found in the novels of Tolstoy, who quite often dealt 
with the psychology of understanding: "No one heard clearly what he said, but 
Kitty understood him. She understood because her mind incessantly watched 
for his needs" (Anna Karenina, part V, Chapter 18). We might say that her 
thoughts, following the thoughts of the dying man, contained the subject to 
which his word, understood by no one else, referred. But perhaps the most 
striking example is the declaration of love between Kitty and Levin by means 
of initial letters (AK, part IV, chapter 13): 
"I have long wished to ask you something." 
"Please do." 
"This," he said, and wrote the initial letters: W y a: i c 11 b, d y 111 t o 11. 
These letters meant: "When you answered: it can not be, did you mean then or 
never?" It seemed impossible that she would be able to understand the 
complicated sentence. 
"I understand," she said, blushing. 
"What word is that?" he asked, pointing to the 11 which stood for "never." 
"That word is 'never,'" she said, "but that is not true." He quickly erased 
what he had written, handed her the chalk, and rose. She wrote: I c 11 n o t .  
His face brightened suddenly: he had understood. I t  meant: "I could not 
answer otherwise then." 
She wrote the initial letters: s t y m f n f w h .  This meant: "So that you 
might forget and forgive what happened." 
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He seized the chalk with tense, trembling fingers, broke it, and wrote the 
initial letters of the following: "I have nothing to forget and forgive. 1 never 
ceased loving you." 
"I understand," she whispered. He sat down and wrote a long sentence. 
She understood i t  all, and without asking him whether she was right, took the 
chalk and answered at once. For a long time he could not make out what she 
had written, and he kept looking up into her eyes. His mind was dazed with 
happiness. He was quite unable to f i l l  in the words she had meant; but in her 
lovely, radiantly happy eyes he read all that he needed to know. And he wrote 
down three letters. Before he had finished writing, she was already reading 
under his hand, and she finished the sentence herself and wrote the answer, 
"Yes." Everything had been said in their conversation: that she loved him, and 
would tell her father and mother that he would call in the morning. 
These examples show clearly that when the thoughts of the speakers are 
the same, the role of speech is reduced to a minimum. 
I believe that group efforts to clarify and share our individual mental 
models can produce positive results in terms of effecting coordinated 
responses in less time than it currently takes organizations to mobilize in the 
face of today's challenges. 
6.7.3 A Final Note 
In this Chapter, we loosely followed the 10-step process in an interactive, real- 
time working sessions with line managers. In the early stages of the project, 
more emphasis was placed on the first six steps as the team focused on getting 
themselves grounded in their own data as well as those whom they 
interviewed (6.4). The team looked at the data through multiple lenses, 
including action maps and KJ diagrams (described briefly in Chapter 3) as well 
as causal loop diagrams and systems archetypes. 
As the team became more certain of the data and their understanding of 
them, we shifted our emphasis to the latter step where the focus is on making 
the explicit mental model representation shared (section 6.5). At this stage, 
the use of the systems archetypes and a learning lab became more significant 
for sharing purposes. In terms of the OADI-SMM model, managing the 
transfer mechanism of mental models made explicit through systems 
archetypes and computer simulators can reduce situational and fragmented 
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learning and enhance organizational learning. Preliminary assessments 
indicate that the learning labs are succeeding to a degree in transferring and 
spreading the knowledge and skills to a broader group. Specific new actions 
and benefits gained have been rec0rded.I' 
The research process and mapping methodology described in this 
dissertation shows a lot of promise in helping product development teams to 
speak a common language-the language of "systems thinkingu-to 
articulate and work through their issues in a productive and effective 
manner. Further field work with additional teams can provide a richer, more 
diverse experience base with which to refine the methodology and research 
approach. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and Summary 
"[Lkarning organizations may be a tool not just for the evolution 
of organizations, but for the evolution of intelligence." 
-Peter M. Senge 
7.0 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The contributions of this dissertation are three-fold: 
1. It advances the theory of organizational learning by developing a 
framework that makes an explicit link with individual learning 
and by specifying the mechanism-mental models-through 
which the organization can absorb individual learning. 
2. It refines the development of tools for advancing organizational 
learning by providing a methodology for making implicit 
individual models explicit and mapping them into a 
representation that is accessible to others. 
3. It applies the framework and methodology to two substantive 
areas-TQM and product development management-providing 
interesting insights in both areas. 
These contributions are of particular relevance to the fields of operations 
management, system dynamics, and organizational studies. 
0 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
332 Organizational Learning: Framework & Methodology 
7.1 CONTRIBUTIONS TO OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 
The contributions of this work that may be of interest to the Operations 
Management community are the insights gained in applying the framework 
and methodology of organizational learning to two substantive areas-TQM 
and product development management. In the TQM setting, the 
methodology was used to map the learnings of individuals about their 
company's TQM false start experience which led to the emergence of potential 
common themes that may be applicable to other organizations. 
7.1.1 Total Quality Implementation Setting 
In the Total Quality Implementation setting, the methodology was used to 
analyze several companies' experiences in trying to implement TQM 
(although the learnings could probably apply to any change effort). Out of 
that process, they obtained a rich set of systemic insights about what 
happened. 
The systems archetypes provided a common structure for analyzing the 
stories. In particular, we discovered that one archetype, Limits-to-Success, 
was prevalent, playing itself out in various ways involving issues of training 
capacity, management commitment and attention, and others. This suggests 
that a useful step to take at the beginning of any implementation effort is to 
identify in advance all possible sources of organizational limits to success. 
Plans can then be put in place to anticipate or eliminate the barriers one is 
likely to encounter as the implementation rolls out through the organization. 
As the research study is expanded to include sites at different companies 
and those who are at different phases of implementation, a pattern of 
dominant archetypal dynamics may emerge that could be useful for 
managing later stages of an implementation. For example, Limits-to-Success 
0 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
Discussion & Summary 333 
may be of predominant importance in the initial stages, while Shifting-the- 
Burden may become more prevalent in the middle of the process. The initial 
results of this study provide preliminary evidence for the usefulness of the 
methodology outlined in Chapter 4. 
7.1.2 Product Development Management Setting 
In the product development management setting, the research took an 
approach different from that used in the TQM setting. The researcher did not 
go in and interview people after the fact, but was actually part of the team that 
worked together to look at the process. Several valuable lessons emerged 
from this effort. 
One of the key issues in product development is how to compress the 
cycle time. There are many techniques, but one fundamental concern is 
managerial: In a complex development effort, how can the organization best 
manage the interconnections of all the sub-teams, to compress the cycle time 
and help the different teams work smoothly together. In this setting, the 
bottleneck Clark and Fujimoto describe is the quality and frequency of 
communication in the overlapping activities, e.g., product engineering and 
process engineering. 
The use of action inquiry exercises and the approach of mapping mental 
models with systems archetypes helped product development managers at 
Cars, Inc. to begin identifying systemic causes of why they couldn't get 
important information on a timely basis. Through the process change that 
occurred over time, they were able to get information about problems earlier. 
The use of the archetypes also provided the means to gain consensus around 
an important issue with which the team is struggling. 
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A substantive outcome of this research was the pervasiveness of the 
Tragedy-of-the-Commons archetype in product development at Cars. The 
principle of the Tragedy-of-the-Commons in the product development 
process is that the leverage usually lies a t  a higher level than the one at which 
the problem occurs. Therefore, each person needs to understand at what 
level he or she is operating in a particular ToC, and at what level does the 
situation need to be resolved. 
In a Tragedy-of-the-Commons archetype, there are basically two options: 
(1) find a collective solution at the individual level, or (2) give power to a 
higher level to allocate or otherwise control the consumption of the shared 
resource. In general, by the very nature of the system of rewards and 
incentives that are in place in a ToC structure, finding a solution at the 
individual level is usually extremely difficult. Therefore, the second lever is 
to defer the managing of the commons to a higher level of management that 
can weigh the global implications of all the individual local actions. The 
striking outcome of team training in systems thinking was the collective 
identification and agreement on when autonomous decision makers should 
voluntarily relinquish negotiating control over decisions critical to their sub- 
organization's interests and to the performance of the sub-systems for which 
they were responsible. 
The study result suggests that product development efforts, in general, 
could benefit by identifying all potential Tragedy-of-the-Commons issues that 
the team may encounter at the beginning of a project. This can help the 
program managers flag potential problems early on in the process and design 
management systems to address them. 
@ 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
Discussion & Summary 
7.2 CONTRIBUTION TO SYSTEM DYNAMICS: 
The field of system dynamics, its methodology, principles, and practices, can 
make a significant contribution to organizational learning, especially in 
helping to understand dynamic complexity. Intuitively, managers find value 
in the approach because of its ability to capture complex organizational 
dynamics, but the methodology can be very difficult to put into practice. We 
gained some important insights in our attempt to translate the methodology 
into more digestible pieces for mass consumption. 
One lessen is that the basic pen-and-paper tools like causal loop diagrams 
can be made easier to use by delineating a step-by-step process for constructing 
them. Computer modeling expertise, in and of itself, is not the ultimate goal. 
I liken the development of system dynamics to that of TQM. The goal of 
TQM efforts was not to have people attain PhD's in statistics, or to even 
become practicing statisticians. Simple tools which were based on statistical 
theory and principles were developed and then used by managers to look at 
real world problems, and see where the principles might be relevant. Over 
time, a methodology that people could easily learn and use was developed. 
Although TQM and system dynamics originated at about the same time 
(circa 1950's), today TQM is practiced worldwide, compared to the still 
relatively unfamiliar field of system dynamics. That continues to be true 
even though system dynamics arguably has greater potential for increasing 
insight into managing complex organizational dynamics. This work takes a 
beginning step toward realizing that potential. 
7.2.1 Rigor, Relevance, and Usability 
In any academic field, there is always an ongoing tension between rigor vs. 
relevance. While considering relevance, one must also underscore usability. 
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A theory can be relevant but unusable. Through the process detailed 
particularly in Chapter 5, relatively untrained graduate students were able to 
use the mapping tools to analyze TQM implementations and develop 
relatively sophisticated causal loop diagrams. This is a step forward for the 
potential to broaden the audience of system dynamics. 
Clearly, there is still much to be done. We should continue to develop a 
methodology that non practitioners can use to look at and diagnose 
organizational problems from a systemic perspective. People may then be 
able to transfer their structural understanding into another setting and 
identify, not only isolated individual events that happened in a particular 
TQM implementation, but also the systemic reasons for the events. 
7.2.2 Levels of Use of Systems Archetypes 
The product development setting work brought out three levels of use for 
systems archetypes, distinctions that had never explicitly been made before. 
We discovered at least three distinct levels of use, as well as the need for 
managers to feel comfortable about their ability to use the archetypes at each 
level, rather than become frustrated because they can't master them or use 
them the 'rightJ way. The three levels are: 
1. Systems archetypes as metaphorical stories 
2. Systems archetypes as structural pattern templates 
3. Systems archetypes as dynamic scripts (or theories) 
First, people acquire the ability to use the archetypes as a simple story 
metaphor .  They understand the basic lessons, key elements, and the 
outcomes or the high leverage actions that are embodied in each one. This 
allows people to go into a situation, identify the storyline that is at work, 
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explore the implications of that storyline, and gain some initial 
understanding of the problem under study. 
Level two use occurs as people start to map a particular problem to the 
relevant archetype template, by taking a story and pattern-matching it to fit an 
appropriate archetype-identifying each of the core categories, e.g., problem 
symptom, symptomatic fix, etc. in a template. At this point, people are 
becoming explicit with the naming of variables, linking them with directed 
arcs, distinguishing between balancing and reinforcing loops, and 
understanding conceptually why one is a balancing loop, and another is a 
reinforcing loop. 
At the third level, people are quite familiar with not only the loops, but 
also the signing of the links in s's or o's, and they are able to coherently 
construct each of the loops. The archetypes serve as dynamic scripts (or 
theories) which guide their inquiry in different settings, with the ability to 
transfer insight from one setting to the next. People can go beyond 
identifying the core categories in the archetype's template and begin building 
on to it with additional loops . The archetype serves as a core script or theory 
that guides their inquiry to better understand their system. 
These three levels of distinction in the use of archetypes are important, 
because once they have been mastered, its a matter of practice to become more 
comfortable with multiple layers of loops. After those skills are acquired, 
working with the archetypes involves more gradations of differences and 
complexity. 
This discovery of the three levels of use came from the work with the 
learning team at Cars, Inc.: 
1C: What you want to be careful of, is that the archetypes -you can spend days, hours, 
trying to figure out what the right one is, and that's a good thing, getting 
everybody to talk, but it's sometimes difficult to do, difficult to conceptualize and 
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what we found is that we spent time-we all knew how to articulate the problem in 
words, but couldn't figure out how to draw the picture. And you spend a lot of time 
trying to get the arrows going in the right direction, that can be not productive. 
Especially if everybody can just talk a problem through, at some common level of 
understanding. 
SSM D: We try to understand the basic archetypes, the examples from the book and the 
stuff we've done at core competency, so we have an understanding of what the basic 
problem statements are, and we use those to articulate the problems vs. trying to 
draw our own charts in a lot of cases. So, yes, we do not draw a lot of archetypes, but 
do we use the archetype methodology? I think we do. 
Our intention with this work and further study is to improve the causal 
looping methodology continually for mass consumption. The diagnostic 
approach demonstrated in Chapter 5 provides a systematic way of 
interviewing and mapping one's experiences, while the product development 
setting described in Chapter 6 is oriented toward real time problem 
articulation. Both are attempts at making the methodology more usable for 
mass consumption. 
7.2.3 Model Decomposition and Identification of New Archetypes 
The area of model decomposition offers some exciting possibilities in its 
application to causal loop diagrams. Another way to look at the issue of 
model decomposition is to see it as a search for dominant structure. 
Richardson (1986) presents a classification scheme that shows how the 
different approaches map into three different types of behavior analysis: time 
graph, eigenvalue, and frequency response (see Figure 7.1). The diagram 
decomposition guidelines used in Chapter 4 were based on model reduction 
work that used linear eigenvalue analysis (Eberlein, 1986; 1989). Although 
the methods involving eigenvalues and frequency response require 
mathematical representations in order to apply them directly, the time graph 
behavior analysis can be applied to causal loop structural analysis. 
Efforts to explore and develop better and more efficient ways of 
"decomposing" large diagrams into smaller ones, while retaining the 
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"dominant structures" in the original diagram, may be very fruitful. A 
systematic process of mapping and decomposing may lead to the discovery of 
new archetypes as many diagrams from many studies are decomposed into 
their minimal structural form. These new archetypes could then be 
translated into computer models for further testing and validation. Through 
this process, system dynamicists may then be able to systematically build a 
library of these generic structures which can provide a systemic structural 
theory for understanding a significant majority of organizational dynamics. 
Model 
Reduction 
Loop 
Constribution 
Classification Scheme for Determining Dominant Model Structure 
(source: Richardson, 1986) 
Figure 7.1 
7.3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
In this dissertation, we developed a conceptual framework and a theory for 
linking individual learning to organizational learning. The mechanism 
identified for achieving that transfer was through making implicit mental 
models through the use of representational systems. Several criteria were 
identified as important requirements for a representational system to capture 
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dynamic complexity: that it be abstract, generic, runnable, theory-driven, and 
testable. A methodology and research process was proposed for making 
implicit mental models explicit using grounded theory-building and system 
dynamics causal loop diagrams. 
The two case settings, TQM and product development, illustrated the use 
of the methodology and produced several insights as described in Chapters 5 
and 6. The proposed framework and methodology, in addition to providing 
methods and tools for mapping, can also help shift people's perspective by 
virtue of using the methodology itself because it encourages people to look at 
their experience more systemically. Organizationally, if this perspective is 
shared, it has the potential of chansing the organization's Weltanschauung 
from an event-causes-event orientation to a systemic understanding of how 
structure influences behavior. 
Although "the basic processes that contribute to the occurrence, breadth, 
and depth of organizational learning depends on organizational memory,'' 
relatively little empirical work has been done on the construct of 
organizational memory and shared mental models, (Huber, 1991, p.107). 
Further work is needed for a better understanding of the role of mental 
models in individual and organizational learning, especially the types of 
mental models that are appropriate for representing dynamic complexity, the 
methods with which to capture the understanding of such complexity, and 
the means through which new learnings can be transferred to the whole 
organization. The framework of organizational learning and the 
methodology developed in this dissertation is proposed to serve as a guide in 
pursuing these goals. 
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7.4 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Until recently, on-the-job learning appeared to provide adequate preparation 
for managing in a world where change, though accelerating, still occurred 
across generations rather than within generations. Schon (1971) points out 
that a major disruption occurred when the pace of change crossed into the 
intra-generational state-lessons learned became obsolete within the same 
generation. As the world grows increasingly more complex, problems take 
longer to solve and the proposed solutions have shorter lives. In fact, Ackoff 
(1981) posits that solutions are often stillborn because problems change so 
rapidly that solutions, when found, are often no longer relevant. 
One consequence of such rapid change is that managers are forced to 
make decisions with equal rapidity. However, the complexity of the problems 
makes it imperative that managers take more time to reflect on their 
decisions. How, then, can a manager speed up and slow down at the same 
time? How can one manage in a world where experience is no longer the 
best-or  even adequate-teacher? Where change makes yesterdays' lessons 
obsolete? How can organizations remain viable given this paradoxical 
dilemma? At a more macro level, how can we learn about the tremendous 
messes we face today and implement solutions in time? These are the kinds 
of questions which we are trying to address at the MIT Organizational 
Learning Center (OLC). 
The project at Cars, Inc. is one of several projects being conducted at the 
OLC which attempt to design and embed a learning process within an 
organization. We are trying to integrate a variety of research methods and 
the building of theory at various levels (See Figure 7.2). Although a lot of the 
OLC work lies in the (virtual) world of ideas, model formulation, design of 
flight simulators and learning labs, an important aspect of the OLC's theory 
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its close integration with active experimentation in the 
The OLC research efforts can be viewed in terms of four different, but 
inter-related, learning loops which guide all projects-grounded theory 
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building, dynamic theory building, behavioral decision theory building, and 
managerial practice field theory building. A brief description of each follows. 
Grounded T h e o y  Building Loop LI:  This loop represents the field 
research tradition of building theory based on a firm grounding on observable 
data. Action science, clinical research, and ethnography are probably the most 
relevant approaches. It is an inductive process of building a general theory 
based on intensive field study. Mapping tools such as systems archetypes and 
causal loop diagram can play an important role in building grounded theory 
as demonstrated in this dissertation. 
Dynamic Theory Building Loop LJ2: This loop includes the traditional 
system dynamics model building process of data collection, model 
formulation, testing, revising, and validation. It includes some of the work 
represented by LI, and builds on it in a more rigorous fashion. Operations 
management and system dynamics computer models are included in this 
loop, although they use different methods. 
Behavioral Decision Theory Building Loop L3: In terms of work being 
done at the OLC, Sterrnan's (1989) work on dynamic decisionmaking is a good 
representation of this process. Using interactive computer simulators to 
study how managers make decisions in a laboratory setting is one part of the 
work; linking the impact of those studies to actions in the work place is 
another (Bakken, 1993; Diehl, 1992; Kampmam, 1992). 
Managerial Practice Field Theory Building Loop L4: This loop describes 
the process of helping an organization engage in its own process of 
developing a theory about itself, starting with a particular focus area, like 
product development. The OLC pilot projects can be viewed as a vehicle for 
helping managers and researchers work collaboratively on this process. 
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All four learning loops are important to organizational theory building. 
In the short term, no single project is likely to adequately address all four 
loops at once, but each project should be focusing on at least one of these 
loops. The two case settings presented in this dissertz o n  were most firmly 
rooted in the grounded theory building loop, although the product 
development case also utilized some of the work that involved the other 
loops. 
7.5 REFLECTIONS 
Given today's pace of change and organizational complexity, managers need 
to be competent in applying the research skills of a scientist to better 
understand their organizations. The old paradigm of experiments in 
organizations being fed into research institutions that receiving the output 
and feed the results back into the organizations is no longer adequate. Intra- 
generationalrchange means thxflhe researchcycle must be^Onwithin a 
much shorter time frame, otherwise solutions (in the form of research 
results) will be stillborn-the problems which they hi;re addressing will no 
longer be relevant. 
7.5.1 Managers' New Roles: Researcher and Theory-Builder 
The dichotomy between manager and researcher must end because the pace 
of change is such that one can no longer separate the two functions- 
managers must wear both hats simultaneously. Ed Baker's (1989) proposal 
that the CEO's new role should be that of Head of Research and Development 
lE.M. Baker. "The Chief Executive Officer's Role in Total Quality: Preparing the Enterprise 
for Leadership in the New Economic Age," Conference on Quality, Madison, Wisconsin, April 19-21, 
1989. 
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for the Enterprise is exactly the type of leadership needed for supporting such 
a shift. 
Managers also need to become theory -bu i lders  within their own 
organizations. They must create new frameworks within which they 
continually test their strategies, policies, and decisions to inform them of 
improvements on the organization's design. It is no longer sufficient to apply 
generic theories and frameworks like band-aids to one's own specific issues. 
Managers must take the best of the new ideas around and then build a 
workable theory for their own organization. As theory-builders, managers 
must have an intimate knowledge of how their organization works together 
as a whole. But they also require some guiding theory and methodology to 
make sense of their experience and learning. 
There is no "golden formula" that will hold for all time, or even for one's 
tenure in a present position. Companies who lived by the learning curve 
theory almost died by the learning curve theory (as in the case of Texas 
Instruments and the personal computer debacle). Others who followed the 
BCG business portfolio theory also had their share of problems by either 
giving up entire markets or not taking full advantage of synergies among 
their different businesses. Theory building should not be done as an 
academic exercise but as a process grounded in reality which continually helps 
provide a framework for interpreting one's competitive environment. 
7.5.2 Collaborative Research/Practitioner Model 
The research partnership at the OLC is, in part, a mutual mentoring process. 
It would be helpful for researchers to move away from the detached, purely 
rationalistic perspective and recognize the inherently chaotic nature of 
organizations. In this spirit, the collaboration engendered at Cars, Inc. is one 
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of mutual mentorship, one of understanding each role better so that each can 
grow to become a better manager-researcher or researcher-manager. 
This type of partnering and collaboration requires significant immersion 
into both corporate and academic worlds, producing results that can be 
interpreted in each other's culture and language rather than each being 
sufficient only to its own separate community. In this kind of research, the 
messenger has to be consistent with the message. The work would not be as 
effective if the researchers were not always, in their best efforts, trying to 
model the principles and practices that are part of the process. Strauss has his 
own reflections on the relationship between the researcher and the research 
which resonates with my own: 
We should add that while much research involves routine operations and 
can at times be boring, assuredly also at its most creative it is exciting, fun, 
challenging, although sometimes extremely disturbing and painful. This means 
that researchers, as workers, can and should care very deeply about their work 
[emphasis added]-not being simply possessive about its products or jealous of 
their research reputations, but find deep and satisfying meaning in their work. 
(Strauss, 1987, p. 9) 
It is to that spirit of deep caring that this dissertation is dedicated. 
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I Tool 1 
"hard" variables 
issue +-* fw,,s 
Diagram "soft" variables 
Over Time 
3. Causal 
Loop 
Diaeram 
1 4. System >-& -1 1 
5. Graphical 
Function Diagram 
K 
7. Policy 
Structure 
Diagram 
Management 
High t 
Simulator 
10. Learning Reflection 
Laboratory 
Experimentation 
Description 
A brainstorming tool for capturing free-flowing thoughts 
in a structured manner and distinguishing between hard 
and soft variables that affect the issue of interest. 
Using some of the main branch variables from the fishbone 
diagram, the behavior of each one can be graphed over 
time, taking into account any inter-relatedness in their 
behavior. (Also called reference modes). 
Drawing out causal relationships using the fishbone and 
behavior over time diagrams helps identify reinforcing 
and balancing processes. 
Helps in recognizing common system structures that fit  
one of the recurring system archetypes such as eroding 
goals, shifting the burden, limits to growth (compensating 
feedback), fixes that fail (policy resistance), etc. 
Represents the effect of one variable on another graphically 
by plotting the relationship over the entire range of values 
that the X variable may theoretically operate. 
A library of simple structure-behavior pairs consist of the 
basic dynamic structures that can serve as building blocks 
for developing computer models, e.g. exponential growth, 
delays, smooths, S-shaped growth, oscillations, etc. 
-- 
A conceptual map of the decision making process that is 
embedded in the organization. Focuses on the factors 
which are weighed for each decision point. Build library 
of generic structures. 
Allows you to map all the relationships that have been 
identified as relevant and important to an issue in terms of 
mathematical equations and run policy analyses through 
multiple simulations. 
Provides "flight" training for managers through the use of 
interactive computer games based on a computer model. 
Through formulating strategies and making decisions to 
achieve them, help connect consequences to decisions mad< 
A managers' practice-field. It is equivalent to u sports 
team's experience, where active experimentation is blended 
with reflection and discussion . Uses all the systems 
thinking tools, from fishbone diagrams to MFS's. 
Ten Systems Thinking Tools 
(source: The Systems ThinkerThf, Vol. 1, No. 3) 
Figure 1 
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Guideline I Example 
2 -4 When choosing a variable name. use noons. Avoid verbs ana acuon phrases 
- iince theaction is conveyed in themws.  For example, "Costs" is better than 
1 
Z 'hmt!asing Costs." since a decrease in incn sing Costs is confusing. The 1 
SJ 
- sign of the arrow ("s" for same or "o" for opposite) indicates whether Costs 
- &
ncrease or decrease relauve to the other vanable. a 
Variables should be something thai can be rneasured-quantiues thai can : 
v a r y  over ume. It does not make sense to say thai "Siaic of Mind increases Rewxm\ Happmss 
or decreases. A term like "Happiness." on the other hand. can vary. 1 I
- 
- ~ $ f s 6 6 n d  Y 
a 3 
- Choosing the "posiuve" sense of a variable name is preferable. An increase :/3 o r ~ ~ m ~ ' G m ~ ' i s c l ~ ~ m ~ ~ ~ m ~ m " C o n ~ n m . "  ' emand> Growth 
1 coa~action 
4 For every course of acuon included in the diagram, think of the possible 
urunmded consequences as well as the expected outcomes. An increase in 
"Production Pressure" may increase "Production Output," for example, but 
it may also increase "Stress ' and decrease "Quality." 1 
4 All balancing loops are gd-seetang processes. Try to make ihe goalsdnwng 
the loop explicit. For example. Loop B l  may raise questions as LO why 
- increasing "Quality" would lead to a decrease in "Acnons to Improve 
" Quality." By explicitly identifying "DesiredQuality" as the goal in Loop B2. 
we Â¥ - we see thai the "Gap in Quality" is really driving improvement acnons. L. Wt@f W Y ~  
- 2 4  P s c o v d  
Distinguishing be tween perceived and actual siaas "Perceived Quality" vs. 3 
"Acuia! Quality" is important. Percepttons often lag reality, and mistaking 
a 
s theperceivedsiatus for current reahty can be misleading andcreate undesirable +cuonim B2 Gapin Quiluy 
" 
d 
results. ~mprove Q U ~  9
1 Quality> 
1 I f  there are mdnple consequenms of a vanable. s u n  by lumping them into 
one t m  while finishing the rest of the loop. For example. "Coping 
Strategies" can represent many different ways we respond 10 stress (exercise. , STRESS 
0 
meditation, alcohol use. etc.). 
3 There arc atmost always hffenng long-term and shon-tenn consequences of 
actions. Draw loops with increasing radius as they progress ttorn short- to 
STRESS ~1 Ucohol Lie long-term processes. Loop B 1 shows thcshon-ienn behaviorot using alcohol 
lo combat stress. Loop R l ,  however, draws out the long-term consequences -4 R l  HUbb 
which will actually increase stress. I Productivity - 
0 If a link between two terms is not clear to others and requires a lot of i Dgmand _____^- ~ ~ ~ l , ~ ~  
explaining, the variables probably need 10 be redefined or an intennediale : 
(enn needs to be inserted. "Higher Demand" leading to Iowa "Quality" may ' s Production 0 Demand- be less obvious than when "Production Pressure" is inserted in between. ; Pressure -Quality 
A short-cuito determining whether a loop is balancing (B) orreinforcing (R) ' 
is tocount the number of "o's" in the loop. An odd number of "o's" indicates 
3 balancing loop. an even number lor none) means it is a reinforcing loop. solvency 
CAUTION: After labeling the loop, you should always talk yourself around 4 
Lhe loop and make sure the story agrees with your R or B label. wiihdnwurrorn 3mk 4 "o'Ã§ = R 
Guidelines for Drawing Causal Loop Diagrams 
(source: 771e Systems ThinkerTM, Vol. 1, No. 3) 
Figure 1 
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MIT ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING CENTER PILOT PROJECTS 
Approximately fifteen sponsor companies work collaboratively with MIT to 
develop a research agenda at the Organizational Learning Center (OLC). One of 
the ways in which the companies collaborate is through pilot projects. The pilot 
projects have two primary challenges: (1) to contribute significantly to 
participating corporations and (2) to generate research results in the form of new 
tools, methods, and understandings of the ways that learning is promoted or 
thwarted. These challenges are aligned with the "basic charter" of the Center, 
restated here: 
"to draw closer together the communities of management research and 
management practice so as to make learning about complex, dynamic managerial 
issues a way of life in ~r~aniza t ions ."~  
The project definition process received a lot of consideration at the OLC, and 
the notes from a meeting on the topic emphasizes its importance: 
"By a 'good project,' we agresd that we meant, 'projects that meet the 
standards of both a CEO & a rigorous researcher.' In other words, the project 
as conceived and articulated stands to help managers deal with crucial issues and 
produce usable knowledge that can advance management practice and theory 
more broadly. This is a demanding standard. Very few academic research 
projects would meet it, as would few organization change initiatives. But we feel 
it is realizable ... because management's and academia's goals are fundamentally 
aligned."^ 
To facilitate a "good project," the OLC established an outline for project 
definition process, which will be explored below. The OLC also strongly 
recommended that the first-generation projects concern an area where a strong 
foundation of system dynamics and a management flight simulator (computer 
simulation game) exist. This project, as it was defined with Cars, Inc., fit the 
desired criteria. 
l~nforrnation from a Center memo from Peter Senge and Bill Isaacs to Corporate Affiliates about the 
project definition process, August 6,1991, p. 1. 
^Information from Center memo from Peter Senge, Dan Kim, David Kreutzer, Fred Kofman, Janet 
Gould-Kreutzer and Bill Isaacs to Corporate Affiliates about defining projects, July 4,1991, pp. 3-4. 
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1 . INTRODUCTION 
The Facilitator's Guide was prepared for the training of future facilitators of 
Product Development Management Flight Simulator Sessions . The purpose or 
this guide is to help the facilitators develop an understanding of the 
interconnections and assumptions that form simulator's underlying model . This 
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will prepare the facilitator to describe the underlying model to users during a 
session and show how the management decisions influence the product 
development process in the flight simulator. The second purpose of this guide is 
to show how a facilitator might run a session, including the session introduction, 
various simulation scenario possibilities, session debrief, and an example of a 
successful product development strategy. The guide will discuss: (1) the flight 
simulator in general, (2) the underlying model called the microworld, (3) the 
management decisions, and finally (4) an overview of how to facilitate a flight 
simulator session. 
This guide assumes that all facilitators have previously run the simulator in a 
Learning Lab environment and are familiar with causal loop diagrams and stock 
and flow structures. This Guide is meant to be used together with the User's 
Guide, which contains more detailed information on the flight simulator 
interface. 
1.1 The Product Development Management Flight Simulator 
The Product Development Management Flight Simulator (MFS) gives you the 
opportunity to "pilot" a product development process. A typical challenge in 
managing a product development program is to meet three objectives: finishing 
in a specified time limit, under an allocated budget, and with a competitive 
quality. In the simulator, the project is separated into two categories of tasks that 
must be completed. There are 100 generic product engineers "tasks" and there 
are 100 generic process engineering "tasks". The product engineers (PE) do the 
product design and testing, while the process engineers (PcE) design and build 
the manufacturing process to turn the design into a product. When both 
engineering groups finish all their tasks, the product is released into the market 
and will be sold. The resulting sales depend heavily on whether the product was 
released on time with a competitive quality. 
As the "pilot" of this simulator, you are expected to make decisions each 
week about: 
adding or removing engineers, 
the desired number of work hours in a week, 
the scheduled completion date for each team, 
the amount of time spent coordinating between the two teams, 
and the quality "goal" for the product. 
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Your decisions will influence the rate at which the engineers can accomplish 
tasks, the quality they will build into the project, and even the rate they will leave 
the project because of stress. 
There is no winning or losing. The purpose of the flight simulator is to 
provide the opportunity to experiment with management decisions that are too 
costly and lengthy to experiment with in real time. The default target completion 
date is 40 weeks. Although no decisions need be made after the project is 
completed, the simulation will continue to run for 80 weeks to show the sales 
from releasing the product into the market. 
1.2 Major Components of Flight Simulators 
There are three major components of the management flight simulator, the 
microworld, the information system, and the simulator controls. 
Microworld: The microworld is the system dynamics model that 
underlies the flight simulator. Here the interactions 
between the different variables are explicitly described. 
It has been tested and calibrated; but like any model, it is 
a simplification of reality and is based on a set of 
assumptions about the product development process. 
The Facilitators Guide is designed to familiarize the you 
with this model. 
Information System: The product development progress is monitored through 
a complex information system. You have access to 
multiple reports that detail the current status of different 
facets of the project. Historical information can be 
obtained as either graphs or tables and show the 
behavior of the variables over time. The information 
system is described in depth in the User's Guide to the 
MFS. 
Simulator Controls: The simulators controls are in the "cockpit" of the flight 
simulator. Here you can make decisions and control the 
information system by selecting the report or graph you 
would like to view. 
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The facilitator's guide is intended to describe the microworld and the 
simulator controls. The information system is described in the User's Guide, 
including a description of each report and graph available. 
2. THE MICROWORLD 
To explain the behavior of the product development management flight 
simulator during a session, it is necessary to understand the microworld behind 
the model. We begin our exploration of the microworld by examining the major 
stock and flow structures and critical feedback loops that govern the behavior of 
the system. There are two major parallel structures underlying the microworld; 
the product engineering (PE) structure and the process engineering (PcE) 
structure. These two structures are almost identical, so we will describe only one 
of them in depth. First the product development structure will be presented, and 
then the differences in the process engineering structure will be discussed. Using 
the causal loop diagrams developed, it should be possible to examine how 
management decisions can have both obvious and unexpected impacts on the 
product development "system" and understand how they influence the progress 
towards the project goals. 
2.1 Product Engineering 
The product engineering system has been separated into 7 sectors for discussion 
purposes. These sectors are Tasks, Staffing, Schedule, Quality, Rework, and 
Coordination. The general interactions of the seven sectors are shown in Fig. 1, 
the Microworld Overview Diagram. The objective of the project is to manage the 
timing, cost, and quality of completing all of the product and process engineering 
tasks. Thus, the heart of the product development microworld in the Tasks 
structure that governs the process of task completion. The available staff, the 
time left in the schedule, the length of the work week, the time spend 
coordinating, the quality of practice, and the amount of rework generated all 
influence the rate of which tasks are going to be completed each week. This 
overview diagram will be expanded into a much more detailed causal loop 
diagram for the product engineering "system" by discussing each sector and 
then adding it to the diagram. First, the basic structure that governs the product 
development tasks will be presented. To the Task Structure, the Staffing, 
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Schedule, Quality, Rework, Work Week, and Coordination Structures will be 
added one at a time until the full causal loop diagram is developed. 
Microworld Overview Diagram 
Figure 1 
2.1.2 Task Sector 
The model assumes that there are 100 generic "tasks" that must be completed by 
both the process and product engineers. We begin by examining the product 
engineering (PE) sector. The stock and flow diagram showing the heart of the 
task structure is shown in Fig. 2. The product engineers begin the project with 
100 tasks remaining in the project. These are in the PE Tasks Remaining Stock. 
They are completed at a certain PE Task Completion Rate. The number of tasks 
completed flow into the PE Tasks Completed Stock. However, all tasks are not 
done correctly, nor are the mistakes found immediately. As the project 
progresses, some tasks are discovered to require rework, so are removed from 
the stock of PE Tasks Completed and are returned to the pool of PE Tasks 
Remaining. The rate at which tasks are completed, and the rate at which they are 
discovered to require rework is a function of many other variable in the product 
development process. This same stock and flow layout is used to show the 
current status of the product and process engineers in the Overview Report of 
the Management Flight Simulator. 
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PE Causal Looping Diagram, Task Structure 
Figure 2 
2.1.2 Staffing Sector 
For tasks to be completed, there obviously must be engineers available to work 
on them. One of the major management decisions made in this flight simulator is 
to add or remove engineers. This project is assumed to be a one project of many 
in a large company so you are not hiring or firing engineers, but rather moving 
them internally from one project to another so there is no hiring delay. The stock 
and flow structure that captures the staffing dynamics for the product engineers 
is shown in Fig 3. This structure assumes that there are two different kinds of 
engineers that work at different levels of productivity. Experienced Product 
Engineers are assumed to work at a certain level of efficiency, measured by 
productivity (tasks per person per week). The project begins with several 
Product Engineering Staffing Stock and Flow Structure 
Figure 3 
experienced product development engineers who are assumed to be the core 
team that worked on the earlier phases of this project. All other engineers added 
to the project through the # Product Engineers decision are assumed to be 
inexperienced to the project and must be trained before they are able to operate 
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at the full productivity of an experienced engineer. Inexperienced is defined as a 
fully trained engineer, but one unfamiliar to the project. Note that decision 
variables in the management flight simulator are displayed in bold and are 
contained by a rounded rectangle. 
The rate at which inexperienced engineers become experienced is the PE 
Learning Rate. It is a function of the ratio between the experienced and 
inexperienced engineers. As shown by the causal links, the more experienced 
product engineers available to train the engineers relative to the number of 
inexperienced engineers, the greater the learning rate. Both inexperienced and 
experienced engineers leave the project through Project Engineering Turnover, 
which is modeled as flows out of the engineering stocks. There are both 
voluntary and involuntary turnovers. The involuntary turnovers are caused by a 
decision to remove engineers. A decision to remove engineers is made by 
entering a negative number in # Product Engineers. Inexperienced engineers 
will be removed first by an decision to remove engineers because they are less 
productive. Only after there are no more inexperienced engineers will 
experienced engineers be removed. The voluntary turnovers are a function of 
pressures on the engineers and will be discussed when other variables are added 
to the system. Because the experienced and inexperienced engineers have 
different productivity's, they are added together with a separate weighting to 
calculate the effective number of product development engineers. Although it is 
not shown in the Staffing diagram, maintaining an engineering team costs 
money. The total number of product engineers accumulate costs each week 
based on the Expense Per Engineer (an initial decision). The cumulative PE costs 
are called the IJE Team Costs and are displayed in the Forecast Report of the 
MFS. This limits the number of engineers that can be hired while trying to finish 
the project under budget. 
Figure 4 shows how the Staffing Sector interacts with the Tasks Sector. The 
previously discussed sectors and relations are shown in gray while the new 
variables and causal links are shown in black. When the effective number of 
engineers is increased by adding engineers, the PE Task Completion Rate will 
increase, decreasing the Tasks Remaining and increasing the Tasks Completed 
relative to what they would have been had the engineers remained constant. 
There is assumed to be an ideal Engineer/Task ratio that will allow the project to 
be finished in time and within budget. As more engineers are added, the ratio 
will approach its ideal value, which means less engineers need to be added. This 
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is a balancing loop and denoted B l  in the diagram. Similarly, more effective 
engineers means a higher task completion rate, less tasks remaining, and so less 
engineers than would have been needed. This second balancing loop is denoted 
B2. The link between the Engineer/Task Ratio and the # Product Engineers is 
special because it is not a link in the model, but rather an implicit link that causes 
the "manager" to decide whether or not to add more engineers based on 
feedback (information) from the model. If there are too many engineers relative 
to the number of tasks remaining, then engineers can also be removed. 
# Product Engineers 
0 
Figure 4 
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2.2.3 Schedule Sector 
Tasks 
An important element in managing a product development project is to establish 
PE Tasks Remaining Completed 
- 
reasonable scheduled completion dates. There are two schedule dates that must 
PE Task Completion Rate o 
0 
PE Causal Looping Diagram, adding Staffing Sector 
be set in this project. A Project Release Date must be chosen for the project to be 
released into the market. This is also the deadline for the process engineers to 
finish all of their tasks since the process engineering is the last phase of the 
product development process. The Product Engineers have a separate deadline 
that is the Scheduled PE Finish Date. This enables the managers to set different 
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time pressures on the two groups on engineers. The key to managing the 
scheduled completion dates is to be ready to flexible enough to change the 
release dates to maintain the desired time pressure and thus quality of practice. 
The Schedule Sector for the product engineers in shown added to the causal loop 
diagram in Figure 5. 
From the current # of tasks completed and the current task completion rate, a 
projected finish date is estimated. This is the week # that all the PE tasks will be 
completed by if the task completion rate remained constant. If there is a gap 
between the Scheduled Finish Date and the projected finish date, there is either 
excess time or too little time. Suppose the projected finish date was greater than 
the Scheduled Finish Date. Time pressure on the product engineers would 
increase since the engineers feel there is too little time in the schedule. High time 
pressure leads to a greater productivity, which increases the task completion rate, 
narrowing the gap between the projected and Scheduled Finish Date. This is a 
balancing feedback loop and is denoted B3. Similarly, if the task completion rate 
increases, the tasks completed would be greater than they otherwise would be, 
decreasing the projected finish date. This is also a balancing loop/ B4. The exact 
way in which time pressure influences productivity is clearly an assumption. To 
show the assumption/ the graphical function of the effect of time pressure on 
productivity used in the ithink model is shown in Fig. 6. It is the graphical 
pattern that demonstrates the assumed relationship rather than the exact 
numbers. 
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In Fig. 6, the x-axis is the time pressure while y-axis is the effect of time 
pressure on productivity (called PE Eff SchedPress). When the time pressure is 
one, indicating that there is exactly enough time in the schedule to finish 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 
PETimePressure 
Effect of Time Pressure on Productivity 
Figure 6 
the project, the effect is one, which is a neutral effect and does not alter the 
productivity. When time pressure exceeds one, the effect can increase to 1.2, 
equivalent to a 20% increase in productivity. The most productivity can increase 
due to just time pressure is 20% because the quality of the work is assumed to 
stay constant. On the other hand, if the time pressure goes below I, the 
productivity can drop by as much as 50%. This is because the engineers have the 
time in the schedule to keep engineering (trying to increase product quality), and 
are assumed to do so. Any time pressure beyond the limits in the graphical 
function will simply be the effect of the time pressure at the limit. 
Returning to the causal loop diagram of Fig. 5, an increase in time pressure 
will also increase the turnover rate for engineers (meaning they leave for a less 
stressful work environment). They will turnover from both the inexperienced 
and experienced engineers. This is a reinforcing loop (Rl ) :  an increase in time 
pressure will increase turnover, which decreases the effective number of 
engineers, decreasing the task completion rate, increasing the gap between the 
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projected and Scheduled Finish Date, increasing time pressure. Another 
assumption is that the ratio of engineers / tasks remaining will influence 
productivity: too many engineers on too few tasks will become increasingly 
unproductive. This relationship is also a graphical function (see Fig. 7). 
t : :  : : : : : : : : : \ 1  
. . . . .  . . . . . .  Io.000 I : : : : : : : : : : :  . . . . .  1 
Effect of EngineerITask Ratio on Productivity 
Figure 7 
The limits on the axis of engineer to task ratio are complicated because they 
are a function of the Scenario Scale. Scenario Scale is an initial decision 
(described in the Simulator Controls Section) that sets the magnitude of the 
number of engineers required for this project. The graphical function in Fig. 7 is 
shown with a Scenario Scale of 1. For any scenario scale of less than one, 
multiply the upper limit of the PE to Task Ratio by the scenario scale. This 
assumption indicates that as the engineers/ task ratio goes above cm, they work 
with decreasing productivity (tasks per engineer per week). This creates a 
balancing loop (B5). An increase in the engineer/task ratio above 1 will decrease 
productivity, decreasing task completion rate, increasing the number of tasks 
remaining relative to the number that would have remained i f  there were no change in 
productivity. This leads to a decrease in the engineer/task ratio relative to what it 
would have been. 
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2.2.4 Quality, Work Week, and Rework 
Quality.  One of the three objectives in the flight simulator is to complete the 
project with a competitive quality. This quality is the quality of the product and 
is the final accumulation of all the tasks weighted by the quality of practice at the 
time each task was completed. The quality of practice is a measure of the 
amount of time and care put into completing each task. The PE quality of 
practice incorporated into the PE causal loop diagram is shown in Fig. 8, Note 
that this figure shows the additions of Quality, Work Week, and Rework. The 
quality of practice is a function of time pressure and the Quality Goal. An 
increase in time pressure is assumed to decrease the quality of practice as 
engineers are rushing to complete each task, which increases the task completion 
rate since less time is being spent on each task. As the task completion rate 
increases, time pressure will decrease, which will allow the quality of practice to 
increase. This is a balancing loop (66) .  The Quality Goal will influence the 
quality of practice in the direction of the goal because this is the quality level the 
engineers are striving to work at. However, there is a time delay which 
represents the time delay between announcing a new goal at management level 
and actually seeing the goal implemented in engineering practice. Although 
there is only one Quality Goal, the product and process engineers have separate 
quality of practice because they have different time pressures influencing their 
portions of the project. 
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Rework.. Rework is a measure of tasks that are completed incorrectly for a 
variety of reasons and must be reworked. As discussed in the Task Sector, when 
a task is discovered to require rework, it is removed from the tasks completed 
stock and returned to the tasks remaining stock. In this sector, we will examine 
what variables in the product development system influence the fraction of the 
tasks done correctly. Figure 9 shows an outline of the causes of rework. Each 
week, a certain percentage of the tasks completed are 
Rework 0 
Percent Complete 
Coordination Quality of Practice 
effect 
Causes of Rework 
Figure 9 
completed correctly. Those tasks not completed correctly require rework. 
Obviously, the more tasks correct, the less rework, so there is a causal connection 
in the opposite direction. The fraction of tasks completed each week is 
influenced by the work week, the coordination effect, the current quality of 
practice, and the percent of the total product engineering tasks complete. 
If we return to the causal loop diagram shown in Figure 8, we can tie each of 
the causes of rework into the system. First, there is assumed to be some inherent 
error associated with the project that is a function of the percent of the total PE 
tasks complete. In the beginning of the project, the most unknowns exists and 
there is the highest probability of error. As the project progresses, the fraction of 
tasks done correctly will increase, approaching 1 when all the tasks are complete. 
This feedback loop is a reinforcing loop (R3), the more tasks complete, the greater 
the fraction of the total PE tasks complete, the greater fraction correct, leading to 
less tasks requiring rework, and a higher number of tasks complete than there 
would otherwise have been. The fraction of the tasks completed correctly is also 
influenced by several characteristics of the working environment. Clearly, the 
quality of practice influences the fraction of tasks completed correctly. This 
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creates a reinforcing loop (R2),  as an increase in quality of practice will lead to an 
increase in the fraction correct, decreasing the rework required, increasing the 
tasks completed, decreasing the gap between projected and scheduled finish 
date, decreasing time pressure, increasing the quality of practice. Work week 
influences the rework because prolonged period of a long work week can cause 
burnout, which increases the probability of errors being made. Finally, the 
coordination effect can increase the fraction correct because increased 
coordination means more time is being spend making sure the part is 
appropriate for its intended usage. The effect of coordination is not shown in 
Figure 8 because coordination has not been introduced into the system yet. 
Coordination is discussed in the next section. 
Another important assumption is that mistakes are not discovered 
immediately. To simulate this phenomena, the rework will stay in the stock of 
tasks completed as undiscovered rework. Only when the rework is "discovered" 
does it flow from the stock of tasks completed into the stock of tasks remaining. 
This means the tasks requiring rework will appear "completed" until the 
mistakes are discovered leading to over optimistic projections of completion. 
The rate at which the tasks requiring rework are discovered is a function of the 
amount of the project completed and the coordination. 
As the project progresses, and different designs are integrated into a single 
product, errors become obvious. This is why the tasks requiring rework seem to 
all be found as the project nears completion even though rework is generated 
throughout the project. Increased coordination also increases the rework 
discovery rate as the product engineers and process engineers can review each 
other's work. Figure 10 shows a "base case" of the discovered product 
engineering rework relative to the total number of tasks completed, taken from a 
run on the management flight simulator. The line denoted with the diamonds is 
the total number of tasks discovered to require rework. Although the tasks 
found to require rework are returned the stock of tasks remaining, they are 
added to a stock called total discovered rework to keep track of the total number of 
tasks that required rework. As is clearly shown, the tasks are discovered to 
require rework as the project nears completion, slowing down the project 
progress substantially. The actual rework discovery rate (tasks found to require 
rework each week) for the same time period is shown in Figure 11. This clearly 
shows when the rework was discovered during the project. 
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"Base case" product engineering rework 
Figure 10 
W o r k  W e e k .  Since the task completion rate is a function of the number of 
engineers, their current productivity, and the amount of time spent working each 
week, an easy way to increase the task completion rate is to increase the Work 
Week. There is a separate work week decision for each engineering team, the PE 
Work Week and the PcE Work Week. As shown in Fig. 8, the immediate effect 
of the work week is to increase the task completion rate. If the monthly average 
work week becomes too long, the engineers will begin to burnout. An increase 
in the burnout effect will decrease productivity, increase engineering turnover, 
and decrease the fraction correct of the tasks completed. These causal links are 
not shown as full feedback loops because PE Work We2k is a decision in the 
game rather than being an indigenous relationship in the microworld. The 
feedback loops are connected outside the microworld when the decision to 
change work week is made in the game based on information from the 
microworld. There can be overtime costs associated with the work week. A cost 
for overtime is calculated based the overtime rate (an initial decision) and the 
engineering salary (another initial decision) for the number of engineering hours 
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worked over the base week of 40 hours. If overtime costs are not desired, the 
overtime rate should be set to zero at the beginning of a simulation session. 
"Base case" product engineering rework discovery rate 
Figure 11 
2.2.5 Coordination 
The final component to the PE causal loop diagram is coordination. 
Coordination between product and process engineers will allow them to 
exchange useful information and increase cooperation such that they can 
improve their productivity and avoid making errors, hence reducing the rework 
necessary. Since the process engineers are designing a manufacturing process to 
build the product that was designed by the development engineers, coordination 
is clearly a crucial element to an efficient project. 
"Coordination" in this model tries to capture some of the differences in 
product development performance between a "lean production" organization3 
"Lean Productionr1 concept as defined in The WorU The Story of L a  
Production by James Womack, Daniel Jones, and Daniel Roos. New York: HarperCollins, 1990. 
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and the traditional "mass production" organization. According to Clark and 
Fujimoto4/ the average Japanese manufacturer (traditionally associated with lean 
production) required about 1.7 million engineering hours for a new automotive 
product development project and took about 46 months from first design to 
customer deliveries. In contrast/ the average American and European producers 
(traditionally associated with mass production) required about 3.1 million 
engineering hours and took 60 months. Obviously, not all of this difference in 
performance occurs during the process and product engineers phases. The 
average U.S. product and process engineering phases required some 34 months 
while the average Japanese producer complete these phases in about 24 months. 
C k ~ k  and Fujimoto found that the average Japanese had higher productivity/ 
more overlap between product and process engineering/ anu less required 
rework. In The Machine That Changed The World, the difference in product 
development performance between lean production and mass production is 
attributed mostly to four project characteristics; leadership, teamwork, 
communication/ and simultaneous development? Each of these project 
characteristics is an important aspect of project management. In the microworld, 
we try to capture the concepts of leadership, teamwork, and communication 
under the broad heading of coordination for simplicity. Coordination makes 
simultaneous development possible because the process engineers can begin 
designing the manufacturing process based on informal communication instead 
of having to wait for the finished product designs. Obviously/ better 
communication (more coordination) leads to less mistakes during simultaneous 
development. 
Returning to the microworld we have been discussing, the PE causal loop 
diagram with the effects of coordination added is shown in Fig. 12. Coordination 
is based on the Coordination Fraction decision. The Coordination Fraction is 
the fraction of the work week to be spent on coordination activities. Because the 
number of engineers in the product team and the process team can be different at 
any given time, the coordination is based on the smaller of the two team sizes. 
For example, if the Coordination Fraction was .1 (10%) and there were 10 total 
product engineers and 20 total process engineers, the coordination effect would 
^ Kim B. Clark and Takahiro Fujimoto, Product Development Performance: Strategy, Organization, 
and Management in the World Auto Industry, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991, 
p. 78. 
The Machine That Changed The World: T k S t o r v  of Lean Production/ p. 117 
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be based on 10 engineers from each team contributing 10% of their productive 
time towards coordination. This is equivalent to 1 engineer from each team 
spending 100% of time coordinating. The equivalent number of engineers 
spending 100% time coordinating are called the coordinating engineers. The 
immediate effect of coordination is that the coordinating engineers are 
coordinating rather than completing tasks, so they are subtracted from the 
effective engineers, reducing the task completion rate. 
Coordination involves changing work habits and learning new 
communication skills, so there is actually a time delay between the investing time 
in coordination and feeling the positive effects of the coordination. The delayed 
coordination is called the coordination effect. The coordination effect is a 
function of the ratio of coordinating engineers to the total number of engineers in 
the entire project. The more coordination engineers there are relative to the total 
number of engineers, the greater the coordination effect will be. The 
coordination effect will range from zero to 1; 0 indicates there is no coordination 
effect , .5 indicates that overall, 50% of the engineering time is effectively spent 
coordinating, and 1 indicates that all engineers in the project spend 100% of their 
time effectively coordinating. 
Based on the research previously discussed, the coordination effect is 
assumed to influence the fraction of work done correctly, the productivity of the 
engineers, and although not shown in the causal loop diagram, the rework 
discovery rate as discussed in the section on Rework. The effect of the 
coordination effect on the product engineering fraction of tasks completed correctly 
is displayed as a graphical relationship in Fig. 13. When the coordination effect is 
zero, indicating no effective coordination, the effect on fraction correct is 1. 
Remember that an output of 1 is neutral, no influence on the fraction correct. The 
fraction correct increases as the coordination effect increases, but with 
diminishing returns. The maximum gain in the product development fraction 
correct from coordination is about 10%. The gain from coordination is relatively 
low for the product engineers because product engineering is an upstream 
activity relative to the process engineering. This means that the process 
engineers base their design on the work of the product engineers. Because of 
this, coordination has a different influence on the process engineering fraction 
correct as will be discussed in the section on Process Engineering. 
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Another assumed impact of coordination is that it can increase productivity 
significantly. The research of Clark and Fujimoto has suggested that the lean 
production projects have achieved productivities of 2 1/2 time greater than the 
average mass production organization. While there is no data to numerically 
define the relationship between coordination and productivity, we do know that 
it requires a substantial investment in coordination to realize the full potential of 
productivity gain. The graphical function showing our assumed relationship 
between productivity and the coordination effect is displayed in Fig. 14. Again, 
no coordination will have no influence on the system so has output of 1. We 
have assumed that the optimum coordination effect is around .5. Above this, 
coordination effect has a negative effect on productivity which demonstrates the 
assumption that too much coordination will result in confusion and uncertainty 
about individual tasks. The exact relationship is not important. What is 
important is that it has gives the same challenge to the MFS user that a real 
manager would have in experimentally trying to discover what the optimum 
amount of coordination is. The coordination effect on productivity is the same 
for both the product engineers and the process engineers. 
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Two important data points were discussed when comparing lean production 
to mass production. The average productivity of a lean production project was 2 
1/2 times greater while the project completion time was only 70% of the average 
mass production project. While the reason for this in a real project is quite 
complex, this discrepancy is accounted for in the model by the difference 
between the task completion rate and productivity. With a coordination effect of 
.5, the engineers work 2 1/2 time faster, but they also spend 50% of their time on 
coordination activities rather than completing tasks. The net gain is substantially 
less than 2 1 / 2  times. When the work saved from decreased required rework is 
also accounted for, using significant coordination in the MFS can reduce the 
overall time required for the project by about 30%. This is comparable with the 
data presented in Clark and Fujimoto and is accurate enough to convey the 
importance of coordination. 
2.2 Process Engineers 
The process engineering is the last phase in the product development project, 
other than the pilot run. The general causal loop diagram used to describe the 
process engineering system is almost identical to the product engineering 
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diagram except there is a separate decision to hire process engineers, an 
independent work week, and a separate scheduled completion date. The hiring 
decision is # Product Engineers and will add or remove process engineers in the 
same way the product engineering staffing works. The scheduled completion 
date for the process engineers is the Scheduled Release Date because the process 
engineers are assumed to be the last phase of the project and should be finished 
before the product is released into the market. The schedule is different from the 
product engineer's so that the process engineers can be scheduled to work 
through a different time phase of the project. Be aware that when the scheduled 
release date is reached, the product will be released into the market place 
whether or not the process engineers have finished all their tasks. This means 
that the customers will receive the product at whatever the quality the product 
has at the release date. The quality can be improved by finishing all the tasks, 
but it takes a long time to change the customer's perception of quality. 
Because the process engineers are the downstream phase of the project, there 
are some minor feedback differences. The primary difference between the 
process and the product engineers is what influences the fraction of the tasks 
completed correctly. Since process engineering is essentially developing a 
manufacturing process to manufacture the product designed by the product 
engineers, the process engineers are dependent on the designs of the product 
engineers. If the product engineers have not completed their design, the process 
engineers will have an increased uncertainty about the needed manufacturing 
process and are less likely to do it correctly. The closer the product engineers are 
to completing their design (all tasks completed) the more likely the process 
engineers will be to finish their tasks correctly. In the microworld, the process 
engineering fraction correct is a function of the percent of the total product 
engineering tasks completed, the higher the percent completed, the higher the 
PcE fraction correct. 
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The Coordination Effect on Process Engineering Fraction Correct 
Figure 15 
The second difference is the influence of coordination on the fraction correct. 
Because the process engineering is the downstream activity, coordinating with 
the process engineers has a much more powerful influence. The graphical 
function that shows the assumed relationship between the coordination effect 
and the process engineering fraction correct is shown in Fig. 15. Again, there is 
no influence from a coordination effect of 0. As the coordination increases, the 
effect on the PcE fraction correct increases with diminishing returns. The 
influence on coordination is more complicated than the graphical function would 
suggest. Remember that the coordination is only one effect. The fraction correct 
is also influenced by burnout, the PcE quality of practice, the fraction of the total 
PE tasks complete, the inherent errors associated with any project. Although the 
graphical function suggests that the coordination effect can increase the fraction 
correct by a factor of 4, the fraction correct will never exceed the limits of 
inherent error. Also, coordinating does not prevent errors resulting from a low 
quality cf practice or a high burnout from overwork. What the coordination 
effect does influence is the effect of the fraction of the PE total project complete. 
The process engineers can successfully design a manufacturing process even if 
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the product engineers are not finished if the coordination is high, indicating that 
the process engineers have a good understanding of the work begin done by the 
product engineers. 
3. SIMULATOR CONTROLS 
Part of facilitation a session of the management flight simulator is to explain the 
simulator interface the users will be interacting with. This section briefly covers 
the components of the "cockpit", the weekly management decisions, and the 
initial decisions available to the facilitator for changing the scenario. 
3.1 Simulator Cockpit 
When the flight simulator is launched, game screen in Fig. 16 will appear: 
Menu Bar. Click and hold mouse button on the menu choice and drag 
the mouse to the desired command. Start a new game by selecting the 
restart option under the explore menu. The "Cockpit" 
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Decisions are displayed in the upper portion of the "cockpit". The 
decisions are described in Management Decisions sections of this Guide and are 
separated into weekly and initial decisions. The list of reports is displayed in the 
second section of the cockpit. Each report selected will appear to left of the 
cockpit. In the figure above, the overview report is currently selected. The last 
portion of the cockpit displays the possible graphs to view. Toggle to the table 
viev; by selecting the graph bar and choosing tables. For detailed information 
and variable definitions about reports and graphs, refer to the User's Guide for 
this Management Flight Simulator. 
3.2 Management Decisions 
The management decisions are the possible weekly decisions in the management 
flight simulator. If the weekly decisions are not currently displayed in the 
cockpit, they can be found by toggling the decision bar in the simulator cockpit 
from initial decisions to weekly decisions. The consequences of each decision 
should be explored by returning to the causal loop diagrams developed during 
the Microworld section of this Guide. 
PE-Work-Week: Number of hours per week the product engineering team 
will work. A long work week (above 40 hours) increases the task 
completion rate, but can eventually lead to burnout if the work week is too 
high for too long. Burnout will lead to lower productivity, more errors, and 
a higher turnover. Beware that there may be overtime costs for work weeks 
above 40 hours. 
PcE-Work-Week: Number of hours per week the process engineering team 
will work. 
Product-Engineers: Number of new product engineers to add each week. 
Enter a negative number to remove product engineers. Additions to the 
product engineering team are assumed to come from a different project 
within the company, so are assumed to be competent engineers, but 
inexperienced because they are unfamiliar with this specific project. 
Process-Engineers: Similar to the product engineers, process engineers can 
be added or removed each week. 
CoordinatiotzJrac: Fraction of total hours worked to be spent coordinating 
activities between the product engineers and the process engineers. The 
coordinating effect is based on the amount of time spent by the smaller of 
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the product and process engineering teams. For example, if you have 20 
product engineers and 10 process engineers and the Coordination Frac is .2, 
the coordination effect will be based on 20Â° of 10 engineers from each team. 
Coordination between product and process engineers will allow them to 
exchange useful information. 
Schd-PE-Finish: This week is chosen as the completion date for all product 
engineering tasks. As the scheduled finish approaches, the product 
engineers will feel a time pressure if the time required to finish the project 
exceeds the time remaining in the schedule. 
Scheduled Release Date: The week number chosen for product release. The 
goal is to release the product on the target release date, an initial decision. 
When the scheduled release date is reached, even if the project is not 
complete, it is launched and the marketing force begins selling the product 
with the current quality. Because process engineering is the last phase of 
the project, the scheduled release date is the deadline for the process 
engineering team to complete all their tasks. 
Quality-Goal: This is the quality the engineers are striving to build into the 
product. A higher quality goal will pressure both the process and product 
engineers to have a higher quality of practice leading to a better final quality 
of product. The quality goal is defined as a quality relative to the 
competitors in the field. The competitors are assumed to have a quality of 1. 
For example, a quality goal of 1.2 indicates a desired product quality 20% 
better than the competitors. 
Initial Decisions 
The initial decisions are only changed at the beginning of a simulation in order to 
try a scenario based on a different set of assumptions. They are currently set to a 
"default" set of values which establish a standard product development scenario. 
These decisions are found in the initial decisions list. The values of the initial 
decisions can be found in the initial decision list and most are also shown in the 
Introduction Report of the MFS. 
A) Target-Release-Date: The original product release date set by marketing. If 
this date is missed, the product loses competitive advantage. 
B )  Core-PE-Team: The number of experienced product engineers already 
committed to the project when it enters the product development phase. 
The core PE team will be automatically updated if any changes are made in 
the Scenario Scale. 
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C) Base_Productivity: Base number of tasks that can be accomplished by an 
experienced engineer in a week. Both product and process engineers are 
assumed to have the same base productivity. Changing the Scenario Scale 
will automatically adjust the Base Productivity so that a different number of 
engineers will be requiring to finish the task in the same time. 
D) Project-Budget: Total budget allocated for this project in thousands of 
dollars. The budget is calculated by the estimating number of engineer- 
weeks it would take to finish the project working at the base productivity 
rate and multiplying by the expense per engineer week. A 10% cushion is 
added to the estimate. The project budget will automatically be updated 
with any changes in the Scenario Scale. 
E )  Eng-Salary: The weekly engineering salary in thousands of dollars. The 
default is $800/week, which is shown as $2 thousand in the actual initial 
decision listing. 
F) Eng-Overhead: The overhead is meant to include all the costs of supporting 
an engineering team beyond their salary. This includes benefits, equipment, 
support services, prototyping, etc. Default is $1.2 thousand per engineer 
per week. Together, the engineering salary and overhead make up the total 
cost per engineer-week shown on the Introduction Report. 
G) Overtime_Rate: This is the fraction of the engineering salary to be paid for 
engineering overtime work. Overtime is considered to be any hours 
worked beyond the base 40 hour week. The default is 1.5, equivalent to 
time and a half. If no cost for overtime is desired, the overtime rate should 
be set to zero. The cumulative overtime costs are shown in the Time & Cost 
Forecast Report on the MFS. 
H) Scenario-Scale: The approximate scale of the project. A xa l e  of 1 assumes 
that 100 engineers in 40 weeks would be able to finish the project. For a 
product development team of 20 people, a scenario scale of .2 would be 
appropriate. Changing the Scenario Scale will automatically change the 
Core PE Team, the Base Productivity, and the Project Budget to made the 
project suitable for different approximate team sizes. 
I) Sched-Sensitivity: The schedule sensitivity is the number of weeks ahead of 
the actual time that the engineers will feel time pressure from the schedule 
date. Changing this variable will change the sensitivity of the engineering 
teams to the approach of the completion date. 
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4.1 Suggestions On Running A Session 
In order to run a session of the management flight simulator as an effective 
learning experience, the MFS must be placed in context. Otherwise, there is a 
tendency for the MFS to be used as a video game where the participants compete 
to win (finish with best time, etc.) and miss some of the potential learnings that 
can come from a more rigorous exploration of the product development system. 
This section is intended to provide a rough guideline of how to run an effective 
session of the management flight simulator. Once you have run a session or two, 
you should feel free to innovate. 
Before beginning the session, make sure that the initial decisions are set for 
- p- pp pp - - - 
the scenarioyou desire. If you are just planning to use the default setting, check 
to make sure you know what the Target Date, Budget, and Base Productivity are. 
These will allow you to estimate the scope (magnitude of engineers required) of 
the project. Also, the MFS should be set to allow the user to go back and correct 
a mistake. The "allow go back" option under the Options menu must be checked 
to allow this feature. We have found the following format to be an effective 
structure for a MFS session. Each section will later be discussed in detail. 
Introduction: 
- Use of management flight simulators in general 
- Overview of product development microworld 
- How to use computer interface (simulator controls) 
Beginning the simulation: 
- Break the group up into teams of at least two people 
- Each team should have a User's Guide for reference 
- Introduce strategy sheets 
- Allow teams 15 minutes to familiarize themselves with the 
interface 
Simulation, should take around 45 minutes: 
- Each team should record their objectives & plans on the strategy 
sheet before starting the simulation 
- Facilitator should float around answering questions. The objective 
is not to tell the teams the optimum decisions to make, but rather 
to point out important feedbacks. 
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- When the teams finish, they should save each exploration under 
the team name they have used on the strategy sheet. 
- Final results & comments should be recorded on the second page 
of the strategy sheet. 
Debrief: 
- Collect results from strategy sheets 
- Display results to the group (different experiments, not 
performance comparison) 
- Explore feelings during MFS 
- What appeared to be critical variables? 
. - Discuss the role of coordination 
. - Try to link discussion back into the microworld underlying the 
MFS 
- Can expand on the causal loop diagrams discussed during the 
introduction. 
- If time permits, run through another simulation using different 
teams. 
4.1.1 Introduction To Management Flight Simulators 
The first part of the introductory discussion should cover the general usage of 
Management Flight Simulators as learning tools. In this section, we will trace 
through the general introduction that has been used in previous learning labs. 
Again, this material is just intended to create an outline of how to run a session. 
A good reference source for general information on MFS is the chapter on 
Microworlds: The Technology of the Learning Organization in The Fifth Discipline by 
Peter Senge. 
Management flight simulators are intended to create a managerial practice 
field. In all other arenas where teams are expected to perform they have the 
ability to practice. When we think of great teams, we tend to think of football 
teams, ballets, etc. All of these teams have the ability to work together until they 
understand the game. It is hard to image one football player saying to another at 
the end of a game, "So when's the next game? Great, I'll see you then". Yet this is 
exactly what happens for real product development teams. The only chance to 
manage a product development project, or to be part of the team, is during a real 
project when substantial personal and corporate investment is linked to the 
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performance of your team. With that much riding on a project, learning about 
managing through rigorous experimentation is impossible. 
A practice field has several unique characteristics: 
Control the pace by speeding up or slowing down time. Phenomena 
that stretch out over many months can be reduced to several minutes 
to show the long-term consequences of decisions. 
Compressing space. In a practice field, all of your environment is 
reduced to a manageable size so that the consequences of decisions 
and actions are visible 
Repeated trials. Sometimes "plays" must be repeated to learn what 
went wrong, or even to understand what variables helped lead to 
success. 
Pauses for reflection. To learn from doing, there must be an 
opportunity to sit down with the team, or with other managers, and 
try to understand why the system behaved the way it did in response 
to the strategies used. 
Safe environment to experiment. The idea of a practice field is to 
create a safe place to experiment with different strategies without 
worrying about the consequences of failure. Sometimes the greatest 
learnings come from failing, not succeeding. 
Appropriate tools and equipment. Without the proper environmentl 
it is impossible to practice. 
We have called these managerial practice fields 'management flight 
simulators' because we view them as similar in concept to a flight simulator used 
by pilots rather than a video game. The goal of a video game is to perform and 
get the best possible score. In contrast, the goal of a flight simulator is to learn 
how to fly. This involves experimenting with different strategies, varying the 
conditions, trying maneuvers that will cause failure. But throughout this 
processl learning about the system and understanding the short term and long 
term consequences of decisions. 
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The reason that practice fields are effective is that human beings learn best 
through doing. We act, observe the consequences of our actions, and adjust our 
actions to get closer to our goal. But learning only happens when the feedback is 
fast and local. When cause and effect are separated by space and time, the 
consequences of our actions become so tangled with other variables and concerns 
that we no longer recognize them as connected directly to the actions. The 
computer simulation allows time and space to be compressed. In the microworld 
we have created, the consequences from actions are fast and local, but still in a 
complex system This makes learning possible. The computer also contains the 
tools and equipment necessary to practice running a project. It simulates the 
"tasks", the engineers, the time pressure, and other aspects of a real project. One 
important thing to stress during management flight simulator sessions is that 
performance is not important unto itself. More learning about a system takes 
place while trying to battle failure than when coasting through a successful 
project. 
4.1.2 The Product Development MFS 
Having placed the management flight simulator in the context of a learning 
environment, it is time to introduce the details of the product development MFS. 
A full product development project in the automotive industry is typically 
separated into 6 phases; concept generation, product planning, advanced 
engineering, product engineering, process engineering, and pilot run. We have 
chosen to model the product and process engineering phases because the 
managerial challenges are more evident than the technical ones in these phases. 
Additionally, approximately 1 / 2  of the total disadvantage to the Japanese in the 
Automotive industry occurs during these phases. 
During a session, each of the participants will have the opportunity to 
"manage" a product development project. To introduce the MFS, you (as 
facilitator) should run through the introduction that is Section 1.1 of this Guide. 
Describe the basic project goals and the decisions the participants will be 
expected to make each week. These decisions should be placed in context by 
describing (briefly) the microworld that underlies the management flight 
simulator. Generally, we do not develop the full causal loop diagram presented 
in this Guide before the participants get to use the simulator. Instead, the most 
important information is presented. Sometimes the full causal loop diagram of 
the microworld can be discussed during the session debriefing - after the 
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participants have had exposure to the system. The following points are 
necessary before starting the simulation: 
The task structure: The objective of the h4FS is to complete all the 
product and process engineering tasks within the time, budget, and 
quality specified. Go over the stock and flow diagram that was 
presented as Figure 2 to show how rework fits into the model of task 
completion. 
Staffing: First show the staffing stock and flow structure and discuss 
the difference between experienced and inexperienced engineers and 
how the hiring works. This was shown in Figure 3 of this Guide. 
Task & Staffing: To show how the two stock and flow structures 
interact, show Fig 4. This also shows the feedback loop between the 
engineering/tasks ratio and the number of tasks remaining in the 
project. 
Rather than developing the full causal loop diagram, the rest of the 
microworld can be generally described using the Microworld 
Overview Diagram presented in Figure 1. Using this diagram, you 
can discuss the rest of the available decisions. Here is a quick outline 
to use when discussing the decisions. Please add more from what 
you have learned about the microworld. 
- Staffing (previously discussed when presented the staffing 
diagram) 
- Schedule: There are dates for both teams, be sure to tell how time 
pressure will increase the tasks completion rate but will 
eventually decrease the quality of practice. The product release 
date pressure the process engineers, and is the date when the 
product will be released into the marketplace. High time 
pressure will also cause engineers to turnover. 
- Quality: The Quality Goal and time pressure influence the quality 
of practice. High quality of practice creates less rework, but 
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increases the time required to complete each task. Tasks finished 
at the Quality of practice become parts of the quality of product. 
- Workweek: Different work week for each team. Increases task 
completion rate, but will eventually cause burnout if too high for 
too long, leading to increased rework and lower productivity. 
The engineers might also be required to be paid overtime for 
work week greater than 40 hours. The exact rate is shown on the 
Introduction Report of the MFS. 
- Coordination Fraction: Fraction of each week to be spent on 
coordination activities. Immediate effect is to reduce the task 
completion rate. After a time delay, it will improve productivity 
and reduce rework. Be sure to explain the meaning of 
coordination as it is used in the MFS. Give an example of the 
coordination effect if there are two different team sizes. 
After the scheduled release date has been reached, the product will be 
released into the market place. If you are not ready to release the product, be 
sure to let the product release date slip. When the product is released into the 
market place, your company will try to sell it. The resulting sales are shown on 
the Sales & Marketing Report and in the graphs. The sales of your product will 
depend heavily on whether the product was released by the date set by 
marketing and on what quality the customer perceive you product at. You can 
continue to work on the project after it has been released, but it difficult to adjust 
the customers initial perception of quality. After the project is completed (all 100 
PE & PcE tasks) all of your engineers will be automatically removed from the 
project. You can change your time step to continuously and what the sales and 
marketing efforts. All initial sales will result in losing money because the model 
assumes that there is a learning curve to production that will cause the 
production cost to drop as more units are produced. 
Note that the model you are presenting is not reality. It is not meant to be 
reality. All models should be evaluated on the basis on their usefulness with 
respect to their intended purpose. With the introduction to the microworld, you 
will have given the participants a broad, fuzzy picture of the exact computer 
model. This is quite similar to the understanding a real manager might have 
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when beginning a new project. Aware of the rules and general expected 
behavior, but nothing more. Part of the objective of the simulator is ;or the 
participants to begin learning about the system by experimenting with decisions 
and trying to understand the feedback from the model. The art of answering 
questions during the simulation is to encourage this experimental behavior, 
giving broad pointers, rather than telling what the optimum decisions are. 
4.1.3 Beginning The Simulation 
Now we are ready to move to the computers. If you have access, the easiest way 
to begin the computer usage is to have a computer projecting through an 
overhead projector. Otherwise, use transparencies of the "cockpit" and each of 
the reports. Show the general structure of the cockpit, where the decisions, 
reports, and graphs are and how to enter a decision or select a graph or report. 
Also demonstrate how you can scroll through the complete list of available 
decisions and reports. Don't forget that you can toggle between graphs and 
tables. Simulate forward a few weeks in time to demonstrate the simulator. 
Next, we usually explain each of the reports quickly to show where various 
information can be found. It is important to explain the different computer 
projections shown in the report and point out that they (the participants) should 
only believe the projections about as much as they would believe one from their 
own company. 
The participants should be broken into teams of at least two people. We 
have found that team playing is more effective as a learning experience because 
the decisions and strategies have to be discussed. We usually allow the teams 15 
minutes or so just to play around with entering decisions and getting familiar 
with the information system. Each team should have at least one copy of the 
User's Guide which contains definitions for all the variables in the reports and 
graphs. 
4.1.4 The Simulation 
After the participants have had a chance to get a little familiar with the MFS, we 
introduce a strategy sheet. Each team should use a sheet for each game. This 
helps them develop a strategy in both words and by sketching their hiring and 
coordination strategy over time. The first page of the strategy sheet should be 
filled in before beginning a real simulation. The second page is for final 
information after the  game. One of the common difficulties with forming a 
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strategy is to decide on the scope of the engineers needed to finish the project in 
time and under budget. This can be easily done by referring the participants to 
the Introduction Report of the MFS. This shows what the time and budget 
constraints are, what the base productivity of the engineers is, and what it costs 
to employ each engineer for one week. For this, it is quite simple to calculate the 
number of engineers required to finish the project by the chosen scheduled 
completion dates, assuming the engineers work at the base productivity through 
the project. 
The first run through the simulation usually takes between 45 min. to 1 hour. 
When teams finish the simulation, we try to have them save the exploration 
under their team name and record all of the relevant information on the second 
page of the strategy sheet. This saves all the decisions and model feedback from 
the game and may be useful for future research on simulator behavior. 
42.5 Outcome 6' Debrief 
To begin the simulation debrief, we usually collect all the results from the 
strategy sheet and make a comparative list of: 
Percent Time Used 
Percent Budget Consumed 
Quality at Release Date 
Final Quality 
Final Profit 
Optional: Total Required Rework 
The results are not listed just to compare performances. Rather, each of the 
teams has just managed an identical project in an identical product development 
world. Yet the outcomes have probably varied significantly. The only real 
difference between the projects is in the mental models of the participants that 
governed their decision making process. Each one of the outcomes is an 
"experimental" result of how a particular mental model interacted with the 
product development system. 
The second interesting point from examining the results is when i t  comes to 
measuring performance. The first question most of the teams ask is how did we 
do? But that question can only be answered against a bench mark. If everybody 
misses the original project goals, the bench mark simply becomes the team that 
did the best. Their results become the measurement for success. Yet it really has 
nothing to do with the potential "best" that could be achieved in managing the 
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system. Although we have demonstrated chat you can indeed achieve the project 
objectives, most companies do not have the advantage of knowing what is really 
achievable in a project and merely set their goals according to the best past 
performance. This happened in the American automotive industry. They had a 
vision of what a "good" product development performance was until the 
Japanese competed with their version of a "good" performance. This forced the 
American industry to reassess the way it defined a good project. 
The rest of the debrief should be a discussion of how people felt while they 
were "managing" the simulator, if they felt in control, what they thought were 
important variables to what, and so forth. The issue of coordination be explicitly 
discussed. What are the tradeoff's between spending time on coordination 
activities for the long term gain in reduced rework and increased productivity? 
How does this to relate the participants' work experience? If it proves useful to 
the discussion, in the past we have returned to the more complex causal loop 
diagrams to show the consequences of the various decisions. 
One excellent way to help people discuss their experience with the Flight 
Simulator is to use the archetypes to show some common decision making 
behaviors. I have included here two Shifting-the-Burden examples that have 
come up in past learning labs, Figs 17 and 18. 
Overtime or - , # of engineers 
\ -\ 4 
o \ 
Productivity 
\ 
\ Investment in f 
Coordination 
Shifting-the-Burden Response to Increased Rework 
Figure 17 
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Shifting-the-Burden Response to Falling Behind Schedule 
Figure 18 
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1. I NTRODUCTION~ 
Our increasingly interconnected and dynamic world challenges managers to find 
new ways to understand and control change. The accelerating rate of 
technological, organizational, and social change means managers are faced with 
situations that are in many ways new, and must increasingly deal with the 
unexpected. Managers are not alone in facing such daunting tasks. Modern 
society is built upon systems of enormous complexity, from nuclear power plants 
to jumbo jets. A pilot, for example, must also control a system of great 
complexity and be prepared for the unexpected. There is, however, one 
significant difference between the pilot of a jet and the manager of a project. No 
one would dream of sending a pilot up in the real thing before they had 
extensive training in the flight simulator on the ground. The simulator allows 
the pilot to learn, to make mistakes, to experience the unexpected without risk to 
passengers or aircraft. Yet managers are expected to fly their projects into 
unknown skies with their only training being in management "ground school" or 
experience as junior crew members. 
The Product Development Flight Simulator (MFS) gives you the opportunity 
to "pilot" a product development process. The challenge in managing a product 
development program is to meet three objectives: finishing in a specified time 
limit, under an allocated budget, and with a competitive quality. The project is 
separated into two categories of tasks that must be completed. There are 100 
generic product engineers "tasks" and there are 100 generic process engineering 
"tasks". The product engineers (PE) do the product design and testing, while the 
process engineers (PcE) design and build the manufacturing process to turn the 
design into a product. When time reaches the scheduled release date, the 
product is released into the market and will be sold, even if all the engineering 
tasks are not complete. The sales depend heavily on whether the product was 
released by the target release date with a competitive quality. 
As the "pilot" of this simulator, you are expected to make decisions each 
week about adding or removing engineers, the desired number of work hours in 
a week, the scheduled completion date for each team, the amount of time spent 
coordinating between the two teams, and quality "goal" for the product. Your 
decisions will influence the rate at which the engineers can accomplish tasks, the 
^ Parts of this introduction are adopted from the Peovle E q r e s s  Briefing Book, an unpublished MIT 
document by Professor John Sterman. 
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quality they will build into the project, and even the rate they will leave the 
project because of stress. You may finish far over budget, or over targeted 
release date, or even with a low product quality. But there is no winning or 
losing. The purpose of the flight simulator is to give you insight into the product 
development issues raised and to begin to understand the dynamic 
interconnections that exists within the system. The flight simulator is a 
laboratory in which a wide variety of different management strategies can be 
tested. More importantly, the consequences of various strategies can be explored 
systematically without risking the futures of a real firm. Or risking a red career. 
Most of all, enjoy yourself. This is an experimental laboratory so don't be 
afraid to try new strategies. You might want manage the first few simulated 
projects using the strategy you think will most likely to succeed. In later trials, 
you may wish to systematicaliy vary aspects of your strategy to gain an 
understanding of how the product development process responds to 
management decisions. Remember, sometimes you learn more by having to 
"pilot" through rough weather, poor visibility, and with unexpected mechanical 
failures. The beauty of a flight simulator is you can walk away from every crash 
landing. 
2. G ~ N G  STARTED 
There are three major components of the management flight simulator itself. 
These are the microworld, the information system, and the si~rzulator controls. 
Microworld: The microworld is the systems model that underlies the 
flight simulator. Here the interactions between the 
different variables are explicitly described. It has been 
tested and calibrated; but like any model, it is a 
simplification of reality! based on a set of assuinptions 
about the product development process. For a detailed 
description, refer to the Facilitator's Guide. 
Information System: The product development progress is monitored through 
a complex information system. You have access to 
multiple reports that detail the curreit status of different 
facets of the project, Historical information can be 
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obtained as either graphs or tables and show the 
behavior of the variables over time. 
Simulator Controls: The simulators controls are in the "cockpit" of the flight 
simulator. Here you can make decisions and control the 
information system by selecting the report or graph you 
would like to view. 
When the flight simulator is launched, the computer screen shown in Fig. 1 
will appear. Decisions are displayed in the upper portion of the "cockpit". 
Selecting and holding the arrows to the right of the decision names will scroll 
through the list of decisions. Change a decision by selecting (place the mouse 
pointer over and clicking) and entering the desired value. 
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There are two types of decisions in the simulator, initial decisions and weekly 
decisions. Toggle to the next decision list by clicking the mouse on the decision 
bar at the top of the decision box in the cockpit. The weekly decisions are 
described in Management Decisions sections of this Guide. The initial decisions 
have all been previously set to create the desired scenario, so there is no need to 
change them. 
The list of reports is displayed in the second section of the cockpit. There are 
7 reports that give the current information on different aspects of the praduct 
development project. Please read the introduction report before beginning the 
simulation to see what the specific goals and initial parameters are for the project 
you are going to manage. Select a report simply by "clicking1' on the report 
name with the mouse. The report selected will appear to left of the cockpit. In 
the figure above, the overview report is currently selected. A printout of each 
report with the definitions of the relevant variables are included in the 
Information System Summary of this Guide. 
The last portion of the cockpit displays the possible graphs to view. Each 
graphs contains multiple variables that are listed in the Graphs & Tables section 
of the Information System Summary. Toggle to the table view by selecting the 
graph bar and choosing tables. 
2.1 Management Decisions 
As manager of this simulated project, there are eight decisions you can make 
each week to guide the project. These are called the weekly decisions and are 
described in detail below. This is another set of decisions that can be accessed by 
toggling the decision bar in the cockpit, the initial decisions. These decisions are 
used only to set up the scenario of the simulation and should not be changed 
during a simulationt If you would like to learn more about the initial decisions, 
refer to the MFS Facilitator's Guide. 
a) PE-Work-Week: Number of hours per week the product engineering team will 
work. A long work week (above 40 hours) increases the task completion 
rate, but can eventually lead to burnout if the work week is too high for too 
long. Burnout will lead to lower productivity, more errors, and a higher 
turnover. 
b) PcE-Work-Week: Number of hours per week the process engineering team 
will work. 
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c) Product-Engineers: Number of new product engineers to add each week. 
Enter a negative number to remove product engineers. Additions to the 
product engineering team are assumed to come from a different project 
within the company/ so are competent engineers, but inexperienced because 
they are unfamiliar with this specific project. They become experienced on a 
learning curve that is based on the availability of experienced engineers to 
familiarized them with the project. The inexperienced engineers are not as 
productive as the experienced. 
d) Process-Engineers: Similar to the product engineers/ process engineers can be 
added or removed each week. The learning curve for the process engineers is 
similar except the learning process can be improved by coordinating with the 
product engineers. 
e) Coordination-Frac: Fraction of total hours worked to be spent coordinating 
activities between the product engineers and the process engineers. The 
coordinating effect is based on the amount of time spent by the smaller of the 
product and process engineering teams. For examplef if you have 20 product 
engineers and 10 process engineers and the Coordination Frac is .2, the 
coordination effect will be based on 20% of 10 engineers from each team. 
Coordination between product and process engineers will allow them to 
exchange useful information such that thev can improve productivity and 
avoid making errors/ thus reducing the necessary rework. However! the 
coordinating staff will have to spend some of their productive time on 
meetings which reduces the number of tasks completed each week. 
f) Schd-PE-Finish: This week is chosen as the completion date for all product 
engineering tasks. As the scheduled finish approaches, the product engineers 
will feel a time pressure if the time required to finish the project exceeds the 
time remaining in the schedule. Time pressure will increase productivity, but 
the quality of practice can decline if the engineers are under too much 
pressure to work fast. 
g) Scheduled Release Date: The week number chosen for product release. The 
goal is to release the product on the target release datef an initial decision. 
When the scheduled release date is reachedf evm if the project is not 
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complete/ it is launched and the marketing force begins selling the product 
with the current quality. Because process engineering is the last phase of the 
project/ the scheduled release date is the deadline for the process engineering 
team to complete all their tasks. If the estimated time required for the process 
engineers exceeds the time left in the schedule near the end of the project, 
they will feel a time pressure which influences their working ability. 
h) Quality-Goal : This is the quality the engineers are striving to build into the 
product. A higher quality goal will pressure both the process and product 
engineers to have a higher quality of practice leading to a better final quality 
of product. The quality goal is delined as a quality relative to the competitors 
in the field. The competitors are assumed to have a quality of 1. For example! 
a quality goal of 1.2 indicates a desired product quality 20% better than the 
competitors. 
2.2 Strategy Suggestions 
Before starting the management flight simulator, it is quite useful to think up a 
strategy of what decisions you are going to make over time such as adding 
engineers/ scheduled finish dates! coordination/ and quality. To help you 
formu1a:e a strategy! and to help us gather information about the simulator/ you 
will be requested to maintain a strategy sheet during each session of the product 
development management flight simulator. This sheet requests that you records 
the goals of the project/ the initial parameters/ and the strategy you intend to 
follow for each simulation. One common difficulty in forming a strategy is to 
decide the scope of the number of engineers required to finish the project in time 
and under budget, One way to do this is to estimate the number of engineers 
that would be requiring to finish the project in the time you would like if they 
were working at the base productivity. The base productivity, target release date/ 
and budget are all displayed on the Introduction Report in the actual 
management flight simulator. For budget calculations~ the cost of hiring each 
engineer for a week is also included in the Introduction Report. 
Another tip to deciding on the scope of the project is to check out the 
forecasted required number of engineers. These forecasts are done for both the 
process and the product engineers and are shown in the respective Engineering 
Team Status Reports. These estimates are the number of engineers that would be 
required to finish the project by the scheduled finish dates if they worked at the 
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base productivity throughout the project. However, trust these forecasts as far as 
you would trust a forecast in your real job. Engineers cannot always be expected 
to work at the base productivity. 
A couple of warnings. Like in real life, some actions have long term 
consequences. Prolonged high time pressure can cause people to leave the 
project. Extended long work weeks can decrease the quality of the work being 
done. Too many engineers with too few tasks can be individually unproductive. 
If given no time pressure, engineers tend to keep engineering to increase the 
quality of the part they are working on. These behaviors can be discovered by 
attending to the information being fed back to you through the simulator reports 
and graphs. 
Good Luck, have fun, and please record your thoughts and actions on the 
second page of the strategy sheet when the simulation is over. If you have 
questions about the meanings of variables in the flight simulator, the information 
system summary of this report describes the variables found in each report, and 
also the variable found in each graph/table by the order they appear in the MFS. 
3.1 Reports 
Reports provide weekly feedback about the project. There are eight reports: 
Introduction Displays the project budget, target release date, and 
other important parameters of the management flight 
simulator. These parameters are all initial decisions 
and may vary depending on the scenario chosen for 
each session. It is important to check this report each 
simulation to review the goals and parameters. 
Project Overview Overview of project goals and product and process 
engineering teams. 
Product Eng Status # of Product Engineers, task completion status, and 
estimated completion date. 
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Process Eng Status 
Quality Report 
Cost & Timing Forecast 
Project Summary 
Sales & Marketing 
# of Process Engineers, task completion status, and 
estimated completion date. 
Quality goal, quality of practice, known rework, and 
quality of product. 
Forecasted project completion date and project cost. 
Summary of project goals and productivity. 
After release information on sales and marketing 
progress. 
There is some duplication of information, so you should feel free to use only the 
reports that have the information format comfortable to you. To show a report, 
simply click on the desired report name in the report box of the cockpit. A box 
containing the report will appear to the left of the cockpit. 
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3.1.1 Report 0. Introduction 
Introduction 
N e w  P r o d u c t  Deve lopmen t  
Your challenge, as p i l o t  of t h i s  management f l i g h t  s imulator ,  
i s  t o  complete a development p ro jec t  w i t h  the fo l lowing 
goals: 
Release product by week # 4 0 
w i t h  a budget of $ 1  7 6 0 thousand dol lars 
and a compet i t i ve  f i n a l  product  qua l i t y  fr 1 1 
The ent i re  pro jec t  consists of: 
100 generic Product  Engineer ing (PE) tasks  
100 generic Process Engineering (PcE) tasks  
Each engineer has a "base" p roduc t i v i t y  of - 2  5 0 tasks  per 
engineer-week. The cos t  per engineer i s  $ 2  0 0 0 /week, 
w h i c h  includes sa lary  ( $ 8  0 O/week), benef i ts ,  and other  
overhead costs. The over t ime r a t e  i s  1 . 5  t imes  the salary. 
I There are 2 engineers i n  the  Product  Engineering team a t  the beginning of the project.  
Project Goals: 
~ a r ~ e t  Release Date Your objective is to complete and release the product 
by this week. Releasing after this date will result in 
lost competitive advantage in the marketplace. 
Budget Allocated money for this project. This restricts the 
number of engineers you can afford to hire. 
Product Quality Tl. -; competitor is assumed to have a product quality 
of one. Your goal is to achieve a product quality 
equal to or better than your competitor's. 
Initial Parameters: 
Engineering Tasks Number of tasks for both the product and the 
process engineers to complete by the target release 
date. 
Base Productivity Estimated number of tasks one experienced engineer 
would complete in a week if nothing else were 
influencing productivity. 
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Expense per engineer Cost to maintain each engineer for one week, includes 
both salary and overhead. Salary and overhead are 
initial decisions 
Overtime Costs Based on the overtime rate, which is the faction of the 
base salary for overtime. For example, an overtime 
rate of 1.5 is time and 1/2. One engineer working a 50 
hour week with a salary of $800/week would charge 
1 /4  week * $800 /week * 1.5 overtime rate or $300 
overtime. 
Initial Product Engineers Core team of experience product engineers starting 
the project. 
3.1.2 Report 1. Project overview 
Week # 0 
1 Product Engineers I 
Product  Eng Product  Eng 
Add i t ions  Tu rnove r  I 
Discove ry  Rate  
PE Tasks  
Remaining Completed 
P r o c e s s  Engineers 
ProcessEng  0 0 ProcessEng  Add i t ions  Tu rnove r  I 
Discove ry  Rate  b b h p c E  TaSJ PcE Tasks 1 0 0.0  Complet ion Rate 
Remaining Completed 
The overview report is divided into three sections (see picture of report). 
Project Goals Overview: 
Week # Current week of the simulator. Simulations run for 
100 weeks. 
% Project Complete Percent of entire project (total tasks) complete. 
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% Budget Consumed Percent of project budget currently consumed. 
% Time Consumed Percent of time in the original target date consumed. 
Product Engineering Team (Process Engineering has similar variables) 
PE Additions Number of product engineers added or removed each 
week. PE additions are made by using the 
c-product-engineers decision. (weekly decision) 
Total Product Engineers Current number of product engineers includes both 
experienced engineers and inexperienced engineers. 
(the total number of product engineers is displayed in 
the box superimposed on the picture of people in the 
product engineering portion of the report.) 
PE Turnover Product engineers voluntarily leaving the project each 
week. This is a natural turnover of engineers 
resulting from burnout or extended high time 
pressure. 
PE Tasks Remaining Both product and process engineers begin the project 
with 100 tasks to complete. The product engineering 
tasks remaining are shown here. 
Completion Rate The product engineers complete tasks as a function of 
the number of product engineers and their 
productivity, skill level, work week, and quality of 
practice. 
PE Tasks Completed Number of product engineering tasks complete. 
Rework Discovery Rate A certain percentage of the tasks completed by the 
product engineers are incorrect and required 
rework. Each task discovered to require rework is 
taken out of the task completed pool and put back 
into the tasks remaining pool. The fraction of tasks 
done incorrectly is a function of the product 
engineering time pressure, their quality of practice, 
the amount of burnout from overwork, and the level 
of coordination with process engineering. The tasks 
requiring rework are not instantly known but rather 
are discovered as a function of how much of the 
project is completed and the level of coordination 
with process engineering. 
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3.1.3 Report 2. Product Engineering Team Status 
Week # 0 
P r o d u c t  Engineering Team S t a t u s  
Exper ienced Engineers 2 
(engineers)  
Inexper ienced Engineers 0 
(engineers)  
Engineer Turnover  
(eng ineers /week)  
Forecasted Required Engrs 1 5  
PE Work  Week 
(hou rs /week )  
Sched PE Comple t ion  
(weeks )  
P ro jec ted  Comple t  ion  
Da te  (weeks)  
PE Completed 
(O=no, 1 =yes) 
PE Tasks Remaining 
( tasks)  
PE Task Completion Rate 
( tasks /week )  
PE Tasks Completed 
( tasks )  
PE Cumulative Rework . O  ( tasks)  
Experienced Engineers The number of experienced product engineers. 
Inexperienced Engineers Engineers added through the product engineer 
decision are assumed to be inexperienced. 
Inexperienced is d-efined as a fully trained engineer, 
but one unfamiliar to the project. After a certain 
training period tha' is a function of the availability of 
experienced engineers for teaching, the inexperienced 
engineer will become an experienced engineer. 
Inexperienced engineers are not as productive as 
experienced engineers. However, a decision to 
remove engineers will first remove inexperienced 
engineers because they are less productive. Only after 
there are no more inexperienced engineers will 
experienced engineers be removed. 
Engineer Turnover Number of product engineers leaving the project. 
Voluntary leaves resulting from time pressure and 
burnout will happen for both inexperienced and 
experienced engineers. 
Forecasted Required An estimate of the number of engineers required to 
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Engineers, 
PE Work Week 
complete the project by the scheduled finish date 
working at the current estimated product engineering 
productivity. 
Desired number of hours in the product engineering 
work week. There may be overtime costs for work 
weeks over 40 hours/week. Check the Introduction 
report to see if the engineers must be paid for 
overtime. The length of the work week directly affects 
ihe task completion rate. The more hours worked, the 
more tasks can be completed. However, if the work 
week is too high for too long, the engineers will begin 
to burnout. Burnout leads to lower productivity, 
more errors, and a greater engineering turnover from 
the stress. (weekly decision) 
Sched PE Completion Desired date for the product engineers to finish. 
(weekly decision) 
Projected Completion Projected product engineering completion date based 
on the current number of engineers and the current 
task completion rate. 
PE Completed A switch to show when the product engineers have 
finished. 1 indicates all tasks are complete and 0 
indicates there are still tasks remaining. 
PE Tasks Remaining Number of product engineering tasks remaining. 
PE Task Completion Current task completion rate, a function of the 
Rate number of engineers, their productivity, work week, 
and level of coordination. 
PE Tasks Completed Number of product engineering tasks completed. 
PE Cumulative Rework Product engineering tasks discovered to have been 
done incorrectly are returned to the stock of tasks 
remaining. The cumulative rework acts as a final 
measure of what percent of the tasks had to be 
reworked. Tasks are done incorrectly as a function of 
the quality of practice, burnout from overwork, and 
coordination with process engineers. 
0 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
418 Organizational Learning: Framework & Methodology 
3.1.4 Report 3. Process Engineering Team Status. 
Process  Engineering Team Sta tus  
Experienced Engineers 0 PcE Woik Week 
(engineers) I (hours lweek )  Inexperienced Engineers 0 Sched Release Date  (engineers) (weeks)  
Engineer Turnover Projected Completion 
(engineerslweek) Date  (weeks)  
Forecasted Required Engrs Project  Completed 
(tasks) 
PcE T a s k  Complet ion R a t e  
( tasks lweek )  
4 0  
4 0  
2 5 
0 
PcE Tasks  Completed 
PcE C u m u l a t i v e  R e w o r k  
(tasks) 
Experienced Engineers Number of experienced process engineers 
Inexperienced Engineers Additions to the process engineering team are also 
assumed to be inexperienced. The learning curve is 
similar to that of the product engineers, but 
coordination can improve the learning time because 
the product engineers can familiarize the process 
engineers with the project. 
Engineer Turnover Number of process engineers leaving the team each 
week due to burnout or extended time pressure. 
Forecasted Required An estimate of the number of engineers req~ired to 
Engineers complete the project by the scheduled release date 
working at the current estimated process engineering 
productivity. 
PcE Work Week Desired number of hours in the process engineering 
work week. There may be overtime costs for work 
weeks over 40 hours/week. Check the Introduction 
report to see what the engineers must be paid for 
overtime. The length of the work week directly affects 
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the task completion rate. The more hours worked, the 
more tasks can be completed. However, if the work 
week is too high for too long, the engineers will begin 
to burnout. Burnout leads to lower productivity, 
more errorsl and a greater engineering turnover from 
the stress. (weekly decision) 
Sched Release Date Scheduled week # for project release and for all 
process engineering tasks to be complete. (weekly 
decision) 
Projected Completion Projected product engineering completion date based 
on the current number of engineers and the current 
task completion rate. 
Project Completed Displays 1 when all the pmcess engineering tasks are 
complete. 
PcE Tasks Remaining Current number of process engineers tasks remaining. 
100 total tasks to complete over the course of the 
project. 
FcE Task Completion Number of tasks the process engineering team 
Rate completes each week. The rate is a function of the 
number of engineers, their productivityl skill levell 
work week, and quality of practice. 
PcE Tasks Completed Number of process engineering tasks complete. 
PcE Cumulative Rework A fraction of the process engineering tasks are found 
to be done incorrectly. Upon discovery, they are 
removed from the tasks completed stock and returned 
to the tasks remaining stock. The cumulative rework 
shows the current total number of tasks that were 
discovered to require rework. The faction of 
the process engineering tasks incorrect is a function of 
the PcE quality of practice, their burnoutl the percent 
of the product engineering tasks completed 
incorrectly (faulty designs sent over)l the amount of 
the total product engineering tasks completedl and 
the coordination with the product engineers. 
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3.1.5 Report 4. @a/ity Report 
Qual i t y  Repor t  
Qual i t y  Goal 
( 1  = c o m p e t i t o r )  
Qua I 
Qua I 
( 
t y  o f  Pract ice ( 1  = c o m p e t i t o r )  
Product Engineering Team 1 - 0  0 
Process Engineering Team 1 .O 0 
- 
t y  of Product - 0  0 
=compe t i  t o r )  
Customa- Perceived Qua1 i t y  1 - 0 0  
Cumula t ive  Known Rework {Tasks) 
Product  Engineers 
Process Engineers .O 
Quality Goal 
Quality of Practice 
Quality of Product 
Customer Perceived 
Quality 
Desired final quality of the product. The competitor 
is assumed to have a quality of 1. A quality goal of 
1.2 would indicate a desired final product quality 20% 
better than the competitor. (initial decision) 
Current quality being built into the product. Both the 
process and the product engineers strive to work at 
the quality goal, but because it takes more time to 
practice high quality, increases in the time pressure 
will reduce the quality of practice. 
Current quality of the product. Each week! the tasks 
completed correctly by the product and process 
engineers at the current quality of practice contribute 
to the overall quality of the product. The tasks 
completed contribute to the quality of the product as 
a percentage of the overall number of tasks in the 
project. 
As soon as the product is released (time=sched~ded 
release date)/ the customers obtain an initial 
perception of the quality. This perceptiort of quality 
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changes as the quality of the product changes, but 
more slowly as time passes after the product release 
date. 
Cumulative Known Total number of tasks requiring rework for both the 
Rework product and the process engineers. Since there were 
100 initial tasks for each group, the cumulative 
rework is also the percent of the total tasks that 
required rework. For example, if the product 
engineers had a cumulative known rework of 11.2 
tasks at the completion of the project, i t  would 
indicate an average of 11.2'/0 of t a s ~ s  done incorrectly 
during the project. 
3.1.6 Report 5. Time 13 Cost Forecast 
- 
Week # 0 
P r o j e c t e d  Complet ion D a t e  
Orig inal  Target Date i s  week # 4 0 
Your Scheduled Release Date i s  week # 4 0 
Based on a PE required t i m e  es t imate  of 2 5 
and a PcE required t i m e  es t imate  of 2 5 
You are pro jec ted t o  f i n i sh  the  p r o j e c t  i n  week # 2 5 
Cost  E s t i m a t e  
Your budget f o r  t h i s  p ro jec t  i s  $ 1  7 6 0 . 0  ( i n  thousand 
So far,  you have spent: 
Product Engineering Base Costs  - $.  0 
PE Over t ime Costs  - $ 0 
Process Engineering Base Costs - $.  0 
PcE Over t ime Costs - S . 0  
Total: $ . 0 ( i n  thousand 
Based on your current  t o t a l  p ro jec t  team of 2 engineer 
your t o t a l  p ro jec t  cos t  are l i k e l y  t o  be $ 1  0 O ( i n  thousand2 
w h i c h  i s  6 % of  the budget. 
1 Target Date This is the targeted project completion date 
established in the beginning of the project. Releasing 
after the target date makes the product less 
competitive in the market place. (initial decision) 
Scheduled Release Date Week chosen to release the product. (weekly 
decision) 
PE Required Time Number of weeks to finish the product engineering 
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Estimate tasks based on the current PE tasks completion rate 
and number of tasks remaining. 
PcE Required Time Number of weeks to finish the process engineering 
Estimate tasks based on the current PcE tasks completion rate 
and number of tasks remaining. 
Projected Completion Tl~e projected completion is the longer of the two 
team time requirements plus the current week 
number. 
Project Budget 
costs 
Total dollar amount allocated to the project. (initial 
decision) 
The base costs are the cumulative team costs based on 
the 40 hour work week. Overtime costs are acceunted 
separately. The current total project cost is also 
shown. 
Total Project Team Total number of engineers working on the project. 
Projected Costs Cost of employing the current process and product 
teams for the time required to finish the respective 
remaining tasks. 
Projected % of Budget Projected costs as a percent of the Pro~ect Budget. 
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3.1.7 Report 6 .  Project S ~ ~ t r ~ n ~ a y  
P r o j e c t  Summary 
Product Engineering Process Engineering 
Projected Complet ion Date: 2 5 
{Week ff\ 
Esimated Product iv i ty :  .250 
iTasks/Person-week1 
Measured Product I V I  ty: ,250 
{Tasks/Person-week1 
Cumulat ive  Known Rework: .O 
{Tasks}  
Qua l i t y  of Pract ice:  1 .OO 
{Compet i tor=!  1 
[ Percent of Project  Completed: o ) 
Percent of T i m e  Used: 
Precent of Budget Consumed: 0 
Product Qual i ty  . O O  1 
Projected Completion Projected week of completion based on task 
Date completion rate and number of tasks remaining. 
Estimated Productivity Estimated number of tasks competed per person per 
week. The productivity is influenced by the time 
pressure from the schedules, the engineer to tasks 
ratio (too many engineers can be ineffective), the 
amount of coordination, and the fraction of each team 
that are inexperienced. 
Measured Productivity Measured by dividing the tasks completion rate by 
the respective team size. This will often be different 
from the estimated productivity because the 
measured productive takes into account loses in 
productivity from inexperienced engineers and time 
spend coordinating. 
Cum Known Rework Total number of tasks requiring rework for each team. 
This is a significant end of project indicator because it 
shows the percent of the total tasks that had to be 
reworked, a sign of inefficiency. 
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Quality of Practice Current quality being built into the product by each 
team. 
Project Goals Current status on the percent project complete, time 
used, budget consumed, and the quality of product, 
3.2.8 Report?. Sales and Marketing Report 
Unit Sales 
Week # 0 
Sales & Marketing Report  
Unit Sales 
(uni ts/week) I InstalledBase 
(units!  
Revenues 
($ thous./week) 
Cumulative Prof i t s  1 ($ thousands) 
( Customer Perceived Quality 1 . O O  "1 
Cumulative Production 0 
Number of units sold each week. Sales begin when 
the scheduled release date is reached and the product 
is launched. Sales depend on the customer perceived 
quality of the product relative to the competitors. The 
competitors quality will improve slowly over time. 
Installed Base Number of units currently in use. There is loss due to 
wear. 
Revenues Each unit is assumed to sell for 12,000 dollars. 
Cumulative Profits Cumulative profits to date. There is assumed to be a 
learning curve to production that allows the cost to 
produce each unit to exponentially fall as the total 
number of units produced increases. This means the 
more units sold, the greater the profit on each unit. 
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Customer Perceived 
Quality 
Cumulative Production 
3.2 Graphs & Tables 
As soon as the product is released (time=scheduled 
release date), the customers obtain an initial 
perception of the quality. This perception of quality 
changes as the quality of the product changes, but 
more slowly as time passes after the product release 
date. 
Total units produced to date. 
While weekly information on the progress of the project is available from the 
report pages, the behavior of the product development system over time is found 
in the graphs. The variables can also be displayed as tables by toggling the 
graph/ table bar in the microworld. Each graph displays several different 
variables. In the listing, the graph names are in bold while the variable names 
are in italics. 
A Decision1 
PE-Work Week A full description of each management decision 
PC E W o r k W e e k  can be found in the Management Decisions 
Product _Engineers Section, page 5. 
Process _Engineers 
A Decision2 
CoordinationFrac 
Quality-Goal 
SheduledPEFinish 
SchedReleaseDate 
All Staffing 
Total-Produc t_Engrs Sum of the experienced and inexperienced product 
engineers. 
Total_Process_E ngrs Sum of the inexperienced and experienced process 
engineers. 
COP Team Costs 
P E T e a m C o s  ts Total cumulative cost of the Product Engineer- 
weeks. Based on the number of Product engineers 
employed each week and the expense per engineer 
week. Includes overtime costs. 
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Cost of Project 
Cum-Project-Cost 
Project-Budget 
Cost of Overtime 
P EOvertirneCosts  
Engineer Experience Mix 
PcERookieFract 
Process Engineer 
To tal_Process_Engrs 
Inexp_Process_E ngrs 
Total cumulative cost of each Process Engineer- 
week 
Sum of the two Team Costs. The goal is to keep the 
cumulative project cost under or equal to the 
budget. 
The budget is calculated by finding number of 
engineer-weeks it would take to finish the project 
working at the base productivity rate and 
multiplying by the expense per engineer week. A 
10% cushion is added to the estimate to make the 
budget. (Initial decision) 
Cumulative overtime costs for the product 
engineering team. 
Cumulative overtime costs for the process 
engineering team. 
Fraction of Product Engineers that are 
inexperienced. 
Fraction of Process Engineers that are 
inexperienced. 
The total process engineers is the sum of the 
inexperienced and the experienced engineers. 
Additions to the Process engineering team are 
assumed to be inexperienced. Inexperienced is 
defined as a fully trained engineer, but unfamiliar to 
the project. After a certain training period that is a 
function of the availability of experienced engineers 
for teaching and the coordination with the product 
engineers, the inexperienced engineer will become 
an experienced engineer. Inexperienced engineers 
are not as productive as experienced engineers. 
The number of experienced Process Engineers. 
1 1993 Daniel H. Kim 
Appendices 
Process Engineering Effort 
PC E-Tnsks-Completec! Current number of process engineers tasks 
remaining. There are 100 total tasks to complete 
over the course of the project. 
PC E_Tasks_Remaining Number of process engineering tasks remaining. 
Total_Disc-PcE-Rework A fraction of the process engineering tasks are 
found to be done incorrectly. Upon discovery, they 
are removed from the tasks completed stock and 
returned to the tasks remaining stock. The 
cumulative rework shows the current total number 
of tasks that were discovered to require rework. 
The faction of the process engineering tasks 
incorrect is a function of the PcE quality of practice, 
their burnout! the percent of the product 
engineering tasks completed incorrectly (faulty 
designs sent over), the amount of the total 
product engineering tasks completed, and the 
coordination with the product engineers. 
Process Engineering Turnover 
Inexp-Proc Engr-TO Number of inexperienced process engineers leaving 
the team. They will leave for voluntary reasons due 
to burnout and time pressure 
Product Engineer 
Total_Product_E ngrs 
lnexv_Product-E ngrs 
Experienced process engineers leaving the team. 
Average turnover of inexperienced and experienced 
engineers. 
Sum of experienced and inexperienced product 
engineers. 
Engineers added through the product engineer 
decision are assumed to be inexperienced. 
Inexperienced is defined as a fully trained engineer! 
but one unfamiliar to the project. After a certain 
training period that is a function of the availability 
of experienced engineers for teaching ! the 
inexperienced engineer will become an experienced 
engineer. Inexperienced engineers are not as 
productive as experienced engineers. 
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Exp-Prodiict-Engrs Number of experienced product engineers. 
Product Engineering Effort 
P E-Tasks-Cotnpleted Number of product engineers tasks completed. 
There are a total of 100 product engineers tasks to be 
completed during the project. 
PE-Tasks-Remain iq Number of product engineers tasks remaining to be 
done. 
Total-Disc-PE-Rework Total number of product engineering tasks that 
were discovered to require rework. 
Product Engineering Turnover 
hexp-PE-TO Number of inexperienced product engineers leaving 
the team. They leave for voluntary reasons due to 
burnout and time pressure 
Exp-PE-TO Experienced product engineers leaving the team. 
Avg-PE-TO Average of experienced and inexperienced 
turnovers. 
Productivity Estimated 
Estimd-PE-Prod Estimated number of product engineering tasks 
competed per product engineer per week. The 
productivity is influenced by the time pressure from 
the scheduled finish date, the engineer to tasks ratio 
(too many engineers can be ineffective), the 
amount of coordination, and the fraction of 
each team that are inexperienced. This estimate 
does not account for the amount of time spent on 
each task and the time spent coordinating. 
Es tirnd-PcE-Prod Estimated process engineering productivity. See 
explanation for product engineers. 
Productivity Measured 
Measured-Prodty-PE The measured product engineering productivity is 
the PE task completion rate divided by the total PE 
team size. This measure of productivity is much 
more accurate because it averages in the actual 
amount of time spent on each tasks and the time 
spent coordinating. 
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Project Progress 
PE Tasks Completed 
PcE Tasks Completed 
Quality of Practice 
Quality-Goal 
The measured process engineering productivity is 
the PcE task completion rate divided by the total 
PcE team size. 
Number of PE tasks completed. Shown in the same 
graph as the PcE tasks completed to show the 
overall project progress a,~d the relative product and 
process engineering phases of the project. 
Number of process engineering tasks completed. 
Desired final quality of the product. The competitor 
is assumed to have a quality of 1. A quality goal of 
1.2 would indicate a desired final product quality 
20Â°/ better than the competitor. (initial decision) 
PE-QuaMy-of-Practice Carrent product engineering quality of practice. 
The product engineers strive to work at the quality 
goal, but the quality will fall with increases in time 
pressure. 
PcE-Quality-of-Practice Current process engineering quality of practice. 
Quality of Product 
Quality-Goal Desired final quality of the product. There is a time 
delay between setting the quality goal and having 
that goal implemented in the engineer's quality of 
practice. (weekly decision) 
Product-Quality Cumulative quality of the product and process 
engineering tasks completed at their qualities of 
practice. 
Rework Cumulative 
Total-Disc-PE-Rework Cumulative product engineering tasks discovered to 
require rework. 
Total-Disc-PcE-Rework Cumulative process engineering tasks discovered to 
require rework. 
Rework Discovery Rate 
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P E-Rework-Discouery A certain percentage of the tasks completed by the 
product engineers are incorrect and required 
rework. Each task discovered to require rework is 
taken out of the task completed pool and put back 
into the tasks remaining pool. The fraction of tasks 
done incorrectly is a function of the product 
engineering time pressure, their quality of practicel 
the amount of burnout from overwork, and the level 
of coordination with process engineering. The tasks 
requiring rework are not instantly known but rather 
are discovered each week as a function of how 
much of the project is completed and the level of 
coordination with process engineering. 
PcE-Rmork-Discoue y Process engineering tasks discovered to require 
rework each week. 
Task Completion Rate 
PE-Task-Completion Product engineering tasks completed each week is 
- Rate a function of the number of product engineers and 
their productivity, skill level, work weekl and 
quality of practice. 
Work Week 
PE-Work-Week 
PE-Average- Work 
- Week 
PC E- Work- Week 
PC E-Average- Work 
- Week 
Process engineering tasks compieted each week is 
a function of the number of product engineers and 
their productivity, skill level, work week, and 
quality of pracnce. 
Hours worked each week by the product 
engineering team. The work ~veek directly 
affects the task completion rate. 
The average work week for the product 
engineering team averaged over a month. When the 
average work week gets too high, burnout will set in 
leading to lower productivity and more errors. 
Hours worked each week by the process 
engineering team. 
The average work week for the process 
engineering team averaged over a month. 
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Work Pressures 
PE-Time-Presszi re Product Engineering Time Pressure is the amount of 
pressure put on the engineers by the ratio of the 
estimated time required to finish the PE portion of 
the project to the time left in the PE schedule. As 
time pressure incrgases, productivity increases but 
eventually the qu&ty of the work practice will 
decrease. 
The Process Engineering Time pressure is similar to 
the Product Engineering Time Pressure except it is 
driven by the ratio of the estimated time required to 
time remaining in the scheduled release date. 
The following graqhs concern the saleslmarketing results of the completed 
project. The project is "launched" when time is equal to the scheduled release 
date. This means that is the project is not completely finished at that timef the 
product will be released and sold without reaching its full quality. 
. - 
z. Installed Base 
Installed Base Number of units currently in the field. 
zc Lead Time 
LeadTime Number of weeks required to fill an order. 
z. Drders 
Orders Total number of unit ordered each week. 
z. Perceived Quality 
Actual-Qmlity Actual quality of the product. 
Customer-Percd As soon as the product is released 
- Qiiality (time=scheduled release date)/ the customers obtain 
an initial perception of the quality. This 
perception of quality changes as the quality of the 
product changes, but more slowly as time passes 
after the product release date. 
z. Revenues 
Revenues 
Profits 
z. Revenues Cumulative 
Weekly revenues. Each unit is assumed to sell for 
12,000. 
Weekly profits. Revenues minus cost of production. 
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Cumulated revenues for total sales. 
Cumulated profits on total sales to date. 
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